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ROOTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN IDEA OF MILITARY SOCIETY

BY ALBERT T. LAUTERBACH

IN RECENT German literature on war problems a certain author is quoted more often than any other, and never unfavorably. Another writer is cited very rarely, and then only under heavy insults. Yet the modern German war machine and its underlying ideas owe at least as much to the latter as to the former. The first is General Carl von Clausewitz, a contemporary of Napoleon. The second is Dr. Walther Rathenau, whose historical activities took place about a hundred years later, or during the first World War.

Military Politics and Military Economics

Clausewitz' philosophy is based both on his own experiences during the Napoleonic wars and on the views of leading Prussian generals of his period such as Scharnhorst.¹ There is little evidence for the present-day German claim that the opinions of Clausewitz (1780-1831) are in line with those of Frederick the Great (1712-1786), the semi-liberal, sarcastic, Prussian monarch who much preferred the French language and literature to the German and has only in recent years been remodeled into a hero of German nationalism. Although his ruthlessness and cynicism in international affairs could hardly be exceeded, there is little reason to believe that he thought of totalitarian wars or annihilation strategy in their present-day meaning.²

Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst reestablished the Prussian army on the basis of conscription after the destruction of its professional system by Napoleon. He is credited with the then revolutionary statements that "only masses can make an impression and lead to great results," and that "the army shall be the combination of all the moral and physical forces of the nation."³ From another teacher of Clausewitz, August Wilhelm Anton von Gneisenau, came the first suggestion that Germany should become for Europe what Prussia was to be for Germany—a nucleus of centralization.⁴

Clausewitz himself, however, repeatedly emphasized the decisive influence of Napoleon's ideas and actions upon his own war philosophy. After having fought for years on the side of Bonaparte's opponents, and having spent some time in France as a prisoner of war, Clausewitz wrote his famous book after 1818.

¹ Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Berlin, 1937).

² See Ludwig Renn, *Warfare: The Relation of War to Society* (New York, 1939), pp. 18, 25; James T. Shotwell, *What Germany Forgot* (New York, 1940), p. 67 ff.; Hans Bauer, *Warum Krieg?* (Zurich, 1938), p. 27.

³ Quoted by Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession* (New York, 1937), p. 90.

⁴ See F. W. Foerster, *Europa und die deutsche Frage* (Luzern, 1937; English ed., New York, 1940), p. 333.

A major part of it was completed after Napoleon's death. He occasionally called Napoleon "the god of war himself" and was deeply impressed by the latter's utilization of both the *levée en masse* and the new industrial equipment.⁵ In fact, these and other features of Napoleonic warfare were founded on the liberation of the peasants and the industrial development after the French Revolution; in basing his theories on them, Clausewitz was far ahead of the Prussian society of his time. This explains the singular fact that he remained almost unknown during his life and was declared a hero of Prussianism only after his death.

Perhaps Clausewitz was little more than Bonaparte's uninvited theoretician. To the latter are attributed such topical utterances as "Armies do not suffice to save a nation, but a nation defended by all her people is invincible,"⁶ and "I will lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. Rich provinces, great towns will be in your power; you will find there honor, glory, and riches."⁷ Possibly present-day Germany owes even more to Napoleon than to Clausewitz, but we have to deal here primarily with the latter's ideas.

"War is an act of force and there are no limits in using the latter" is the starting-point of Clausewitz' war philosophy.⁸ Limits of destruction are set only by means even more efficient than physical destruction. "The aim is to make the enemy defenseless . . . War does not arise suddenly; its expansion is not the work of the moment . . . Its political purpose is the original motive."⁹

. . . There are wars of all degrees of importance and energy." The most famous sentence of Clausewitz' works runs, "War is not only a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, its carrying out by other methods."¹⁰ War is "a real chameleon, for it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case." The objectives of warfare are "the armed forces, the territory and the will of the enemy," and victory is in fact "the exhaustion of both the physical forces and the will, gradually brought about by warfare." On the other hand, "in war, everything is indefinite and calculations have to be based on variables only."¹¹ . . . War does not belong to the field of arts and sciences, but to the field of social life. It is a conflict of great interests, which is solved in a bloody manner, and only in this respect does it differ from other conflicts."¹²

Another famous and topical section of Clausewitz' book deals with the "moral factors" in warfare. "The whole warfare presupposes human weakness and is

⁵ See Emil Franzel, *Abenländische Revolution* (Prague, 1936), p. 156; Renn, *op. cit.*, p. 41 ff.

⁶ Quoted in Hans F. Helmot, ed., *Das Buch vom Kriege* (Berlin, no date), p. 29.

⁷ Vagts, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Vagts considers this evidence of the mendacity of Bonaparte.

⁸ *Vom Kriege*, p. 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

directed against the latter."¹³ While "a defensive form of warfare is in itself stronger than an aggressive one, . . . a fast, vigorous transition toward attack is the most brilliant form of defensive."¹⁴ He advocates conscription and says that "a poor class, accustomed to straining work, usually proves to be warlike and vigorous."¹⁵ His idea of "absolute warfare" is clearly a forerunner of totalitarian warfare, and he demands a "subordination of military viewpoints under political."¹⁶ Of post-revolutionary France, he says, "Her political renaissance had mobilized other methods and other forces, and thereby achieved an energy of warfare which would otherwise have been inconceivable."¹⁷ On the other hand, he predicts for Tsarist Russia that "she can only be defeated by her own weakness and by effects of internal dissension. To hit these weak spots of her political existence, a shock going right to the heart of the government will be necessary."¹⁸

Clausewitz' views on warfare are favorably quoted by Hitler in the chapter of *Mein Kampf* dealing with "the consequences of cowardly submission,"¹⁹ and there are few, if any, other German advocates of militarized society who do not base their philosophy on Clausewitz' views about the social nature of war; only Ludendorff dared to dissent, as will be shown later on. One of his most ardent admirers, W. M. Schering, says that Clausewitz was, above all, a philosopher, though one in a general's uniform.²⁰ He emphasizes that Clausewitz was perhaps the first modern author to consider the general social implications of war, especially the "moral factors." Although Clausewitz used to attend lectures by Kiesewetter, a disciple of Kant, even Schering doubts whether he can philosophically be considered a "Kantian." As a matter of fact, Clausewitz' general philosophical ideas are shallow and hardly worth discussing, though his political opinions are rather interesting.

On the other hand, his conception of war as a normal and regular phase of human relations in general and of politics in particular, and of annihilation of the enemy as the real purpose of warfare (and therefore implicitly of politics!), has exerted a tremendous influence in Germany in the last fifty or sixty years and particularly since the early thirties of this century.

Between Clausewitz and Rathenau there are not only the space of a century—and what a century!—and a fundamental difference of social and intellectual background, but a period of rapid development of nationalistic and militaristic thinking in Germany, as in some other countries. It cannot be within the scope

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 588.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 613.

¹⁹ (63rd ed., Munich, 1933), II, 759 ff.

²⁰ *Die Kriegsphilosophie von Clausewitz: Eine Untersuchung über ihren systematischen Aufbau* (Hamburg, 1935).

of this article to deal extensively with all the protagonists of this development, but we may mention briefly a few important influences during the nineteenth century.

Some of the ideas of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), who said that "between States there is neither law nor right save the law of the strongest,"²¹ probably had their share in Clausewitz' war philosophy, as may have had the political philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) which regarded the State—the Prussian State—as the objectification of the World Spirit.

In the subsequent decades two men were outstanding in maintaining and extending the concepts of militarized government, Treitschke and Bismarck. Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke (1834-1896) declared the Prussian military system to be the embodiment of national character and virtues²² and at the same time started a semi-conscious falsification of history in accordance with the ideological needs of nationalism. This has remained one of the major features of German nationalism ever since.

Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), on the other hand, carried out as a statesman the principles of German expansionism which had been established by the aforementioned philosophers, though the protagonists of German nationalism today differ from him in many fundamental traits of character and ideology. In the third volume of his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, he says,

A lover of peace, a benefactor to his people, and a civilizing agent does not as a rule influence the Christian nations of Europe so deeply and so inspiringly as one who is ready to make victorious use of the blood and treasure of his subjects on the battlefield.²³

And in his Reichstag speech of January 11, 1887, Bismarck said,

If we Germans are to wage war with the full effect of our national strength, then it must be a war in which all who participate or endure sacrifices for it, in short the whole nation, must agree. It must be a people's war.

Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, who ever since the nineties has denounced the dangers of "Prussianism," believes that "it was in fact Bismarck's thinking in terms of plain violence that made the military element the first in rank not only in the government but in the German soul."²⁴ Shotwell says that "not only did Bismarck win but he taught the German people to lose confidence in themselves, as a people lacking in political capacity."²⁵ His military counterpart, the elder Moltke, is characterized by his saying that "the army is the

²¹ Quoted in Aurel Kolnai, *The War against the West* (London, 1938), p. 8.

²² *History of Germany in the 19th Century* (7 vols., New York, 1915-19); *Politics* (2 vols., New York, 1916).

²³ Charles Downer Hazen, ed., *The Kaiser vs. Bismarck: Suppressed Letters and New Chapters from the Autobiography of the Iron Chancellor* (New York, 1921), p. 143 ff.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 70. See also Louis L. Snyder, *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Background of Modern German Nationalism* (Williamsport, 1935).

most outstanding institution in every country, for it alone makes possible the existence of all civic institutions." Moltke was also one of the first German generals to recognize the importance of the supply problem, and as early as the sixties he fostered the large-scale construction of railroad lines because of military considerations.

Graf Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913), Moltke's second successor as Chief of Staff and author of the famous Schlieffen Plan, did not envisage anything like a mobilization of all national resources for he was pretty certain that his plan would render any long-run aspect of the coming war unnecessary.²⁶ It was Hans Delbrück, author of the renowned *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, who introduced the concept of attrition strategy—and thereby long-term war and large-scale mobilization of national resources, in juxtaposition to annihilation strategy—into the public discussion, thus arousing the indignation of certain purely military strategists.

Shortly before the first World War, General Friedrich von Bernhardi stressed the comprehensive and permanent nature of modern warfare: "War is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a truly civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality."²⁷ Bernhardi was also one of the few generals who foresaw to some extent the decisive importance of economic factors in coming wars.

Yet the World War found Germany, like the other belligerents, largely unprepared from the point of view of war economics. The man who succeeded in building up a German war economy at a rapid pace was Walther Rathenau. We can here outline only a few basic ideas of this encyclopedic thinker—philosopher, sociologist, economist, statesman, and businessman. His tragedy was to organize war instead of the new peace economy which he had worked out—and to die from the bullets of the very nationalists for whose economic concepts he unconsciously had paved the way.

In his *Reflexionen* (1907) he deals prophetically with the "romanticism of race."

It is going to glorify the pure Nordic blood and create new concepts of virtue and vice. The tendency toward materialism will check this romanticism for a time. Then this tendency will vanish, because the world needs, besides the blond temperament, the dark intellectuality, and because the demoniacal insists upon its rights. But the traces of this old romanticism will never disappear.²⁸

His skepticism toward any purely material progress was deeply rooted, yet he spent the bulk of his studies and life on elaborating a perfected economic machinery. His basic idea was to organize national economy on a permanent scale while leaving private initiative unimpaired.

²⁶ *Cannae* (Fort Leavenworth, 1931).

²⁷ *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* (Berlin 1912; English ed., New York, 1924); *On War of Today* (New York, 1914).

²⁸ *Gesammelte Schriften* (5 vols., Berlin, 1918).

After the outbreak of the World War he tried to convince the military leaders that the raw material supply must be centralized if Germany was to win a prolonged war. He was ridiculed for awhile, for how could a Jewish businessman teach Prussian generals the right conduct of a war which in any case was to be won within a brief period? In the second year of the war he finally was given charge of German raw material organization. He began his office in the Prussian War Department with a staff of three, including typists. After two years of warfare his office was by far the biggest division of the entire War Department and controlled practically all of the German economy.

During this activity and after the end of the war Rathenau wrote a number of books and articles on how to adjust the social and economic organization of the World War period to peace conditions. Even in "Germany's Raw Material Supply" (1915) he predicted that state-guided private ownership would be the basis of a new peace economy. In fact, state guidance was to remain, but the peaceful purpose set by Rathenau was subsequently to be abandoned even more thoroughly than in the World War days!

Shortly after the war he elaborated his ideas on state-controlled society and tried to give them a philosophical basis. He criticized the ideas of the French Revolution as being too individualistic and, at the same time, regretted that Germany's collectivistic imperialism was comparatively late—"Even worse than our imperialism is the fact that we started it too late." Individualistic capitalism had, in his opinion, thus far lived on premature exhaustion of resources and was being replaced by "Prussian capitalism," a concept closely related to Oswald Spengler's "Prussian socialism." He declined to have any compulsory economy but repeatedly demanded a state-guided economy based on cartels and monopolies but retaining private initiative. For this purpose war was, in his view, "a great and pitiless teacher." In "*Die neue Wirtschaft*" (1919) he once again advocated "an increased efficiency of the national economy according to new principles that have been clarified and explained by the war economy."²⁹


In *Zur Kritik der Zeit* (1912) Rathenau had dealt with the mechanization of modern society, which, in his opinion, will survive the capitalist institutions and apply to a state-controlled economy as well. Again he glorifies "the State" and says that the most impressive word of revolution that was ever spoken by a king was that of Frederick the Great, who defined the ruler as a servant of the State.³⁰ At the same time he admires the racial qualities of Prussian officers as compared with those of humble soldiers.³¹ He cleverly remarks on the comparatively young bourgeois society of Germany which was poor during at least one century and has been unable to get rid of its inferiority complexes since.³² "Modern wars are in the life of nations the same thing as examinations are

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 225.

³⁰ *Zur Kritik der Zeit* (Berlin, 1918), p. 70.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 222 ff.



WALThER RATHENAU

From H. K. U. Kessler, Walther Rathenau: His Life and Work (New York, 1929).

in civilian life, namely proofs of fitness . . . All politics is economic politics, or war preparedness." To this later idea he elsewhere adds:

The entire state of preparedness should, as far as possible, represent exactly the internal power complex. The numerical strength of the armies and navies is to be related to the population in the same way as a picture to the reality. So must be the means of fighting to the wealth of the nation and technical level, or their training and efficiency to the civilization and ethics.³³

In *Von kommenden Dingen* (1917) Rathenau speaks of the decisive rôle of "Weltanschauung, faith, and transcendent ideas" as compared with material purposes. He both criticizes and praises the concepts of equality and freedom. Although he has a profound admiration for certain qualities of Prussianism, he says that Prussia has never learned anything except by blows.³⁴

The war finally destroys the freedom of private economy and prepares future forms of public economy by emphasizing that economic affairs of a civilized nation are not the affair of an individual but the affair of all . . . Armament consists of any conceivable material that earth produces . . . The problem of armament becomes a problem of labor and materials . . . Although capital, manpower, and materials are not and do not become collective property as recommended by socialist programs, they are entrusted to protection by the collectivity . . . State intervention should start where free competition, due to favorable conditions, has not thus far required utmost effort, or where the strength of the individual does not suffice for economic changes, or where the temporary interest of the individual is opposed to the permanent interest of the collectively.³⁵

Rathenau's original idea of highest social efficiency was clearly an organization of society on the patterns of a peaceful state-capitalism. Yet, whatever the theoretical aspects of such an idea may be, the only way in which it worked out in Germany, both under Rathenau's leadership and later, was as a war economy and militarized society. Shotwell's judgment on him is this:

Instead of troops on the march and the clash of armies in the field he had a vision of tall chimneys pouring out smoke and of flaring furnaces lighting the sky all the way from Berlin to the Rhine. This, as he saw it, was the vital element in modern war. But mobilized industry meant mobilization of the sources of supply as well, for the whole structure of national defense under the conditions of modern science rests on raw materials.³⁶

Perhaps Rathenau was the greatest protagonist of a neo-mercantilism, the relation of which to the mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has recently been elaborated in a fascinating way by the French economist Marchand.³⁷ Of course the present German supporters of a militarized society do not recognize their intellectual relationship either to the old mercantilists or to Rathenau, whom Alfred Rosenberg treats contemptuously³⁸ and most of the other Nazi authors avoid even mentioning.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 200 ff.

³⁴ *Von kommenden Dingen* (Berlin, 1924), p. 220.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277 ff.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 20 ff.

³⁷ *La Renaissance du Mercantilisme à l'Époque Contemporaine* (Paris, 1937).

³⁸ *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1932), p. 661.

From the "Decline of the West" to Wehrwirtschaft

Although "Aryan" and nationalist, Oswald Spengler has not met with much more gratitude in the Third Reich than Rathenau. Yet Spengler's political philosophy has been essential for the whole idea of militarized society. This does not apply so much, perhaps, to his greatest work, *Decline of the West*—though the forecast of an "era of world wars" is quite in line with its ideas—as to Spengler's pamphlet on *Preussentum und Sozialismus*,³⁹ in itself an incidental study of the "decline" philosophy. In it he says that history knows no race whose development would have been more tragic than that of the Germans, for the latter always had to fight one another. Bonaparte felt that the destruction of the realm created by Frederick the Great was his chief task and, says Spengler, an insoluble one. This attitude is typical of the persecution mania that is at the root of German nationalism. Frederick's State, he continues,

is a masterpiece of State, our most genuine and personal creation, so personal that no other race could ever understand or imitate it.⁴⁰ . . . The German, or rather Prussian, instinct says: the power belongs to the community and the individual is its servant. The community is the sovereign . . . Everyone obtains his place. Command and obedience rule.⁴¹

Spengler identifies "genuine" socialism with Prussianism. "Fatherland and revolution were identical in 1792, but contradictions in 1919." His ideal is "the old Faust-like bid for power, for an endless march, in the dreadful will to achieve an absolute world rule in the military, economic, and intellectual meanings."⁴² He prophesies that "everybody shall either bow to our political, social, and economic ideals, or perish,"⁴³ and he bluntly identifies socialism with a bid for world rule as represented historically by Spain, England, and Prussia against the "anarchic" nations of Italy and France. "World history is a history of states; the history of states is a history of wars."⁴⁴ Ideas are to be fought to the end "by arms, not by words."

War is the eternal form of high existence of mankind and states exist for the purpose of war; they express preparedness for war The genuine International is that of imperialism, of rule over the Faustlike civilization, hence over the whole earth, to be exerted by one single forming principle, and not through compromise and concessions but through conquest and destruction.⁴⁵

Could a more up-to-date formula for the recent Nazi policies be given? Spengler's genius foresaw twenty years ago what was to become the guiding idea of Germany. The same post-war years which induced Rathenau to apply his war-born state-capitalism to what he considered a new peace period brought

³⁹ Munich, 1920. See also *The Decline of the West* (New York, 1932) and *The Hour of Decision* (New York, 1934).

⁴⁰ *Preussentum und Sozialismus*, p. 7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

about Spengler's philosophy of international hold-up politics. However, a third German was needed to complete the philosophy of total war as a permanent purpose of national life. This was Erich Ludendorff.

Despite the fact that General Ludendorff himself had been more responsible than anybody else for the German strategy of the last phase of the World War, he severely criticized the war conduct of his country immediately afterward. One of his main arguments was that the imperial regime had failed to mobilize the total moral and physical resources of the nation. In 1922 he wrote that the old regime had stuck to Clausewitz' conception of war as a means of politics instead of subordinating politics to war purposes. "War is foreign policy by other methods Moreover, the entire policy has to serve the war In the life of nations, power means right, and your own nation is the supreme concept."⁴⁶

When National Socialism came into power Ludendorff remained in the background, and in the last few years of his life was not always on good terms with Hitler. However, his book on *The Total War*, published in 1936, exerted a tremendous influence on the younger German military generation despite his renewed attack upon Clausewitz. In fact, his ideas are just new formulas for the same way of thinking, and the totalitarian *Führer*-regime has rendered the whole question of the priority of warfare or politics a secondary one.

In *The Total War*⁴⁷ Ludendorff emphasizes the connection of Clausewitz' whole concept of war and politics with the French Revolution. Then he speaks of "the total war, which is not merely a matter of armed forces but touches immediately upon both the life and soul of each member of a belligerent nation." Since Clausewitz, he says, the relationship between war and politics has changed, which may be due simply to the ever growing importance of the moral strength of a nation. The entire political life shall be directed toward the greatest possible efficiency of the nation in a total war, and the standard of living of the people should be adjusted in peace time to future war needs, while the statesmen must watch carefully the needs and aspirations of their people in the psychological field.

The spirit creates the victory.⁴⁸ . . . The total war requires a decisive and therefore inexorable war action on the part of the leader.⁴⁹ . . . The attack remains the absolutely decisive form of fighting It is utterly erroneous to believe that a war must necessarily be started by a declaration of war.⁵⁰

After what has happened to most of Germany's neighbors in the past two years, Ludendorff's views may sound almost old-fashioned or self-evident. Yet


⁴⁶ *Kriegsführung und Politik* (Berlin, 1922).

⁴⁷ *Der totale Krieg* (Munich, 1936; English ed., London, 1936).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.



OSWALD SPENGLER

From Oswald Spengler, Reden und Aufsätze (Munich, 1937).

four or five years ago they were revolutionary even for Nazi Germany, though they were definitely in line with the previous development of German nationalist thought. It is worth while to quote here the following judgment by Wickham Steed:

From Clausewitz, the classical writer "On War," to Ludendorff, whose book "Total War" once more extolled war as the supreme object of a nation's existence, the course of German military thought runs parallel with German political philosophy. Though Clausewitz defined war as the "handmaid of policy," he also said that in the service of a splendid policy war might become almost an end in itself. Ludendorff chides him for ever thinking of war as merely the handmaid of policy instead of declaring it to be the highest form of national activity in preparation for which all energies of heart and mind and body must be enlisted, the whole enterprise being guided and inspired by German knowledge of a German God.

However fantastic Ludendorff's military religiosity may seem, it is a consistent development of the line which German metaphysical thought has followed, and has clothed with political aspirations, since the end of the eighteenth, throughout the nineteenth and during the first few decades of the twentieth centuries.⁵¹

The topic of this article is not the problem of "Prussianism" as such, and the latter notion only partly overlaps the concept of militarized society. Such writers as F. W. Foerster have for decades claimed that "Prussian militarism" has gradually infected the whole German race. Even earlier, Mirabeau had said that the national industry of Prussia was war. However, Prussianism used to mean primarily a blind belief in the superior forces of the State, which has been connected with militarism historically rather than logically. Moreover, it has often been shown that the protagonists of so-called Prussianism have in many instances not been Prussians at all, for example the elder Moltke. Very similar concepts have arisen in other countries where a strong social influence of feudal classes coincided with a centralized, state-guided industrialization as in Japan, and we do not know what forms the social and political system even in Western countries may assume in the course of prolonged warfare. Mussolini once proudly said, "We are the Roman Prussians!" As a matter of fact, the actual establishment of a militarized society has historically been closely connected with the progress of Fascism, both in Germany and elsewhere.

I cannot here go into the questions of how far the recent German concept of militarized society is Prussian or non-Prussian or of how important the share of the international trend toward Fascist systems in it has been. The fact is that such ideas as Germany's historical mission being that of an authoritarian teacher, and therefore ruler, of the world, or of distrust and contempt toward all other races, are in themselves only a counterpart of inferiority complexes—see the characteristic German proverb, "Many foes, much honor!" Undoubtedly these ideas have in the last few decades worked out in a more disastrous way than ever before. Here again we may quote Foerster: "There is a kind of politics that is merely an expression of and a means for disintegration and either open or hidden warfare of all against all."

⁵¹ In the preface to Kolnai, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Militarized Society Today

Although all contemporary German writers, and National Socialism as such, are bitterly opposed to "materialism," their concept of militarized society in our time is based primarily on the economic implications of modern warfare. Their starting point is the importance of *Wehrwirtschaft*, which means an economic system directed, both in peace and in war time, toward military purposes with the aims of profit or welfare becoming secondary and damnable. From this economic starting point they analyze with German thoroughness the social, political, and cultural implications of such a "war economy in peace and war time," and most of them have years ago arrived at the conclusion that only a totalitarian organization of society can cope with the needs of modern warfare—in other words, that National Socialism is the up-to-date form of German militarized society.

General Georg Thomas, who has for years been in charge of the German economic war organization, wrote in 1937 an article in which he expressly traced these ideas back to Clausewitz and Bismarck and, to some extent, even to Bonaparte.⁵² His conclusions for our period were these:

The future war will return to that of our ancestors who waged war with all of their race contributing toward it Totalitarian war demands both operative and economic thinking The commander-in-chief must be the head of total warfare and must be acquainted with economic leadership, economic warfare, and propaganda, just as much as with military operations. He will cope with this leading position only if he has devoted himself to these tasks in peace time to the same extent as to his operation drafts.

From a slightly different angle, Ewald Banse—who has proposed since the early thirties to make *Wehrwissenschaft*, or "preparedness science," the focus of all scientific work—says, very much on Clausewitz' pattern, that "the essential difference between statesmanship and warfare is that the former takes the long view, while the latter is a short-term expedient."⁵³ The statesman is at the same time a master in *Wehrwissenschaft*. This new science is "the systematic application of every branch of human thought and human endeavor to the end of increasing the preparedness strength of our people." For this principle, Banse gives some striking examples such as *Wehrgeographie*, *Wehrgeologie*, *Wehrmedizin*, and *Wehrpsychologie*.

From the ideological side Ernst Jünger, as early as 1930, called war a normal condition of humanity, the only suitable environment for a full development of the human personality. He also advocated a general labor soldiery or "organization of entire populations on the pattern of armies."⁵⁴

⁵² "Operatives und wirtschaftliches Denken," *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte 1937* (Hamburg, 1937).

⁵³ *Germany Prepares for War* (New York, 1934), pp. 4, 349.

⁵⁴ *Krieg und Krieger* (Berlin 1930). See also *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* (Berlin, 1938).

Another characteristic Nazi philosopher of the earlier period was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, the inventor of the present-day concept of the Third Reich. He elaborated in the twenties the German claim for world leadership as applied to the world condition after the first World War.⁵⁵ These ideas were then further developed by Alfred Rosenberg. In his *Mythus* he says, "All schemes, systems of thought, and values are, in our eyes, only means for strengthening the vital struggle of the German people against the outside world."⁵⁶ In a later book he adds, "The German nation is just now about to find its style for good . . . It is the style of the marching column, regardless of where and for what purpose this marching column is to be used."⁵⁷ Professor August Forsthoff considers the idea of militarized society as the most exact counterpart possible of the ideas of the French Revolution, which were based on individual rights.⁵⁸

Turning to recent writers, General Horst von Metzsch, often considered an *enfant terrible* among Nazi officers because of his frank criticism of various policies, emphasizes the importance of Clausewitz' ideas for the present German generation.

Clausewitz, a protagonist of German character such as we need today. Clausewitz, a prophet of the German State such as we have today . . . [He is] the right man for our time. Not because we need this great thinker to understand our present *Führer*, but to find Adolf Hitler confirmed in many respects by Carl von Clausewitz . . . If Clausewitz was said to be *le plus allemand des allemands*, then Adolf Hitler is for the world of today the personification of Germany.⁵⁹

A dangerous compliment indeed! Von Metzsch also lays stress upon Clausewitz' saying that unification of the German people can be achieved only by force; on the other hand, moral factors play a decisive rôle in history. Clausewitz, von Metzsch adds, was the first to elaborate the concept of an "absolute war," full destruction of the enemy with possible glorious self-destruction as the alternative. In another book von Metzsch says that "a war is always the result of the preceding peace period . . . Adequate preparedness will achieve soldierly feeling within the whole race, . . . [and] the military sense must become the sixth sense of the German," though the latter's peaceful nature is emphasized simultaneously. "War is not only a crop but a seed."⁶⁰

Colonel Kurt Hesse,⁶¹ another leading military writer, is chiefly interested in the social implications of modern war economy.

⁵⁵ *Das Dritte Reich* (3rd ed., Hamburg, 1931).

⁵⁶ *Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts*, p. 661.

⁵⁷ *Gestaltung der Idee* (Berlin, 1937), p. 303.

⁵⁸ "Kriegswirtschaft und Sozialverfassung," *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte* 1936 (Hamburg, 1936).

⁵⁹ *Zeitgemäße Gedanken um Clausewitz* (Berlin, 1937), p. 19 ff.

⁶⁰ *Krieg als Saat* (Breslau, 1934), p. 19 ff.

⁶¹ *Der Kriegswirtschaftliche Gedanke* (Hamburg, 1935) and the leading article in *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte* 1938 (Hamburg, 1938).

Wehrwirtschaft is often identified with national economy as such; in other words, the economy must be fit equally for defense both in peace and in war time; the economic ideas must correspond to the military ideas, without *Wehrwirtschaft* necessarily being directed toward an actual war.

On the other hand, there is the opinion of certain military officers that *Wehrwirtschaft* necessarily refers to a war in some near or distant future. Hesse himself defines it as "the principle that determines the idea, form, and development of the national economy both in peace and war time."

Major General Karl Haushofer, now a professor at the University of Munich, is responsible for a strange mixture of geography, political science, biology, and strategy that he calls *Geopolitik*, with the important subdivision *Wehr-Geopolitik*.⁶² The basic idea is that each geographic area necessitates utilization by a race of definite qualities, both these qualities and the essentials of the area itself being more or less invariable. The superior races only fulfill natural requirements by occupying those areas suitable for them, even if this involves the displacement or extinction of other races. It is clear that this philosophy is at the root of the famous living-space theory in its modern shape. *Wehr-Geopolitik* means the adaptation of a superior race to definite strategic tasks traced by these "natural" necessities. To accomplish this, even the landscape of the conquering country itself must in peace time be adjusted to war requirements.

Hermann Rauschning believes that both of the chief elements of Hitler's strategy originated in the Clausewitz tradition. In his "broadened strategy" he "remains true to the doctrine of Clausewitz that as a rule the simple existence of a strong army is sufficient for the achievement of aims in foreign policy affecting a weaker opponent." If, however, actual war is to be waged, then

Nationalist Socialist strategy will seek to reach a decision in warfare by a single blow of such destructiveness as has hitherto been regarded as inconceivable. It carries to the highest pitch the strategy advocated by Clausewitz, the direct thrust at the heart of the enemy power.⁶³

This interpretation of Rauschning has meanwhile proved only too exact.

Another wing of German military writers stresses the intellectual character of preparation for total war, astonishing as this may sound. Major Beutler, who defines *Wehrwirtschaft* as "a will and endeavor with a view to winning superiority over the enemy in war, in the field of economy, and through methods of economy," calls such a system "something purely intellectual" (*Geistiges*), or at least not necessarily connected with any definite measures.⁶⁴ Colonel Eberhard Scherbening regards *Wehrwirtschaft* simply as "a national economy seen from

⁶² *Wehr-Geopolitik* (Berlin, 1932) and *Weltpolitik von Heute* (Berlin, 1934).

⁶³ *The Revolution of Nihilism* (New York, 1939), pp. 181, 141. See also *The Voice of Destruction* (New York, 1940).

⁶⁴ "Wesen, Aufgaben und Begriffe der Wehrwirtschaft," *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, October 1937.

the viewpoint of efficiency in a future war."⁶⁵ In fact, these shades of opinion are of little importance. The secular idea of German military thinking, implying that all peace institutions have to be subordinated to war needs and that war is at least as normal a condition of social life as peace, is maintained by each of these writers.

Militarized Society Perpetuated

All of them merely paraphrase and modernize the saying of Heraclitus that war is the father of all things. Hans Blüher calls war "an event of nature," and Edgar Jung considers it "an instrument of order."⁶⁶ General Hans von Seeckt, the creator of the new German army, is credited with having said:

War is the culmination of human pursuits. War is the natural and closing phase of an evolution in the history of mankind. War is the father of all things. At the same time, it prepares the end of a period in the history of a nation, and again becomes the father of a new evolution.⁶⁷

Another writer has said, "War is the secret master of our century; peace merely has the function of a simple armistice between two wars."⁶⁸ And to quote Ewald Banse once more:

War means the highest intensification, not of the material means only, but of all spiritual energies of an age as well; it means the utmost effort of the Volk's mental forces and the will of the State toward self-preservation and power, Spirit and Action linked together.⁶⁹

Other Nazi writers express analogous opinions from the angles of economics and psychology. Oswald Wyss believes that economic life has adopted functions like general staff work,⁷⁰ and the *Wehrpsychologe* Karl Pintschovius, starting from the phenomena of "unshaped fear" in modern warfare, says that the latter must now be directed against the very willingness to fight on the side of the enemy.⁷¹

Very few are the Nazi writers who believe that competitive institutions can be adapted to fit into a militarized society. Professor Adolf Lampe is the outstanding among them, especially in the field of economic policy.⁷² An anti-Nazi Austrian author, Stephan Possny, has attempted to set up principles of a competitive war economy from a different angle,⁷³ but otherwise both supporters and opponents of militarized society seldom believe that the latter, or even substantial steps in its direction, are compatible with competitive in-

⁶⁵ *Wirtschaftsorganisation im Kriege* (Jena, 1938).

⁶⁶ Blüher, "Philosophie auf Posten," *Gesammelte Schriften* (Heidelberg, 1916-21); Jung, *Sinndeutung der deutschen Revolution* (Oldenburg, 1933).

⁶⁷ In *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, January 1936.

⁶⁸ In *Deutsche Wehr*, December 1935.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Kolnai, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

⁷⁰ "Der Kriegszustand der Friedenswirtschaft," *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte 1936* (Hamburg, 1936).

⁷¹ *Die seelische Widerstandskraft im modernen Kriege* (Oldenburg, 1936).

⁷² *Allgemeine Wehrwirtschaftslehre* (Jena, 1938).

⁷³ *Die Wehrwirtschaft des totalen Krieges* (Vienna, 1938).

stitutions. Willy Neuling even suggests that only a new social and economic science, replacing the traditional methods of investigation, can cope with such new developments as the "command-economy."⁷⁴

To turn now to non-German judgments about the range and the future of militarized society, we may first recall a Russian State Councilor who more than forty years ago, at the suggestion of the Tsar, devoted two bulky volumes to show that wars would in future no longer be possible as the entire world would not have sufficient funds at its disposal to finance them.⁷⁵ This was written precisely at the beginning of an era of unprecedented militarization of European society.

Until recently few British or French writers have paid much attention to the shifts in the nature of war and preparedness or to the possible social implications of the century-old German concept of militarized society. Bertrand Russell wrote in 1938 that, "If I were conducting a war, I should insist that all the generals must be businessmen and all the admirals civil engineers; I should confine professional soldiers and sailors entirely to the lower ranks." His reason for these statements is the professional military mind's conservatism toward shifts in the concept of war. He added at that time: "The very wide-a more liberal regime is, I believe, as complete a delusion as the analogous widespread belief that a totalitarian state is more efficient in war than one with lief in absolute monarchy, which existed in the time of Louis XIV."⁷⁶

In France, Clemenceau's World War saying, "*La guerre est une chose trop sérieuse pour qu'on la laisse diriger par les militaires*," has become famous, but its actual meaning—the wide social scope of modern warfare—has rarely been understood. Marshal Foch may also have had a vision of the character of the period to come when he said at the signing of the Armistice in 1918, "Let the armies stand at ease. The war is postponed for twenty years." Only recently, however, has a Frenchman analyzed some of the actual social implications of both total warfare and the aforementioned German ideas. General Debeney identifies a modern *potentiel de guerre* with "the normal industrial power of a country" and claims that moral factors will decide the issue in mechanized war. This is in line with Clausewitz' ideas, but Debeney adds, "Of course, it cannot come into question to upset in peace time the normal life of a nation in view of a possibility that is without any doubt particularly serious, but might take place only after one or several generations."⁷⁷ This is exactly the point beyond which no other nation has been willing to follow the Germans until long after the outbreak of the second World War.

⁷⁴ "Wett' werb, Monopol und Befehl in der heutigen Wirtschaft," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* (Tübingen, 1939).

⁷⁵ Ivan Stanislavovich Bliokh, *The Future of War, in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations* (Boston, 1902).

⁷⁶ "Science and Social Institutions," in *Dare We Look Ahead?* (London, 1938), p. 14 ff.

⁷⁷ *La Guerre et les Hommes* (Paris, 1937).

As to German writers not connected with National Socialism, it is worth while to recall a remark of the great sociologist Max Weber, made at the end of the first World War:

War economy is guided by one aim, which has, in principle, but one meaning and for which such full powers may be utilized as a peace economy has at its disposal only in case of a "state slavery" of its subjects . . . Its engulfing aim destroys virtually any consideration of the peace economy to follow.⁷⁸

Weber, himself a progressive conservative, had a clear vision of the final implications of a militarized society as appears from many of his writings.

Another German conservative, and one who has passed through National Socialist ideas and politics—Hermann Rauschning—even calls the weakness of German conservatism toward National Socialism "the suicide of the old order."⁷⁹ He claims—largely in contrast with the results of my own investigation—that for the older conservative nationalism

war and violence were the *ultima ratio*, the last resort, not the first . . . With the conception of the permanent mobilization of the whole nation there is developing in the army leaders the idea of an all-comprehending militarism, in which war and violence must become virtually the one constituent element in the whole life of the nation: the army must swallow up state and society, economic and cultural and private life, every sphere of human life that until now enjoyed an independent existence.⁸⁰

He calls this idea "revolutionary militarism," as opposed to the older conservative militarism.

As a matter of fact, militarism in the traditional meaning has been a much narrower concept than militarized society. As has been shown, it used to mean the aspiration of a semi-fuedal officers' caste for imposing their social influence and ideas upon a society which, in itself, was by no means conceived as permanently geared for war. Alfred Vagts has remarked, quite rightly, "Generally speaking, militarism flourishes more in peace time than in war."⁸¹ Moreover, the irrational, if not religious, roots of the Nazi idea of militarized society are by far deeper than those of the old militarism. Aurel Kolnai has elaborated this in his remarkable book, *The War against the West*:

To maintain a big army, together with corresponding armaments, is still to a large extent compatible with the preservation of peace; to imbue the whole life of a nation with the scale of values, the mode of life, the attitude of war, amounts to such a concentration of war-preparedness as would make an indefinite maintenance of peace appear, as it were, irrational . . . We see that the War against the West is a religious war.⁸²

We may add that only the characteristic Fascist infusion of collectivist mass movement ideas ("Common weal has precedence over private weal" accord-

⁷⁸ "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft," in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik* (2nd ed., Tübingen, 1925), vol. III.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Kolnai, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 123 ff.

⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁸² Pp. 637, 562.

ing to the Nazi party program) has shifted the idea of militarism into that of militarized society.

We cannot here go into the question of *why* German liberalism, in its broadest sense, has lost every battle since the Napoleonic Wars (though some of its ideas were put into effect by its political enemies), nor why the *Herrenvolk* ideologies, aiming at eventual world domination by a fully militarized German nation, have ever since Clausewitz become more and more consistent and uncompromising.⁸³ Adolf Grabowsky considers "social imperialism," or a militarized society based on collectivist ideas, a logical successor of the older feudal and commercial imperialisms.⁸⁴ Others point out that, only after a period of unprecedented development of technique, social organization, and international intercourse by capitalist society, have age-old military ideas in Germany been able to become virtually all-embracing. The problem of how far this development itself is due to recent developments of the capitalist society, both in Germany and elsewhere, far exceeds the scope of this article.

Years ago Werner Sombart claimed that not only social systems may produce war, but that wars may also be at the root of new social systems; he referred specifically to the historical roots of capitalism.⁸⁵ Be this as it may, the militarization of German society has undoubtedly shaken fundamental concepts of the previous social system. Neither individual liberties nor private ownership, either at home or abroad, are compatible in the last instance with the aim of mobilizing all national energies for steady conquest, though legal rights may outwardly be maintained. The concepts of war and peace become even more meaningless when the entire national policy either replaces or prepares final military operations and when the total activity of a highly industrialized nation becomes directed toward periodically "pressing the starter-button" for more and more conquest. The "economic man" who, perhaps wrongly, was supposed to be at the root of competitive society, is displaced by the perpetual quasi-religious warrior who controls by draconic methods the entire national life.⁸⁶

Modern methods of social technique have enabled German Fascism to put into effect what was *in nuce* implied in Clausewitz' war philosophy and to compel other nations to adopt hesitantly protective measures in a similar direction. One difference still survives: substantial as the adjustment of other nations or governments to this state of affairs may have become, nowhere are the historical roots of the idea of militarized society so deep as in Germany. The fate of that country and, perhaps, of the world will depend largely on whether these

⁸³ See, for instance, Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (New York, 1938), p. 14 ff.

⁸⁴ *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus* (Basel, 1939). See also my "Zur Problemstellung des Imperialismus," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* (Tübingen, 1931).

⁸⁵ *Krieg und Kapitalismus* (Munich, 1913).

⁸⁶ See Peter F. Drucker, *The End of Economic Man* (New York, 1939).

roots can finally be eradicated. It is one of the most amazing facts in modern history that the militarization of German society, which has been in line with a century-old ideological trend in German nationalism, took the world by surprise when Hitler finally put this idea into effect. The lack of understanding on the part of the democratic nations of the explosive power of this idea, if and when applied to an industrialized society, accounts for the terrific success of the Nazi aggression in its initial phases. A militarized society is no longer a theoretical scheme but a very real fact. While a democratic society cannot imitate totalitarian institutions indiscriminately, it has above all to realize the full significance of this danger to the non-German world in order to cope with it.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONSCRIPTION

*EUROPE'S EXPERIENCE*¹

BY HERMAN BEUKEMA

AS DEFINED by Colonel F. N. Maude, English scholar and soldier, conscription is "the selection by lot or otherwise of a proportion of men of military age for compulsory service in the naval and military forces of their country." The definition appears to be both simple and all-inclusive. At first glance one would anticipate no difficulty in the attempt to survey either the social conditions which have underlain the resort to conscription at various times in history or the socio-political consequences to the nations which adopted it. We discover our error when we note that compulsory service has been not only the tool of the despot but the freely accepted weapon of embattled democracy. Again, on one occasion we find conscription universally applied to all men of fighting age, as in the *levée en masse*; on others we find the principle modified by exemptions—either selective, for the best interests of the State and the individual, or corrupted by purchase and influence to the detriment of both. With rare exceptions compulsory military service has been confined to males, but those exceptions are now on the ascendent.

Here, then, are enough variants which, though they conform in principal to Colonel Maude's definition, make it clear that any investigation of the social aspects of conscription must be a study in contrasts. Moreover, the casual investigator may easily repeat the double error into which some past surveys have fallen: first, in attributing to conscription rather than to war the social and political effects, good or evil, which have ensued; second, in failing to compare the effects which stem directly from conscription and those resulting from the partial or complete reliance on voluntary enlistment or some other method of induction. Incorporation of any such errors in analysis may well invalidate the conclusions reached.

The present study of conscription is necessarily confined to an examination of the more important variations cited above, beginning with its employment as a democratic weapon. Consideration is then given to the degeneration of democratic conscription into the better known despotic type. Lastly, brief comment is made on instances of the draft where, throughout its course, it was a function of autocratic rule.

Ancient history furnishes two striking examples of democratic conscription in the records of Athens and of the early Roman Republic. The Athenian

¹ Read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, New York, N.Y., December 30, 1940.

hoplites and sailors of Marathon and Salamis were true citizen levies of a democratic people. They received no pay; they furnished their own arms and equipment. Citizenship meant for them not merely privileges but duties and obligations as well. Whatever they lacked in military efficiency was compensated for by their sense of a common determination to accept death in combat rather than life under an Oriental despotism. Delbrück states that in the Periclean Age more than eighty per cent of Athens' male citizens were enrolled in the citizen-militia.² From that figure it is evident that only the physically disabled, the very aged, and children were exempted from military duty. The victories achieved by common sacrifice were duly credited by contemporary writers for their share in the social unification and spiritual vitalization which made inevitable the coming of Athens' Golden Age. Modern criticism not infrequently sees in that development the evidence of the particularism which kept Hellas in discord until she collapsed before the foreign invader. Whatever the truth of that contention, the manner of Athens' victory over Persia remains as a triumph for democratically exercised conscription. Moreover, its contrast with the Spartan equivalent should be noted. The Spartan youth, literally conscripted in his infancy, trained by the State under a system so rigorous that the weaklings were "liquidated," lived only as a soldier, a cog in the state machine. The Athenian saw his own world through the eyes of a citizen; his soldier status was secondary, called into being only through the dictates of necessity. Both systems have been classed as democratic. One, however, energized the individual to the achievement of his highest potentialities; the other tended to reduce him to a cipher. The Athenian system gave to civilization the Golden Age; the Spartan, a blank page.

From Rome we have borrowed the word "conscription," derived from the Latin "*conscriptere milites*," the enrollment or registration of men chosen for the legion from the whole body of free-born Roman citizens capable of bearing arms. Liability to service covered the ages from seventeen to sixty. The Roman conscript received no pay, and, like his Athenian prototype, he provided his own arms and equipment. This requirement automatically placed the wealthy in the cavalry, the less well-to-do in various categories of heavy and light infantry, and left the *proletarii*, a numerous class, at home as "getters of children." Men of no property, they were deemed devoid of patriotism. The Roman system was admirably suited to the needs of the Republic in its early years when the rather numerous wars were of relatively short duration and permitted the citizen-soldier to fill his double rôle. In spite of the emphasis on class distinction resulting from the assignment to arm of service according to wealth, the mutual sharing of hazards was a powerful factor in

² Citizenship in ancient Athens, it should be noted, was limited to a minority of the populace—possibly not more than 10 per cent, certainly not more than 20 per cent of the people. The remainder consisted chiefly of slaves and resident foreigners.

knitting together the early Romans for not only war but for the constructive duties of peace as well.

The Middle Ages furnish few instances of conscription unless we fall into the frequent error of considering the soldier-serf a conscript.⁸ To quote General Crowder, the serfs "did not come to arms in the service of a common cause, but in payment of a debt of fealty to which they were not a party." One notable example of medieval conscription has transmitted its influence through the centuries to express itself finally in the democratic institutions of the Switzerland of today. It originated in 1291 when the three forest cantons—Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden—discovered in universal liability to service the means of defending their independence against overwhelmingly stronger enemies. All males of sixteen and upwards were liable to service. The physically unfit paid a tax in lieu of service; the physically fit draft evader suffered heavy punishment and became an outcast. The Swiss system marked a distinct social advance over the Athenian and Roman policies because of its broader underlying basis of citizenship. Whereas Athens disbarred from military service not less than eighty per cent of her populace as non-citizens and Rome at first rejected her *proletarii*, the Swiss cantons imposed the obligation on all males. In sharing the common dangers and sacrifices entailed by war the Swiss achieved a sense of social and spiritual unity which ever since has evoked the admiration of the historian.

The thirteenth century gives us a short-lived example of conscription in the North Italian communes, which, for a brief period, approached democracy in their social and political organization. Internecine strife led to the substitution of the mercenary, the professional soldier, for the less efficient citizen levy. With the collapse of democracy went its democratic counterpart, universal conscription. In the Low Countries the free cities of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres launched an abortive effort in the same direction. Effective for a while in curbing the rapacity of the nobles, it was too weak to withstand the rising tide of nationalism. One of the most interesting experiments in this direction was made by Sweden after the Protestant party gained control in the early seventeenth century. To maintain the armies of Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus, the Riksdag decreed the organization of an army to be recruited by fixed quotas from the various districts. In return, the conscripts, officers and men, were provided with sufficient land to support themselves and their dependents. Military service was thus tied to the soil by the "indelta" system. This curious combination of the medieval and modern social concepts immediately won the support of every element in the nation—a support which vanished when the ambitions of Charles XII converted conscription into a tool of despotism which

⁸ Traditional terms of feudal service theoretically exempted the serf from all military obligations, such duties being limited to the knights and men-at-arms. However, for the garrison of a beleaguered castle such distinctions promptly vanished. In time the serf's exemption was more honored in the breach than in its observance.

so far drained the nation's resources that Sweden's subsequent status as a third-class power was assured.

Except for the English "fyrd," to be discussed later, the principle of conscription vanished for some centuries, to be reborn in the stress of revolutionary France's wars with the Royalists. Its advent then was an abrupt and complete reversal of the initial stand of the revolutionaries, who at first looked on conscription as an instrument of oppression, a wasteful consumer of national income, and the earmark of militarism. By December 1789 Dubois Crance was declaring to the Assembly,

I lay it down as an axiom that every citizen must be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen; or we shall never have a real constitution We must have a truly national conscription. Every man must be ready to march as soon as the country is in danger.

The Assembly turned down the proposal, however, and placed its dependence on the volunteer system. Unable to stem the advance of the Austrians and Prussians, the Republican government hastily "requisitioned" three hundred thousand men of the National Guard in February 1793 and followed that act with a general levy of all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. There were no exemptions except for the physically disabled, and the guillotine promptly put a period to such popular resistance as developed. Under this system all soldiers were known as "volunteers," a fact which has created no little confusion among the historians. Jourdan's law of 1798 incorporated conscription into the constitution, prescribing universal liability to a five-year term of military service for the age group mentioned above. That step placed the seal of approval on the results obtained by the emergency levy of 1793, of which Colonel Maude wrote,

Raw enthusiasm was replaced by a systematic and unsparing conscription, and the masses of men thus enrolled, inspired by ardent patriotism and directed by the ferocious energy of the Committee on Public Safety, met the disciplined formalists with an opposition before which the attack completely collapsed.

The nation's call to arms in fact produced in a few month's more than a million men. That call incidentally presaged the almost universal dependence of European States on conscription as a basis of recruitment from that day to the present.

Contrary to popular opinion, English history affords one of the longest and most interesting pictures of conscription recorded. Although its origin is not absolutely certain, it appears to have been brought to England's shores with the waves of Angles and Saxons who overran the country in the fifth century of our era. If so, John Lothrop Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* presents a clear picture of the completely democratic organization of the early German tribes, both for peace and war, which became the parent of the English fyrd. Certainly, it was well established before King Alfred's day. The privilege of taking the oath of arms, a privilege not to be evaded, was conferred on all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. Like the Roman legionary

of republican days, the English militiaman equipped himself. His equipment, assignment to branch of service, and rank depended almost wholly on his property status. Training, placed by custom at two months annually in King Alfred's time, was rarely either regular or thorough. Nevertheless, the fyrd remained for centuries the principal dependence of the English monarchs for home defense. It acquitted itself magnificently on many battlefields and was a powerful factor in developing the sturdy qualities of the yeomanry who wiped out the French armies at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. The English soldier of those battles was a volunteer, it is true, but he was accepted for service only after he had demonstrated his capacities in the militia. In its long history down to 1908, when it was finally absorbed into the "special reserve" of the Regular Army, the fyrd survived many vicissitudes, usually from the hands of rulers like the Stuarts who mistrusted the democratic attitude of the citizen-soldiers. Its disappearance was due to several factors, chief among them being England's increasing dependence on sea-power after the sixteenth century and the need of a long-service professional soldiery for her foreign garrisons after she was launched on her program of imperial expansion.

Prussia's military revival after Jena is the one other important example of democratic conscription prior to the World War. How complete its reversal from Prussian tradition is evident from Frederick William II's rejection of a proposal to summon the *levée en masse* in 1794 in answer to France's resort to the "nation in arms." The Prussian king declared that it was "infinitely dangerous [politically] to assemble such a mass of men." After Prussia's humiliation at Napoleon's hands he had no choice except to take his councilor's advice. Scharnhorst's scheme circumvented the stipulation of the Treaty of Tilsit, with its limit of forty-two thousand as the strength of the Prussian army, by passing the entire young manhood of the nation through the ranks of that army. The recruit received no more than a few months' training in fundamentals before his transfer to the reserve. What he lacked in military efficiency at the end of his period of training was more than compensated for by the high average level of intelligence of the group—a true cross-section of the nation's manhood—and by the patriotic ardor roused by the wiping out of class distinctions in the imposition of a universal obligation. In that respect Prussia's experience followed revolutionary France's earlier precedent, and, like that precedent, the social levelling and welding vanished with the restoration of autocratic rule.⁴

The conscript system of recruitment, as already stated, had become the accepted practice throughout Europe before the outbreak of the first World War. A varying cadre of professional troops provided the nucleus of instructors for

⁴ G. C. Coulton records in *The Case for Compulsory Service* that during the American Revolution the Langrave of Hesse-Cassel supplied the British Army with 23,000 conscripts at a net profit of nearly \$23,000,000. Modern history provides no cruder example of coldblooded barter in human flesh.

the annual contingents called to the colors. Historians of the period are wont to speak of the democratic basis on which the great standing armies of 1914 were created. The description fits only if the term democracy can be whittled down to denote merely the theoretical obligation of all able-bodied men to render military service. Even with this definition, the description overlooks the devices of exemption and substitution by which very considerable numbers evaded service, and it assumes that the military agencies of an autocracy like Russia can be democratic in theory or in fact. Candid analysis dismisses the notion of Europe's democratic conscription until it turns to Switzerland, where national defense, like all other functions of the State, was on a fully democratic basis. Great Britain, it should be added, is outside the discussion inasmuch as she maintained a small, long-service, professional army of volunteers.

The heavy losses suffered by all the belligerents in 1914 compelled them to revise their methods of recruitment. Before the end of 1915, the various loopholes of exemption, substitution, and other means of evading service had generally been eliminated. Great Britain's experience in building an army was particularly significant, inasmuch as her costly errors taught the United States what to avoid when the time came to draft our Selective Service Act in 1917. Contrasting America's success from the outset with the long agony of England's failure, General Crowder remarks:

Not so fortunate was England. Imbued with our own heresy, she did not escape the deadly cost, which we happily avoided. How she blindly struggled to maintain the volunteer doctrine; how, step by step, she receded from it, first through the importuning of her wiser leaders, then through an overwhelming national necessity; how she yielded first in principle, then in partial practice, until the realization of the awful toll was thrust upon her and she took the whole drastic step, this is . . . a story of vital national interest.

British "muddling through" in this instance assured the early transfer to the "Roll-of Honour" of the best and bravest of her young manhood; assured also the repeated and prolonged disruption of production as tens of thousands of her key men in industry "joined up." It was not merely the fact that Britain's best blood, in the broadest sense of the term, stood almost alone under German drumfire for two years of war, but the fact that guns and shells for their support were inadequate that remains as an unanswerable indictment of British policy. It was not until July 15, 1915, that Parliament provided for registration of the men of fighting age, a job so badly bungled that two years later the Minister in charge confessed to Parliament that the National Register could not be depended on for its accuracy before the middle of 1918. No thorough-going legal provision for conscription was made until passage of the second Military Service Act, May 25, 1916. Not until August 1917, three months after the United States had placed conscription on a fully selective basis to maintain the proper military-industrial balance, did England follow suit. Throughout those years of bungling every form of pressure, including social ostracism, was resorted to in order to push the proper individuals into uniform. Too many

of the wrong men got there instead. The resulting social cleavages and the general bitterness which ensued played no little part in the subsequent aversion of the British citizen to anything savoring of military conscription. Under such circumstances politics prevented Parliament from facing the truth of European developments after 1933. So it happens that Britain pays not once, but twice, for her stubborn and stupid reluctance in the first World War to espouse thoroughgoing democratic selective military service.

The decade after 1919 witnessed Europe's general return to the peace-time conscription prevalent before 1914. Exceptions were Great Britain, relying once more on volunteers and repeatedly finding herself unable to fill the ranks even though recruiting standards were seriously reduced; the defeated Central Powers, which by treaty were compelled to content themselves with small long-service professional armies; and Soviet Russia, which frankly resorted to the nation-in-arms principle, the first important instance of its full-scale peace-time employment. Russia, in fact, was the one power of importance which in the first decade after the Armistice of 1918, maintained in full the obligation of all able-bodied men to military service. Her policy was the first step toward the inauguration of what we may call the 1939 concept of the "nation-in-arms," to be discussed later.

Before glancing at totalitarian war and its underlying peacetime mobilization of all resources, human and material, we must note a few outstanding examples of conscription which bear no relation to democratic concepts of social and political organization. They are, in fact, quite the reverse, based on the despotic use of human raw material for the attainment of militaristic ambitions. Unhappily humanity has had far more experience with compulsory service as a function of militarism than as a democratic means of defense. It is even more regrettable that truly democratic conscription has all too often degenerated into pure militarism when the infatuation of the mob for its leader has blinded it to its nation's true interests. Just so, imperial Athens, launched on a program of conquest after the defeat of the Persian invasions, placed its destiny in the hands of soldier-adventurers and their armies of mercenaries. It was all too late when Demosthenes exhorted the decadent Greeks to "Recruit your armies, man your fleets, not with the off-scourings of Hellas and Asia, but with the best of your free-born citizens, and you may yet conquer." The native Athenian had ceased to be a soldier.

Rome's record in this respect differs in no essential from that of Greece, unless one takes the position that the Punic Wars were defensive in character. Long before 146 B.C. the amateur Roman generals had been replaced by professionals like Scipio Africanus, and the warrior-farmer in the ranks had likewise given way to the professional legionaries. Soldiering had become a life-time career. The veteran who survived the campaigns to win at last his retirement and the farm granted him by the State was usually a social encumbrance, too old to marry, too proud or too inept to till his land. Meanwhile the great

mass of the citizens, concerned only with their peace-time activities, lost all sense of obligation toward the defense of the State. Imperial Rome, in fact, leaned more and more on the recruitment of barbarians as mercenaries. In the hour of Rome's final crisis she had no reserve of citizen-soldiers to fall back upon. The fat years of "bread and circuses" had so far sapped the native-born Roman's will and capacity to fight for his beliefs or his country that it was but a question of time until she must collapse before the onset of a more virile people. And, interestingly, that people was one which had held to its prehistoric traditions requiring every man to be a soldier, every soldier a man; democracy at its crudest and with its fangs displayed, but democracy nevertheless.

The full story of the degeneration of Rome's system of universal compulsory service stretches through the better part of two centuries. Seventeen centuries later revolutionary France traversed a similar road in the span of two years when it fell under the spell of Napoleon Bonaparte's leadership. For a brief period the fiction of emancipating the oppressed of Europe deluded the impressionable who marched behind the Corsican's banners and gave them the élan to press home the bayonet attack at the critical moment. When that delusion ended, there remained a solid nucleus of superbly trained veterans, professional soldiers all, fanatically attached to the "Little Corporal." They became the central cadre around which Napoleon organized army after army by conscripting everything male and human that was fit to carry a musket. His system drained not only the life-blood of France but of the subject territories as well. Whatever vestige of democracy existed in his method was destroyed when exemption by purchase—a very handsome purchase—permitted the well-to-do to escape service. Napoleon reaped the fruits of his militarism when, in 1810, more than eighty per cent of the annual French quota failed to appear for registration. To hunt down the bands of *réfractaires*, deserters and evaders, sixteen flying columns of his best troops, more than forty thousand men all told, were diverted from their normal duties. The Napoleon of ten years earlier, not yet quite a megalomaniac, would have read the lesson aright with its augury of the wholesale defections that helped to make a hell of his retreat from Moscow—prelude to the final disasters of Leipzig and Waterloo.

It was a trick of fate that gave to Prussia, briefly espousing democratic principles in the rejuvenation of her national vitality, a major rôle in administering the deathblow to Napoleonic tyranny. But hardly had the reports from Leipzig been digested in Berlin when a long-term service law, finally enacted in 1814, put an end to the momentary appearance of the Prussian citizen-soldier. The rank and file of the armies which fought at Sadowa, Gravelotte, and Verdun were primarily soldiers rather than citizens. The only vestige of the democratic principle remaining from Scharnhorst's day was the universality of obligation. Even that was vitiated by the manner in which exemptions were regulated. All the distinctions of caste adhering to the individual in his civilian status accom-

panied him into the ranks. Like its prototype of Frederick the Great's day, the Prussian (later, German) army after 1814 was the bludgeon of the autocrat.

There remains a final general classification of conscription which at no time approached the democratic principle either in purpose, application, or in the political and social organization of the people upon whom it is employed. Despotism has filled more pages of history than all other forms of social and political organization lumped together. A categorical account of the despots' employment of conscription would do likewise and in the end would leave the reader with a sense of monotonous repetition. The autocrats of Imperial Egypt and Assyria were brothers under the skin to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane of the East and to Louis XIV and Frederick the Great of the West in their attitude to their subjects, whether peasant, artisan or soldier. Necessarily the soldier suffered more than his civilian brother, at least in terms of physical sacrifice. On the whole, neither the man-at-arms nor the civilian subjects of these autocrats received more consideration than that which a careless ranchman of today gives to his herd. To the ruler, these men were no more than intelligent live-stock, *homo sapiens* in uniform.

The principal variants in the general picture relate to the efficiency and intelligence with which the despot used his human cattle. Genghis Khan and Frederick the Great demonstrated that an ethnologically homogeneous group could be welded by hard training and clever leadership into a striking force of great potency; moreover, that victory and loot were ample compensation to the rank and file for the sacrifices endured. Let that leadership ossify, however, as it did in Germany after the death of Frederick the Great, and the outcome may spell Jena and Tilsit. When the despot brings into the ranks a motley of unassimilated peoples, his military host is as apt to be a mob as an army, a fact well demonstrated at Arbela and Actium.

Repeating an earlier comment, the totalitarian war of today presents the world with a concept of conscription far more sweeping than anything witnessed since the practice of wholesale extermination of defeated peoples was ruled out as an uneconomic procedure. Soviet Russia gave the cue with her Compulsory Service Law of August 15, 1930, establishing liability for all citizens regardless of sex. Women are accepted for military duty in peace-time and may be drafted in time of war. Italy goes a step further with a pre-military training program beginning for both sexes at the age of six. As a result, when the Italian youth is drafted for military service at the age of twenty-one he is already a trained soldier. Nazi Germany, with its particularly efficient system of military and pre-military training, has decreed that all citizens, women as well as men, shall be obligated to render service over and above strictly military duty. France, all too late, was moving toward totalitarian mobilization when her defenses collapsed. Only then did Great Britain move to the passage of an Emergency Powers Defense Bill, passed May 22, 1940. It provides for the conscription of all British resources, human and material, during the period

of the emergency. Its application thus far falls well short of the rigors inherent in the provisions of the Act. Dictatorship is there—to be applied as needed, whether in a bombed area, a munitions plant, or a channel of distribution. To round out the picture of a world under arms, the Oriental appendage of the Axis, with its National Mobilization Law of 1938 and the decrees of the Konoe Ministry, is living under a system of conscription at least as inclusive as that which obtains in the unconquered regions of Europe.

For the five hundred millions of people under totalitarian rule, conscription has become the war-time extension of a peace-time social concept which reduces the individual to the status of a fraction of the State. He lives only in the contribution which he makes to the collective output of the whole, whether in goods or in carnage. Shouting "Heil Hitler" or "Workers of the World Unite," he goes forward with his fellows in mass formation to almost certain death in the hope that a few of his comrades may be pushed through the enemy line to disrupt communications. Fanatically he adheres to the "Party line," or, if reason intrudes to chill his enthusiasm until he deviates so far as to express an independent thought, he pays for his rashness with the loss of liberty or life. Except for the bit of ribbon or the trinket which may be pinned on his breast, he finds his reward in the glory of his nation's conquests. Whatever social terraces may remain as a heritage of the past tend to level to a common plain through the erosions of common sacrifice, confiscatory taxation, and the swifter scoop-shovel action of the State's periodic decrees. The net result is a social, mental, and spiritual horizon no higher than that enjoyed in ancient days by the warriors of Assyria or Sparta. The despot's conscription does, however, leave one terrace, one upper level from which the conscript may look down. On the lower level he sees the peoples enslaved through his collective, regimenting efforts. He enjoys that satisfaction so long, and only so long, as his social order produces a fighting machine superior to the forces sent into action by the collective will and common sacrifice of democratic conscription.

The examples cited afford us no more than a glance at three types of conscription; two, in fact, if one chooses to class all instances of the despotically administered draft under a single head. They are, however, typical. Further analysis, covering the full range of military history, would not vitiate the major conclusions which may properly be drawn as to the social and political conditions which have produced these types of conscription and the effects of their employment on the nations involved. First, it is evident that conscription for the autocrat—whether ancient, medieval, or modern; whether the scion of an established line of autocrats like Frederick the Great or the adventurer who subverts democracy into despotic rule as did Napoleon—is the most efficient device for prompt conversion of the human raw material under his control into a striking force of terrific power.

The autocrat finds justification for his action in his military successes. The historian, concerned chiefly with the social and political consequences of such suc-

cesses to the people rather than with the aggrandizement of the monarch, sees not only the harsh treatment of the vanquished but the absence of any betterment in the lot of the victors. The spurious prosperity resulting from the inflow of captured treasure and subsequent tribute which has usually followed on the heels of military victory so gained have not served to change the fundamental status of the subjects of the despot. There has been no relaxation in the harshness of his controls. The change, if any, has been in the contrary direction, aimed at securing still greater military efficiency for the furtherance of the ruler's ambitions. In the lot of the French citizen in 1813, in that of the Japanese, Italian, and German citizens today, and in the bread-lines standing in the snow of Russia's richest agricultural area all through the winter of 1939-40 while the Soviet armies were pounding the Finnish lines, we find perfect pictures of the consequences of despotic conscription.

By contrast, democratic conscription has in every instance occurred as the voluntary dedication of a nation's resources to the cause of defense. The armies so raised have not always been notable for their efficiency; often, the contrary. Frequently deficient in training and led by commanders whose experience in leading troops was necessarily limited, they have had to depend on morale to make up for their technical shortcomings. And that morale, the spirit of a common cause, has not only been the product of the social conditions which democracy alone makes possible, but it has served as a priceless asset for the problems of peace remaining after the war. A proviso must be added—the benefits of democratic conscription have persisted to the day of peace only for the nations which in the heat of war have not lost sight of their own true interests. Napoleon's early successes blinded the French people to the fact that their liberties were being wiped out. A gullible people, dazzled by military success, are all too apt to overlook the necessity of qualifying a grant of power to the nation's leaders with the proviso "for the period of the emergency only" and the further necessity of leaving in being the popularly elected instrumentalities which shall determine when the emergency has in fact ended. Therein, as history has clearly shown, lie the greatest social and political dangers of democratic conscription.

THE MODERN ITALIAN NAVY

BY THEODORE ROPP

I. Before 1900¹

IN MANY ways the events of our time have crystallized in the naval balance of power. Against the three powers of the New World Order, the old navies—Dutch, French, English, and American—have gradually pooled most of their remaining resources. Since all of the new fleets developed after the middle of the nineteenth century, only parts of their stories have been analyzed. There is much on Germany, something on Japan, but little in English on the naval history of modern Italy. This sketch, based almost entirely on printed materials, is only an outline of its place in the Mediterranean's complicated strategy.² Though the unification of Italy in 1860 was its official birthday, it was formed by a combination of the navies of Naples and Sardinia. The former originated in the Neapolitans' attempt a century before to shake off their traditional Spanish allies. When the ambitious Queen Caroline swung into the diplomatic orbit of England and Austria, Edward Acton, the son of an English doctor residing in Switzerland, was hired to reorganize her fleet. He had served with the navies of France and Tuscany, and his success with the navy soon made him first minister, a would-be "Pitt of southern Europe." He founded a naval school, and one of its first pupils, Francesco Caracciolo, fought with Rodney and Nelson in the American Revolution and the early wars against the French Republic. Acton's one hundred and twenty ships and twelve hundred guns were of considerable assistance to the hard-pressed British Mediterranean fleet, and, after the occupation of the mainland by France, Sicily remained under British and royal control.³

When the French organized a fleet on the mainland, Giovanni Bausan, another pupil of Acton and Rodney, won some fame as a local commander, but Napoleon's grandiose naval schemes fell far short of realization. French officers organized considerable forces at Genoa, Venice, and Naples, but they never succeeded in capturing the Italian islands.⁴ In 1815 most of their Italian officers were forced to retire and many of their ships were destroyed. Venice and its

¹ The second part of this article, dealing with the Italian navy since 1900, is to be published in the following issue.

² Archibald Hurd's short *Italian Sea Power in the Great War* (London, 1918) is almost the only thing in English. The best Italian outline is Pietro Silva, *Da Lissa a Premuda* (Milan, 1918). E. Squadrilli, *Politica Marinara e Impero Fascista* (Rome, 1937), has been published by the Italian Navy League. D. B. Malaguzzi, *Marina d'Italia* (Milan, 1929), is better. I have omitted most references to standard diplomatic and naval histories and document collections.

³ The documents on Nelson's summary execution of Caracciolo are printed in *Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins* (The Navy Records Society, vol. XXV [London, 1903]).

⁴ A. Lumbruso, *Napoleone e il Mediterraneo: vent' anni di guerra oceanica fra Gran Bretagna e Francia* (Genoa, 1934).

arsenal fell to Austria, and Naples was restored to Ferdinand. Though his son, Ferdinand II, built the first steam warships in Italy, he did little for the training of either officers or men. The service became a nursery for the children of the aristocracy, and the fleet put to sea only for the suppression of the chronic insurrections in Sicily. In spite of its modern warships, the police-ridden Neapolitan navy was as rotten as the Bourbon monarchy. Its flag was hissed in other Italian ports; its few progressive officers hated the very thought of fighting for such a kingdom. The character of its officers and seamen was to be one of the most serious weaknesses of the united navy. Its real strength was to come from the rival kingdom of Sardinia.

There, after the Treaty of Utrecht, the House of Savoy had hired several English officers to suppress the Barbary pirates around their new possession of Sardinia. Though commands were given in French, the sympathies of the tiny fleet were essentially English. It remained loyal when the King was forced to flee from the forces of the French Revolution, and Admiral del Geneys joined Nelson at Maddalena in northern Sardinia. With the acquisition of Genoa in 1815, Del Geneys founded a naval school and a corps of regular officers. His new fleet played an honorable part in the suppression of Mediterranean piracy and regularly allotted a ship for the protection of Italian settlers in turbulent Latin America. The Sardinian navy was the first to take an interest in national, rather than purely local affairs, and it grew rapidly with Cavour's reorganization of the kingdom.⁵

Like most Liberals, Cavour felt that a powerful navy was essential to Italian commercial development and that the expansion of Genoese trade was the best way of securing their loyalty. He planned the Sardinian navy as the nucleus of a national fleet and copied many features of the French naval bureaucracy. The ministry was organized like the French ministry, he introduced the French system of naval conscription, and his naval constructors' corps was patterned after the French *Genie Maritime*. The Sardinian naval academy was reorganized along French lines, and many officers were sent to England and France for additional scientific training. The modern Italian navy has always been strongly influenced by that of France; in the same strategic area they have gradually evolved similar strategic theories. Cavour encouraged merchant shipping by creating the free port of Genoa and the first Atlantic steamship service, while he helped Ansaldo's locomotive works at Sampierdarena to become the first large private shipyard in Italy.⁶ His Sardinian navy formed the efficient core of a rather motley united fleet—Sardinians, Neopolitans, Tuscans, Red Shirts, and Venetian volunteers.

⁵ *Storia delle campagne oceaniche della R. Marina* (2 vols., Rome, 1936); A. Michelini, *Storia della marina militare del cessato Regno di Sardegna* (Turin, 1863).

⁶ In 1866 the government helped create a second private shipyard. The Orlando brothers, backed by two prominent statesmen, Sella and Angioletti, turned the old Leghorn arsenal into a private yard. (M. Battaglieri, *La politica navale del conte di Cavour* [Genoa, 1932].)

The new fleet did not lack heroes—Garibaldi's two good fighting ships had been commanded by six admirals—and all of them expected good positions in the national force. Cavour's promises to the disaffected Bourbon officers had been just as rosy as those to the Sardinians and the Red Shirts. The straight-laced nobles from Turin rubbed shoulders with their hated rivals from the south and Garibaldi's unwashed merchant captains and revolutionaries. Though the latter were gradually eased out, rivalry between the Sardinians and the Neapolitans continued for many years.⁷ The center of gravity of the new fleet was a new arsenal at Spezia, once picked by Napoleon as the strategic center of the northern Italian coast. On the flank of an expedition from Toulon to Rome or Naples, it was a symbol of the tension between France and the new kingdom over the Roman question, while the defenseless condition of southern Italy only emphasized the need of friendly relations with England. Cavour's achievements were vital factors in the navy's later development, and they should not be entirely overshadowed by the breakdown of its still heterogeneous organization under the stress of a new war with Austria.

Under the constant diplomatic pressure of France and Austria, Cavour's successors hastily purchased a whole ironclad fleet without considering the untried weapons' effects on either strategy or tactics. The ten naval ministers of the six years between the unification of the kingdom and the war of 1866 bought and built ironclads more or less at random and rushed through an elaborate paper program for the fleet. Its strategic purpose was simply "the adequate protection of the Italian coast" by a force equal to the combined navies of Spain and Austria, Italy's traditional oppressors. France and England were hardly mentioned, though a force of this size would hold the balance of power in the Mediterranean and be superior to Austria in the Adriatic. Though their ideas were still very vague, this was its real strategic objective.⁸ They hoped to triple the navy by 1873, and twelve new ironclads were actually ready in 1866. The two largest (*Re d'Italia* and *Re di Portogallo*) had come from Webb in New York, one ship and a great deal of material had been bought in England, and eight others had been purchased in France. One native ironclad had been completed, and six others were being built in the country's expanding shipyards.

The Sardinian Admiral Persano, the author of this plan, had proved himself a capable naval administrator. He was extremely popular in the Chamber of Deputies, but, like most of the older officers, he was simply unaware of the need for more careful military preparation for the coming struggle. Like them he had great confidence in his splendid new ironclads, and no one objected when he saved money on sea training and gunners and stokers. The Italian fleet was already the third largest in Europe. His reluctance to build a major base in

⁷ D. Guerrini, *Come ci avviamo a Lissa* (Turin, 1907), table IV.

⁸ *Studi per la compilazione di un piano organico della marina* (Turin, 1863).



ADMIRAL CARLO PELLION PERSANO

From The Illustrated London News, April 13, 1867.

the Adriatic is easily understandable; as long as Venice might be obtained peacefully, nothing would be gained by sinking money in Ancona for a war which might come before a major base could be constructed anyway. Naval thinking everywhere was confused and contradictory, and the Italians' lack of strategic insight was not primarily responsible for the disaster. Their men fought bravely, but that did not make up for their lack of training and the incompetence of many of their officers. The Battle of Lissa was the last of a series of misfortunes which began with the desertion of many of the foreign engine room men and a number of boiler and machinery accidents.

Admiral Persano's second, Admiral Vacca, was constantly intriguing to secure the command for himself, and the two other principal officers were equally incompetent. There was no plan of campaign, and they had not even studied the basic tactical formations for ironclads. When war had actually been declared, the Minister purchased several hundred copies of Bouet-Willaumez' *Tactique Supplémentaire* from a book store in Toulon and ordered all officers to read it. Though outnumbering the Austrians about five to three in both armoured and unarmoured vessels, the Italians spent the first month doing nothing in an improvised base at Ancona. When the army was defeated at Custoza, the government ordered Persano to "do something, or anything" to redeem the country's reputation. Though the Austrians had been cruising off Ancona daring the Italians to come out and fight, Persano decided to bombard the island of Lissa. There, after a day of inconclusive cannonading, Tegetthof's inferior forces finally caught up with him. In the *mélée* which followed, the Austrian flagship rammed and sunk the *Re d'Italia*, a smaller Italian ironclad was blown up, and the fleet fled in some disorder to Ancona. A third battleship was accidentally sunk trying to get into the harbor. Though Tegetthof's forces were too slow to pursue the Italians, total Austrian casualties of 38 killed and 138 wounded could be set against an Italian loss of two ironclads, 620 killed, and 161 wounded. Before the beginning of the battle, Persano left his flagship without signalling the rest of the squadron, and Albini's wooden ships took no part whatever in the action.

After the war, the Senate convicted Persano of disobedience, incompetence, and negligence in a sensational trial which disgraced the navy and many of its older officers. General Pescetto was made minister of marine and most Italians regarded the navy as nothing more than a coast defense branch of the army.⁹ The naval budget was cut from seventy-eight to twenty-five million lire, and, when war with France seemed certain in 1868, Admiral Riboty was simply ordered to avoid another Lissa by falling on the superior forces of the French and sinking as many of them as possible before his own destruction. The era of rapid naval expansion had come to a humiliating end. It took years to eradicate

⁹ The pioneer work of the Italian strategic school adopted this purely defensive attitude (Lovera di Maria, "Conferenze al corso speciale della Scuola Superiore di Guerra," *Rivista Marittima*, March 1868).



THE IRONCLAD RAM "AFFONDATORE"

founding in the harbor of Ancona, from The Illustrated London News, August 25, 1866



THE FRIGATE "CASTEL FIDARO"

From Le Monde Illustré, May 21, 1864.

the Italian navy's inferiority complex and even longer to persuade others that it was worthy of consideration in the naval balance of power.¹⁰

French hostility, however, soon forced the Italians to show more interest in their fleet, and the administration of Admiral Riboty (1868-1873) began its rehabilitation. He freed it from the army's tutelage, completed the base at Spezia, and took part in a new examination of the whole defensive problem. Half of the country's largest cities, many of its inadequate railways, and Sicily and Sardinia were at the mercy of the sea. Only the most enthusiastic partisans of the monitor could advocate it for the deep waters of the Italian coasts, and the most elementary consideration of the problem showed the need for both a first class army and a sea-going fleet.¹¹ To convince the public of the necessity for such a force Riboty began a considerable propaganda campaign, one of the first official attempts to sell naval expansion to the public of a Continental state. A lurid story (modelled on English invasion yarns) of the horrors of a French invasion by sea was distributed to the members of the Chamber of Deputies,¹² and quantities of technical, historical, popular, and juvenile articles were sent to such papers as the *Fanfulla* and *Gazzetta d'Italia*.¹³ The arguments in all this literature were primarily defensive; the country needed a "high seas coast defense fleet" to ward off a French invasion by sea. As late as 1886 this possibility immobilized a third of the first line Italian army. The navy's chief aim was an "active defensive"; its primary function the avoidance of battle with a superior force. By keeping "in being" it could prevent the landing of any large expeditionary force.¹⁴

¹⁰ A semi-official account is C. Randaccio, *Storia delle marine militari italiane dal 1750 al 1860 e della marina militare italiana dal 1860 al 1870* (2 vols., Rome, 1886); G. Gonnì, *Fatti e documenti della marina italiana* (Florence, 1917), is good. See also D. Geurini, *Come arrivammo a Lissa* (Turin, 1908); A. Lumbroso, *Il processo dell' Ammiraglio di Persano* (Rome, 1905), and *La battaglia di Lissi nella storia e nelle leggende* (Rome, 1910). The Austrian account is *Der Kampf auf dem Adriatischen Meere im Jahre 1866* (Vienna, 1869).

¹¹ *Al mare, Al mare. La difesa navale delle coste* (Genoa, 1872); "Difesa delle coste e delle isole," *Rivista Militare Italiana*, July 1873; *Relazione a corredo del piano generale di difesa dell' Italia* (Rome, 1871).

¹² Carlo Rossi, *Il racconto di un guardino di spiaggia* (Rome, 1872). Rossi was an employee of the ministry.

¹³ The most prolific author was A. V. Vecchi (Jack la Bolina). His *Al servizio del mare Italiano* (Turin, 1928) and "La letteratura nello sviluppo della marina," *Rivista Marittima*, May 1897, tell much of the story. An important collection is Carlo de Amerzaga, *Il pensiero navale Italiano* (Genoa, 1898).

¹⁴ This was still a real danger. France could throw twice as many men into the vulnerable sections of Italy's western coast as her inadequate railways could bring up to meet them. In spite of the exhortations of their German allies, the army adopted a similar defensive attitude. The traditions of four centuries of invasion could not be overcome overnight. See W. A. H. Hare, *The Armed Strength of Italy* (London, 1875); Charles Martel, *Military Italy* (London, 1884); G. B. Bruzzo, *Considerazioni sulla difesa generale dell' Italia* (Florence, 1870); A. Ricci, *Appunti sulla difesa dell' Italia* (Turin, 1872).

In spite of the recent exploits of the *Alabama*, these pioneer Italian naval strategists were not interested in commercial warfare. War with England was out of the question, and an attack on France's Mediterranean communications would not then have been a decisive factor. The French and American cult of commerce destroying had no influence in Italy, and the Italians, in turn, did not influence the course of nineteenth century naval strategy. The Italian naval historians, Vecchi and Guglielmotti, like their French contemporary, Jurien de la Graviere, did not investigate the nature of sea power or attempt to analyze its general conditions. Even their ideas about the Mediterranean went back to the Roman tradition, and they concentrated on the relatively minor problem of defending the coasts of Italy. But the navy's confidence in itself was restored, and its strategic problem was at last outlined clearly. Riboty's successor, Simone de Saint Bon, was the first of the younger men who put these ideas into practice.

One of the Sardinians whom Cavour had specially trained abroad, Saint Bon's first move was to condemn most of the small wooden ironclads of the pre-Lissa fleet. Because Italy could afford but few battleships, she should try to "anticipate progress" in the ones she did construct. Where Tirpitz believed in letting richer powers bear the expense of experimentation, Italy has usually taken the diametrically opposite view, that technical progress is one of the chief weapons of a weaker fleet. Through special loans and money from the sale of scrap he began the construction of four new and exceptionally powerful ships, primarily designed to meet conditions in the Mediterranean Sea. From the first, Italian strategists have avoided the familiar fallacy that sea strength can be determined arithmetically by measuring a country's coastline or seafaring population or investments; they have confined their interest almost entirely to the Mediterranean.¹⁵ Riboty had begun several new ships, but they were the usual conservative copies of existing foreign designs. To improve them, Saint Bon appointed another Sardinian, Benedetto Brin, as director of naval material. Brin had studied at Lorient in the school of the *Genie Maritime*, and these two pupils of the great French and English designers now produced the first outstanding Italian battleship, the famous *Duilio*.

She had been begun as a vessel of the "breastwork monitor type" with four 35-ton guns in twin turrets on either end of an armoured breastwork which rose from the armoured waterline. News from London that Sir William Armstrong was preparing designs for 60-ton guns gave Saint Bon a chance to "anticipate progress" by ordering them. To do this the armour was taken from the ends of the ship, which were now protected by an underwater armoured deck and numerous water-tight compartments stuffed with coal and stores. While the *Duilio* and her sister ship, the *Dandolo*, were still under construction, Armstrong announced a 100-ton gun, and the Italians finally bought them instead. This

¹⁵ E. Prasca, *L'Ammiraglio Simone de Saint Bon* (Rome, 1906); G. Secchi, "La mentalità militare dell' Ammiraglio Saint Bon," *Rivista Marittima*, April 1928; and Saint Bon, *Pensieri sulla marineria militare* (Naples, 1863).



THE BATTLESHIP "ITALIA"

From The Illustrated London News, October 21, 1893.

mail order artillery was three times the size of the original; where waterline armour was carried it was twenty-two inches thick. These two ships were the first of a new "central-citadel" type.

The *Duilio* was the result of changes in a ship already on the ways. In the even more radical *Italia* and *Lepanto*, Brin and Saint Bon constructed the ideal units of their "high seas coast defense" fleet. With the heaviest guns—up to 160-tons¹⁶—that could possibly be produced, they were to be able to reach every part of the Mediterranean sea at a top speed three knots faster than that of any previous battleship. To secure this tremendous speed, range, and armament waterline armour was done away with entirely and the armoured deck and cellular layer were extended the whole length of the ship. A fifth larger than any other warships afloat, they were intended to serve as long range coast defenders of tremendous speed and power to surprise the enemy in the midst of a landing or bombardment. By merely keeping "in being" they could prevent most serious threats against the coast. In abolishing armour on the waterline the Italians were greatly influenced by Lord Armstrong, one of the leaders of the curious reaction against the use of armour which took place in the early 1870's. The idea that "penetrable" armour was useless because of the debris a successful blow would carry with it was tacitly accepted by an English Committee on Designs, which suggested trying the cellular combination adopted by Brin for

¹⁶ They actually carried 110-ton guns, slightly larger than the largest modern battleship gun.

the *Duilio*. Armstrong's ideal high speed, heavily armed, "freely penetrable" ship would have been somewhat like the *Italia*.¹⁷ In both armament and protection the *Italia* and *Lepanto* were a radical development of some of the principles of British and French designs; for fifteen years they were the largest and fastest battleships afloat. At the same time Saint Bon tried to transform two gunboats into high speed scouting cruisers,¹⁸ and the two men had outlined the basic principles of all later Italian warship design. Their emphasis on the quality of the individual ship, their sacrifice of defensive for offensive power, and their appreciation of the importance of speed are fundamental to the Italian tradition.

Though their originality has often been overestimated, both men were able and energetic, and the Italian navy became a proving ground for foreign inventions.¹⁹ Though the new ships were all built in Italy, they contained much foreign material—Armstrong guns, Penn's engines, and Creusot steel armour, the first used anywhere. Their plates were still imported from England, and much Italian work was either copied from foreign firms or done under the supervision of foreign foremen.

Though the collapse of the Right in 1876 forced Saint Bon's resignation, Brin took office under the new Prime Minister to continue their policies. He proved equally skillful in influencing public opinion and in defending their work in the Chamber of Deputies.²⁰ He merged the naval schools of Naples and Genoa into the modern naval academy at Leghorn and began a campaign to free the navy from its dependence on foreign materials. In this, however, he was accused of manipulating naval contracts to secure reelection in his Leghorn constituency, and his resignation in 1878 ended five years of active naval expansion. In these years Italian naval expenditures had risen by about 21 per cent, but France was still spending twice as much and did not regard the new navy as a particular threat to her Mediterranean position. The tradition of Franco-Italian friendship was still strong among the parties of the Left, and the fall of the Right in both countries in 1876 resulted in better feeling on both sides.

In this situation the navy's attention again turned to Austria and the Adriatic. This more normal type of naval problem, with Italy's forces superior to those of the enemy, led, in the ministry of Ferdinand Acton (1879-1883), to a widespread reaction against Saint Bon's advanced technical views. Many officers felt that the unarmoured sides of the "mastodon" ships were disastrously open to

¹⁷ The guns of the *Italia* were heavily protected, however, and the total displacement was much too great for Armstrong's approval. Emil Bertin was another advocate of this system.

¹⁸ They were not successful. Previous fast steam cruisers, like our *Wampanoag*, were commerce destroyers. The French *avisos* were slower than their battleships.

¹⁹ Saint Bon was responsible for the foundation of the Italian torpedo service. Many early experiments, here as elsewhere, were failures. (E. Simion, "L'adozione e l'evoluzione delle armi subaquee nella marina Italiana," *Rivista Marittima*, May 1927.)

²⁰ His letters to the editor of the *Gazzetta del Popolo* are published in the *Rivista Marittima*, December 1933.

common shell fire, while other objected to the incredible slowness of their giant artillery. With ninety men in a turret, it took ten to twenty minutes to load and fire each round. Several accidents revealed weaknesses in the Armstrong system of gun construction, and many officers feared that the *Italias* were too big for the confined Adriatic. The Austrians were concentrating on small battleships and torpedo craft, and many officers wanted ships of this type to meet them. The four big battleships were almost the whole Italian fleet, and the life of the younger officer was a deadly round of routine watch keeping.²¹ Acton found the majority in favor of smaller and better armoured ships, and Brin's efforts to drag the matter into politics proved to be a boomerang. Both he and Saint Bon temporarily retired from political life, but, as usually happens when technical details are fought out in Parliament, the result was an unsatisfactory compromise. The three new ships of the *Lauria* class turned out to be copies of the *Duilio*, too advanced for the conservatives but not nearly as radical as the *Italias*.²² At this time the Italians were greatly influenced by the French advocates of cruiser and torpedo warfare, and Acton bought the Armstrong cruiser *Giovanni Bausan* as a model. Though the possibilities of doing serious harm to Austria or France by destroying commerce were modest enough, several would-be strategists enthusiastically advocated it. This trend toward French ideas lasted for several years, and one result was the organization of a general staff and the appointment of Saint Bon as its first chief.

The Tunis quarrel of 1881 was not immediately reflected in a Franco-Italian naval race, and the Austrian and Near Eastern questions were uppermost during most of Acton's ministry. The arsenal at Venice was modernized, and work was begun on a new base at Taranto. For political reasons, Acton continued to build battleships at Naples, but he did not modernize the Neapolitan fortifications. Even with the building of a new arsenal the naval budget increased only 11 per cent in five years, and the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 did little to change the naval situation. Relations with France were at least tolerable until a new series of incidents brought the two countries to the verge of war.

The Franco-Italian naval race was just beginning when Brin returned to the ministry in 1884 to continue his program of freeing the navy from its dependence on foreign materials. Its plates, engines, armour, guns, torpedoes, and mines were still being purchased abroad. Before the country could even begin to produce them, native steel had to be provided. With some French capital, the technical aid of Schneider-Creusot, and a twelve million lire government loan,

²¹ Italy had neither foreign stations nor colonies to provide independent commands for them.

²² Officers on active service could still sit in Parliament, and the public was often treated to unedifying quarrels between a minister and his supposed subordinates (Saint Bon, *La Quistione delle navi* [Turin, 1881]; Brin, *La nostra marina militare* [Rome, 1881]; G. Maldini, "Le nuove costruzioni navali per la marina italiana," *Nuova Antologia*, October 15, 1880).

a small pipe foundry at Terni became Italy's first modern steel company.²³ Forty-seven million lire in naval orders, a high tariff, and a subsidy for steel merchant ships made the enterprise an immediate success. Brin followed this by persuading foreign arms manufacturers to invest in Italy. Armstrong began a naval gun factory, the Berlin firm of Schwarzkopf set up a torpedo factory, and Thornycroft's torpedo boats were copied by another company. Ansaldo was forced into a "partnership" with Maudslay for constructing marine engines, and Hawthorne "assisted" another engine manufacturer. Foreign money and government orders at good prices started a considerable industrial boom.²⁴

By this time the French "*Jeune École*" had become violently hostile to Italy. In the event of war, they proposed the ruthless bombardment of her open coastal cities "to seal the fate of the Triple Alliance in the Mediterranean." Like the modern partisans of ruthless air bombardment, they thought that terror was the most direct road to victory and that arsenals or merchant ports could be rendered useless by lobbing explosive and incendiary projectiles in their general direction. For a while the "*Jeune École*" had no effect on official policy, but in January 1886 Admiral Aube became a member of the famous cabinet with General Boulanger. He concentrated most of France's modern ships at Toulon and began to experiment with fast gunboats and high explosives. In Italy both navy and army experts demanded an immediate increase in the fleet,²⁵ and Italian naval expenditures rose fantastically. In six years the naval budget more than tripled, while arms took up a third of the total budget of the state. Some of the increase was due to Brin's subsidization of the private armaments industry, but most of it went into coastal and Alpine defenses and the most ambitious battleship program in the navy's history.

During Acton's administration most of Italy's money had gone into cruisers and torpedo craft, and the *Lepanto* and the three *Lauria*s were still under construction. Now Brin completed these four battleships and laid down the three of the *Re Umberto* class. They were *Italias* with lighter guns, higher speed, and light side armour to keep out the new French high explosive shells. Five more cruisers were copied from the *Giovanni Bausan*, and two cruisers were purchased at Elswick. One of these, the *Piemonte*, the first ship armed entirely with quick-firing guns, was copied in eight other vessels. The "torpedo gun-boats" and "torpedo cruisers" combined the functions of scouting and destroying torpedo boats. Once more emphasizing power and speed instead of protection,

²³ Its stock had been bought quietly by those with proper connections. Italy did not have a single Bessemer or open hearth. In the eight years 1881-89, iron and steel production rose from 99,000 to 340,000 tons.

²⁴ A. V. Vecchi, "Naval and Maritime Industries in Italy," *Naval Annual*, 1908; G. Martorelli, "La industria delle costruzioni navali in Italia," *Rivista Marittima*, January 1911; E. Giretti, "La Società di Terni," *Giornale degli Economisti*, October 1903.

²⁵ C. Manfredi, "Gli ufficiali dell'esercito e l'incremento della flotta," *La Lega Navale*, October 15, 1901.

Brin's ships were regarded by the French naval staff as "really magnificent" for that period.

At the same time much money was spent on naval bases. Genoa was heavily fortified, a base was created at Gaeta near Naples, and the three narrow entrances to that vital area were flanked by secondary ports. The passage between Corsica and the mainland was already threatened by Spezia, but additional torpedo bases were constructed at Elba and Monte Argentario, and both sides of the Straits of Messina were heavily fortified. The narrow Sardinia-Corsica channel was controlled by an important new base at Maddalena, a small group of granite islands at the northern tip of Sardinia. Maddalena is nearer than Spezia to France's principal objectives on the Italian coast; it lies across the direct route from Marseilles to the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, and it is closer to the coast of southern France than any other Italian base. Its development was an important card in Italy's friendship with England; a British fleet at Nelson's old base in northern Sardinia could easily intercept a French thrust toward Egypt or Malta. It soon became the real strategic center of the fleet, a defensive and offensive base of the first importance.²⁶

Its fortification was one of the key points in the writings of Italy's greatest naval strategist, Domenico Bonamico; a powerful squadron based on Maddalena was a prerequisite for his "defensive-offensive" strategy.²⁷ He recognized "but one means of contending for the mastery of the sea" and refused to be diverted to the secondary objectives of bombardment and commerce destruction. Without the forces for immediate command of the sea Italy would wear France down by an "offensive-defensive," destroying isolated detachments of the enemy while keeping "in being" to prevent a major bombardment or invasion. Italy would gain little and might lose much by a reckless offensive, but her "high seas coast defenders" would form a battle fleet easily fast enough to crush inferior and avoid superior forces.²⁸ Costly as the effort had been, Italy was proud of the results, and the navy's new prestige was reflected in such trivial incidents as the addition of a naval aide to the royal staff and the importance of nautical themes in the nationalistic poetry of Gabriele d'Annunzio.²⁹ By 1889 the Italian fleet was practically equal to that of France. The French naval staff admitted its inability to protect the Provençal coast from the depredations of a fast force

²⁶ C. Marchese, "L'Ammiraglio Nelson alla Maddalena," *Rivista Marittima*, October 1902; "Die Strategische Bedeutung Maddalenas," *Marine Rundschau*, April 1901.

²⁷ A well informed scare story of 1888 thought that Italy's ships would be divided into three groups, with some modern units and some of the Lissa type in each (Charles Rope, *Rome et Berlin* [Paris, 1888], p. 24). This vague "Garrison" theory was just being replaced by the concentration of the effective ships as a separate unit to operate on the quadrangle Maddalena-Spezia-Naples-Messina.

²⁸ Most of Bonamico's work appeared in the official *Rivista Marittima*. Two books are *I primi elementi della guerra marittima* (Turin, 1880) and *Il Problema marittimo dell'Italia* (Turin, 1881).

²⁹ His early journalistic work was *L'Armata d'Italia* (1888). One of his best known naval poems is his early "O mare, O gloria forza d'Italia" in the *Canto Novo* (1881).

based on northern Sardinia and refused to accept responsibility for the transportation of the famous 19th Corps from Algeria. The army reluctantly replaced it with naval infantry, a good sign that they no longer considered an immediate landing in Italy. The Italian navy had accomplished its primary objective of freeing the peninsula from the threat of an invasion by sea.³⁰

At the same time the First and Second Mediterranean Agreements pledged England's support to the Mediterranean *status quo*, the Triple Alliance was reenforced by military agreements, and even Spain joined the league against French and Russian aggression. When the concentration of the French fleet at Toulon in 1888 convinced Italy that France was planning a sudden attack on Spezia, the British fleet paid a ceremonial visit to Genoa to warn France of her intention of coming to Italy's assistance. The next month a British, Italian, and Austrian squadron visited Barcelona, and four German battleships were sent to Maddalena. The naval staff was firmly convinced that a French attack would have resulted in immediate British intervention.³¹

But most naval ministers have obtained impressive results in periods of naval expansion; the testing of Brin's work came in the early 1890's when France turned to economic pressure to force Italy out of the Triple Alliance. The depression which followed forced the government to reduce its armaments expenditures, and the naval budget was cut from 157 million to ninety-six million lire. The navy was so heavily involved in the expansion of its material that fixed charges ate up most of this reduced income, and the personnel was forced to bear most of the burden. For some years Saint Bon and Acton had accused Brin of emphasizing engineering at the expense of practical seamanship, and the reductions fell hardest on those branches of the service least able to bear them.³² Like a family of impoverished nobility, the navy did its best to keep up appearances, but salaries and promotions were ruthlessly curtailed, and there was even a "squadron of patriotic abnegation" on shore pay for sea service. They cut target practice to save ammunition, stayed in port to save coal and engine repairs, and hauled their torpedo craft up on shore to prevent their deterioration. The skilled ratings who kept the ships in good order in port were swamped by untrained deckhands when they put to sea, and the discouraged officers regarded most of their crews as thoroughly worthless. Their optimistic building program ended by being detrimental to the general efficiency of the fleet, while the ships themselves were growing obsolete with terrifying rapidity.

As the monster guns of the "citadel ship" of the seventies had doomed the original ironclad, smokeless powder, high explosives, and quick firing guns now

³⁰ Italy had seven modern battleships to France's six and the same proportion in modern cruisers (J. L. de Lanessan, *La marine française au printemps de 1890* [Paris, 1890]).

³¹ Admiral G. Ducci, "Accordi e convenzioni durante la triplice alleanza," *Rivista Marittima*, March 1938.

³² D'Annunzio's *L'Armata d'Italia* reflects Saint Bon's views. "Le recenti discussioni sulla marina da guerra," *Nuova Antologia*, July 16, 1889; V. de Gorloff, "La flotte italienne en 1887-88," *La Nouvelle Revue*, May 1, 1889.



THE IRONCLAD "RE UMBERTO"



THE CRUISER "SAVOIA"

Both from The Illustrated London News, July 27, 1895.

ended the reign of the *Italias*. Their day and that of their blunderbuss guns was over; a *Re Umberto* or *Royal Sovereign* could smother their unarmoured sides with high explosives. While France constructed eleven large and four small battleships of the new type, Italy finished only the three *Umbertos* and two smaller ships. In cruiser design the same conditions prevailed, and the French armoured cruiser was definitely superior to the Italian and British "protected" type. Though Italy built five powerful armoured cruisers, France launched eight in the same decade; the Italians were completely unable to hold their position of practical equality with France.

This disastrous change was the result of the one basic weakness of all the "central citadel" ships; their great theoretical gun power had not led to similar improvements in practical gunnery. The new small guns were more effective at prevailing battle ranges; the cult of the ram and the powders then in use had prevented the discovery of the modern principles of gunnery. If the works on tactics are any indication, the Italians expected to use the soft-ended *Duilios* for ramming.³³ This belief in the ram had been a major factor in Acton's reaction against Brin; it was partly responsible for their failure to develop the dreadnaught directly from the all-big-guns ships of the 1880's.³⁴ Although Commander Ronca saw the nature of the whole problem of fire control, there was simply no money for expensive experiments in gunnery.³⁵ At the same time Brin's carefully protected private arms manufacturers nearly expired, and the government saved some of them only by entering the international armaments trade. Five heavy armoured cruisers were laid down by the government in private yards and then sold to foreign governments by the shipbuilders. As soon as the slips were vacant another ship would be laid down; the arms firms were given a backlog of orders, and the government had two of the latest cruisers always under construction.³⁶ By such measures the arms firms were kept from bankruptcy, though the severe depression led to several consolidations within the industry.³⁷ Meanwhile the French were developing the Tunisian port of Bizerta at the entrance to the one unprotected passage to the Bay of Naples—a standing menace, then and now, to one of the weakest spots in the whole Italian defensive system. At the same time Corsica became an important secondary point, and the

³³ The prize essays printed in the *Rivista Marittima* in 1881 are very interesting.

³⁴ The 17-inch gun of the *Duilio* was replaced by a standard 12-inch type. The German *Kaisers* carried 9.4's, half the size of the guns of the previous period. Count Albini proposed some ships like the dreadnaught. (*Uno sguardo all'avvenire navale* [1887].)

³⁵ "Studio sulla tattica navale moderna," *Rivista Marittima*, September 1890; E. Simion, "L'evoluzione dei metodi del tiro navale," *ibid.*, December 1926.

³⁶ One, the *Cristobal Colon*, was captured by our fleet at Santiago. These cruisers were so heavily armed that they were almost pocket battleships, and the Italians hoped to use them to eke out their battle line (H. le Masson, "Les croiseurs cuirassés du type Ansaldi," *Revue Maritime*, March 1935).

³⁷ Terni and the Elba-Savona metal works were linked to Fiat-San Giorgio, Odero, Orlando, and Vickers-Maxim. Armstrong and Ansaldi formed the rival trust.

Toulon-Corsica-Bizerta line covered the main French transport route to North Africa.²⁸ By 1891 the French had recovered sufficient confidence to plan to bring the 19th Corps from Algeria and to talk of throwing an expeditionary force from Tunis into Naples or Sicily. The Italian navy had dropped from third to seventh place in a single decade, and the whole Mediterranean coalition had begun to disintegrate.

Rosebery, the new English foreign secretary, assured the Italians of his personal sympathy, but Italy could hardly be sure of the divided Liberal Cabinet. Many English experts now complained of their Italian "liabilities," while others proposed a general British withdrawal from the Mediterranean. Laird Clowes, the naval correspondent of the *Times*, was especially outspoken, his "The Mill-stone Round the Neck of England"²⁹ being typical of a considerable section of English naval opinion. They had little faith in Italian gunnery and still less in the morale of the men behind it. There was no alternative for Italy but a reconciliation with France and the renunciation of many of her western Mediterranean ambitions. For fourteen years Brin had been in practically continuous control of Italian naval policy. Like Crispi, he had overstrained the resources of his country, while ships and engineering had overshadowed men and their training. But, for all his faults, he left his fleet a tradition of engineering progress, a developed armaments industry, and a place in public opinion which have continued to the present.

²⁸ There is no Corsican harbor suited to a major base, but several points were heavily fortified. Though France had promised not to develop Bizerta at the time of the acquisition of Tunis, Italy's allies did not support Crispi's frantic protests.

²⁹ *Nineteenth Century*, March 1895. See also John Leyland, "The Italian Navy and Its Recent Maneuvers," *United Service Magazine*, January 1894; S. M. Eardley-Wilmot, "Italy as a Naval Power," *ibid.*, April 1893.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

The editorial board believes that the changes introduced in this issue, including the new name **MILITARY AFFAIRS**, will convey more effectively the purposes and scope of the journal to the now rapidly widening circle of interested persons who are not members of the society. It should be emphasized, however, that the magazine will continue to be, as it always has been, the journal of the **INSTITUTE** and that there is to be no change in its established editorial policy. Your editors reaffirm their belief in, and will continue to attempt to give additional meaning to, the organization's motto: "Let History Arm the Mind."

At the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees held in Washington on January 18, the following Trustees were reelected: Captain Dudley W. Knox, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, and Colonel John R. M. Taylor. In addition, the following members of the Board were elected for the first time: Dr. Robert G. Albion, Lieutenant Colonel Herman Beukema, Dr. Edward Mead Earle, Dr. Luther H. Evans, Dr. Ralph H. Lutz, Brigadier General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel John W. Thomason, Jr. Colonel Robert Arthur, Mr. Hoffman Nickerson, Vice Admiral William L. Rodgers, Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, and Colonel John W. Wright, whose terms of office have not expired, will continue to serve as Trustees.

Vice Admiral Rodgers, President, and Dr. H. A. De Weerd, Editor, were reelected, and the following new officers were elected: Colonel Arthur L. Conger, President Emeritus; Dr. James Brown Scott, Vice-President; Captain Frederick Bernays Wiener, Treasurer; Mr. Robert E. Runser, Librarian; and Mr. Jesse S. Douglas, Managing Editor. The terms of office of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, Mr. Frederick P. Todd, and Mr. Elbert Lowell Huber have not expired, and they will continue to serve, respectively, as Provost, Secretary, and Bursar.

An off-the-record meeting of unusual interest and significance was held on March 25 at the headquarters of the **INSTITUTE** on "The Future of the National Guard." The two principal speakers were Congressman Ross A. Collins, member of the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, and Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, whose official and unofficial activities since 1912

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have kept him in close touch with this problem. Among those who contributed to the lively discussion which followed were Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Major General Milton A. Reckord, Brigadier General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr., Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Wattles. Captain Frederick Bernays Wiener acted as chairman.

The Seminar on American Military Policy being conducted for the second year by Professor Earle at the Institute for Advanced Study proposes to publish the results of the studies of individual members and of their common discussions under the tentative title *The Changing Conditions of American Security*.

Members of this Seminar have been very active in the field. Dr. Earle and Dr. Vagts have contributed articles to this journal in addition to their other publications. Dr. Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, a study of the effects of naval inventions on international politics, 1814-1918, is to be published this spring by the Princeton University Press. Dr. Herbert Rosinski, author of *The German Army*, is to deliver the 1941 Lowell Lectures at Harvard University on "Command of the Sea."

The *Sixth Annual Report of the Archivist of the United States, 1930-1940*, stresses the current importance of information contained in government records of the World War period for the study of procedures and methods used at that time. In this connection it might be mentioned that Mr. Wayne C. Grover, of the Division of War Department Archives and an active member of the INSTITUTE, has been employed in research for the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, the World War records of which are in The National Archives. The *Annual Report* also includes lists of accessions from the War and Navy Departments during the fiscal year and of publications for which information was obtained from records in The National Archives. A substantial proportion of the latter, some twenty-five titles, are on subjects of interest to the military historian.

Contributors to This Issue

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★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Armed Horde, 1793-1939: A Study of the Rise, Survival and Decline of the Mass Army, by Hoffman Nickerson. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1940. Pp. 427. \$3.50.)

The author of this book has stated its significance in words far more effective than any that could be employed by the reviewer:

. . . Exactly a hundred and fifty years ago in 1789—shortly after the United States had sought to protect themselves against democracy by their Federal Constitution—the French Revolution began. From that time to our day democratic ideas have come to dominate politics just as the mass army has dominated war. It is the thesis of this book that the two are inseparably connected both with each other and with a third thing, barbarism [p. 14].

The mind of the author is clearly dominated by two things: first, a scholarly interest in the history of warfare and, second, a pronounced dislike of democracy in any and all of its manifestations. His book is an expression of the second of these things through the medium of the first. He is clearly attempting to deliver the most devastating attack on democracy of which he is capable by concentrating his effort on, and canalizing his attack through, that field of knowledge in which his opinions are known to be most competent.

That Mr. Nickerson should have the temerity to publish a work of this character in the face of the “war dance of democracy” now under way in this country shows a courage of conviction which must be honored. Honor it we may, for we do not have to do, here, with one who belongs to the swarm of latter-day enemies of democracy—enemies whose creeds have the same roots as criminal psychology and who recognize no obligations of honor toward people not belonging to their “gang.” We have to do here with a writer whose social philosophy is that of an eighteenth-century English squire. His attack is therefore not so much dangerous as it is amazing—amazing in the same way as the bombardment of New York next Friday by an eighteenth-century man-of-war would be amazing.

Now the evils of democracy are certainly manifold, and they need ceaselessly to be pointed out, whether by friends or by disbelievers. What Mr. Nickerson has to say about the evil effect of democracy on the nature of war is at least partly true, and his whole hypothesis is plausible enough to deserve thoughtful

consideration. What he has to say needs to be said if for no other reason than to impel democracy to think more cogently about the relation between itself and the art of warfare. Yes, what he has to say needs to be said, and though he is bold to say it at this time, I, for one, will defend him in his right to say it. But I cannot agree with his outlook.

Whatever the evils of democracy, pointing them out does not constitute a valid argument for a different social order. The evils of another social order may be greater. If our ancestors abandoned the pre-democratic social order, it was because they had come to find its evils intolerable. And if their descendants have since adhered to democracy, it has been because they have felt its evils to be less vicious. If exasperation with the current defects of democracy tempts anyone to agree too much with Mr. Nickerson in his predilection for a government of "the rich, the well-born, and the able" such as prevailed in Georgian England, let that person read Sir George Nicholls' *History of the English Poor Law* (1854); let him read the works of John and Barbara Hammond, such as *The Village Labourer, 1760-1832* (1911); and let him reread Fielding, Smollett, and Dickens. And if he has difficulty in feeling the reality of conditions which existed so long ago, he might turn to *Harper's Magazine* for February, 1941, and read the article by Malcolm H. Clark on present-day conditions in petty-magnate-ridden Newfoundland. The history of government by "the rich, the well-born, and the able" offers a voluminous and horrible record of "man's inhumanity to man." Believers in democracy will undertake to match every evil or crime attributable to democracy with two or three worse evils or crimes standing in the record of oligarchy or autocracy.

So, even supposing it to be true that democracy has been attended by a particularly evil form of warfare which in turn intensifies other evils of democracy, it does not follow that democracy is a less desirable social order than one which restricts the evils of war. In judging the relative desirability of social orders, they must be compared in all their aspects, total evils being balanced against total benefits, and judgment rendered through comparing the balances of good or evil obtained.

Turning from Mr. Nickerson's social philosophy to the specific hypothesis he advances, one may say that he succeeds in showing that, in European civilization as a whole, the growth of democracy and the development of mass warfare have been more or less concurrent. But so much, surely, has been obvious to anyone with a smattering of history. What Mr. Nickerson *intends* to show is that the growth of democracy has *caused* the development of mass warfare. The fatal defect in his effort to do this lies in his failure to consider, and effectively discredit, the other hypotheses of causation which might account for the concurrence of the two phenomena. Thus, the impartial mind requires a careful examination of the question of whether the development of the art of warfare has not been the cause of the growth of democracy. Above all, the impartial mind requires attention to the question of whether both phenomena may not have been

the concurrent effects of some one underlying cause—such as increasing facility of communication and transportation—or some combination of underlying causes.

As is so well known in the sciences making use of quantitative method and so little appreciated in other lines of intellectual endeavor, mere proof of a correlation creates no presumption whatever with respect to causation. Causation can be determined, if at all, only by very rigorous intellectual processes, which John Stuart Mill attempted to codify in his celebrated "Canons." The assumption of Mr. Nickerson that A is the cause of B because A is accompanied by B is not acceptable to your reviewer because it is utterly too simplistic to be probable in the light of our knowledge of the general complexity of causation in history. On the basis of my own study and reflection it is impossible for me to believe anything else than that a very complicated pattern of factors and reciprocating effects was at work to produce the political and military developments of the last century and a half.

While rejecting Mr. Nickerson's hypothesis as too simple and patently an *a priori* assumption in accord with his social philosophy, one might still accept a demonstration that the two phenomena in question have been highly correlated. But any effort at such demonstration runs up against the difficulty of accounting adequately for the supremely important part played by Germany in the development of mass warfare. This difficulty the author meets by admitting the operation of another evil force which he is at pains to distinguish as "Prussianism." Since the social order of nineteenth-century Germany furnishes one of history's most robust examples of rule by "the rich, the well-born, and the able," this ascribing of peculiar importance to a particular national spirit must be suspect. Beyond that, the device can be turned around against the author's preceding analysis, and the introduction of mass warfare by the French Revolution attributed to "Gallicism" rather than democracy. I must therefore consider the demonstration of a close correlation between democracy and mass warfare to be unsatisfactory.

One may now say that while the book has a thesis it is also a history of the art of war during the period it covers and hence a work which calls for evaluation as an assembling of facts. Such evaluation must at once acknowledge the exceptional learning and acumen of the author as a military historian. His learning is not the forced and narrow learning of the historical sweat-shop worker but the richer and wider learning of a truly cultured scholar. His command of the facts is excellent and shows much probing investigation of what had been obscurities. His appreciation of the significance of facts is keen and often highly stimulating. His presentation of the facts is limpid and flowing, like the waters of an upland stream. He sees military history as a whole and never allows himself to become lost in its minutiae. He has the true instinct of an historian—to tell a true story and tell it well—and this instinct is so strong that his desire to substantiate a thesis is recessive. The style and quality of treatment is quite similar to that found in *Warfare*, by Oliver L. Spaulding, Hoffman

Nickerson, and John W. Wright (New York, 1925). Indeed, the present work may be accepted, in spite of its thesis, as a continuation of *Warfare*, which terminated with the period of Frederick the Great.

DALLAS D. IRVINE

The National Archives

Toward a New Order of Sea Power, by Harold and Margaret Sprout. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. 332. \$3.75.)

Mahan in 1890 produced his first analysis of the methods whereby England gained supreme command of the seas; the Sprouts herewith analyze the stages by which England has lost that commanding position during the half century since Mahan first wrote. The high reputation which this Princeton professor and his wife gained with their *The Rise of American Naval Power* in 1939 is further enhanced by this splendid new volume based on extensive research and presented with lucid clarity. The first volume was a history of American naval policy from 1776 to 1918. The new book covers only a few years but takes the whole world situation into account. In the closing words of the book, they sum up its purpose:

Students of sea power and world politics have long lamented the lack of any comprehensive critique of Mahan in the light of changing world conditions, political and technological. There has hitherto been comparable lack of any detailed treatment of American naval policy and thought from the armistice of 1918 to the Washington Conference. Finally, there is compelling need today for systematic reappraisal of that Conference, from the standpoint of longer historical perspective, and in the light of new information unavailable to earlier writers.

They have met those needs in masterly fashion.

The authors emphasize the fact that, even before 1914, England was no longer able to impose her old *Pax Britannica* by commanding the sea lanes of the world. So long as her principal rivals were European, she could command distant seas by local control of the North Sea, the Channel, Gibraltar, and Suez. The rise of strong new navies in America and Japan made it impossible for England longer to dominate those waters, though the new rivals, in turn, could scarcely hope to replace England in dominating the world naval situation. This situation is the underlying feature of the "new order of sea power."

The passages on the 1919 peace settlement reveal that Wilson used America's ambitious new naval building program as a club to secure British acquiescence in the League of Nations and recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. They also throw interesting light upon Japan's acquisition of the German islands which lie athwart our route to the Far East.

One source which makes their discussion of the Washington Conference more complete than any earlier accounts was their use of the detailed diary kept by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt (Jr.), who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and chief technical adviser to the American delegation. This enables them to take the reader behind the scenes where he can appreciate the adroit tactics which

produced such tangible results. The first Conference chapter is a piece of admirable narrative describing the surprise effect of the American proposals. Later chapters tell of the troubles which arose from the French attitude and the discussion of such controversial topics as submarines, cruisers, and aviation. The attitude toward aerial bombing of battleships, for instance, was influenced by the recent successful tests on the *Ostfriesland*.

One excellent feature of Sprout writing is the frequent lucid summing up of the major aspects. If, for instance, the reader has not time to read the whole book, he will find the gist of it compressed into Chapter XV; if he has a little more time, it can best be spent on the first three chapters which analyze the changing conditions of sea power around the turn of the century. That gift for summarizing distinguished the Sprout volume from another book on naval policy which appeared almost the same week—Arthur J. Marder's *Anatomy of British Sea Power*, covering the years 1880 to 1905. Though it is packed with interesting detail, the reader is likely to "lose sight of the woods because of the trees." That never happens in *Toward a New Order of Sea Power*.

ROBERT G. ALBION

Princeton University

I Saw France Fall; Will She Rise Again? by René de Chambrun. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1940. Pp. 216. \$2.50.)

One of the central historical problems of this present war is the collapse of the French army in June 1940; undoubtedly the future will see many books and articles that will attempt to explain the reasons for this disaster to France. In many ways this little volume by M. Chambrun is just another book written to enlist the sympathy of the United States for France; from another point of view, however, it is a valid historical document not to be overlooked by the scholar who will write the definitive history of this present war. M. Chambrun, a reserve officer, was attached to the fortress troops in the Maginot line, and later transferred to the B. E. F. as a liaison officer. He saw the *Sitzkrieg* from the first row in Lorraine, and then found himself engulfed in the full fury of the *Blitzkrieg* in Belgium and northern France. His historical judgments and his philosophical observations will probably be quite useless to the scholar trying to probe the meaning of this war, but his descriptions of life in the Maginot line, his observations on the B. E. F., and his personal experiences in the maelstrom of May-June 1940 do provide evidence valuable to the student who will try to understand the whole picture of the war.

M. Chambrun's picture of the life under the concrete fortifications and of the psychology of the troops, *Les gars du béton*, as well as his realistic description of the war at the outposts of the lines during the *Sitzkrieg*, are of much more interest to the historian than his attempt to analyze the "soul of Lorraine." His account of the morale of the officers of the B. E. F. will surely be an important source for our understanding of the army that fought from Belgium to Dunkirk. Par-

ticularly interesting is his description of the problems created by the wholesale exodus of civilians in Belgium and northern France. M. Chambrun's story points to the conclusion that the Germans used this method of disrupting the Allied armies as one of their most effective "secret weapons." The attitude of the British toward the unfortunates on the road shocked M. Chambrun beyond words; "the British officers," he writes, "did not seem greatly affected by these scenes. Perhaps . . . they and their fathers have always been accustomed to fighting in foreign countries, and have a detached attitude toward civilian victims of war . . ." (pp. 130-131). His harrowing account of a trip to Dunkirk, with occasional pictures of British and French troops under fire, not only confirms a great American General's view of war but also describes it in some detail.

M. Chambrun's connections with the United States through his mother and his illustrious ancestor, Lafayette, have well equipped him to write for Americans. His style is vivid, and, unlike so many of his countrymen, he has cast his ideas in a mould easily grasped by readers on this side of the Atlantic. The reviewer believes that neither his "rightest" convictions nor his rather thin philosophical explanations prevent M. Chambrun's book from having value to the student of military history.

JOHN B. WOLF

University of Missouri

The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, by Samuel Richey Kamm. (Wheaton, Illinois: privately printed. 1940. Pp. 264. \$2.50.)

The rôle of the businessman in our national development has been long neglected. Too much of our historiography relates to the activities of statesmen and others who have paraded before their generations in the public press and in the political arena. Too infrequently does it recognize in these national figures the mere reflection of fundamental changes to which American captains of industry have been the principal contributors. Our businessmen are especially noticeable in times of crisis when the political leaders are compelled to call to their assistance men of practical experience—men able to organize and create, men able to do more than make stirring patriotic appeals to democratic citizenry. Thomas A. Scott, the subject of the present work, embodied such qualities.

Dr. Kamm's study gives a clear-cut narrative of Colonel Scott's rise to power as one of the great railroad builders of Pennsylvania during the pre-war period. It emphasizes the importance of the methods and tactics of the businessman in the discussion of Scott's part in making the Pennsylvania Railroad the greatest transportation system in the United States by 1860. Scott contributed much to this end by making his road dominant in the Pittsburgh area. It also shows the influence of western Pennsylvania industry in the legislative halls at Harrisburg. Much of local interest is to be found in the references to Scott's dependence upon such vital young men as Andrew Carnegie. Scott, while still a young man, was important politically and was high in the ranks of our economic

leaders at the opening of the Civil War. He was therefore well fitted by experience and through his connections to draw upon and utilize the resources of the nation in such a period of emergency. These characteristics are illustrated very effectively in the contrast drawn between the work of Scott and the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. Scott knew what he was doing and usually achieved his purpose; Cameron knew merely what he wanted.

The volume also shows the vital importance of an adequate system of transportation and communication during modern warfare. In these two fields Scott performed his greatest services for the preservation of the Union. The author has brought to light much interesting material relative to the Northern railroads and telegraph services, especially as they functioned during Lee's invasion of Maryland in 1862. Even more important data are included relative to the part played by these Northern utilities in bringing to a successful conclusion the campaign that ended in the Battle of Gettysburg. The speed exhibited in rebuilding the Federal lines of transportation and communication after the battle had been won is amazing. The study also indicates the importance of the Civil War in accelerating the unification of the railroad and telegraph systems of the United States. In the case of the railroads, it helped to bring about the use of a uniform gauge and gave many valuable object-lessons concerning the transportation of through traffic between distant parts of the country.

Interesting side excursions, such as the incident of Mrs. Greenhow, do not detract from the narrative but tend to show just how intricate is "this business of war" and how frequently statesmen are unable to cope with existing situations. The author analyzes critically, not only Secretary Cameron, but other leaders of the Federal Administration, both in and out of Congress. In most cases responsibility seems squarely placed and blame never flagrantly exaggerated.

General Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan," formulated in the early spring of 1861 and including the outline of the military strategy finally so successful in the West, is unfortunately omitted from the material. In the discussions of various military operations in the Mississippi Valley, some further omissions are apparent to the specialist, but their absence does not detract from the value or interest of the volume for either professional or general readers. An example is Scott's contribution in literally forcing Flag Officer Foote to send two of his gunboats past the Confederate batteries at Island Number Ten, thereby ending a stalemate of a month's duration. The only important bibliographic omissions seem to be the private papers of General John A. McClernand at the Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois, and of Captain Lewis B. Parsons at the Missouri State Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri.

Dr. Kamm is to be congratulated for portraying the work of a great American businessman during the Civil War. The study is especially apropos at this time as the present world emergency calls to the public services many of the economic leaders of the contemporary generation. The leaders of economic activity have given the United States a civilization far superior in material

excellence to any other of which definite records exist. Their work will continue to have a lasting effect on the future course of American civilization, and American historiography, it is to be hoped, will not neglect so long the parts they will play.

THEODORE R. PARKER
University of Pittsburgh

Stonewall Jackson's Way, by John W. Wayland. (Staunton, Virginia: The McClure Company. 1940. Pp. 244. \$4.75.)

This book is a labor of love. Written by an inspired devotee of the astute Stonewall and the Old Dominion through which he moved, it is a sort of militarized Baedeker's guide to certain portions of Virginia and Maryland.

It is a new idea and a good one. It may prove to be the prolific ancestor of a line of such historical writings: the telescoped treatment of a great man's career through the physical scenes of his exploits. With profusion of pictures and maps, and parsimony of words, it uses geography to interpret events. In this day of perfected communication, when all the world is a tourist, it has distinct merits. And for the few who cannot take to the road it offers pleasure in vicarious visits to towns, fields, and houses where their heroes had their being.

If this effort begets others, the offspring doubtless will improve the species: photography and cartography will be more professional; better unity and continuity of narrative will be attained; and more scholarly discipline will be observed in the matter of accepting local tradition in factual details.

This is not to quarrel with the author. Before one is far into the book he has an assured feeling that he is traveling through Virginia on the route followed by Virginia's Old Jack, with a good companion who has steeped himself in all that priceless atmosphere and has gained a thorough, and not over-sentimental, knowledge of it. It is a privilege to go along with him. His amateurish maps and photographs become incidental and auxiliary to the abundant local information and companionship.

This reviewer hopes there may be more and better books written by this method. He feels an urge to take along the book and do the circuitous tour of Jackson's way, beginning at Lexington, April 21, 1861, and ending at Lexington, May 15, 1863. What a course, through what places and events—Winchester—Harpers Ferry—Port Republic—Gaines Mill—Malvern Hill—Manassas—Sharpsburg—Fredericksburg—Chancellorsville!

BRANCH SPALDING

*Fredericksburg and Spottsylvania
National Military Park.*

OTHER RECENT BOOKS**INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE**

The Economic Causes of War, by Lionell Robbins. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 210. \$1.35.)

TOTAL WARFARE

The Labor Cost of the World War to Britain, 1914-1922: A Statistical Analysis, by N. B. Dearle. (New Haven: The Yale University Press. 1940. Pp. 260. \$2.00.) Another volume in the series *An Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by James T. Shotwell.

New Ways of War, by Tom Wintringham. (New York: Penguin Books. 1940. Pp. 128. \$25.) An instructor of the British Home Guard writes on warfare, based on his experience in the Spanish Civil War, and gives his views of the rôle of the civilian forces in total warfare.

Science in War. (New York: Penguin Books. 1940. Pp. 76. \$25.) Another Penguin book on war, this time a symposium of twenty-five scientists on the relation of science and war.

L'Allemagne Face à la Guerre Totale, by General P. Serrigny. (Paris: Grasset. 1940. Pp. 245. Fr. 21.) A noteworthy French underestimation of the German economic and military power.

The Real Rulers of Germany, by Hans Behrend, translated by Charles Ashleigh. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1939. Pp. 230.) The purpose of this book is to show that Hitler's backers are the Junkers, millionaires, bankers, and industrialists.

LAND WARFARE

Muster and Review, by Richard Ager Newhall. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1940. Pp. 194. \$2.50.) A study of English military administration, 1420-1440.

How to Be an Army Officer, by Lieutenant William H. Baumer, Jr. (New York: Robert M. McBride & Company. 1940. Pp. 238. \$1.75.) A handbook for candidates seeking commissions.

If Germany Attacks: The Battle of Depth in the West, by Captain G. C. Wynne. (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 340.) A study of the battle doctrines of the opposing armies on the Western Front at the end of the first World War.

SEA WARFARE

Cruisers in Battle: Naval "Light Cavalry" under Fire, 1914-1918, by Hector C. Bywater. (London: Constable and Company, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 276.) A work based on British and German official naval histories.

AIR WARFARE

Fighting Planes of the World, by Major Bernard A. Law. (New York: Random House. 1940. Pp. 66. \$1.00.) An illustrated volume showing some of the principal types of military planes. The illustrations and editorial comment are distinctly below the standard of Howard Leigh's *Planes of the Great War, 1914-1918*.

Flight Training for the Army and Navy, by Bur Leyson. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1940. Pp. 307. \$2.50.) A handbook for pilots compiled from official publications of the Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service.

ESTABLISHMENTS*Great Britain*

H. M. S.: His Majesty's Ships and Their Forbears, by Cecil King. (New York: The Studio Publications. 1940. Pp. 389. \$4.00.) A history of the ships of the Royal British Navy.

Squadrons Up: A Firsthand Story of the R. A. F., by Noel Monks. (New York: Whittlesey House, 1941. Pp. 260. \$2.50.) The exploits of Squadrons 1 and 73 in France as told by the military correspondent of the *London Daily Mail*.

United States

Where They Have Trod: The West Point Tradition in American Life, by R. Ernest Dupuy. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. 1940. Pp. 424. \$3.00.) An account of the United States Military Academy with a record of the men, movements, critical issues, customs, reforms, and survivals which have shaped its character. To be reviewed.

The University Greys, by Maude Morrow Brown. (Richmond: Garrett & Massie, 1940. Pp. 265. \$2.00.) A history of Company A, 11th Mississippi Infantry, Confederate States Army.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

Washington and the Revolution: A Reappraisal, by Bernard Knollenberg. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 269. \$3.00.) A study of Washington's relations with Gates, Conway, and the Continental Congress.

George Washington as the French Knew Him, edited by Gilbert Chinard. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1940. Pp. 347. \$2.50.) Impressions of Washington from the memoirs of French officers and travelers, ably translated and edited.

Lone Star Preacher: Being a Chronicle of the Acts of Praxiteles Swan, M. E. Church South, Sometime Chaplain, Fifth Texas Regiment, Confederate States Provisional Army, by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Thomason. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1942. Pp. 296. \$2.75.) A historical novel in the modern manner illustrated by the author with the pen sketches which, since the appearance of his *Fix Bayonets*, have made him stand out among military artists. To be reviewed.

With Custer's Cavalry, by Katherine Gibson Fougera. (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 285. \$3.00.)

World War I

'*These Men*', by Maurice J. and Lilli Swetland. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1940. Pp. 312. \$2.50.) An account of the American forces serving on the Western Front, describing the individual action of the men of the 27th New York Division in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line and containing over seven hundred individual citations for bravery in battle.

World War II

The War: First Year, by Edgar McInnis. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1940. Pp. 312. \$1.50.) A short history of the first year of the present war by a professor of history at the University of Toronto. The author presents a straight narrative account and avoids critical analysis of the war. Included are maps, chronological tables, texts of documents, and an index.

A Record of the War: The First Quarter, September-November 1939, by Sir Ronald Storrs. (London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 391.) The first in a series of four volumes on the first year of the war.

Vanguard to Victory, by Skene Catling. (London: Methuen and Company. 1940. Pp. 235.) An account of the B. E. F. during its first six months in France, based on the author's daily dispatches while serving as a Reuters' war correspondent.

Le Operazioni Militari in Polonia e in Occidente, by General Ottavio Zoppi. (Milan: Instituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 1940. Pp. 170. L. 13.) An analysis of the first months of the war by an Italian soldier.

Juggernaut over Holland, by Elco Nicolas van Kleffens. (New York: The Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 195. \$4.00.) An account of the Nazi conquest of Holland by the Dutch Foreign Minister. To be reviewed.

De Gaulle and the Coming Invasion of Germany, by James Marlow. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company. 1940. Pp. 95. \$1.00.) A study of the leader of the Free French forces and wishful thinking in the face of a threatened invasion of Britain.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

"National Defense and Political Science," by Edward Mead Earle, in *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1940 (LV, 481-95.) An argument for the study of military problems by civilian scholars.

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

"The Social Types of War," by Hans Speier, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 445-54). An analysis of war as types of social conflict.

"The Social Function of War: Observations and Notes," by Robert E. Park, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 551-70). An analysis of war as a political institution.

"An Anthropological Analysis of War," by Bronislaw Malinowski, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 521-50). The relationship between institutions and warfare.

"Some Biological Considerations about War," by Raymond Pearl, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 487-503). An analysis of the basic biological principles underlying belligerent behavior.

"The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace," by Franz Alexander, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 504-20). An analysis of conditions under which peace is possible.

"War and Civilization in the Future," by Frederick J. Teggart, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 582-90). The effect of modern warfare upon civilization.

"The Garrison State," by Harold D. Lasswell, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 455-68). An analysis of the characteristics of the future State in which soldiers will replace business men as the ruling elite.

TOTAL WARFARE

"Wehrwirtschaft: Economics of the Military State," by Henry William Spiegel, in *The American Economic Review*, December 1940 (XXX, 713-23). An analysis of recent German thought on the subject.

"German Planning for Total War," by Fletcher Pratt, in *Harpers Magazine*, February 1941 (CLXXXII, 225-37). A description of the staff planning system used by Germany.

"The Defense of the United States," edited by John A. Krout, in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, January 1941 (XIX, 1-146). A series of addresses and papers read at the Academy's annual meeting in November 1940. They cover all major aspects of the problem of defense, including organization, strategy, naval policy, technological research, finance, economics, and labor.

"The Control of War Preparations in the United States," by Carl Brent Swisher in *The American Political Science Review*, December 1940 (XXXIV, 1085-1103). Discussion of the creation and control of emergency agencies designed to perform war functions, with special reference to World War experience.

"Democracy Demoralized: The French Collapse," by Hadley Cantrill, Donald Rugg, and F. W. Williams, in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, December 1940 (IV, 630-51). An analysis of the French defeat in terms of failing public morale.

"The Only Way England Can Win," by Fritz Sternberg, in *The American Mercury*, December 1940 (LII, 427-34). A five-fold increase in British and American industrial output is held to be essential to match German production.

"British Strategy in Europe, 1803-1814," by Major-General Sir W. D. Bird, in *Army Quarterly*, July 1940 (XL, 299-308).

"Britain and the Axis in the Near East," by Albert Viton, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1941 (XIX, 370-84). The strategic positions of Italy and Britain in the eastern Mediterranean.

"Canadian Economy in Two Wars," by Grant Dexter, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1941 (XIX, 442-52). A comparison.

"War and Technology," by Waldemar Kaempffert, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, January 1941 (XLVI, 431-44). Traces the technological relations of military progress to industry and science.

"Railroads in National Defense, 1829-1848," by E. G. Campbell, in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December 1940 XXVII, 361-78. The influence of considerations of defense on the expansion of the railroads in the United States.

"Transportation and Defense," by Frank C. Hanighen, in *Harpers Magazine*, February 1941 (CLXXXII, 303-12).

"Air Raid Shelters," by C. G. Flebes, in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1941 XXXIII, 37-42. A semi-technical survey by an engineer with broad European experience.

"The Use of Atrocity Stories in War," by Francis O. Wilcox, in *The American Political Science Review*, December 1940 XXXIV, 1167-78. An analysis based largely on Italy's use of atrocity stories in the Abyssinian campaign.

LAND WARFARE

"The Panoply of War," by Lieutenant-Colonel B. Granville Baker, in *Army Quarterly*, July 1940 (XL, 336-41).

"An Analysis of the New Organization of General Engineer Units," by Captain Colby M. Myers, in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1941 (XXXIII, 21-25).

"Maps from an Artilleryman's Viewpoint," by Major Thomas North, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, January 1941 pp 20-30. A review of modern American cartography and its application to military purposes.

"French Transportation and Supply in 1914-1918," in *Army Quarterly*, July 1940 (XL, 342-44).

Combat

"Attack or Defense," by Major Thomas R. Phillips, in *Army Quarterly*, July 1940 (XL, 209-33).

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

CHANNEL ISLAND DEFENSE, ABOUT 1691

Sometime during the War of the English Succession (1689-97), the English Privy Council received a complaint from the Island of Jersey concerning that island's defense needs. Its source remains a mystery although the statement itself conveys the impression of at least a semi-official as well as a local and well-informed origin, with the author speaking for the whole body of inhabitants. The date can only be conjectured. Since the "abstract" refers to "their Majesties' service," the document was obviously composed sometime before Queen Mary's death in 1695. Likewise, since "His Majesty," specified in the first item, was undoubtedly William III, who became king on February 23, 1689, the reference to "about 2 years ago" suggests the first part of 1691 as the earliest possible date, with the likelihood that somewhat later is to be preferred. Channel Island defense would scarcely have appeared among the most pressing problems of the new reign.

The document is to be found in the papers of John, third Earl of Bridgewater.¹ This gentleman (1646-1701) had the varied if somewhat conventional career of the great magnate. As Viscount Brackley, a courtesy title, he sat for Buckinghamshire in the only parliament of James II. In 1686 he succeeded to the peerage. The following year saw his removal from the Lord Lieutenancy of Bucks on the ground of disaffection. This eclipse ended with the Revolution of 1688 which he whole-heartedly accepted. He regained his Lord Lieutenancy and became a Privy Councillor and first commissioner of trade and plantations. In 1699 he was appointed first commissioner for executing the office of the Lord High Admiral. On the important occasion of the second reading of the Irish Forfeitures Bill in 1700, and in the absence of Lord Chancellor Somers, he presided over the House of Lords. He had an excellent reputation as man

¹ Ellesmere Collection, El 9800, in the Huntington Library. The old catalog of the Ellesmere Collection gives no clues concerning its provenance. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the Library authorities. For convenience, the spelling and punctuation have been modernized and the contractions expanded.

and citizen, a reputation which a casual reading of his numerous papers will sustain.

There is little need to comment upon the contents of this "abstract"; the details speak for themselves. Yet, in addition to its genuine intrinsic importance, the document now possesses an additional interest. Much of the complaint, *mutatis mutandis*, might have been composed within the past few months. The corrupt contractor, the defense shelters totally unfit for the pounding to be anticipated, the irritation of the inhabitants, the convoy needs for maintaining island trade, the opportunities for destroying French commerce, and the desirability of strengthening defenses are all there. Indeed, with not too great effort, stretching of the imagination, or twisting of phrases, the manuscript could be redated and modified in such a way as to bear every indication of verisimilitude for the very recent past. The old saw about history repeating itself, no matter how invalid when viewed in historical perspective, has the pragmatic value of counteracting some hysterical cries about the uniqueness of recent events.

CHARLES F. MULLETT

Abstract of some matters relating to their Majesties' service and the safety of their Majesties' Island of Jersey humbly offered to his Majesty and to right honorable the Lords of his Majesty's most honorable Privy-Council.

1 Concerning the new barracks.

1stly His Majesty was graciously pleased about 2 years ago for the safety and defense of his Majesty's castle of Elizabeth and for the ease and relief of the inhabitants who suffered extremely by the continual quartering of soldiers upon them, to allow about £5000 for the building of new barracks in the said castle. John Fitch, Esq., undertook and contracted with his Majesty for the building of the said barracks. The said Fitch hath notoriously deceived his Majesty in that building and thereby defeated his Majesty's gracious intention towards us, first, in setting up the said barracks in the most improper place of all the castle, the most exposed to storms, and to the enemy's shot from without, and part of them on false and new made ground, and making besides the roof of the said barracks too extreme wide that whereas the inhabitants in the greatest shelters dare not make those of their houses above 18 or at most 20 feet wide, this in the most exposed place of the whole island is made 40 feet wide, and there wants a 3rd part of the timber for a good and strong roof.

2dly In pulling down many good and useful lodgings better than any he hath built merely to have the materials, though he himself was bound by contract to provide all materials at his own charge.

3dly In breaking the said contract almost in every other article of it, and making in general so slight a building that it hath not been able to stand up a year, but part of the roof is already fallen down to the ground and the rest is in so tottering a condition that it cannot long subsist; the soldiers are removed out of the castle and disposed of up and down the island in houses hired purposely for them at the public charge of the inhabitants, whereby the oppression which his Majesty did graciously intend to relieve us from continueth, and his Majesty's castle of Elizabeth in this time of danger without its necessary garrison.

Wherefore it is humbly prayed that a speedy remedy be applied to those evils which threaten the ruin of the island by ordering the above said undertaker,

1. To transport the barracks into a fitter place.
2. To build them up anew (in such a place) at his charge answerably to the agreement contracted with his Majesty.
3. To pay the cost and damages the island has been and is still at in finding lodgings for the garrison through his default.

2 Concerning the old barracks.

When the new barracks were built, money was allowed and order given to Mr. Fitch to repair the old ones, but instead of doing that he pulled down the best of them (as is said before) and did so little to any purpose to the rest that by a letter from Jersey of the 23rd of January last, advice is given that they are so ruinous and out of repair that the major of the garrison threatens to send the 3 companies (which of the whole battalion is all that remains in the castle) to be quartered upon the country whereby not so much as one soldier will remain in the castle and the inhabitants contrary to his Majesty's gracious intentions will be more than ever oppressed. Whereupon it is humbly moved,

1. That Mr. Fitch be called to account about the said old barracks, and that compensation be made by him for those he pulled down with necessity and merely to convert the materials to his own uses.
2. That as many of those old barracks as are left standing be forthwith repaired.
3. That his Majesty's storekeeper in the island be authorized to lay out money from time to time in contingent and necessary repairs of the said barracks, it being evident that what would cost his Majesty but £20, if remedied in time, doth often want of such authority, and before a return can be had from England stand him some hundreds of pounds.

3 Concerning the guns of the bulwark.

The inhabitants have lately on such places as are most exposed to the enemy's descent raised at their own proper charge several bulwarks or batteries for guns.

His Majesty by an Order of Council of the 3d November last has been graciously pleased to give them 45 taperboard demy cannon with carriages to be planted on the said batteries.

It is humbly prayed,

1. That it be expressed that the said carriages are intended to be standing or land carriages and not ship carriages only which we conceive will be useless in those batteries.
2. That ladles, sponges, cartouches, and all other necessary appurtenances not mentioned in the Order together with a proportionable quantity of powder and shot, be added to the said guns.
3. That his Majesty would be pleased to allow one or more transport ships with a convoy for the safe carrying over the said guns into the island.

4 Arms of the Militia.

The number of arms in the island and of men actually in service may be about two thousand five hundred. But there being about 500 more husky young fellows able to serve his Majesty but so poor that they cannot provide themselves arms at their own charges, his Majesty is humbly prayed to give us out of his stores that number of firelocks, bandoliers, and swords (vizt. 500) to be distributed by the officers of the militia to such as want them and are not able to provide themselves.

5 Convoys for our merchantmen.

The manufacture of stockings is the staple trade of the islands which used to be vended into England and into France. The trade with France ceased by the war, that with England is much interrupted by the taking of many of our vessels for want of convoys; therefore it is humbly desired that his Majesty would be graciously pleased ('till such time as he can spare the frigates to attend these islands) to order such men of war as sail to and from these islands, or that cruise that way, to convoy all such merchantmen as are ready to sail with them, that the trade and intercourse with England may be in some measure restored.

6 Small frigates to cruise about the islands.

The chief trade of the French at present is betwixt St. Malo and Havre de Grace and so up to Rouen and Paris, and because they dare not often venture into the Channel (fearing the English men of war) their common and usual way is through the islands, which therefore we humbly conceive to be a very proper station for some of his Majesty's lesser frigates who would at the same time both annoy the enemy and be a security to the islands.

Lastly. It is humbly moved that the state of their Majesties' ancient castle of Montorgueil, formerly so strong a bulwark against France, together with St. Aubin's fort which commands the road, both at present quite out of repair, be taken into consideration.²

² This last article is in a different hand from the rest, but no particular significance attaches to the change.

"LEWIS' MAP OF 1806"

In the Spring 1940 issue of the JOURNAL (IV, 64), "W. O. T." asked where the original is of the "map copied by Nicholas King in 1806 from one sent to President Jefferson by Meriwether Lewis." King's copy was reproduced in Elliott Coues' *History of the Expedition under the Command of Captains Lewis and Clark*¹ and is well known as "Lewis' map of 1806." No definite answer can be given to the specific query, but the history of this interesting map may be instructive since several misconceptions concerning it have persisted. In spite of repeated statements to the contrary² and of the note in

¹ (New York, 1893) IV, pocket. This is a facsimile of King's manuscript copy which is in the map collection of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. 51, now in The National Archives. So far as is known this is the only extant manuscript copy of this map although at least two appear to have been made as will be seen below. Whether this is one of those two or is a third retained in the War Department at the time is not known. The title block of this map is reproduced herewith.

² See [Samuel L. Mitchell,] "Lewis's Map of the Parts of North America which lie between the 35th and 51st Degrees of North Latitude, from the Mississippi and the upper Lakes to the Pacific Ocean," *The Medical Repository, and Review of American Publications on Medicine, Surgery, and the Auxiliary Branches of Science*, IX (2nd Hexade, vol. III, 1806), 315-18; Arnold Hague, "An Early Map of the Far West," *Science: An Illustrated Journal*, X (November 4, 1887), 217-18; Coues, *op. cit.*, I, 221, n. 4; Reuben G. Thwaites, *Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1804-1806* (New York, 1904-1905), I, 244, n. 2; Walter Thiele, *Official Map Publications* (Chicago, 1938), p. 107.

the title block of King's copy, the original was drawn by William Clark rather than by Lewis, it was made in 1805 rather than 1806, and it was sent by Lewis to the Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn, rather than to Jefferson. The evidence for these assertions is as follows.

Of the two officers Clark was the acknowledged cartographer, only one of the many known maps of the expedition being the work of Lewis.³ While they were wintering at Fort Mandan, Clark wrote in his journal on January 5, 1805, that ". . . I employ my Self Drawing a Connection of the Countrey from what information I have recved . . .," and two days later he noted that ". . . I continue to Draw a connected plott from the information of Traders, Indians & my own observation & ideas . . .".⁴ Clark may have been referring to the two sketches of the region between Fort Mandan and the Rocky Mountains reproduced by Thwaites,⁵ but it seems more probable that the two sketches were preliminary to the "connected plott" which he was drafting. If no more had been shown on the map sent to Washington than is shown on the sketches, King's "copy" would have been far more his own work than that of either Clark or Lewis.

In a letter to Jefferson of April 7, 1805, moreover, Lewis indicated a more complete map than the two sketches can possibly be considered and, further, that it covered a considerably wider field, including the Columbia River:

. . . I have transmitted to the Secretary at War, every information relative to the geography of the country which we possess, together with a view of the Indian nations, containing information relative to them, on those points with which I conceived it important that the government should be informed . . . The map, which has been forwarded to the Secretary at War, will give you the idea we entertain of the connection of these rivers [the Missouri and the Columbia], which has been formed from the corresponding testimony of a number of Indians who have visited that country, and who have been separately & carefully examined on that subject, and we therefore think it entitled to some degree of confidence . . .⁶

In this letter Lewis did not imply that the map was his own; on the contrary, the distinction made between the singular and plural pronoun appears to

³ Thwaites, *op. cit.*, VIII, v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 244-46.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII, plates 12 and 13. These are facsimiles of manuscripts in the Voorhis collection (*ibid.*, I, l-liii).

⁶ Jefferson papers, vol. 148, sheets 25878-25880, in the Library of Congress; extracts printed, with variations, in *American State Papers: Indian Affairs* (Washington, 1832-61), I, 706. A curious misprint occurs in a portion of this letter which is not quoted above but which is of significance to the present discussion. Lewis' original letter spoke of the "transportation of our baggage . . . from the Missouri to the Columbia river," and it is the reference to these two rivers which is the antecedent to which "the connection of these rivers" refers in the above quotation. Jefferson transmitted it correctly to Congress (Senate doc. 113, 9th Cong., 1st Sess., in The National Archives, 9A-E2; House of Representatives, 9th Cong., 1st Sess., volume of messages from the President, 1805-06, in the Library of Congress) but in the printing *Columbia* became *Cumberland*.

MAP

of part of the Continent of

North America

Between the 35th and 55th degrees of North Latitude, and extending from 89th Degree of West Longitude to the Pacific Ocean.

Compiled from the Authorities of the best informed travellers, by M. Lewis.

Note. The Missouri River from Fort Mandan in Lat 47° 21' 47" N, and in Long° 101° West, from the Meridian of Greenwich, is corrected by celestial observations. The Country West of Fort Mandan is laid down principally from Indian informants.

Copied by Nicholas King, 1806.

Scale 30 miles to an inch.

TITLE BLOCK OF "LEWIS' MAP OF 1806"

Courtesy of The National Archives.

confirm the probability that it was Clark's map which Lewis, as commander of the expedition, had transmitted.

Certainly this letter indicates clearly that it was sent to the Secretary of War rather than to the President,⁷ but, if additional evidence is needed, it is only necessary to note that Lewis' very detailed invoice of the articles sent to Jefferson does not include a map or sketch of any kind.⁸ Furthermore, Dr. Mitchell, then United States Senator from New York as well as editor of *The Medical Repository* and particularly interested in such matters, stated that the map had ". . . been forwarded to the Secretary at War; and, under the direction of Gen. Dearborn, other copies have been made for the inspection of Congress . . .".⁹

Jefferson, in transmitting Lewis' letter and King's copy of the map to Congress on February 19, 1806, did not indicate that the original map had been sent to him, but he did imply, if not actually state, that it had been made by Lewis rather than by Clark:

. . . A letter of the preceding day, April 7th, from Captain Lewis is herewith communicated. During his stay among the Mandans he had been able to lay down the Missouri according to courses and distances taken on his passage up it, corrected by frequent observations of longitude and latitude, and to add to the actual survey of this portion of the river a general map of the country between the Mississippi and Pacific from the thirty-fourth to the fifty-fourth degree of latitude. These additions are from information collected from Indians with whom he had opportunities of communicating during his journey and residence with them. Copies of this map are now presented to both Houses of Congress¹⁰

King's title block likewise gives Lewis credit for the original, but these are natural errors since Lewis transmitted the map without specifically naming its author.

The map was obviously made between January 5 and April 7, 1805, but when it was received in the War Department,¹¹ copied by King, and forwarded to Jefferson is not known. Dr. Mitchell explained that the map was not to be published until Lewis and Clark returned as ". . . it is expected these new facts in geography will form a part, and a most valuable one too, of their book of travels in the west . . .". Their return made the map obsolete, however, for there could have been at that time no purpose in distributing a map known

⁷ It should be noted, however, that there is no record of its having been received in the office of the Secretary of War, but the entries for letters in the registry books of that period are very brief and the document files incomplete. Two letters were received from Lewis dated at Fort Mandan on April 6, 1805, but neither of these is extant so that it is impossible to determine what enclosures may have been sent with them (Secretary of War, Letters Received, vol. 2, L-267 and L-291, in The National Archives).

⁸ Jefferson papers, vol. 148, sheet 25876.

⁹ Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

¹⁰ *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, I, 705-706. The maps sent "to both Houses of Congress" are not on file.

¹¹ The two letters from Lewis to the Secretary of War, referred to above, were not received until July 16 and September 16, 1805. Jefferson received his letter from Lewis on July 13, 1805.

as a result of subsequent exploration to be inaccurate. It appears to have been published for the first time in 1887¹² and was republished by Coues in 1893.

Its significance lies in the fact that it shows the extent of Lewis' and Clark's geographic knowledge of the vast country between the Mississippi and the Pacific before they had crossed it. Their conception of the Missouri River and of the coast line was quite accurate, but their information about the interior of the Pacific Northwest was very meager. They drew heavily upon British maps of that region,¹³ and it is not without interest to note that Mackenzie's erroneous connection of the Fraser and Columbia Rivers was thereby perpetuated for many years on the best American maps. Since Lewis and Clark did not see the upper Columbia, Clark's later well known map embodying the results of the expedition¹⁴ showed that portion of the river essentially as it had appeared on Mackenzie's map and on King's copy. The Pacific Northwest as shown on this later map by Clark was, in turn, followed exactly by the famous cartographer John Melish, who did not correct the error until 1822.¹⁵

JESSE S. DOUGLAS

¹² As a folded insert with Hague's article cited above. This is not a facsimile and is considerably smaller than Coues' reproduction which is itself reduced nearly one-third. The outer border dimensions of King's manuscript copy are 30.5 inches, vertically, by 43.75 inches, horizontally.

¹³ King's copy shows evidence of the use of the two charts of the Northwest coast in George Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, and Round the World* (London, 1798), IV (atlas); of the map in Alexander Mackenzie, *Voyages from Montreal, on the River St. Laurence, through the Continent of North America, to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans, in the Years 1789 and 1793* (London, 1801); and of A. Arrowsmith, "A Map Exhibiting All New Discoveries in the Interior Parts of North America" (London, 1802).

¹⁴ First published in Paul Allen's edition of the *History of the Expedition under the Command of Captains Lewis and Clark* (Philadelphia, 1814). A facsimile of this map also appears in Coues, *op. cit.*, IV, pocket.

¹⁵ Twenty known editions of Melish's map of the United States and contiguous territories were published between 1816 and 1823. For a more extensive discussion of them in this connection see my "Matthews' Adventures on the Columbia: A Pacific Fur Company Document," *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, XL (June 1939), 118-20, n. 41 and 42.

OUR NATIONAL GUARD

AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY¹

BY FREDERICK P. TODD

ONLY a Guardsman can understand the Guard. Only one who has sacrificed his time, his money, his friends, and often even his civil career to be a citizen-soldier can appreciate the psychology of those who have done likewise. To laymen and military professionals the pleasure derived by these men from hard and unrequited labor doesn't make sense. For, as Captain Liddell Hart has written of its British counterpart, the National Guard "defies logic."²

In Washington's words, some men have "a natural fondness for Military parade." Whatever may be the exact cause—and there are many—there are persons who enjoy military life and who will join together to indulge this taste. In them is evident the same sort of spirit so noticeable today in amateur sports, a spirit which William James recognized in *The Moral Equivalent of War*. On the other hand, the bulk of our citizenry has little interest in military affairs, either from temperament or lack of contact with it. While willing to serve in an emergency or to train as a national obligation, they would never do so of their own free will.

The failure of most Americans to understand this phenomenon, this "amateur military spirit," has permitted it to go undistinguished from all other forms of civilian participation in military matters. Every soldier who was not a Regular has been labeled either militiaman, conscript, or volunteer, but no one has cared to penetrate beyond these generalities. For this reason the history of the National Guard remains yet to be written, indeed yet to be studied.³

The word "militia" has in the past been given three widely different meanings. In its broadest sense it covers all citizens who could be called out in an emergency to defend the country, our able bodied manpower. In a narrower sense—the one most commonly used in America—it refers to those citizens, roughly between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, who were enrolled by law in regularly organized units. This is its most accurate meaning, but here it is necessary to point out that the units of which this militia was composed fell

¹ The continuation of this study is to be published in the following issue.

² *The British Way in Warfare* (London, 1932), pp. 259-79. This chapter is unusually effective in pointing out the institutional similarity between our National Guard and the British Territorial Army.

³ Histories exist for the Guard of a few States, notably William P. Clarke, *Official History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania* (3 Vols., Philadelphia, 1902-12), and Major John H. Nankivell, *History of the Military Organizations of the State of Colorado, 1860-1935* (Denver, 1935). Adequate histories exist of some of the older regiments. In most instances, however, these are largely fraternal in character, and little effort is made to study the organization in the framework of contemporary military and political events.

into two distinct classes. It is from the third use of the word "militia," describing either of these subordinate classes, that most of our confusion arises.

The two classes of militia were fundamentally different, but, in spite of the recognition this difference has been accorded in the past, it has all too often been missed by later military writers. The first of these classes was usually called "Volunteer Militia" or simply "Volunteers," and the second was known as "common militia." These are the terms which are used in this article. The former class had uniforms, arms, equipment, training, *esprit de corps*, and organization—perhaps only of a sort, but none the less real. The latter class possessed none of these attributes and had little desire to obtain them.

The National Guard, popular belief and legislation to the contrary, is not descended from the common militia. In fact, its development has been in opposition to, and frequently in spite of, this body. It is a lineal descendant of the Volunteer corps, for the Guardsman is essentially an amateur soldier; the militiaman was ever a civilian.

Put briefly, the common militia was an impractical political concept, the Volunteer an inescapable military reality. Failure to understand this has meant failure to harness fully this great amateur force. We have experimented no end with professionals and the indifferent to the neglect of our enthusiasts. The intelligent use of amateur activity is not alone a military problem; it applies to all sciences and professions subject to emergency expansion. Outlets must be carefully prepared and delicate balances preserved, but that nation which has directed its volunteer soldiery along useful channels has gone a long way in solving its problems of national defense.

America's failure to do this is reflected in our uncertainty even today over the very reason for the Guard's existence. Is it being supported to preserve domestic tranquillity, or to assist in the national defense, or to stimulate a military spirit, or to act as a safety valve for our more martial citizenry? Since we have not answered these questions, we are faced with another. Whom does the Guard serve? The oft repeated sophistry of dual function only evades the problem. The soldier must be the first to recognize that he cannot serve two masters. Like many another of our military issues, this awaits a fearless solution.

The American Volunteer, 1755-1783

There still persists a popular American fancy that, following the defeat of Braddock's command on the banks of the Monongahela in 1755, colonial ingenuity came to the fore and devised a system of irregular tactics which at length gave the British victory over the French. There is little doubt that men like Washington saw the absurdity of fighting Indians in stiff formations and high brass hats, but as a matter of fact the men who brought about this revolutionary change were four or five British and Swiss professionals. We Americans relied on militia and thereby perpetuated an institution which has

caused more suffering and waste than all of our other military institutions put together.

The provincial forces in the French and Indian War included three kinds of troops: rangers, militia, and uniformed volunteers. No absolute lines were drawn between these types, but nevertheless they were distinct enough. The rangers were selected scouts and hunters, serving under the tough discipline of captains like Rogers, Stark, and Gorham. Crack shots and indefatigable on the march, they were a scourge to the French and Indians. Their type reappears throughout all our early history, on the fringe of the army as scout or skirmisher—indispensable, but always the irregular.

The militia, which formed the bulk of the force, was composed of ordinary civilians. They were raised by a simple prescription which later became painfully familiar. Each spring the legislature of a colony authorized a certain number of men for the particular "expedition against the French" to be carried out that summer. By foul means and fair a collection of farmer boys, apprentices, and village loafers was signed up or drafted out of the militia. Sometimes they were furnished a blanket and parts of their equipment, but often as not they were allowed money to buy these articles for themselves. Then, without training, under officers who knew little or nothing more than they of fighting, these miserable contingents were sent off into the trackless forest. Hundreds died or deserted, and in the fall the survivors returned, sick and thoroughly disgusted. Next spring the same travesty had to be repeated for the campaign rendered inevitable by the impotence of the preceding one. Little wonder that few ever reenlisted. Little wonder, indeed, that a deserter from Fort Ontario in 1756 left this note tied to a stone:

Gentlemen, You seem surprized at our Desertion, but youl not be surprized if you'l Consider that we have been starved with Hunger & Cold in the Winter, and that we have received no pay for seven or eight Months; Now we have no Cloaths and you cheat us out of our allowance of Rum and half our working money.⁴

The uniformed volunteer was the third class, and they were supplied by Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. From this last colony came their archetype, the New Jersey Blues commanded by one Peter Schuyler. Now Schuyler was a provincial, but he was also an accomplished soldier. To practical woods fighting he had added the science to be learned from books. He appears to have been strongly impressed by the new light infantry which enlightened regulars like Bouquet, Howe, and Wolfe had just inaugurated in America, and he equipped and trained his regiment accordingly. He cut the skirts from his men's coats and the hair from their heads, gave each of them buckskin breeches and stout leggings, a hatchet, and a good musket imported from England. The Blues were as well uniformed as the regulars and were proud of it. Although it returned

⁴ Quoted in Stanley M. Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765* (New York, 1936), p. 202. See also his *Lord Loudon in North America* (New Haven, 1933), pp. 83-103, for an interesting study of provincial militia.

home, the regiment was not disbanded after every campaign and so developed a strong sense of continuity and *esprit de corps*.⁵

The New Jersey Blues did not consider themselves as militiamen; they were volunteer light infantry. Their record was excellent. As the regiment passed through New York in 1758 the newspapers commented on the men's "handsome appearance" and called them "the likeliest well-set Men as has perhaps turned out on any Campaign." An officer who saw it in the field two years later spoke of the Blues as "a well disciplined, regular Corps," with "the Men in their blue Uniform faced with Scarlet." With justifiable pride Governor Bernard of New Jersey reported to the Royal government that it was "universally allowed to be the best Provincial Regiment in America."⁶ It was this because: (1) it was established as a distinctive unit on as permanent a basis as the circumstances required; (2) it was commanded by the best military minds available who, if not regulars, had imagination, energy, and experience; (3) it was adequately trained for the work at hand; and (4) it was fully, neatly, and intelligently clothed, armed, and equipped. New Jersey put only one regiment in the field but did it well.

Over a decade elapsed before the Colonists were at war again. Yet long before the new conflict broke out it was obvious that some steps had to be taken to set up a force which would carry on in the initial stages. As an answer, Massachusetts established the minute-men, the traditional American citizen-soldier. A careful examination of their services is not encouraging, however. Prior to the clashes at Concord and Lexington (upon which their sole claim to fame rests), the minute companies of Massachusetts were only partially organized. They melted away and disappeared within a few weeks thereafter. The idea, or perhaps it was the name, appealed to the Continental Congress, and in July 1775 this body recommended the organizations of one-fourth of the total militia of each colony into minute companies. These were to receive double training and greater pay and were to be available for instant service, if necessary, in other colonies. But Massachusetts did not think enough of them to revive her companies, and the other colonies met with universally discouraging apathy and inefficiency. The entire scheme seems to have been abolished or forgotten by the campaign of 1776.⁷

The soldiers who did count for something in the early years of the Revolution were not the militia, which Washington called his "broken staff." They were the same two kinds which had counted in the French and Indian War. From

⁵ *New Jersey Archives*, 1st ser., IX, 184-86; David L. Pierson, *History of the Oranges to 1921* (3 vols., New York, 1922), I, 77-81; Thomas Mante, *The History of the Late War in North-America* (London, 1772), pp. 29-30.

⁶ *New York Mercury*, June 5, 1758; *Commissary Wilson's Orderly Book . . .* (Albany, 1857), p. 28 n.; *New Jersey Archives*, 1st ser., IX, 174.

⁷ Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 32 ff.; Hugh Jameson, "A Note on the Minute-Men," *Journal of the American Military Institute*, IV (Winter 1940), 258-60.



MECHANIC INFANTRY OF BOSTON
A typical Volunteer unit of the 1850's, from the music cover of
"Capt. Adams Quick Step" (Boston, 1853).

the frontier came riflemen, and from the cities came uniformed volunteers. The story of the former is too well known to require mention here; for irregular fighting they were, as always, unbeatable. The troops that steadied the uncertain lines of Washington's force at Long Island and White Plains, who were the backbone of the Continental Army until it had been whipped into veteran estate, were units like Smallwood's Maryland and Haslet's Delaware Battalions, superbly equipped regiments of the finest men in those colonies; Hand's Pennsylvania Rifle Corps, the oldest of the Line; Alexander Hamilton's excellent New York Battery, now Battery D, 5th U. S. Field Artillery; Knox's Artillery Regiment from Massachusetts; Greene's fine, disciplined infantry from Rhode Island; and several others. The background of each of these units is a story in itself, but in every one is discernible the peculiar characteristics of the New Jersey Blues, the proof marks of the elite volunteer organization.⁸

Before the Revolution had officially ended the founders of our nation commenced to grapple with the problems of our future military establishment. In 1783 Congress asked Washington for his "sentiments" on this topic, and he in turn sought the suggestions of his principal subordinates. The replies of these men, their experience of seven long and bitter years of warfare fresh in their minds, show remarkable unanimity and foresight. In recent years a careful analysis of these opinions has been made by General John McAuley Palmer.⁹ It is not an exaggeration to say that, had the proposals of Washington or Steuben regarding militia been adopted, we would have secured in 1783 substantially what we are only now reaching after a century and a half of bloody, costly experience.

In essence, the proposals called for a small standing army and a *well organized* militia, a force which could produce fine regiments like Haslet's and Smallwood's. All condemned the old militia system which had poured thousands of ignorant and spiritless civilians onto the battlefield. The methods of securing this well organized militia varied, but in general they specified the superior training of a small or "select" fraction of the male population under uniform Federal supervision. This fraction might be selected on the basis of a limited compulsory service, by age or by lot, or by the judicious employment of the already existing independent volunteer companies. The latter method was politically the most expedient, although all realized the difficulties to be encountered in harnessing these units. Washington summarized this method in 1783 as follows:

. . . I conceive it will be eligible to select from the district forming a Regiment [of common militia, i.e., register of the able bodied men in the district] the flower of the young men to compose an additional or light Company to every Regiment, for the purposes before specified, which undoubtedly ought to be the case unless something like

⁸ Noah Brooks, *Henry Knox* (New York, 1900), pp. 19-22, 34 ff.; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2d ser., X, 1-42, 303-90; George W. Greene, *The Life of Nathaniel Greene* (New York, 1867-71), I, 71 ff.; Clarke, *op. cit.*, I, 135 ff.; Henry P. Johnston, *The Campaign of 1776 . . .* (Brooklyn, 1878), *passim*.

⁹ Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: *Three War Statesmen* (New York, 1930).

a Continental Militia shall be instituted. To each Division [again, of common militia] two Troops of Cavalry and two Companies of Artillery might also be annexed, but no Independent or Volunteer Companies foreign to the Establishment should be tolerated.¹⁰

If we could not have a Federal force of part-time soldiers, Washington suggested that the Volunteers of each State be recognized in its stead. Note that he speaks of "the flower of the young men." He was thinking of the enthusiastic boys of his elite Light Infantry and the youngsters of the Volunteer Light Horse who had carried his dispatches. Note also that control would be exercised by authorizing only those units which would subscribe to the conditions outlined by the legislation. Only those willing to fight when needed would be established.

For the next eight or nine years the subject received much attention in Congress, but as the memories of war began to soften and the troubles facing that body continued to increase, the prospect of securing an enactment with teeth in it grew fainter and fainter. At last, on May 8, 1792, an insipid and credulous bill was passed which pleased no one save those anxious to get on with more profitable legislation. Although the Militia Act of 1792 has been vigorously criticized, it is difficult to see how any stronger bill could have been passed. It should not be forgotten that the States had their own militia laws and the point really at issue here was states' rights. At least it set down unmistakably, as Upton has pointed out, the truly democratic doctrine that every able-bodied man owes military service to his country. The sections which shifted the responsibility for furnishing arms and equipment onto the people and the preposterous paper organizations it demanded were, of course, absurd and unworkable. Yet under the "militia clause" of the Constitution it did try to standardize the discipline and training throughout the States and rather feebly requested an annual report from each.¹¹

Unmistakably, too, it recognized the Volunteer corps, and by allowing them to "retain their accustomed privileges," yet requiring them otherwise to come under the terms of the act, it took a decided step toward the formation of a Federal National Guard. It left their training entirely to chance. Other legislation of this period allowed them to be called into Federal service for three months, unless, of course, they volunteered on their own initiative for a longer period.

The remarkable part of the Act of 1792 lies not in its weakness but in its longevity. It was the basic militia law of the land for over a century—until, in fact, 1903. And throughout all of this period it was the target for the most violent attacks and counter proposals. As early as 1810, Governor Huntington of Connecticut, a former Continental and a brigadier of Regulars, reflected the

¹⁰ John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington, 1938), XXVI, 393.

¹¹ Palmer, *op. cit.*; James Brown Scott, *The Militia* (Sen. Doc. 695, 64th Cong., 2d Sess.); Frederick B. Wiener, "The Militia Clause of the Constitution," *Harvard Law Review*, LIV (December, 1940), 181-220; Samuel T. Ansell, "Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia," *Yale Law Review*, XXVI (April, 1917), 471-80.

disgust of the soldier when he wrote officially that he had seen no system which would work and believed none would ever be adopted. He hesitated even to express his own ideas thereon because of the "diversity of habits" which would have to be considered and "subdued" to make the American people accept any sensible plan.¹² Instead of a plan, then, there developed an institution—faulty, irresponsible, and frequently inefficient. What we can call the "independent company system" grew of its own accord until first the States and later the Federal government were forced to recognize its potentials. That this "system" survived both legislative and military neglect is strong proof of its vitality and of the depth with which its roots are imbedded in our national culture.

The Independent Companies, 1783-1861

The independent Volunteer company is not, of course, a purely American phenomenon. In England the Fraternity of Saint George or Artillery Guylde (now the Honorable Artillery Company) was granted its charter in 1537, and the idea was transplanted to this country by the first settlers. In 1638 the "Antient and Honorable Artillery Company of Massachusetts" was established along formal lines, but even earlier than this the train-bands charged with frontier defense had begun to assume a permanency and cohesion which raised them well above the level of common militia. By 1750 these independent companies were a well recognized part of the social life of every city. Although often included in the term "militia," the distinction between the two bodies was carefully drawn and officially recognized by the Colonies. In some they were called "associators," in others "chartered companies," but in most they were simply "volunteers."¹³

The stormy years just before the Revolution, as has been suggested above, gave rise to numerous patriot companies. Some of these entered the Continental Line while others served only in a local capacity. New units based on Revolutionary associations sprang up after the peace, and the *Chesapeake* affair of 1807 brought numerous others into existence. It is difficult to determine the number of uniformed Volunteers during all of this early period, but it is probable that they comprised from one-tenth to one-twentieth of the enrolled militia. In 1804, for example, when the man power available for militia service amounted to some four hundred thousand men, there appear to have been about twenty-five thousand members of independent companies.

¹² *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, 263-66. It seems safe to say that no one at any time (save in the bombast of our legislatures) has seriously defended the Militia Act of 1792, just as no man from Washington on has had a kind word for the ordinary militia.

¹³ "The System of Defence in the New England Colonies," and "Indian Relations, King Philip's War," in Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1904-1907), I, 496-578; Louis D. Scisco, "Evolution of Colonial Militia in Maryland," *The Maryland Historical Magazine*, XXXV (June, 1940), 166-77; Clark, *op. cit.*, I, 1-16; Emmons Clark, *History of the Seventh Regiment of New York* (New York, 1890), I, 1-25.



VOLUNTEER CAPTAIN. "Haven't seen you at Drill for the last week or two, Mr. ——"

RECRUIT. "Ah, well, Dear CAPTAIN! I really think I must give you a turn one o' these fine evenings!"

From Harpers Weekly, May 18, 1861. The fact that this cartoon was reprinted from the London Punch, April 20, 1861, without comment suggests the close similarity between the American and British Volunteer.

By the time of the War of 1812 the characteristics of the independent company had sufficiently crystallized to permit a few generalizations. These characteristics are highly important since they have remained substantially the same to this day. These are the hall-marks of the Guard.¹⁴

As we have seen above, the Volunteer is a man who enjoys soldiering and is willing to make a sacrifice to do so. Such a sacrifice must be of both time and money, and thus the Volunteer emerges as a man of some means. It would be a mistake, however, to assume—as is often done—that he is a wealthy man. Although many of the companies were without doubt affluent and many of the members well-to-do, the vast bulk of Volunteers were and are from the great American middle class. Since they participated willingly, they readily accepted discipline, although they were quick to resist bullying and cruelty. They sought training and frequently became highly adept at peace-time evolutions. Some went much further and educated themselves into accomplished officers. But this above everything else: by banding together in groups with some pretense of permanency they gained the priceless possession of *esprit de corps*, the soul of a military unit.

That is the bright side of the picture; there is, of course, another. Since the independent companies were usually built up through the sole effort of their members, they naturally resented outside control. They had chosen their own officers and resisted service under others (although the cases where they were not anxious to serve under a Regular are rare indeed). Above all, they resisted any loss of individuality through inclusion in some huge soulless force. Companies under weak or immoral officers soon drifted into irresponsibility, hooliganism, or dissolution.

These are the faults which are inherent in any self-governing military body; but these are faults which can be turned to lasting advantage. Other failings resulted from the selfish attitude towards the Volunteers displayed by the States and the Regular Army. Left to their own devices the companies deluded themselves into believing that perfection on parade brought proficiency on the battle-field. Pussy-foot legislation permitted their employment only when and where they pleased, greatly narrowing their usefulness. Lack of cooperation from the Army left them with unskilled officers and so discouraged all higher training. Politics, taking advantage of their unorganized promotion system, flooded the

¹⁴ There are a few brief studies of the Volunteers of the pre-Civil War period. Among the most valuable are Paul T. Smith, "Militia of the United States from 1846 to 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History*, XV (March 1919), 20-47, and Theodore G. Gronert, "The First National Pastime in the Middle West," *ibid.*, XXIX (September, 1933), 171-86. Much information may be found in local and state histories and in such regimental studies as Emmons Clark, *op. cit.*; George M. Whipple, *History of the Salem Light Infantry from 1805 to 1890* (Salem, 1890); and *History of the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry . . . 1774 to . . . 1874* (Philadelphia, 1875). The *U. S. Military Magazine* (Philadelphia, 1839-42) is a valuable source of information on organizations and dress of the 1830's. But by far the greatest source of material is to be found in contemporary magazines and newspapers, journals, regimental papers, and the reports of the States' Adjutants General.

upper ranks with incompetents or worse. Against these evils, and the criticism which they naturally brought forth, the independent companies have struggled throughout our entire military and political history.

The period from 1800 to 1860 marks the golden age for independent companies. Thousands of units were formed, some to fade out after a few meetings, others to become permanent entities. In most States the procedure of organization was neither complicated nor costly. A few friends met—usually in the congenial surroundings of some local tavern—and formed a private military club, established by-laws, chose their branch of service and their officers, and selected a name and a uniform.

The name and uniform which resulted usually reflected the background, locality, and imagination of the members. There was a wide field from which both could be chosen. From sedate titles like Fencibles, Light Infantry, Rifles, Guards, and Cadets, the selection ran to such *amphigouri* as Invincibles, Avengers, Patriots, and Snake Hunters. No restrictions existed as to uniforms, although current style played a large part in their selection. Blue and grey were the favorite colors, and the companies were frequently named after the shade selected.

If a war threatened, the selection of officers was usually based upon military merit as they saw it; if not, its basis was wealth, social prominence, or initiative in raising the company. Local politics, as such, figured only indirectly. Most of the units agreed to drill once a week and stuck to it. This was done out of doors in summer, but in winter a drill shed was required, and for this purpose markets and meeting halls were pressed into service. Another essential was the club room. Small at first, they gradually increased in size and splendor until they became the great armories of today.

Having completed a sufficient organization, the company then applied for a charter from the State, together with arms and equipment. If the objectives and the other details appeared satisfactory, such a charter was issued by the Governor, the officers were commissioned, and the company was assigned a nominal place in the paper militia structure. In due course the arms were loaned from the State arsenal and drill commenced. Sometimes manuals were purchased, sometimes issued by the State, but there is little evidence of any further governmental assistance. Frequently the companies hired a retired soldier to instruct them, as they hired the bands to which they marched and the horses which pulled their gun-carriages.

It is difficult to appraise the actual worth of these units to the State and local community, and criticism of them appears impertinent if we remember that it was they who were footing the bill of "preparedness." Their usefulness in adding color to a locality, in furnishing bits of pomp and circumstance when needed, cannot be denied. When faced with sterner duty their effectiveness depended upon so many factors that no general statement seems possible. Without question the bigger city organizations proved their value in supplementing

the almost non-existent police forces of that day. In the thirty year period between 1834 and 1864 the 27th Regiment (later 7th Regiment) of New York was called into State or municipal service to preserve order during riots or great fires on at least eighteen occasions. The average length of service was over three days; in the case of the Draft Riots of 1864 it lasted almost a month.¹⁵

The utility of these companies in actual war is even more difficult to appraise since Federal and State legislation made it virtually impossible for them to participate effectively as an organization. If they managed to get around these difficulties (as hundreds did) they were lumped together in official reports with other forces whose malodorous reputation smothers any citations they may have received. Their first real test—which will be mentioned later—came with the outbreak of the Civil War, but even before this there is ample evidence of solid service.

In the War of 1812 Volunteer companies relieved Regulars from coastal defenses and other routine duties. Many performed hard field service, and General Harrison did not hesitate to call the Pittsburg Blues and his other uniformed corps “the first in the Northwest Army,” although he felt the common militia were “not to be depended upon.”¹⁶ The steadiness of the New Orleans Volunteers under Jackson is by now a familiar story, but the comparable steadiness of the Baltimore Volunteers at Bladensburg has been overlooked in the scorn justly accorded that miserable affair.

No better example of the crack Volunteer company can be found than that furnished by the Mississippi Rifles (now 155th Infantry) of 1846-1847, a regiment of hard riding, hard fighting young men, sons of wealthy planters, who carved out of Mexico a record for themselves of which any Regular outfit would have been proud. Their success can be attributed to the familiar recipe: high class of personnel, trained leadership (Jefferson Davis, a Regular, was Colonel), superior equipment (they insisted upon and got the new percussion rifle), complete and sensible clothing, and plenty of stiff drill. Taylor later cited the regiment for highly conspicuous gallantry and steadiness.¹⁷

If the duties performed by these independent companies were not onerous, they filled in the time with drills, picnics, and target practice. In these activities one detects more than an odor of strong drink. Indeed, in that none too sober age, there is good reason to suspect that champagne or whiskey played a large part in

¹⁵ Emmons Clark, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹⁶ John H. Niebaum, “The Pittsburgh Blues,” *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, IV (April, July, and October, 1921), 110-22, 175-85, 259-70, and V (July, 1922), 244-50. Here is an example of Emory Upton’s characteristic inability to distinguish between volunteer and common militia. In *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1904), pp. 99, 107-11, he stresses Harrison’s disgust with the latter but takes no notice of his report that “conscious valor and intrepidity . . . never existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater part of the militia which were with me through the winter,” although he even quotes the passage.

¹⁷ Robert McElroy, *Jefferson Davis . . .* (New York, 1937), I, 74-94; report of General Taylor, March 6, 1847 (Sen. Doc. 1, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 139); Col. M. J. Mulvihill, *First Mississippi Regiment* (Vicksburg, 1931).

COME! COME! SOLDIERS COME!



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A music cover of the 1840's in tribute to one phase of Volunteer activity.

maintaining company spirit. During parades, pauses for beer were commonplace; in the one extended the Grand Duke Alexis the 9th New York had an entire company of Negro bartenders, in uniform behind the band, bearing ice-pails and champagne. It was to be expected that smaller companies, returning from an outing, often got out of hand, and their noise and unruly conduct gained for them an unpopularity which led at length to a much stricter State control.

It will be seen by now that these units differed only in externals from the target and sporting clubs and the volunteer fire companies of that period. Membership varied widely in wealth and social position, but by 1840 the majority of the Volunteers were of the clerk and artisan class while some of the city companies could have been little better than gangs of toughs. But the most significant development of all did not originate in this country; it came instead from Europe with the overwhelming immigration that engulfed American life during the mid-nineteenth century. This spectacular flood, reaching a peak in 1854 when over four hundred thousand foreigners landed on our shores, left its mark for good or evil upon every American institution and profoundly affected the Volunteer traditions and organizations.

The most pronounced change began to be noticed in the larger Eastern cities, where by mid-century these aliens constituted from a third to a half of the population. Although they naturally tended to group together and cling to their national tongues and customs, they were not slow in adopting those practices of their new country which promised protection, pleasure, or reward. The military club presented at once all of these opportunities, costing little in time or money.

Most numerous were the Germans, and wherever they settled they were quick to organize military companies. Sometimes they bore Teutonic designations, but more often they outdid the native units in patriotism of title. Companies little more than *Gesangvereine*, in which not a word of English was spoken, were nevertheless named Washington Rifle Corps or National Greys. The Irish companies, on the other hand, tended to emphasize, in both title and uniform, their Celtic origin. Many, of course, soon lost much of this alien caste, but there were not a few military clubs which served openly as agencies in the struggle for Irish independence. The ancient hatred of Britain was rarely hidden, and at least one famous New York regiment refused to march in the parade for the Prince of Wales in 1860.

These were but two of the many nationalities represented in the Volunteers of that period. Irishmen in green jackets, Highlanders in kilts, Frenchmen in full red trousers, Prussians in spiked helmets, and Italians in *bersaglieri* hats topped with cock's feathers tramped after one another through the mud and over the pigs that figured so prominently in the streets of an American city. The rise of these foreign companies led to a strong reaction in the form of Native American units, particularly in New York and New Orleans where the pressure was greatest, and was another influence leading to a stricter control over Volunteer affairs.

BATTLE-SCENES AND PICTURE-POLITICS

By ALFRED VAGTS

BATTLE pictures have belonged on the whole to minor art. The great masters have rather avoided the problems involved in depicting the clash of armies. Though they might present a struggle on a small scale, the combat of an archangel with a dragon, and though they knew how to glorify the victorious condottiere on horseback, the triumphal return of armies from the field, they seemed to find battle, the culmination of war, unpaintable. At least two of the greatest painters of the Renaissance, Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, balked at the task.

The orders placed with both these great artists originated in Florentine politics. The Battle of Anghiari (1440) was a victory won in good part by the Florentine burghers' own martial endeavors, and the Republic, two generations later, desired to commemorate this fact in order to revive the earlier warlike spirit and prepare the townsfolk for stormy days that lay ahead. Military murals planned for the Town Hall of Florence were intended, in a sense, as preparedness propaganda to animate popular morale. Leonardo da Vinci indeed accepted the commission, drew cartoons, and actually began a mural of the Battle of Anghiari; but, in 1506, he abruptly quit this work, of which nothing remains. In the same room, on the opposite wall, Michelangelo was entrusted with a similar project; this time the artist refused even to attempt martial representation of the conquest of Pisa and, instead, painted his "Bathing Soldiers." Da Vinci's despair and Michelangelo's unwillingness in all likelihood indicate the conviction of the impossibility of such labors, even to genius, the conviction that battle is even more unpaintable than "unwritable."¹

If the great artist has, on the whole, declined to undertake the depicting of battle, the public and its governors have nevertheless continued to demand the battle-piece from artists and have found their commissions accepted by a host of willing but lesser painters. The battle-piece has fulfilled too important a function in what might be called art-politics of modern states to be abandoned merely because it is bad art. What the public wanted from the military men and from the artist who preserved military performance for posterity was once described by Charles Peguy, who was himself killed in the First World War. The people need parades, cortèges, he wrote, "a motive of inspiration, an action of the

¹There is not enough space here to exemplify further what seems to me to be the typical reluctance of the great artist to depict battle, a reluctance connected with his aversion to accepting governmental or other commissions. One other example, however, is Guariento, a pupil of Giotto who represented for Venice the transition from the Byzantine to the "new style" in Italy. He was called to that city in the 1370's to decorate the walls of the meeting room of the Great Council with a series of Venetian sea-battles, including the mythical one with Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, tasks which he took up only reluctantly. (Heinrich Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig* [Gotha, 1920], II, 324-25.)

imagination, when, reading back into the past, interpreting the present, anticipating the future, they want to make themselves believe that they have not lost the taste for adventures, when, in sum, they are tired of being bored by the images of peace.”²

The people have been, on the whole, more susceptible to the picture than to the word. That the word may lie even the simple think they know; but the picture, whether on coin or stamp, on poster or stained window, carries more conviction. Speech is too closely connected with the orator or writer, making one inquire at once after his name and purpose, whereas the image or emblem seems to bring its own innocent message, leaving inquiries into its authorship and purpose superfluous. What the public does not find in pictures and symbols, it often reads into them. The apparent impersonality, openness, and truthfulness of the image give it a peculiar power to impress the mind and stimulate the spirit without raising inconvenient questions; thus it can be employed with the greatest subtlety and anonymity by adepts of pictorial propaganda. As the governors and guides of the masses have long been aware, the symbol and image, seemingly so clear and unequivocal, actually may be twisted to more diverse uses and views than the political or religious harangue.

Certain types of government, particularly monarchical and dictatorial ones,³ have made more use than others of these popular longings for imagery and symbols, but there are few that have altogether abhorred the use of them as *moyens de gouvernement*. Governors who are at all attentive to the iconological side of politics have taken conscious care to be painted, sculptured, engraved, and photographed in ways that impress the masses and make them feel the omnipresence of the leader, an effect achieved first with the help of coins, then of postage stamps, and nowadays through the radio and in motion pictures. Very often the governor, or his councilors for him, decided to present his figure as the “man on horseback” or the leader in battle; Mussolini, going through the paces, carried on this very ancient tradition. Hitler, however, who had a body-guard and a “body-photographer” before he had a body-physician, has never been photographed or even seen on horseback; only romantic picture post-cards depict him as the mounted knight errant, the Parsifal on the way to Montsalvatsch,

² Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1937), p. 19.

³ Some artists, at least, have been aware of the great desire of princes to be depicted “in decisive moments” of war. Duke Ernst II of Coburg, brother of Albert “the Good,” Queen Victoria’s consort, had himself painted high on horseback during the artillery duel between Danish ships and land batteries in the Eckernförde Bight in 1849, though actually he had not been where he was painted. Again in 1870, he wanted to be painted greeting his own Coburg regiment, the 95th Infantry, in the Battle of Woerth, “a scene which in reality had never taken place.” Georg Bleibtreu, father of the military writer Karl Bleibtreu, and Anton von Werner, two prominent battle painters of the time, declined to take on this unrealistic job, and the Duke sighed, “If only Feodor Dietz [the one who had painted him at Eckernförde] were here, he would doubtless do it.” (Anton von Werner, *Erlebnisse und Eindrücke, 1870-1890* [Berlin, 1913], pp. 20-21.)

which is the Third Empire. But he did deliberately choose to be pictured as the Supreme War Lord.

Iconoclasts, image-smashers, who from time to time appear, have known or suspected what the masses have so seldom realized, that pictures are a tool of government. When Puritan soldiers under Cromwell destroyed cathedral windows, when the Byzantine iconoclasts tore down the images of saints, or when Shinto revolutionaries in Japan denounced the wealth of imagery in the Confucian temples favored by the government of the Shoguns, all these rebels were attacking the art-politics of hostile regimes.⁴ Perhaps the clearest instance of an art-revolt as a phase of political and religious upheaval was presented by the picture-burner Savonarola. The pyres of art set afame in Florence when he seized power were not merely a symptom of religious zeal, but indicated a reaction against the esthetic policy of the overthrown Medicean regime; the pageantry and building of the Medici were, in part at least, calculated to cover up the fact that a private banking firm was gradually taking over the government of the art-loving city of Florence and was making Florence pay its privately incurred debts. The outward splendor of the Medici had increased as their house approached bankruptcy, and so effective was this art-policy that, as Comynes wrote, the people almost loved Lorenzo the Magnificent for helping himself to the public pence. The iconoclasm of Savonarola was an answer to the Medicean methods of government, a government with the help of imagery, for which we might coin the name iconocracy.

The iconocrats, if it is permissible to call them so, the governors and governing societies who practiced art-politics, have long shown a considerable predilection for battle-pieces. Although this predilection showed itself early—the Bayeux tapestry, celebrating the Norman conquest of England, which was ordered by the Conqueror's half-brother Odo, Bishop of Bayeux, is perhaps the best known medieval example—it was only after the formation of the standing armies of modern states in the seventeenth century that the "specialists" in battle pictures appeared. Then we have the Neapolitan Salvatore Rosa and the Frenchman Jacques Courtois, both working in Rome, the Flemish Adam Frans van der Meulen, painting in France, and the Augsburg artist Georg Philipp Rugendas. They were followed in later centuries by Benjamin West, the English contribution to this category thus being furnished by an American;⁵ by Antoine Gros

⁴ A good case of secularized iconoclasm is offered by a revolutionary like William Godwin who wrote in the course of his attacks on monarchy and the imposture by which it flourishes: "To conduct this imposture with success it is necessary to bring over to its party our eyes and our ears. Accordingly kings are always exhibited with all the splendour of ornament, attendance and equipage. They live amidst a sumptuousness of expence; and this not merely to gratify their appetites, but as a necessary instrument of policy . . ." (*An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness* [2d ed., London, 1796], II, 47.)

⁵ West's "Death of General Wolfe" commemorated in 1771 an event which had taken place in 1759 and, as West fully realized, "in a region of the world unknown to the Greeks and Romans, and at a period of time when no warriors who wore such

and Horace Vernet, Albrecht Adam⁶ and Wilhelm von Kobell, whose paintings are "clear" and large enough to show tactical arrangements for battle.

Land powers like Prussia or Austria have preferred land battle-scenes, whereas sea powers favored water fights as did the Dutch of the seventeenth century when it was *bon ton* for a good burgher household to own sea battle-scenes. Whether representations of naval battles, owing to their *plein air* character almost exclusively paintings, were on the whole better art or better sources of history might be debatable. At any rate, certain societies, like the Venetians—Tintoretto's "Battle of Lepanto"⁷—and above all the Dutch of the seventeenth century, preferred them to military battle. In the Dutch republics the Navy was always more "national" than the Army; there were many foreign officers among the Army officers, but hardly a single one among the admirals.

The totally different appreciation of war on land and war on sea is clearly reflected in the arts. Of the many glorious events on land there is hardly a picture of any importance Battles in the field suited the strategy of the State as little as the genius of the artist. Dutch art has pictured the soldier often enough, but he is the object of *genre* painting and usually looks as if he were merely on a visit and was stared at in a half distrustful way. Of every naval battle, however, there are pictures by the best painters . . . of every admiral several good portraits, of the most famous ones also monuments in the churches.⁸

Battle pictures may be sources of military history. It is important to remember, however, that they were not ordered for that purpose but, generally stated, for political purposes, using that term in the widest possible sense. They were ordered by the victor. To this motivation, which makes one bold to say that more battle pictures are due to specific orders than any other kind of painting, must be added the obvious technical difficulties that stand in the way of a satisfactory achievement. Rarely has the artist been a witness of the battle he depicts; often he painted years and years after the actual occurrence. The artist's prime

costume existed. The subject I have to represent is a great battle fought and won, and the same truth which gives law to the historian should rule the painter." Clothing the hero in the garments of antiquity, as the painting of the age was accustomed to do on such heroic occasions, was therefore out of the question for the realistic American. On the other hand, the occasion was extraordinary. West achieved the effect of the extraordinary by making the scene exotic, with an American Indian in the foreground as the vehicle of injecting the exotic. For the revolutionary character of the measure, see Edgar Wind, "The Revolution of History Painting," *Journal of the Warburg Institute*, II, 116 ff. The battle-scene itself, of course, is mere *staffage*.

⁶ Adam (1786-1862), "battle and horse painter, very prolific," as the art lexica characterize him, was a participant of several Napoleonic campaigns as a subject of a *Rheinhund* state. His *Selbstbiographie* (1886) tells us far more about those wars per square foot of printed page than do his paintings per square foot of canvas.

⁷ Tintoretto's painting of Lepanto for the Doge's Palace was destroyed by fire in 1577 a very few years after its completion; another in the Church of San Giovanni e Paolo was likewise burned in 1867. We still possess a Lepanto picture by Paolo Veranese, an allegory of this decisive battle rather than a realistic painting; it, as well as Titian's picture for King Philip I (in the Madrid Prado) "reproduced the impression which the great masters received from this event." (Kretschmayr, *op. cit.*, III, 69-70.)

⁸ J. Huizinga, *Holländische Kultur des siebenzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Jena, [1932]), p. 18.

GENERAL SANTA ANNA AT THE BATTLE OF TAMPICO, 1829
Executed at his order by a French artist in 1835, Santa Anna presented this painting to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Removed and rehung several times as he lost and regained popularity, it is now in the Mexican National Museum. Reproduced from the photographic collection of Detmar H. Fink.



interest is in the picturesque, whatever his orders may be, and uniforms are often beautiful but not the most important thing to depict. Finally, battle, even early battle, is too big and too complicated to fit into even a tremendous frame; that very "abbreviation" which is necessary and essential in art ruins the source character of the battle picture. As a rule, or nearly so, it might be said that the oldest battle pictures, such as the mosaic of the Battle of Alexander in Pompeii or the sculptured warriors on the Trajan column, are the most accurate and tell the most to the historian. The medieval representations of battle reflect the feudal concept of fighting, a series of glorified individual duels between knights rather than the mad scrambles that these battles more probably were. In the Renaissance the battle picture became better as art, better in composition, but hardly more true, from Paolo Uccello's cavalry battles, representing condottiere, to Rubens' "Battle of the Amazons," featuring colors and masses of flesh rather than soldiers of any contemporary kind.

Until 1914, indeed, the battle-scene continued to be in heavy demand, and the largest museum pieces on the European continent were paintings of battles. This was true for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries certainly, whereas in earlier times religious topics had called for the coverage and large canvas spaces and the filling of large frames as if claiming greater attention and awe. Battle-scenes were immensely popular with the people who stayed home from wars and with later generations for whom the earlier wars had been won.⁹ Leutze's painting of Washington crossing the Delaware, corresponding with the popular demand, was done half a dozen times by the artist and was probably in its day the most popular American historical painting, though it was far from being the most accurate.

When the artists proved unable to meet the growing demand of the public to "see" stirring events, the consequence was a monstrosity, the "panorama," a chimera produced by an age of increasing democratization of the arts, a new mass consumption of art, and, at the same time, an age characterized by a material increase in the size of battles until these could only be captured on a circular frame, the size of which reached nearly one hundred and fifty inches horizontally by fifteen inches vertically. The modern movieized battle picture cannot deny

⁹ It is fairly safe to say that for a long time pictures that might be called pro-war were more popular than anti-war pictures. The latter, in a way, began with Callot and were continued by Goya ("Los desastres de la guerra," 1810), Verestchagin, and Otto Dix. Verestchagin (1842-1904) stood in the closest personal relation to war—he received an education as a naval cadet, was dangerously wounded in the Turkish War of 1877, and, since the artist could not "stop following the war," war at last took him when he went down in the Russo-Japanese War with the "Petropavlovsk" in April 1904 by the side of his class mate, the commanding admiral. Since the anti-war character seemed not sufficiently brought out by his paintings alone, Verestchagin took to writing (see *Revue des Revues*, October 1893), and to the use of music. When he exhibited his paintings, together with ethnographic collections, always under electric light, he had choral-like melodies played in an adjoining room in order to put the spectators into an appropriate mood. (Werner, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-36.)

this panorama in its genealogy; in a way, it is nothing but the indefinite prolongation of this canvas.

Immensely popular from the beginning, this pseudo-art of the panorama tried to seize and fix the climax of battle. The panorama owes its invention and propagation to members of nations which were, at the time at least, considerably closer to market demands than to the exigent canons of art. Its originator was a Scottish painter, Robert Barker, who exhibited a panoramic picture of London in that city in 1792. He was followed by the versatile American, Robert Fulton, who gave the Parisians first a "Vue de Paris" and then the first battle panorama. Observing his success, Napoleon I (who, incidentally, had the Bayeux tapestry exhibited in Paris in 1803-04, thus giving it its first great publicity) ordered no less than seven panoramas in which past and later battles were the favorite object. The entrepreneurs, as well as their protectors in government circles and elsewhere, were perfectly aware of the strong appeal which these illusory shows possessed for the masses who found in them so much truth, so much of the feeling of being present, that even a writer like Alfred de Vigny, himself an ex-officer, could write that "if the first merit of art were nothing but the truth, the panorama would be superior to the 'Descent from the Cross.'"

The panorama found a curious contemporary and parallel in the *Tongemälde*, the musical picture, of battles in the 1790's. An Austrian captain by the name of Boehm composed several such scores which were given in Germany as "Victory of Prince Karl" and in France as "Victory of the Republican Armies." This was possible, if for no other reason, because the composer had carefully abstained from the use of the "Marseillaise" and other national hymns and motives. In 1800 Boehm himself directed an audition of one of his battle pictures in the Strassburg Cathedral, employing sound engines of his own invention; the enthusiasm of the public was tremendous and the cathedral doors could not be kept shut. Less cautious, Beethoven composed the one musical battle picture of distinction, "Wellington's Sieg oder Die Schlacht von Vittoria" (Opus 91), with "Rule Britannia" and "Marlborough s'en-va-t-en guerre" as the conflicting motives and "God Save the King" as the crowning termination and triumph. As if to bring out the closeness to the popular demand, this opus was originally written for a mechanical instrument (such perhaps as accompanied so mechanically the early showings in the nickelodeon), Maelzel's Panharmonicon; after being rewritten for orchestra, it was first produced in Vienna in December 1813. Beethoven dedicated this work to the Prince Regent, the later George IV of England, but that unmusical being never deigned to answer or otherwise satisfy the genius.¹⁰ Tschaikovsky was commissioned by a Moscow committee in 1880 to write a piece commemorative of 1812. He wrote quite frankly to his "Beloved Friend" that the result—the "Ouverture 1812"—"will be very showy and noisy, but it will have no artistic merit because I wrote it

¹⁰ Michel Brenet, "Bataille en Musique," *La Grande Encyclopédia* (Paris, [1886-1902]), V, 686.

without warmth and without love."¹¹ And so it turned out to be. Still lower in the scale of musical genius must have stood a musical battle picture which Mark Twain once ear-witnessed, "The Battle of Prague," by one Kotzwarra, a composer unknown to the lexica. It was, said Twain, a "venerable shivaree . . . chin deep in the blood of the slain."

In spite of Mathew B. Brady, the Civil War photographer, the painted panorama went through a new vogue after 1870 and was a regular feature in all the big exhibitions of that era which gave the public the grand illusion of a "look in," of being present where it could not have been. The panorama reached its climax in the 1880's when the memory of the great preceding battles, the American Civil War and the War of 1870-71, threatened to fade away. The memory was refreshed by a combination of forces, those of government, artists, and corporate capital. In that era of nationalism and free movement of capital, Belgian money specialized in erecting several big panoramas in Berlin and elsewhere in European capitals and lesser cities. Artists like Anton von Werner, for many years Director of the Berlin Academy for Art, working with a whole staff of painters, set about the task in the most detailed way, studying first the writing of the General Staffs, then the terrain of the battle in question, and finally, for the most minute particulars, questioning participants in the fight from the highest down.

The memoirs of Anton von Werner (1843-1915) give us an intimate account of the creative processes in such an enterprise. When he and his associates were painting the Battle of Sedan, they received from Moltke, whom Werner had painted several times, "many useful hints" in spite of his proverbial taciturnity. When Werner inquired by letter whether he had worn the helmet or the cap at Sedan, the old man appeared at once in the studio to furnish the most ample and authentic explanations on that point. The Prussian artillery fired single shots and salvos to enable Werner to make realistic studies of fire and smoke; the infantry gave him the benefit of storm attacks repeated over the sand fields around Berlin; participants of the battle enabled him to go beyond the official record in certain places. Everything served realistic illusion down to the lights reflected on the brass and other musical instruments of the band of the 5th Battalion of Jägers, produced by soldering gold and silver to the canvas. On September 1, 1883, the anniversary of Sedan, the panorama was opened by the old Emperor himself, he and his entourage being, according to Werner, "every one an expert critic, who had been present on the spot. . . . The Emperor was obviously surprised; he made me many compliments. . . . 'I have never seen anything similar.'" Together with Moltke, the Emperor retraced his movement over the battlefield of Sedan thirteen years before, remarking, "Only now do I realize what long distances we covered!" For later pictures, dioramas which also referred to Sedan, Wilhelm furnished the most minute details, including costume

¹¹ Catherine Drinker Bowen and Barbara von Meck, *Beloved Friend: The Story of Tschaikovsky and Nadejda von Meck* (New York, 1937), p. 389.

minutiae, and then left the artist with his "fullest appreciation that you by your master work have brought close to the people the memory and the understanding of the day of Sedan," and he told the board of shareholders, "I wish the gentlemen may find also the material reward for their enterprise."

Before the Berlin panorama of Sedan was hardly finished, an American group of capitalists approached Werner through the Berlin embassy to ask whether he would undertake the painting of a panorama of the Civil War for the United States. The President of the Academy was gratified, but as he was already provided with many commissions, mostly for the pictorial representation of the unification of Germany in the Second Reich, he obtained the commission to depict American unification for several of his co-artists. Eugene Bracht, George Koch, and C. Röchling, after a stay of several months in the United States, painted a panorama of the Battle of Chattanooga in Berlin in 1885.

Werner takes leave of this era of the "spacially and artistically powerful works," which have "all disappeared now after the popular eagerness to see had been satisfied and there were no more considerable dividends for the shareholders in sight," with a parting shot at what we moderns consider great art. In Manet's "Shooting of Emperor Maximilian at Queretaro," declares Werner indignantly, the last companions of the Emperor, Generals Miramon and Mejia, are "represented in shirt sleeves, badly stuffed and badly costumed scarecrows. That is not honest work!"¹²

Not only optically, but also politically, these panoramic scenes were "lighted from above." Small scale optical shows, peep shows, dioramas, and stereoramas went to small towns and villages to show the battles of the ages and particularly those of recent wars. When a new war occurred and the penurious showman could not afford to have his raw canvases repainted, it sometimes happened that the old pictures in stock were merely given new titles. Such a transformation of the Battle of Plevna into that of Elandslaagte aroused early in this writer a sense of historical criticism. It must be confessed, however, that his juvenile protest resulted in his being promptly led out of the tent by a proprietor more deeply hurt in his pocketbook, which could not stand disillusionment, than in his artistic sense. The tent show was eventually taken over by the cinema which had its first home behind those same bulging canvases. Photography had opened up new possibilities for the depicting of war during the American civil struggle, and Brady's Civil War photographs are the result not only of the ability of an exceptional technician but of a discerning artistic temperament as well. It is said that after he proposed to President Lincoln "to photograph battle and camp scenes" he and his assistants took more than thirty-five hundred photographs, many of which

¹² Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

were "scenes of actual conflict."¹³ However, this must not raise expectations that go beyond the range of the possibilities of the still camera which cannot capture that elusive totality, Battle.

Clearly, the motion picture camera possessed greater potentialities than all the other recording arts to catch some of the fleeting quality of that hitherto unreproducible phenomenon. The motion picture camera-man, even if he could not be omnipresent, could catch more of the scene than the still camera-man. But although it seemed that at last battle could be portrayed, the character of fighting radically changed. Anyone who carries his historical memory intact through a movie will remember that the coming of cinematography coincided with the modern emptiness of the battlefield which at the time upset so many military expectations based on historical experience. Sea battle, at about the same time, became even more unpaintable and unseizable. After 1900 gunnery ranges were increased far beyond the one thousand or thirteen hundred yards which had until then been thought the most likely battle ranges; distances of five to ten thousand yards were reached by the gunners by 1904-05 and still greater ones thereafter. And so, ironically enough, just as man acquired the power to seize and immortalize the furious action of battle, it became invisible.

The first motion picture theater, a nickelodeon, was opened at Pittsburgh in November 1905 at about the time the Portsmouth Treaty terminated the first war (or the second, if one wants to give the distinction to the Boer War) with an empty battlefield. Despite this discouraging reality, the infant art grew and after awhile attempted a representation of war. By 1907 or 1908 D. W. Griffith had introduced certain methods of giving the unaccentuated or ludicrously misaccentuated flow of the movie a new emphasis and a specific dramatic quality, through the "close-up" and the "fade-out" or "dissolve." This technique could be applied to presentations of earlier wars, but hardly to the combat of the present day. The modern emptiness of earth, sea, and even air does not allow a "close-up," which would be too dangerous for the photographer and his cameras, and the character of explosive action forbids the "fade-out."¹⁴ The really decisive moment cannot be caught by the lens, partly because it cannot be known until afterwards which was actually the decisive moment, and all of the preceding and following moments cannot be photographed.

The modern technique of giving orders is, moreover, not photogenic; it is not gesture. If Goering wields his Field Marshal's baton, it is on ceremonial occasions only. When Hitler is seen leaning over the map-covered table

¹³ W. J. Ghent, "Mathew B. Brady," *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, 1928-36), II, 584-85.

¹⁴ The Germans maintain, however, that some twenty-three army camera-men were killed in making "Blitzkrieg im Westen" (*Time*, January 6, 1941). If this is true, they must have been killed in making parts omitted from the version shown in this country.



HITLER DURING A MINUTE IN P. 5
From the *Illustrierte Zeitung*, November 26, 1936.

with the Chief of Staff and giving the final decision, that is merely a motion picture "retake" of the much popularized earlier paintings of Emperor Wilhelm II, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff in the last war, convincing only to those German minds which remember older paintings only slightly. (The degrees of forgetfulness and remembrance that can be relied upon in the hurried showing of a cinematographic record should be examined more closely.) The effort to overcome the emptiness of the modern battlefield leads, in the judgment of the military observer, to "staging" and "crowding"; where there should be one or two soldiers visible according to the actuality of modern battle, there are instead five or six, except behind the heavy guns where the whole crew is "naturally" assembled, with the consequence that there is a constant showing of gun-firing and loading with practically no sighting (which would be boresome). There is so much in modern battle that cannot be shown, as for example the causal connection between the nearby gun-firing and the explosion of the shell far away, a causal nexus which the photographer or film editor tries to establish again and again, to the satisfaction perhaps of the layman, laywoman, laychild, but to the constant disappointment of those who know modern battle, even if not the most modern battle, from actual experience.

While the movie makers continued to wrestle with the ever growing complexity of the problem of picturing war, governments were taking notice of this new image-building process which rendered the old battle picture out of date. The steps by which movie-makers and governments drew together cannot yet be retraced in detail. Suffice to say that in Soviet Russia this industry first became completely nationalized or socialized, and that in Germany and Italy it did not stop short of this as far as tendency and content of the output were concerned. One of the first products of this identification was the anti-military, or rather anti-naval, "Potemkin" in the 1920's, to be followed, when the remilitarization of Russia was undertaken, by such "historical" pictures as "Peter the Great," "Alexander Nevski," and finally "Tschapajev," the motion picture of the White Russian wars which Stalin is reported to have seen a dozen times.¹⁵ "Tschapajev" offers esthetically, to my mind, the most satisfactory battle-scene in a motion picture. It is

¹⁵ Stalin prefers to be represented on the screen by way of historical indirection and "reflection." His personality and one-man rule, no less than Russian neonationalism, which only foreign communists can view as internationalism or as something quite agreeable with internationalism, are "reflected" by historical motion pictures like "Peter the Great" and "Alexander Nevski," both of them confirming wars and armies and navies as compared with the frankly antimilitaristic "Potemkin." In Russian society iconology is of particular importance. The icon, in the narrow sense of the word, was extensively used by the governors of old Russia. When the Czar, for example, visited troops in the field or troops departing for his wars, pictures of saints or of the Czar himself were distributed by him to the reverent soldiers. Among masses visually inclined, which might be a euphemism for illiteracy, these still pictures of old were replaced by those, still or otherwise, which confirmed the new regime. Hence, Soviet cinematography, which must not only be seen with Western eyes.

magnificent, but it is not battle as fought in 1919 as its makers and Auftraggeber pretend. It makes one think that the Frederician battle, that of the eighteenth century, was perhaps the last that might have been photographed if the camera had then been available.¹⁶

The publicity transmitted by the press cables preceding the arrival of the official German motion pictures on the present war was at least faintly reminiscent of the several *grandes peurs* of the past, those "yellow perils" or "red perils" that were thought to menace peaceful, unsuspecting nations. Presumably stout diplomats stationed in Berlin were said, after the first and official showing of the "Feuertaufe" ("Baptism of Fire") not so very long before the German invasion of Norway, to have blenched and to have admitted that the anti-German and anti-war powers in Europe were lost. Thanks to that readiness which concedes success so willingly to the apparently new thing, this first showing, greeted with general awe, helped the National Socialist Propaganda Ministry to achieve its aim, which is part and parcel of total warfare. But how strong is it really and what is its story? The complete identity between the Berlin "Baptism of Fire" and the version shown since late last summer in New York is not guaranteed; but there is far more of the former in what we may call the Yorkville version than in the March of Time version. More than enough remains to judge its frightfulness or innocuousness.

It is labelled a UFA film. If anything non-official is left to that firm, once Hugenberg's own, as producer or distributor, it is not to be detected in this picture. It is state propoganda with, on the whole, a definite purpose directed at a definite public. Non-German spectators are apt to see it obliquely unless they realize and keep in mind this original address in the choice and the sequence of the pictures. These films are *moyens de gouvernement* taken for the purpose of making the German folks back home, particularly the women, see the war and the preparation for war and the argumentation for war and the conduct of war "in the right way." This right way is essentially the coincidence of two ways—the way in which the German people as a spectator want to see the German soldier, hard at work, far from the temptation of foreign women, fighting for a righteous cause, etc., and the way in which the Reich Government wants him to be seen, righteously speeded along by the Nazi government and Nazi party and the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

For the purpose of justifying the war itself, the *materia politica* usually reserved to White and Blue Books enters the motion (and still) picture to a somewhat large extent. Questions like the German character of Danzig and the persecution of the German minorities by the Poles are presented

¹⁶ This notion goes back to the Fridericus film of the UFA in the early 1920's, which played an important rôle in the remilitarization of Germany. Its success moved some German naval officers to invest secret Reich funds at their disposal in the German movie industry. The connection did not, however, bring forth desirable pictures and resulted in the complete loss of the government funds.

with the help of atrocity stories and with strong hints at retaliation for the captured Poles, who, by the selection of appropriate types, are made out as *Untermenschen*, sub-humans. The battle fronts are shown in graphs of forward movement, encirclement, and annihilation, graphs that are the very counterpart of biological unfolding processes. Interesting as the technique is for the purpose of demonstrating strategic movements, the graphs of the army movements are too general and too hurried to satisfy any student or teacher of military history, but such a student is in for more disappointment than on this point alone.

To console and calm the German people back home, the war is represented not so much as a highly dangerous but rather as an utterly strenuous enterprise, strenuous in the modern sense of the word. In the motion picture of the Polish campaign I detected not one dead German soldier and, I think, not one Polish soldier either; the only dead beings were horses. Not very many wounded are shown either, certainly no discouraging looking ones. Views of material destruction, blasts and fires, are numerous, but not destruction of human lives. The German soldiers are winning the war through marching and other exertion rather than in any other way. Consequently, the engineers and their work loom rather large. The prescription once laid down for the German realistic novel of the nineteenth century was that it must seek to show the people at work; apparently Goebels believes that the war motive picture should show war to the people as work and labor. The war movies demonstrate to the home folks that their soldiers went through hardships and crossed the wide distances of the Polish plains; these obliging soldiers, as if to please the camera-men, raised none of the dust clouds which hung over the field-grey columns in which this writer marched with parched throat through Poland in 1914-15. He had heard reports that this renascent German Army of 1939-40 had even outmarched the Imperial Army of twenty-five years ago by covering up to thirty-five miles a day; but this outdistancing need not be conceded for, as the motion picture all too clearly proves, the soldier of today marches far more lightly than that of 1914, lighter that is by some thirty to forty pounds. The modern soldier does not have to carry his knapsack; such "freedom of the shoulders" makes a veteran of the earlier war rather envious. Besides, far more soldiers ride now than in 1914-15, fulfilling at last the German infantryman's proverb formed under the agonizing load of his pack, that it was better to ride badly than to walk well. Whatever the reaction of the veteran of earlier campaigns in Poland, the reaction of the German people at home will still remain: our boys have a hard time in the field, in the foreign land; war is the hardest work imaginable; on the whole and for most of the soldiers it is not handicraft or head-work but leg-work plus machine-work, those amazing machines that do so much of the essential work. On the whole, the machines are depicted as labor-saving rather than labor-destroying devices. They even seem to make modern war

less dangerous; judging from the scenes of destroyed machinery, an unsuspecting soul might even acquire the notion that the machines did the dying for the soldier in this war.

The leader principle in modern warfare—in contradistinction to modern mass politics—is discreet, if not invisible, to the outside world; orders are not given from the saddle but over the telephone and radio. Still, if it is no longer showy, it has to be shown. In the division of that labor which is war, the head-work is performed by the staffs and the supreme head-work by the *Führer* himself.¹⁷ Consequently, “everything goes according to plan.” The arrangement of the motion picture fits exactly the style of Hitler’s speech of October 6, 1939, delivered with innumerable “I’s” after the close of the Polish campaign: “I deliberately released the German Supreme Command . . . I declared a temporary armistice . . . I extended the time limit . . . I then ordered a general attack on the city [of Warsaw] for September 25 . . . ”¹⁸ In the motion picture, as in this and other speeches, Hitler is far more the Supreme War Lord than William II was at any time during the first World War except on the first day or in unrealistic pictures. He always appears as soon as a city is conquered; he allows himself to be photographed freely; he, even like a film star, hands out autographs to the soldiers begging for it; he is in the very midst of the soldiery and within easy reach of a hundred daggers; and it is considered safe by the police. The latter do not show the same trust for the Poles; in fact, when Hitler makes his entry into a Polish city, driving through the streets behind horse-power rather than on horseback, not one window in a street where most windows have been spared is allowed to be opened. (Perhaps this was the city of Bromberg, half of which was evacuated so that the parachutists could practice how to descend upon a city and its roofs from the air and find their way to the ground.)

The motto of the whole composition is, “The German soldier is irresistible; no obstacle is too great for him.” This is carried to such an extent that practically no active enemy resistance is visible, although some passive resistance is indicated by blown-up bridges and other forms of sabotage. The artillery fires, as during summer maneuvers, without so much as one enemy shot falling

¹⁷ In the statement issued by the new Chief of Staff of the Red Army, General Zhukoff, when he assumed command, it is said with reference to the Finnish campaign that Stalin “personally worked out all details of operations, and to him must go a large part of the credit for the Russian victory” (*New York Times*, February 24, 1941).

¹⁸ According to some enumerator, Hitler refers to himself once in every fifty-three words in a public address and Mussolini, before the Greek campaign and the setback in Africa, once in eighty-three words (*New York Times*, February 10, 1940). Of pictures of the *Führer* there never can be too many, even in his own presence. It is always part of the preparation of the coming of Hitler to have him preceded by innumerable likenesses on the walls of the meeting hall. Only the initial observer wonders whether the obvious differences between the often rather crude images and the actual presence of the *Führer* is not disconcerting to the audience. It might be remarked that one of the first measures of Pétain in the denationalization of French politics was the placing of his head, above a military uniform collar, on the coins of France.

near the German batteries; no German airplane is lost compared with several on the other side (with one rather remarkable "catching" of a shot-down plane which hits the sea). During the whole length of the "Blitzkrieg im Westen" I discovered only two wounded German soldiers—one rushed by in such a hurried and careless way that he might not even have been a legitimately wounded man; the other was a man with a bandage around his head, the traditional embodiment in war paintings of the spirit that "carries on."

There is no hesitation in the forward expression of the German soldier. He marches through neutral Luxemburg in spite of "Entrance Forbidden" signs on the frontier; with such heavy irony the hesitation over committing another violation of international law is overcome in case the people back home should happen to feel the oppressive memory of 1914 or 1919. When compared with the Polish film, where the White Book imbued the motion picture, so to speak, with graphs and atrocity stories, the whole *innocentiste* preparation of the attack in the West through Holland and Belgium is short and careless. No need was felt by the Nazi governors to concern themselves as much as in 1939 with that side of war-making and war preparation; the neutral world had shrunk considerably since then. Other civilian hesitation or revulsion, should it exist, is overcome by depicting German soldiers feeding people of the occupied territory out of their own field kitchens as if they were on a mission of charity or by demonstrating how they saved the famous Cathedral of Laon—by perfunctorily showing a weak arc of water from a hose behind which the high Gothic arcs of the Cathedral loom with the supreme contempt of great art for the low trick played by the invader. For those who have eyes to see something even in the rapidity of a moving picture, genius other than the German becomes visible at this point and still reigns supreme.

It is nowhere difficult to see through the tricks and the tendency of the German movie-makers. When they photograph prisoners of war, they show them as milling mobs, as masses hurrying along under the command of one or two German guards, unshaven, disorderly-looking, as if they had never been a foe to reckon with. The highest scorn is reserved for the colonial troops of France, as if to say to the people far behind the front, "With that sort of non-humans had the pure Aryan to trouble himself in the interest of the new order in Europe." As compared with the film on the Polish campaign the *Führer* is less often visible, though the hearer—a little more than onlooker this time—is left in no doubt that he leads the battle, even if not every specific movement in it as was pretended in the picture of the Eastern campaign, and is with "his" soldiers until the armistice. The well known vindictive arrangement of the signing of the armistice in the 1918 car of Compiègne is followed by a strange exhibition of gloating: the *Führer* dances a little jig before his entourage and holds his stomach as if he had just tasted and swallowed France, a quaint reversion to animalism and—at least symbolically—to cannibalism on the part of the vegetarian Chancellor.

If, perhaps, the visual side of modern battle remains largely uncaught by the camera, do the sound-recording devices do better? Decidedly not. The "decibels" of modern battle are too many and too strong, and apparently also the contrast between the moment when the world on your right seems to go to pieces thunderingly and the silence that seems to wait either for the song of the lark or for the resumption of machine-gun fire. The screech of the Stuka airplanes is there, more symbolically than naturally and somehow connected—on this transmission belt of light and darkness—with the impervious eagle in stone which is the last ferocious vignette of the picture. The bird has obviously heard to his own anthropophagic satisfaction the theme song of the picture, "Denn Wir Fahren gegen Engeland" ("For We Are Marching Against England") and the Dutch "Dankgebet"—a song annexed by the Germans from the Netherlands under the last Kaiser, then banished for awhile because it had a Jewish translator, and now, after the rape of the Netherlands, permitted to be sung again by the grateful masses.

The German movie-makers' next enterprise, "Victory in the West," covering the campaign from May 10, 1940, to Compiègne, was released at the end of January 1941 but had not arrived in this country at the time of writing. It has been shown not only in the Reich itself but also in the capitals of the fewer and fewer neutrals, in Moscow where Soviet officials were "greatly interested," in Bucharest and Sofia, and in Ankara where von Papen "entertained" some Turkish society with it while Anthony Eden, at about the same time, tried to impress the same or other Turks by motion pictures of the work done by the British Army of the Nile.¹⁹

After the campaign in the Netherlands and France, the Battle of Britain remains to be photographed. By no means an easy or convincing task this will be, as those know who have lingered for long moments of interpretation over photographs from the air, as a dentist lingers hesitant over the X-ray plates of the mouths of his patients, or as a historian might very well study the diseases which civilization carries in its bony structure. No matter how effective the new tricks of the photographer, it is safe to predict that future pictures of the Fascist *Blitzkrieg* will remain as crudely unrealistic as the early representation of the invasion of England on the Bayeux tapestry. Man is no nearer than he ever was to capturing in a picture the essence of Battle.

¹⁹ *New York Times*, January 30, March 9, and March 21, 1941.

THE MODERN ITALIAN NAVY

By THEODORE ROPP

II. Since 1900¹

THE Franco-Italian naval race of the 1880's and 1890's had ended with the defeat of Italy; her reconciliation with France turned her attention to the eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic. With some interest in both of the alliances, Italy's naval policy reflected the uncertainty of her general position. There was a sharp rise in the naval budget, though little that was new in naval strategy, and Cuniberti's remarkable light battleships followed Brin's general ideas. Speed and gun power were as essential to catching an Austrian fleet in the narrow Adriatic as in escaping a French force in the wider Mediterranean.² Giovanni Sechi's monumental *Elementi di arte militare marittima*³ was largely based on Mahan and Bonamico. He still feared a French invasion of Italy by sea and ignored the question of commercial communications, though new emphasis was placed on light craft, torpedo, and submarine warfare. These weapons had always been especially suitable for Italy's second naval front, and their development was one result of the reappearance of a powerful Austrian fleet in the Adriatic area. For thirty years after Lissa, Austria had been contented with a purely defensive force of coastal battleships and torpedo craft to protect the harbors around Pola at the northern end of the Adriatic. Now the naval revival of Germany had found an echo in Austria, and the sluggish coast defenders were replaced by fast light battleships to harass the low Italian coast and contest the mastery of the whole sea. The Italian coast had no natural harbors except Venice and Brindisi, and its railways and cities were completely open to the sea. The Dalmatian Islands formed a magnificent protective screen for any Austrian fleet activity, while the new Austrian bases at Zara, Sebenico, and Spalato were closer to many of the Italian coastal towns than either base for the defenders. With the new base at Cattaro, they extended their power southward along the Dalmatian coast almost to the narrow Straits of Otranto. Though the morale of their motley crews was indifferent, their officers and engineering reflected the high standards of the larger navy of imperial Germany.

To meet this challenge, the Italians spent large sums on the Isonzo, the submarine and torpedo forces were almost doubled, and six new dreadnoughts were built against Austria's four. Moderately protected like their predecessors, the new ships continued the Italian tradition of high speed and heavy arma-

¹ The first part of this article, dealing with the Italian navy before 1900, appeared in the Spring issue (V, 32-48).

² His ideas are well expressed in "Il Vittorio Emanuele ed i paralleli fra le corazzate moderne," *Rivista Marittima*, January 1902.

³ 2 vols., Leghorn, 1903-06.



△ Larger naval bases
▲ Smaller naval bases

ment. The powerful Austrian light cruisers were responsible for the fast vessels of the *Quarto* class; in these narrow waters, light cruisers and destroyers were already merging into a single gun and torpedo type. Ancona was abandoned and Brindisi heavily fortified; in November 1914 Italy seized the Albanian port of Valona, almost in the center of the narrowest portion of the Straits.⁴ With all this naval activity, however, Italy did not break definitely with Austria, and the appearance of the first Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts stimulated a belated French building program. The whole French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean against the combined navies of Austria and Italy, and Britain's policy of supporting Italy against France was abandoned in the Anglo-French naval agreement of 1912. Italy's occupation of Tripoli and Rhodes greatly alarmed the British Admiralty; if Italy chose to stick with the Triple Alliance, the Entente would face a very serious situation in the Mediterranean. Though France was still vastly superior in old battleships and had laid out a larger construction program, Italy had as many completed dreadnoughts as France, and the combined forces of the Triple Alliance were superior to the French in the Mediterranean. There, too, the coming of the dreadnought had temporarily threatened the supremacy of the Entente navies.

When Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies, she was promised all her general objectives in the Adriatic area—the Brenner pass, the Dalmatian harbors and islands, Valona, and central Albania. Her task in attaining them was far from easy, though the naval struggle in the Mediterranean was primarily the work of the lighter forces. Here, as in other areas, the old battleships and armoured cruisers proved exceptionally vulnerable, while the new dreadnoughts lay inactive at Pola, Taranto, and Bizerta. The Austrians took full advantage of their favorable geographical situation and confined their naval activity to lightning raids with their fast light cruiser forces. Submarine and torpedo attacks on both sides were very effective, and the Italians developed a large fleet of sub-chasers and motor torpedo boats. By the end of the war over three hundred were in service; in surprise attacks among the Adriatic islands they had torpedoed two dreadnoughts and an old battleship, nearly half the capital strength of the hostile navy. The navy aided in the rescue of the defeated Serbian army, maintained an Italian contingent in Salonica, and cooperated with the army in resisting the final attack on Venice.

With these successes, however, Italy received her first real experience of blockade as hostile submarines took an astounding toll of Mediterranean merchant shipping. Even the closing of the Straits of Otranto by a net over forty miles long did not prove very satisfactory, and nearly 760,000

⁴ Interesting parts of a vast literature are the official *La marina italiana nella Grande Guerra* (Florence, 1935-); Hans Sokol, *Osterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914-1918* (Vienna, 1933); and V. Mantegazza, *L'Altra sponda, Italia ed Austria nell' Adriatico* (Milan, 1905).

tons of Italian shipping were lost. This was exactly half of Italy's merchant marine. Though her imports were cut nearly 40 per cent, all the Italian shipping in service at the Armistice could have supplied only 27 per cent of her needs, and there were serious shortages of both oil and coal.⁵ From the peace the Italians expected three things—a strategic frontier on the northeast, naval control of the Adriatic, and equality of colonial opportunity. She gained the first two of them—the Brenner pass and the centers of the Hapsburg navy, Trieste, Fiume, Pola, Zara, and the island of Lagosta. Though Sebenico, Cattaro, and Spalato went to Jugoslavia, the French attempt to create a Jugoslav navy met with little success, and Italy gradually consolidated her position at the Straits of Otranto. Though the Allies did not honor her claims to Albania, she obtained the island of Saseno, opposite Valona, and began to penetrate the mainland by mixing in Albanian politics. By 1926 she had complete control of Albania's army, trade, and finances as a prelude to the occupation of the country. The fortification of Valona gave the fleet a foothold on both sides of the Straits and the army a bridge-head against either Greece or Jugoslavia. Though some of these developments did not come until some time after Versailles, they were the natural result of Italy's successes in the Adriatic; France's concession of naval parity at the Washington Conference was an equally natural result of the position of practical dreadnought equality Italy had obtained by 1914.

France's pre-dreadnought superiority was by this time wholly worthless, the great building program of 1914 had been completely halted, and the dreadnought strength of each fleet had been reduced to five vessels of 110,000 tons. It was a parity of mutual exhaustion, the opposition of the French Chamber of Deputies to further battleship construction making it practically certain that France would not attempt to recover her former superiority. Though the Washington Conference had no effect on the realities of the Mediterranean, it helped to preserve the *status quo* while each country turned to the problems of internal reconstruction. But there was no agreement in the vital light craft categories; the old Franco-Italian rivalry was simply transferred to that arena. With the end of the German threat in the Adriatic, Italy did emerge from the war with a somewhat better strategic position, though she signally failed to win the colonial outlets to which the secret treaties entitled her. The Allies could hardly have acted more unwisely than in strengthening her military potential while denying her colonial and economic equality.

The coming of Fascism has not changed the basic features of Italian policy in military and naval affairs. The Chamber of Deputies had never asserted

⁵ J. A. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 353-65; besides the official histories already mentioned, there are C. Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana durante la Guerra Mondiale* (2d ed., Bologna, 1925), and G. L. McEntee, *Italy's Part in Winning the World War* (Princeton, 1934).

any real control of military matters, and Italian arms firms had always been mere adjuncts of the government. Though much of its effort has been directed at improving the morale of the common soldier and sailor, critics still regard them as the weakest part of the Italian military structure. In both army and navy, the officers and skilled ratings have generally been fairly good; here, as in Russia, the great problem has been the uneducated peasant. The chief new element was the demand for economic self-sufficiency, a natural deduction from Italy's war experiences. Italian naval strategy had been stood on its head; the dangers of invasion and bombardment had proved less important than the completely neglected and nearly insoluble problems of economic warfare. Italy does not even possess the raw materials for an *Ersatz* campaign, and there are none near her frontiers to improve the situation. Over 70 per cent of her imports must pass through the British bottlenecks of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal; 65 per cent could be reached by a French blockade of the former. There are no alternatives; Italy must risk everything to obtain a quick victory.⁶

This necessity is the common determining factor in Italy's land, sea, and air policies. By fairly moderate expenditures she hopes "to seal the gigantic fortifications God has given" her on the Alps, to concentrate her limited resources on an offensive in the Mediterranean. The idea of using the navy for this purpose had been put forth at the turn of the century, but its most spectacular modern development is General Douhet's well known doctrine of air warfare. His arguments are based on the principle that modern "integral" war embraces every aspect of life and that the only means to victory is moral and social disorganization of the enemy. Because of the tactical superiority of the defensive on both land and sea, only the airplane can act directly on the economic and social structure. In air warfare there are no coasts or mountain ranges or natural barriers to aid the defenders, and the possibilities of the offensive are nearly unlimited.⁷ Italy's experience in position warfare on both land and sea had been most disheartening, and it should not be surprising that such ideas should be particularly appealing to those powers least able to stand another war of attrition. Moral and economic factors had played a decisive rôle in the Austro-Italian conflict, and the relatively short distances and good weather of the Mediterranean seemed to favor the airplane. The great Mediterranean cities lie close to the sea in a position peculiarly open to aerial attack. With Italy's traditional concern over naval bombardment, she was naturally interested in the airplane; its successful offensive development could turn her vulnerable central position into an asset. Though the Italian navy has not in fact become a mere adjunct

⁶There is a map in R. de Courten, "Italy's Naval Policy," *Naval Annual*, 1930. There is no point in plumbing totalitarian statistics, but there is general agreement as to Italy's position.

⁷Douhet's most important writings are found in *Il dominio dell' aria* (Verona, 1932) and *La guerra integrale* (Rome, 1936).

of the air force, cooperation between naval forces and land-based aircraft is a very important element in modern Italian naval strategy. Mass bombing of bases and convoys is a major danger in the constricted Mediterranean.⁸

Italian military theory has presented some curious compromises, between the mass army and mechanization, the war of positions and the *Blitzkrieg*. She relied on fortifications in the Alps to free her resources for a mechanized offensive in the Mediterranean. For this offensive, however, she was reluctant to abandon her old mass formations, and her abundant man power was still conscripted for ditch-digging and road-building infantry. Her comparatively weak industry tempted her to rely on comparatively light mechanized equipment. In both Spain and Africa, the Italians used a "hedge-hog" type of attack, with an advance guard of tanks and artillery, and infantry following in trucks to fortify the positions taken by the tanks and artillery.⁹ Here, again, modern Italian military practice is curiously like that of Russia; a recently industrialized country's mystic faith in mechanization is combined with the older massed man power. In both cases the machines have not been heavy enough to stand up to a really efficient mechanized counter attack, the trained men are likely to be swamped by the hordes of fleeing ditch diggers, and the staff work for mechanized warfare has been too complicated for them to handle. Still, one determinant of modern Italian military policy has been the problem of sea communications. Italy, like England, must keep open her commercial lanes and support large armies outside the Italian peninsula.

Meanwhile the same lesson had been driven home to Italy's rival, and France had developed a very similar naval strategy from her war experience. Though the "*Jeune Ecole*" had always assumed that France herself was self-sufficient, the invasion of her industrial areas had made her as dependent as England on the sea, and two and a half million men were carried on her naval transports. For both powers, the navy's chief function became the assurance of military and commercial communications. Admiral Bernotti, the first Italian post-war strategist, defined the command of the sea as "nothing more than the free use of its highways";¹⁰ the French Admiral Castex called it "the control of the essential surface communications."¹¹ "Totalitarian war," said another Italian, "has so magnified the economic functions of sea power . . . that naval activity is completely centered around commercial warfare."¹² In the Mediterranean an old-fashioned blockade seemed completely out of

⁸ For instance, Admiral Vannutelli, "L'arma aerea e la guerra navale in Mediteraneo," *Rivista Marittima*, May 1929.

⁹ S. Visconti-Prasca, *La guerra decisiva* (Milan, 1934); A. Niessel, "La doctrine de guerre italienne," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1936; Albert Viton, "Britain and the Axis in the Near East," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1941.


¹⁰ *La guerra marittima, studio critico sull' impiego dei mezzi nella guerra mondiale* (Florence, 1923), p. 217.

¹¹ *Theories Stratégiques* (5 vols., Paris, 1929-30), I, 215.

¹² G. Fioravanzo, *La guerra sul mare e la guerra integrale* (2 vols., Turin, 1930-31), I, 463.



THE CRUISER "BOLZANO," 1933
From Jane's Fighting Ships.



A MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT, 1939
Courtesy of Italian Library of Information.

the question; in these narrow waters, as in the Baltic, both powers expected to push through essential military and commercial convoys while remaining constantly on the alert for attacks from the enemy's strongly defended bases. "A fleet," writes Captain Fioravanzo, "is no longer *sea-keeping*, but a force ready to strike out over the sea. Each appearance is a rapid thrust, a brief *soutien-en-masse* toward a definite objective, accomplished in a limited time, on the basis of attainable information or logical presumption . . . A fleet has lost in staying power and operating continuity all that it has gained in speed and precision."¹³ This is the modern version of Bonamico's active "defensive-offensive."

The defeat of Germany left both France and Italy free to turn their attention to the western Mediterranean, and a new Franco-Italian naval race began within a few months of the end of the Washington Conference. Italy was chiefly concerned with consolidating her new position of equality but quickly increasing her cruiser tonnage to the same level as that of her capital ships. The flimsily constructed treaty cruisers of the *Trento* class were in some senses "political" ships to prove to future disarmament conferences and the Italian public that Italy really could protect her newly won parity. Like the lightly built and largely unprotected *Condottieri*, they were intended for hit-and-run work in smooth waters against the French super-destroyers and light cruisers. They were a new application of Lord Fisher's dictum that "speed is armour," a modern version of the heavily armed Armstrong cruisers of the 1890's. Like most French warships of the 1920's, they sacrificed range and protection to speed and armament. The Italian ships of the last five years have increased range but little more protection. The latest heavy cruiser, the *Bolzano*, has been called a "cruisers' battle-cruiser," and their light *Esploratori* are still nearly unprotected but possess great speed and gun power.

On the basis of their experience in the English Channel and the Adriatic, both France and Italy were drawn into a spectacular race for high speed and gun power, for a war of lightning raids and short, sharp, light craft encounters. In the smooth waters of peacetime maneuvers these qualities are always easily exaggerated; they have a fatal fascination for the ambitious designer and the reader of naval annuals and newspaper statistics. In the storms of war, unfortunately, speed is the most uncertain of all tactical factors, at the mercy of any chance hit or machinery accident, and well-protected ships that are "sunk" by the umpires in maneuvers have a habit of keeping on in wartime. Like Fisher's battle cruisers, the Italian cruisers were built for supporting destroyers and finishing off a weaker enemy; a true raider of any type must try to avoid a pitched battle with nearly equal forces. All this is in the Italian tradition—even against Austria they never attempted

¹³ *Basi navale nel mondo* (Milan, 1936), p. 21. The same idea is expressed in the great work of Admiral di Giamberardino, *L'Arte della guerra in mare* (2 vols., Rome, 1937), and in Admiral Vannutelli "Caretteri del potere marittimo nel Mediterraneo," *Rivista Marittima*, January 1926.

the discouraging job of blasting the enemy out of his protected bases.¹⁴ With these high speed convoy and raiding vessels, they built large numbers of the small submarines and motor torpedo boats which had proved so useful against Austria. Their submarine force was recently the most numerous in the world, though many of its units were small boats for the islands of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. In the Ethiopian crisis, the M. A. S. (motor torpedo boats) received more publicity than all the rest of the Italian warships put together; dozens of Fascist suicide crews were ostentatiously ready to blast the English out of the water.

In the capital ships constructed since the breakdown of the naval treaties Italy has again emphasized speed and armament, and the reappearance of the German fleet in northern waters enabled her to win a definite superiority over France alone in the Mediterranean. When France replied to the German pocket battleships with the twenty-five thousand ton *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg*, Italy built the thirty-five thousand ton *Littorio* and *Vittorio Veneto* and completely rebuilt four older dreadnoughts. Though the five reconstructed French battleships were more heavily protected than the refitted Italian ships, the six Italian units were a much faster and more homogenous squadron. Though France had four battleships under construction to Italy's two, the new German fleet would tip the balance in favor of the Axis. The situation of 1889 had been repeated; by 1940, the French faced a somewhat smaller, but faster, Italian squadron well equipped for the traditional hit-and-run warfare of the western Mediterranean.¹⁵ The Italian ships were specifically built for that strategic area, while France was again building for both the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The Italian fleet is still a force for warfare in a confined strategic area, though that type of warfare demands exceptional qualities of morale, initiative, and preparation. The "defensive-offensive" requires constant activity, and that, in turn, assumes an ample fuel supply and the constant presence of the enemy. As long as France's main route to North Africa passed within easy range of the Italian bases, both these conditions would be fulfilled.

¹⁴ G. Engely, *The Politics of Naval Disarmament* (London, 1932); Hans Rohde, *Italien und Frankreich, in ihren politischen, militärischen, und wirtschaftlichen Gegen-sätzen* (Berlin, 1931); Fletcher Pratt, *Sea Power and Today's War* (New York, 1939); Admiral Pratt, "Commerce Destruction, Past and Future," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, November 1934.

¹⁵ The *Littorios* keep the traditional high speed, heavy guns, and moderate protection of the Italian battleship. Umberto Pugliesi, their designer, has an interesting table on ships of 35,000 tons displacement in "Navi di Battaglia," *Rivista Marittima*, January 1937:

	speed	guns	protection
<i>Littorio</i> (begun October 1934)	34	9 15-in.	10 in. belt
<i>Richelieu</i> (begun October 1935)	34	8 15-in.	16 in. belt
<i>George V</i> (begun January 1937)	31	12 14-in.	16 in. belt
<i>North Carolina</i> (begun October 1937)	29	9 16-in.	16 in. belt

H. Evers, "Italienische Schlachtkräfte," *Werft, Reederei, Hafen*, April 1, 1937, is a connected account of Italian battleship policy.

Though it has caused considerable strategic diversion of the British forces,¹⁶ this type of navy is not really suitable for offensive warfare at the extreme ends of the Mediterranean against a power whose interests are important but not vital enough to demand constant convoys through the threatened area. The new "oceanic navy" begun after for the Ethiopian crisis is still largely in the blue-print stage. Some of the new ocean-going submarines may be operating from French or Spanish ports, but the possibilities of an Italian naval thrust beyond that are too remote for serious consideration. The *Littorio* and *Vittorio Veneto* are capable of acting anywhere, but there are no aircraft carriers or light craft to accompany them. So radical a change of policy cannot be accomplished overnight; it is particularly difficult in a period of actual warfare.

At the same time, both France and Italy completely rebuilt their merchant navies; each power improved its relative steam tonnage position, Italy passing France in total tonnage. By December 1937 Italy owned 10 per cent of the world's ocean-going ships, as against 3.7 per cent in 1914. Most of these new ships were fast liners for auxiliary troop transportation or fast convoying through the vital western Mediterranean, the crossing of Italy's main commercial route and the French imperial line to western Africa.¹⁷ In the early 1920's the strategic situation in that area was still that of 1900; both powers had been too occupied with the German danger to construct any new naval bases. The French ports in Toulon, Bizerta, and Corsica still covered the Algiers-Marseilles transport route, Bizerta being a possible point of departure for a landing in Naples or Sicily. Spezia, Maddalena, and minor bases at Genoa, Gaeta (Naples), and Messina formed Italy's defensive system, with Maddalena her chief offensive base against the Algiers-Marseilles transport route. Against Bizerta, Italy has now developed Cagliari in southern Sardinia and Palermo and Trapini in western Sicily, but Corsica has increased in importance with the development of air power. It is within two hundred miles of Turin, Milan, Genoa, Florence, and Rome, in the geographical center of the curving western Italian coast. From Bizerta, Savoy, and Corsica, French air power threatened the whole length of the peninsula. Maddalena, at the same time, was too near the French air bases to serve as a major offensive base, but neither Cagliari nor Palermo could really replace it as an operations center against France's coast and communications.

¹⁶ The 1939 (September) *Jane's Fighting Ships* gave Franco-Italian strength as follows:

	Heavy Capital	Cruisers	Light Cruisers	De- stroyers	Sub- marines	M.A.S.
France	7	7	12	59	78	13
Italy	4	7	14	61	104	142

The figures for France include five refitted dreadnoughts but not the *Jean Bart* and the *Richelieu*; those for Italy do not include two *Littorios*, the *Roma* and the *Impero*, somewhat ahead of two more *Richelieus*.

¹⁷ From 1924 to 1933 she built 613,000 tons of liners as compared with 120,000 cargo and 68,000 tankers. From 1923 to 1932 she built 18 class A liners against 16 for France, 13 for Japan, and 9 for Germany. (*The Shipping World Yearbook, 1935-38*.)

The Italian ports were still farther from the new French sea routes opened to the west of the line from Toulon to Bizerta. Of these, the shortest ran from Oran behind the Balearics and Corsica to Porte Vendras. Though a fast convoy could pass the area exposed to Maddalena and Cagliari in one night, the whole route was only slightly longer than the exposed Algiers-Marseilles line. If Spain and France were actually allied, French troops could take a new "all land" route through Spanish Morocco to Tangier, be ferried from there to Algeciras, and rush to France on the Algeciras-Madrid-Irun railroad. A third route lay entirely outside the Mediterranean. It connected Algeria with the new Moroccan bases of Casablanca and Rabat for transport in the Atlantic to Brest or Lorient. The only weakness of the new railroads which covered French North Africa was the danger of attack from Spanish Morocco, but France's communications with North Africa were reasonably secure against Italian attack as long as Spain was either neutral or friendly.¹⁸

Italy's secret alliance with Spain had long since been abrogated, and Spain was now closely linked to the French alliance system. Before the World War the French had worked out plans to use the Spanish railroads if Italy stayed with the Central Powers, and England was thought to have obtained the Balearics for use against Maddalena. During the war France confiscated German property in "neutralized" Tangier and still further strengthened her position in the new statute of 1923.¹⁹ After the rising of Abd-el-Krim, according to some accounts, France demanded full transit rights on the Irun-Madrid-Algeciras railroad, and her activity near the mouth of the Straits increased her chances of cutting Italy's vital Gibraltar trade route. Cagliari, the nearest Italian base, was 750 miles from the Straits, while Oran and Casablanca are on either side of them. Both France and England could divert their Mediterranean traffic to the Atlantic and completely stop Italian merchant shipping. Though Italy upset the French position by an agreement with Primo di Rivera in 1926, the French recovered their former supremacy when the dictator was replaced by the Spanish Republic. Though Franco-Italian naval relations were unusually tense at the London Conference of 1930, both powers temporarily turned from the western Mediterranean to the problems of the revival of Germany and Italy's Near Eastern conflict with England.

In many ways this new development was entirely unexpected; friendship with England had been a constant factor in modern Italian foreign policy, and England had always favored an Italian counterpoise to France in the western Mediterranean. The Ethiopian question, like the Kruger telegram, suddenly

¹⁸ F. Bertonelli, *Il Nostro Mare* (2d ed., Florence, 1931); Hans Hummel and Wulf Siewert, *Der Mittelmeerraum* (Berlin, 1936).

¹⁹ In spite of the French contention that Italy had signed away her Moroccan interests, Italy claimed that Tangier was a Mediterranean problem which vitally affected her trade and refused to recognize the new Tangier regime (Graham H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier* [Stanford, 1931]).

revealed the latent rivalry of British and Italian Near Eastern imperialisms. For the British, the Alexandria-Port Said-Haifa area had gradually become one of the most vital centers of the Empire, the nexus of the Suez, Cape to Cairo, and Persian Gulf oil routes. Her near Eastern possessions and dependencies are at least as important as French Africa; they furnish a quarter of her cotton, petroleum, and fats, and a fifth of her total trade passed along their Port Said to Aden axis. Though large French forces were usually stationed in Syria, France planned to store oil rather than transport it from the east, and Syria, like Indo-China, was primarily the concern of England.²⁰ Though Italy's Near Eastern position had been severely shaken by the World War, she was the only other great power still pursuing a forward policy in that area. In Libya the harbors of Tripoli, Bengazi, and Tobruk were developed into military and naval bases, and a fourteen hundred mile coastal highway connected the Tunisian and Egyptian frontiers. The total forces in the colony have been put as high as 350,000; the number alone is enough to indicate its new military importance.²¹ Still farther to the east, the Dodecanese Islands have been heavily fortified, originally for the protection of a route to the Black Sea oil region. In 1935 she was getting about 60 per cent of her oil from that area, and Italian capitalists had projected a Trans-Balkan railroad from Albania to Salonica and Constantinople.²²

Even the race with France considerably increased Italy's naval potential against Britain; the new bases at Cagliari, Palermo, and Trapani are much closer to England's sea lanes than Spezia or Maddalena, and the Sicilian bases of Augusta, Syracuse, and Catania threaten Malta's eastern exit. The Pantelleria Islands in the Tunis-Sicily channel have been heavily fortified, and the through route along the southern coast of Sicily is never more than a hundred miles from Italian air and naval bases. For war against England, the Taranto base is probably the most important. In the years between the Ethiopian crisis and the present war, England has, however, consolidated her position while that of Italy has grown weaker. Her newly conquered colonies are still only a liability,²³ and even her victory in the Spanish war did not redress the balance against her. She had achieved, as in 1887, only a precarious balance of forces in the western Mediterranean. In spite of her hold on the Balearics and the danger to the French routes to Africa, she could not touch France's commercial

²⁰ *Geographical Distribution of British Empire Shipping* (The Admiralty, 1936); Admiral Castex, "L'Expansion coloniale et la strategie navale," *Academie de Marine, Communications et Memoires* (1930), p. 203.

²¹ There are good maps in A. V. Pellegrineschi, "Le nuovo strade della Libia," *Gerarchia*, October 1935.

²² One estimate puts her oil sources about as follows: in 1925, 60 per cent American and 20 per cent Black Sea; in 1935, 60 per cent Black Sea and only 22 per cent American. Persian and Syrian oil was about 10 per cent in both cases. (C. Alimenti, *La questione Petroliera italiana* [Turin, 1937].)

²³ A. Palumbo, "La rete stradale imperiale," *Gerarchia*, July 1936, and V. Varanini, "Il nuovo esercito coloniale italiano," *ibid.*, October 1936, are typical of their hopes.

communications with America. Her air force could have done less damage to French industry than French planes could have done to hers, or, to apply Sir Julian Corbett to the whole eighty years of Franco-Italian rivalry, Italy has never really threatened more than "limited" French interests while France has always retained the possibility of an "unlimited" counterstroke.

Against England, Italy's position is still weaker; in spite of all her efforts, she is still "the prisoner of the Mediterranean." There is no possibility of destroying more than a portion of the British battle squadrons; the rest can retire to defensive positions well outside the range of Italian air and torpedo bases. Britain can cut nearly all of Italy's trade routes, and her ill-timed attack on Greece has presented England with a whole series of naval bases right in the center of Italy's own Tripoli-Tobruk-Taranto-Leros Quadrangle. The temporary withdrawal of British convoys from the Mediterranean is neither new nor likely to be decisive;²⁴ all that Italy can hope for is the victory of her Axis partner. In Spain, Italy did the work while Germany obtained most of the benefits; when Germany conquered France, she did not greatly relieve the pressure on Italy. Even the reduction of Suez or Gibraltar will probably be a German affair. In a day when blockades are as often enforced at raw material sources as at their destination, it is hard to believe that even the capture of these outlets would solve Italy's economic difficulties, though it is equally difficult to feel that Britain can knock Italy out of the war through fleet and air action from the eastern Mediterranean. Until French Africa reenters the war, a victory over Italy will be much more difficult than many people imagine. In any event, the war will be decided in Europe by the economic and military action of England, Germany, the United States, and Russia. Italy is still, in the words of *Il Duce*, "essentially Mediterranean," or, as D'Annunzio put it, "She will be a great maritime power, or nothing." Yet that particular sea does not control the raw materials with which modern sea power must be constructed. No "Fascist enthusiasm" or engineering magic can alter that situation.

²⁴ Their continued lack of emphasis on commerce destroying *per se* is interesting in this connection. A. L., "La guerra di corsa," *Rivista Marittima*, March 1932; F. Castracane, "Alcune considerazioni sulla guerra al traffico," *ibid.*, October 1932; G. Laghezza, "Il commercio nella guerra marittima," *ibid.*, March 1930.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

Dr. Richard P. Stebbins joins the staff of **MILITARY AFFAIRS** with this issue as one of the Associate Editors. Dr. Stebbins received his degree from Harvard last year and is now a member of Dr. Earle's Seminar on American Military Policy at the Institute for Advanced Study. His dissertation was on "Italian Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1911-14," and he is coauthor of a biography of Carl Maria von Weber.

There have been several changes in personnel in the Historical Section of the Army War College this spring. Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, a Trustee of the INSTITUTE, has been ordered to active duty and is again Chief of the Section. Colonel Robert Arthur, also a Trustee and formerly Chief of the Section, has been designated commanding officer of a new Barrage Balloon Training Center at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Colonel John W. Wright, another Trustee, has also been ordered to active duty and replaces Lieutenant Colonel Elbridge Colby as Secretary. Colonel Colby has been transferred to the National Guard Bureau. Among the other members of the INSTITUTE who have recently been assigned to the Historical Section are Major George M. Chandler and Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Goddard. Lieutenant Colonel John W. McDonald has been transferred to Fort Knox, Kentucky. It is understood that work is being pushed and that the third volume of the *Order of Battle* series will soon be completed.

The Departments of Public Law and of History at Columbia University offered a course called "Basic Factors in International Relations" during the spring session. The emphasis of the course was on war and defense preparations, and the lectures ranged from "The Rôle of War in Statecraft" to "Problems of Demobilization." Several members of the INSTITUTE participated.

Princeton University has announced a summer session program in Public and International Affairs which will include several courses of interest to students of warfare. Dr. Robert G. Albion, a Trustee of the INSTITUTE, will offer a course on the "History of American Defense." Among other courses are "Labor and National Defense" by Professor D. A. McCabe, "Propaganda Analysis" by Professor H. L. Childs, and "Problems of War Finance" by Professor P. J. Strayer.

Mr. H. Snowden Marshall of the Office of Production Management has organized a second group of the Seminar-Conference on the Total Science of War. This group, also led by Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, held its first session at the headquarters of the INSTITUTE on May 16 and is composed of young men employed in various governmental defense agencies. In view of current world events, both groups of the Seminar-Conference plan to continue meeting throughout the summer.

In January the American Medical Association published the first issue of *War Medicine*, a bi-monthly magazine "containing original contributions, news and abstracts of articles of military, naval and similar interests related to preparedness and war service." Dr. Morris Fishbein heads the editorial board.

H. Bittner and Company has announced the forthcoming publication of *Soldiers of the American Army, 1775-1941*, a volume of colored plates by Fritz Kredel with text by Frederick P. Todd. The plates, which are based on detailed research, include such corps as the Continental Dragoons, Texas Rangers, Louisiana Zouaves, Philippine Scouts, and the Armored Force. The text relates each type to the history of the Army as a whole and explains the clothing and equipment pictured. All plates will be colored by hand under the supervision of the artist.

The jurisdiction of the site of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25, 1876, known as the Custer Battlefield National Cemetery, has been transferred from the War Department to the National Park Service.

Contributors to This Issue

Dr. Alfred Vagts can now be said to be "a frequent contributor" to this journal—"Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich," III (Winter 1939), 210-21, and "War and the Colleges," IV (Summer 1940), 67-75. A member of Dr. Earle's Seminar on American Military Policy at the Institute for Advanced Study, he is the author of *Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik* (1935) and *A History of Militarism* (1937).

The first part of Dr. Theodore Ropp's article on the Italian navy appeared in the preceding issue. He is Instructor of History at Duke University.

The current article and illustrations by Hugh Charles McBarron, Jr., a Chicago artist, is the fourth in a series which began in the Fall 1939 issue (III, 191-99; IV, 55-64, 185-96).

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Where They Have Trod: The West Point Tradition in American Life, by R. Ernest Dupuy. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company 1940. Pp. 424. \$3.00.)

Wars and rumors of war have always turned the nation's interest to West Point, the ultimate fountainhead of its defense system. Colonel Dupuy's colorful presentation of the history of the United States Military Academy comes as a timely response to such interest. The whole story is there, beginning with the abortive first efforts of Revolutionary War days to establish a government institution for the training of army officers, moving on to the realization of Washington's dream through the unremitting efforts of Sylvanus Thayer, "Father of the Military Academy," and finally bringing the reader face to face with the cadet of 1941, immersed in the strategy and tactics of *blitzkrieg*. It is a story that has been told before, many times, but not this way. Other writers, graduates of West Point for the most part, all too often march their series of events before the reader in stiff, marshaled ranks, relying on bare statement to reveal the underlying spirit and aim of the Academy. One might as well seek to discover the inner fundamentals of the West Point system in the moving picture short of the Corps on parade.

Colonel Dupuy looks behind the façade to find the realities. He has asked himself, "What was the purpose and ideal of the founder of the West Point system? How well did he succeed? Who nourished that ideal after Thayer's going, to bring it in full vigor to the present day?" The answers to those queries have been found in the lives and works of the three men who appear as the warp of Colonel Dupuy's theme. He begins with the austere, unbending New Englander, Sylvanus Thayer, who gave the seventeen best years of his life to the casting of the mold which has made the West Pointer a distinctive element in the life of the nation. As the author points out, Brevet Major Thayer faced, on his assumption of the superintendency in 1817, the lack at West Point of many of the conditions necessary to the proper training of cadets for their future careers. Their education was a haphazard affair; no real standards of performance existed; discipline was largely a matter of whim and prejudice; personal and group integrity left much to be desired. Thayer corrected all that. His achievement was won against heavy odds, culminating in his historic difficulties with President Andrew Jackson. Conscious of the performance of a task well done, he concluded that his mission could better be handled by a successor.

Colonel Thayer, however, asked for relief only when he was assured that some man fully imbued with his ideals was ready to carry forward the program. He found that man in Dennis Hart Mahan, U. S. M. A. '24, the son of an Irish immigrant of 1800. Graduated first in his class, Mahan had stayed on as assistant professor of mathematics until ill health compelled him to ask for a furlough in 1826. Three years were spent in France, where, despite poor health, Mahan drove himself feverishly to the study and research which were to make him for forty years America's outstanding authority on the art of war. As Colonel Dupuy shows, Mahan so far mastered it that today his commentaries read like observations on *blitzkrieg*, model '40. Some at least of the cadets took his teachings to heart. In fact, "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign epitomizes the principles laid down by Mahan. It is interesting to note in passing that heredity and environment combined to produce an even more widely recognized authority in this professor's son, Alfred Thayer ("Navy") Mahan, whose writings still dominate the field of naval strategy.

A bare four years were available to preserve the continuity established by Thayer and Mahan. Peter Smith Michie, born in Scotland, came to the West Point faculty at the age of twenty-eight as assistant to Mahan. Triteness notwithstanding, his early career can be described only as meteoric. In less than two years after his graduation from the Academy in 1863 we find him Chief Engineer of the Army of the James, Brevet Brigadier General, while drawing the pay of his substantive rank, First Lieutenant. Down to his death in 1901, Colonel Michie held before his cadets and his colleagues the pursuit of an ideal in education and training which represented Sylvanus Thayer's greatest contribution to his country. The concept had become fixed, not merely in the life and regimen of the Corps, but in the nation's expectations of that Corps.

The reviewer must summarize baldly; the author, by contrast, happily permits the reader to draw many of his own conclusions. From the wealth of fact and incident available, he has chosen discriminately to give a rounded picture which omits none of the shadows. West Point's troubles are there as well as her triumphs. The hazing scandal at the turn of the century, the almost open rebellion of the Corps at one time against Thayer's methods of discipline, the tragedy of division in the Corps over the issues which ultimately brought the country to Civil War—all these are part of a very human document, marked by a vigor of style which distinguishes it from the drabness of most of its predecessors. Well selected illustrations enrich the author's presentation, among them several woodcuts executed by Mrs. Dupuy.

One impression which will strike home to the reader is the position occupied by the Military Academy among the educational institutions of the country through its formative years in the nineteenth century. The degrees and other honors conferred by various universities on men like Thayer, Mahan, and Michie speak for themselves. The faculty members of those years were con-

cerned not merely with the teaching of future officers; they played their full part in national educational advancement, as shown in the data presented by the author in the appendix. His comment omits discussion of the restrictive influences which later threw up a wall around the Military Academy until at one time even the preparation of textual material by the various departments for the cadets' use was forbidden. Their sole sphere had become the classroom; their material was the printed word expounding some one else's ideas. Happily, recent years have broken that wall, permitting the Military Academy personnel once more to play their proper rôle in the education of the nation's youth.

HERMAN BEUKEMA

United States Military Academy

The Economics of War, by Horst Mendershausen. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1940. Pp. 314. \$2.75.)

This timely and, as far as the material is concerned, up-to-date book shows in fine theoretical analysis the complexities of modern war economics. The book is elementary and introductory in character as may be expected from a study covering the full scope of pre-war, war, and post-war economics on three hundred pages. The approach is systematic and analytical, not historical. Thus, for example, we do not find in the book a coherent description of the German war preparations since 1933 or of total war. However, taking the book as a whole, we find an analysis of all the elements of which total war is composed.

In earlier times an Austrian general was entitled to say, "To conduct a war, one needs three things: money, money, and money." Today, however, the emphasis has shifted to the problems of production. It is a merit of this book that, without neglecting the financial problems, it discusses thoroughly the problems of industrial capacity and mobilization.

Dr. Mendershausen's book is divided into four parts: "economic war potential," war economy, international economics of war, and post-war economics. In discussing the "economic war potential," which embraces the human and material resources and the technological skill of a nation, the author gives serious attention to the problem of substitutes. They should not be considered from the cost and profit point of view; their economic burden should be compared with the expenditures for fortifications and other military investments which do not possess peacetime economic value, yet constitute necessary equipment in a world of limited peacefulness.

In discussing war economy itself, the author analyzes the problems which result from competing civilian and military demands and from competing military orders which lead to shortages in raw materials and labor supplies. Interesting is his analysis of the remedies for these situations: priority schemes for orders, rationing production and consumption goods, government operation of

industries, curtailing the rights of labor, directing the labor supply to the places it is most needed, and controlling prices and wages.

As far as financing the war and avoiding inflation are concerned, the author recommends borrowing as long as unemployment persists in the essential industries, but after the problem of unemployment is overcome he advocates the "heroic way" of outright taxation combined with regulation. Price control should be established "at the earliest possible moment and over as wide a field as possible," and it should be supplemented by a system of priorities and by rationing of consumer's goods. These various measures should be undertaken simultaneously. "Not only economic mobilization, but also the management of the war economy require comprehensive and proportionate efforts on the part of the government." One can wholeheartedly agree with these remarks, the more as in practice all steps are taken piecemeal and unsystematically.

As far as strategy is concerned the author draws the conclusion that a country poor in raw materials will probably try to force a decision of the war at an early moment, while a rich country can afford to keep on the defensive side and to face a prolonged war. "In this way it can bring its superiority to bear on the enemy." If Dr. Mendershausen is right, it may very well be that the one party wins all the battles, but that the other party wins the war.

Dr. Mendershausen's book is the first modern comprehensive study in the field of war economics. This and the high quality of the book explain the great attention it has been given by historians and economists.

HANS J. DERNBURG,
Denison University.

Competition for Empire, 1740-1763, by Walter L. Dorn. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1940. Pp. 426. \$3.75.)

At the risk of an Irish bull, the reviewer yields to the temptation of saying that the chief military interest of Professor Dorn's book is not military but political. The explanation of this is that war can be studied on three planes: the philosophical, the political, and the technical.

The author is alive to the importance of military technique. Indeed, he has a chapter on "Eighteenth Century Militarism,"—a somewhat vague and smudgy word which a writer of his distinction might have done better to avoid. His treatment of technical matters, although sound, is summary; one would welcome more precision as to recruitment, and there is hardly a word on the highly specialized linear tactics characteristic both of the land and naval warfare of the period. In touching the hotly debated question of whether Frederick the Great's strategy was intended to annihilate or to exhaust his enemies, he correctly concludes for the latter.

On the philosophical plane an analyst of military history will examine the dominant ideas of an era; will note whether they are religious, humanistic, or naturalistic; and whether they tend to foment or to soothe armed conflict.

This is the book's weak point, for the author sets forth only the destructive aspect of eighteenth century humanism, its "rational" attacks upon religious and political traditions. After reading him no one would suppose that this humanism had a positive side, a cult of moderation and decorum which restrained competition between States both in peace and war, so that the period forms an interlude of comparative calm between the disgusting massacres of the Religious Wars which preceded it and the aimless excesses of the great Revolutionary-Democratic struggles of which we vainly await the end. The omission is the stranger since he justly characterizes "the appalling anarchy in religious values which is the bane of modern society." In the important matters of Rousseau and the anti-intellectual democratic philosophy he has read Babbitt without understanding him.

On the other hand, the book is valuable to the student of war in that it shows armed conflict as a function of the State in competition with other States. The contrast between Prussia and Austria, for instance, is admirably clear. The reader can hardly miss the point that the repellent but able Frederick defeated the lovable Maria Theresa not only because his generalship excelled that of her commanders and because his armies were better drilled, but also because his dominions were far more highly organized for the interstate competition which, since the French Revolution, has become international. He, his civil servants, and his poor but duty-doing and warlike country squires thought of Prussia as an instrument for aggrandizement at the expense of its neighbors. She and her peoples, on the contrary, still thought of Europe as Christendom and of government as an instrument for keeping the peace between divers peoples. Everything has the defects of its qualities; easy going Austria, although five times the size of disciplined Prussia, raised by taxation a revenue not much greater than that of her rival. In other words, the relative scale of war (*i. e.*, the proportion of the resources of entire communities which can be thrown into military activities) depends upon the extent to which a government can persuade or compel the governed to sacrifice themselves for its benefit.

HOFFMAN NICKERSON

Oyster Bay, New York

The Caribbean Danger Zone, by J. Fred Rippy. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1940. Pp. 296. \$3.00.)

In this timely study, readable in style and eminently sound in its conclusions, one of our outstanding experts in Latin American history summarizes the background of the present situation in the eleven states that border the Caribbean. Here is a detailed analysis of both their internal development and their international relations, particularly with the United States. The twelve chapters deal with their resources and politics, the use of the Monroe Doctrine for their protection, the evolution of the Roosevelt Corollary, canal and isthmian diplomacy, the quest for naval bases, dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean, the establish-

ment of protectorates by the United States, capital investments in this area, and finally "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Totalitarian Threat." This significant volume brings down to date the author's earlier researches on this region, published in his indispensable *Latin America in World Politics* and *The United States and Mexico*, and incorporates the latest monographic materials of other competent scholars.

Our frequently expressed and long continued interest in naval bases and isthmian transit routes in the Caribbean produced virtually no results before 1898. We had repeatedly brandished the Monroe Doctrine and cited the "no transfer principle," but our Caribbean policy was essentially that of the dog in the manger, or as aptly expressed by Alvey A. Adey: "We don't want them ourselves and won't allow any European (or extra-American) power to acquire control of them." Our subsequent interventions were inspired by a nexus of causes including strategic considerations, foreign threats, ideological factors, and capitalist pressure. Professor Rippy rightly points out the causal influence of the Platt Amendment, of the suggestions of British interests and politicians, and of the Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case upon the promulgation of Roosevelt's Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine in 1904. A large part of the remainder of the book deals with the consequences that flowed from the Corollary during the ensuing three decades when the United States was more interested in dollars than in democracy.

The abandonment of this policy of intermeddling by the United States during the Hoover administration, though it had no connection with the rise of communism and fascism abroad, nevertheless came at a fortuitously opportune time when it could be used effectively in combatting the totalitarian threat to the Western Hemisphere. Professor Rippy's comments on the operation and present status of the Good Neighbor Policy are particularly pertinent. As he observes, the recession of the United States from its Caribbean protectorates "does not signify the abandonment of the maxim of dominating the Caribbean at least to the extent deemed necessary to prevent its domination by an aggressive non-American power." Continuance of defensive precautions against the totalitarian threat, the author believes, "need not, however, cause a renewal of distrust and bitterness in Latin America In the whole field of American foreign relations there is no more vital objective than Pan-American harmony in pursuit of Pan-American security and prosperity." That harmony can be procured if the United States evinces proper respect for the interests and sensibilities of the Latin Americans. Our program then should be "to continue the Good Neighbor Policy, perhaps expand its scope, and look after the political, economic, moral, and military defenses of the nation."

The chief merits of this study are judiciousness, thoroughness, and authoritativeness. Perhaps the chapters on the isthmian interests of the United States and dollar diplomacy could have been simplified for the ordinary reader if they had been arranged in more strictly chronological order. The value of the

volume for reference and for the reader who has more than a casual interest is enhanced by a selective critical bibliography and a good index.

DONALD MARQUAND DOZER

The University of Maryland

Washington and the Revolution: a Reappraisal, by Bernhard Knollenberg.
(New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 269. \$3.00.)

The title of this work does not indicate accurately the scope of its contents. Ten of its fifteen chapters constitute a defense of General Horatio Gates; the remaining five deal with the Continental Congress and Washington. The book is not a new survey of the entire Revolution, but a reexamination of certain episodes from which, the author believes, wrong conclusions have been drawn. His method of argument is to preface each chapter with a quotation from a historian and then proceed to point out its errors.

If the book was aimed at the lay public it has certain virtues which are lacking if it were written for historical scholars. From the expert's point of view, the historians that Mr. Knollenberg selects for impalement are not particularly illustrious, although they may be, or have been, popular. Bancroft, Trevelyan, J. T. Adams, H. C. Lodge, and Fiske are not regarded as infallible sages by the rising generation of American historians, and certainly Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (particularly volume III) is famous for its John Bullish prejudices. Therefore, in a sense, Mr. Knollenberg has killed some dead horses.

On the other hand he takes on some formidable adversaries when he argues with the late John C. Fitzpatrick and Worthington C. Ford. They are respected students of Washington, and no one has known the Washington manuscripts more thoroughly than Fitzpatrick. Mr. Knollenberg emerges the victor, however, on at least two points: he successfully quashes Ford's accusation (p. 30) that Gates purposely withheld troops from Washington late in 1777 and contributed to his defeat at Brandywine; and he corrects Fitzpatrick's statement that Gerard helped bring about the French alliance (p. 94), when that minister did not arrive in this country until after, and as a result of, the alliance.

On some other points Mr. Knollenberg does not come off so well. He asks why Gates has not been given credit for the successful defense of Ticonderoga in 1776 (p. 8)? Principally, because Arnold held back Carleton's advance until the approach of winter warned Carleton to return to warm barracks. In his second chapter the author omits much of the background of the several shifts in the command of the Northern Department between Gates and Schuyler. He is trying to prove that in the elevation of Gates in August 1777 there was no factionalism, and that Gates was abler than Schuyler because conditions in the American army improved after his taking command. Gates is pictured as the disinterested and loyal servant of Congress in this episode. The author does not mention the rivalry between Schuyler and Gates; yet Congress had

had to settle a dispute of rank between them in July 1776. Then, when Schuyler appeared before Congress in March 1777, Gates was sent north to command. Schuyler was returned to his post in May, and Gates refused to serve under him. He felt he had been disgraced, and he complained of the treatment he had received before Congress in such disorderly fashion that he was asked to withdraw. The New England delegates stuck up for him because their soldiers liked him better than Schuyler. After the fall of Ticonderoga, Gates was ordered to supersede Schuyler; but, before he reached his command in the North, Stark had whipped the Germans at Bennington, and a new spirit swept through the American ranks of which Gates reaped the benefit.

In the third chapter Mr. Knollenberg's summary of Burgoyne's defeat gives all credit to Gates and does not mention Stark's victory at Bennington or Arnold's leadership at Bemis Heights. Hoffman Nickerson's detailed study of the battles, *The Turning Point of the Revolution*, gives little credit to Gates.

As for the Conway Cabal, the author is convinced that it "is probably a myth" (p. 66). On the basis of the evidence he presents, it would appear to be. But certain undiscussed incidents still disturb this reviewer. When Gates heard what Washington had learned of a letter from Conway to Gates, he wrote to Washington accusing someone of looting his correspondence files, sending his letter through Congress. Washington replied, and Gates wrote again, dropping the theft story and saying that Conway's letter did not contain the passage quoted by Washington. Why did not Gates deny the validity of the Conway quotation the first time he wrote? Then, there is the question of Conway's apology to Washington when he, Conway, thought he was mortally wounded. For what did he apologize? Finally, certain letters of Henry Laurens, which Mr. Knollenberg did not take into account, strongly suggest that some intrigue against Washington was on foot in Congress. The idea of a cabal was no invention of later historians bent on canonizing Washington; the word was used contemporaneously with the incident, and Washington himself believed there had been a plot. Fitzpatrick's glib explanation of it may be off balance, but Mr. Knollenberg's denial is not quite convincing.

Some of the revelations and opinions which the author sets forth are not new. That Gates should not be blamed for obtaining no better terms of surrender was voiced by Nickerson, R. G. Adams, and Van Tyne. That the Saratoga victory was the decisive factor in clinching the French alliance has been asserted by others, as the author readily admits. Even Fitzpatrick does not connect Gates with Washington's defeat at Brandywine, but blames it on Sullivan's right wing.

Mr. Knollenberg does not always marshal his evidence objectively. Sometimes he presents it on its face value, without comment. Other times he asserts it does not mean what it appears to, and then proceeds to interpret it. Thus, the reader is left to believe that Washington approved of scalping, ac-

quired western lands by trickery, and wished to increase flogging in the army (pp. 152, 153, 218). Nothing is said of conditions prevailing on the frontier during the French and Indian War, nor of the business of land claims and the Proclamation of 1763, nor of the reason for increasing army floggings. Flogging was the common method of punishment in both the American and British armies. When Washington advised that the limit on lashes be raised from one hundred to five hundred, he was not showing brutality. His reasoning was made quite plain in the letter which Mr. Knollenberg did not quote. As circumstances were, there was no intermediate punishment between one hundred lashes and death, and Washington felt that too many death sentences were being pronounced by courts martial.

On the question of Congress' cowardice in fleeing Philadelphia, which the author denies, he quotes letters which admit the Congressmen were frightened and panicked, but then he says such statements must be taken with a grain of salt (p. 220). Similarly, he is unwilling to accept the harsh opinions of Livingston and Varick on Gates (p. 178) because he assumes these officers had malicious motives, but the malice is not defined or proved. Again, in discussing the Conway Cabal, he asks the reader to remember that Washington was "extremely on edge" when he wrote a letter about the intrigue and "was likely to develop unjustified suspicions" (p. 74).

On the whole, however, the book is a fresh breeze blowing over a subject encrusted with tradition from succeeding historians quoting earlier ones. Those writing today are clearly put on notice that certain episodes demand new investigation, and they will not be excused for retelling the traditional versions. Whether or not he is always right, Mr. Knollenberg has produced a book that must be considered by everyone writing on the topics he touches.

HOWARD H. PECKHAM

William L. Clements Library

Zachary Taylor: Soldier of the Republic, By Holman Hamilton. (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1941. Pp. 335. \$3.50.)

This first volume of two may well rank as the definitive biography insofar as Zachary Taylor's military career is concerned. Presumably a second volume will be concerned with politics and the Presidency. There is no lack of scholarship in this newspaperman's handling of his subject. His work is based largely upon original sources, and his bibliography is comprehensive. It is evident that he has spent much time running down relatively unimportant details in order to round out his picture. The story is plainly written, which makes for easy reading, and scholarly problems are concealed but not neglected.

No attempt is made to paint Taylor as a military genius; at the same time there is effort made to avoid falling too deeply into the "debunkery" that might be encouraged by the "Rough and Ready" tradition. Taylor is presented for what he was, an able leader, a trained soldier, and a gentleman of simple

tastes and ways. The story of Taylor's part in the War of 1812, the Black Hawk War, and the Florida War is given in adequate detail. For the Mexican War, battle descriptions are traditional rather than inspired.

In terming the brevet conferred on Taylor for the defense of Fort Harrison "the first brevet of any kind ever awarded by the government of the United States" there is possible misunderstanding, as brevet commissions were plentiful during the Revolution. The use of "chief of staff" (p. 221) for Scott, the Commanding General, is likewise misleading. Dr. William Beaumont's patient, Alexis St. Martin, was a voyageur, not a soldier (p. 81), at the time he sustained the wound famous in medical history. Most of the maps are too much reduced.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

The March of the Mounted Riflemen: First United States Military Expedition to Travel the Full Length of the Oregon Trail from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Vancouver, May to October, 1849, as Recorded in the Journals of Major Osborne Cross and George Gibbs and the Official Report of Colonel Loring, edited by Raymond W. Settle. (Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company. 1940. Pp. 380. \$6.00.)

The march of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen to Oregon in 1849 is a subject worthy of a volume of documents. Considerable significance has justly been attached to it as the first military expedition to cross the plains and mountains from the lower Missouri to the lower Columbia since that of Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark forty-four years earlier. It is true that Lewis and Clark did not follow the route which later became known as the Oregon Trail, but it should not be forgotten that their party was also military in character and had much to do with making the later expedition both necessary and possible. Thanks to Elliott Coues (who was himself an Army man, an Assistant Surgeon and Brevet Captain) and to the later more comprehensive and scholarly work of Reuben Gold Thwaites, the diaries and journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition are readily available and well known. The Reverend Mr. Settle has undertaken a similar compilation for the march of the Mounted Riflemen by republishing the journal of Major and Quartermaster Osborne Cross, to which have been added the diary of George Gibbs for the portion of the trip from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Laramie, the final report of Lieutenant Colonel (Brevet Colonel) William W. Loring who commanded the Regiment, and a table of distances compiled by Assistant Surgeon Israel Moses. A brief introduction outlines the history of the Regiment and the lives of the authors of the documents, and a map shows the route followed. The volume, a handsome one issued in a limited edition of 750 copies and obviously intended as a collector's item, reproduces

eighteen of the thirty-six illustrations which appeared in the Senate document containing Cross' journal, two other contemporary drawings of interest, and a photograph of Cross.

The reviewer who wishes to criticize this volume fairly should indicate clearly the standards by which he has judged it. Mr. Settle obviously is not a professional historian; yet he has undertaken, apparently without hesitation, one of the most highly technical tasks in the historical field, the editing of documents. Should the labors of novices be treated more leniently than those of professional historians? Is ignorance of bibliography, methodology, and conventions of editing sufficient justification for passing over without comment that which would be considered inexcusable in one who might be presumed to know his business? This reviewer can find in his own mind no other answer to these questions than that any piece of work, be it the delivery of a sermon or the writing of history or the building of a house, must be judged solely by its quality. It does not matter who spoke or wrote or built, but it does matter whether or not the result measures up to a reasonable standard of workmanship. Certainly there is no desire to say anything here to discourage research in western military history; it is recognized that most of the writing in that field has been, and very probably may continue to be, done by non-professional historians. The fact that some of it has been of a very high quality shows that acceptable and valuable work does not necessarily require formal academic training, but those who wish to have their books and articles considered seriously as worthwhile contributions must expect to have them judged by professional standards. It is from this point of view then, rather than from any other motive, that the following critique is offered.

First, the editor has made unnecessary and unwarranted changes in the text of his documents. Mr. Settle states, "The full text of the documents has been retained, the editorial work being restricted almost exclusively to simplifying the grammatical structure of the long and involved sentences so popular in the mid-nineteenth century." One need not look beyond the first couple of paragraphs of Cross' journal to learn what this means. A comparison of these twenty-two lines with the text from which they were taken reveals thirty-seven changes in wording, punctuation, and capitalization. In one sense these changes are not serious; that is, they do not alter the meaning of the paragraphs as a whole. Nevertheless, changing "journey" to "march," "where" to "here," "8th" to "eighth," and "a very" to "an" hardly conforms to accepted historical practice. Cross' journal has not been *edited* as the historian understands that term; it has been rewritten. The reviewer has been unable to collate any of Gibbs diary, but similar changes have also been made in the text of Loring's report. Oddly enough, Moses' table of distances is reproduced almost perfectly from the manuscript used.

This table of distances illustrates Mr. Settle's lack of familiarity with his sources, however. Although he calls it a "hitherto unpublished" document,

it was actually published in 1850 as the last appendix to Cross' journal. As so published it varies slightly from the version given by Mr. Settle, but it is easily recognizable. Furthermore, neither in this case nor in that of Loring's report has the editor used the "original manuscript" as he appears to believe. In both instances he has used clearly marked official copies from the files of The Adjutant General's Office; the originals are in the files of the Headquarters of the Army. Although Mr. Settle has added to our knowledge by calling attention to the fact that it was Moses who kept this table of distances and by publishing Loring's final report, he might easily have performed an even greater service by publishing Moses' covering letter explaining the methods and difficulties of calculating distances on the march and by making available to his readers some of the more important, if not all, of Loring's other reports.

Had he used such an obvious printed source as Cullum's *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy*, some of his errors about Cross' military service would not have been made. Even Heitman's *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, which he did use, shows that Cross was commissioned as 1st Lieutenant on December 31, 1831, rather than September 29, 1827, the date of his transfer from the 4th to the 1st U. S. Infantry. Cullum also shows rather completely Cross' stations and duties during his service, whereas Mr. Settle has relied on the general location of his Regiment. Unfortunately, Cross was not always with his Regiment. Likewise, Cullum explains the gaps in his service which Mr. Settle states are "not known." He "presumed," for instance, that Cross continued to serve as Chief Quartermaster of the Pacific Division (later the Department of the Pacific) from 1852 "until the beginning of the Civil War." Actually, Cross' service with the Department of the Pacific terminated in 1857, following which he was court-martialed for disobedience of orders and embezzlement of public money and suspended from rank and pay for five years. Soon after the outbreak of the Civil War his sentence was remitted, and he resumed his duties early in 1862.

Although Cross' journal forms two-thirds of the present volume and is its *raison d'être*, Mr. Settle has overlooked one of the previous editions of it. He mentions the rare privately printed edition of 1850 and the better known *Annual Report of the Secretary of War* of the same year which, both as a Senate and as a House document, includes Cross' journal, but he does not refer to the separate *Annual Report of the Quartermaster General* for that year (Washington, C. Alexander, 1851), although the *Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1789-1909* shows that such separates were usually issued. This is of some importance since copies of this separate are not difficult to obtain and the editor makes quite a point of the rarity of Cross' journal. With two copies in every library having a set of Congressional Documents, to say nothing of the separates, it is difficult to consider it an unduly rare item.

Even though one cannot help being disappointed in the shortcomings of this volume, those of us who are working in western military history are indebted to Mr. Settle. He has added much to our knowledge of the expedition through his introduction and footnotes, he has republished the practically unknown diary of Gibbs, and he has published one important manuscript report. In short, he has done the same thing for the march of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen that Coues did for the Lewis and Clark Expedition, and his work merits the same praise and the same criticism. Just as Thwaites later had to correct and amplify Coues, so will some more capable scholar have to complete what Mr. Settle has undertaken. There is too much western military history yet to be written for us to waste our efforts; let us maintain the high quality the subject deserves.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS
The National Archives

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Versailles Twenty Years After, by Paul Birdsall. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1941. Pp. 336. \$3.00) An analysis and interpretation of the diplomatic factors which shaped the character of the treaty by a professor at Williams College. One of the best short treatments.

Rank and Warfare among the Plains Indians, by Bernard Mishkin. (New York: J. J. Augustin. 1941. Pp. 188. \$1.50.) The third volume of the *Monographs of the American Ethnological Society*.

TOTAL WARFARE

Blitzkrieg: Its History, Strategy, Economics, and the Challenge to America, by S. L. A. Marshall. (New York: William L. Morrow & Company. 1940. Pp. 188. \$2.00.) An interpretation of modern warfare by the military critic of the *Detroit News*.

America and Total War, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: Smith & Durrel. 1941. Pp. 312. \$3.00.) The views of a well known writer as to how to combat the kind of warfare which has overrun Europe.

Germany Prepares for War: A Nazi Theory of National Defense, by Ewald Banse. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1941. Pp. 357. \$3.00.) A new edition of the famed work on German military thought and planning. Like the early works of Hitler, this book was long regarded as the work of a fanatic. Banse, who is also known for his *Geographie und Wehrwille* (1932), was appointed to the chair of military science at Brunswick Technical College in 1933.

Propaganda and the American Revolution, by Philip Davidson. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1941. Pp. 460. \$4.00.) An account of the efforts to influence morale during the Revolution.

The Economics of Force, by Frank Munk. (New York: George W. Stewart. 1940. Pp. 249. \$2.00.) An analysis of Nazi war economy by a Czech professor now resident in the United States.

Studies in Economic Warfare, by D. T. Jack. (New York: The Chemical Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 421. \$4.00.) A series of studies on war economics from Napoleon's day to the present.

Das Erdöl im Weltkriege, by Ferdinand Friedensburg. (Stuttgart: Enke. 1939. Pp. 131.) A complete account of the world's petroleum resources during the first World War.

Civil Air Defense, by A. M. Prentiss. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1941. Pp. 289. \$2.75.) An authoritative discussion of air defense planning by one of the leading American experts.

LAND WARFARE

Military Science Today, by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Portway. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 154. \$1.75.) A contribution to *The Pageant of Progress Series* by the author of *Science and Mechanization in Land Warfare* and lecturer at Cambridge University. Unfortunately, this was written just before the present war began, and some of the material is outdated.

Shell Shock in France, 1914-1918, by Charles S. Meyer. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1940. Pp. 141. \$1.25.) An account of a British medical officer responsible for the care of many shell-shocked patients, with professional observations on the treatment of such cases.

Medical Manual of Chemical Warfare. (Brooklyn: The Chemical Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 287. \$2.50.) A handbook of information on chemical warfare equipment, substances, and methods of minimizing the effect of chemical attacks.

SEA WARFARE

Mahan on Naval Warfare, by Allan Westcott. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1941. Pp. 315. \$2.50.) A selection of the most important writings of Admiral Mahan.

AIR WARFARE

Winged Warfare, by Major General H. H. Arnold and Colonel Ira C. Eaker. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1941. Pp. 265. \$3.00.) Careful comment by the Chief of the U. S. Army Air Corps and an associate.

All American Aircraft, by Ernest K. Gann. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1941. Pp. 219. \$1.00.) A profusely illustrated book describing principal American commercial, private, and military planes.

ESTABLISHMENTS

Mexico

Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783, translated and edited by Alfred Barnaby Thomas. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1941. Pp. 274. \$3.00.) A reprint of the report of the commanding general of the interior provinces of New Spain, dealing with the same type of Indian problems which faced the U. S. Army a century later.

United States

America Can Win, by Malcom Wheeler-Nicholson. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1941. Pp. 231. \$1.75.) An estimate of America's military position by the author of the much criticized *Battleshield of the Republic*.

America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization, by Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 207. \$2.00.) An examination of the military policy of the United States by a distinguished American soldier.

What the Citizen Should Know about the Army, by Harvey S. Ford. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 230. \$2.00.) A brief account of the present U. S. Army, its development, weapons, doctrine, and training.

What the Citizen Should Know about the Navy, by Hanson Baldwin. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 219. \$2.00.) A brief account of the organization, function, vessels, and traditions of the U. S. Navy.

What the Citizen Should Know About the Coast Guard, by Hickman Powell. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1941. Pp. 194. \$2.00.) An illuminating account of a little publicized service.

West Point in the Confederacy, by Ellsworth Eliot, Jr. (New York: G. A. Baker & Company. 1941. Pp. 479. \$3.50.) An account of the rôle of West Point Graduates in the military service of the Confederacy.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

With Sword and Lance: The Life of General Hugh Mercer, by Joseph M. Waterman. (Richmond: Garrett & Massie. 1941. Pp. 371. \$3.00.) A Scottish surgeon, frontier fighter, and officer during the American Revolution.

From Panama to Verdun, by Colonel Philippe Bunau-Varilla. (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1940. Pp. 272. \$2.50.) The memoirs of an officer famed for his part in the French canal syndicate, for his participation in the Dreyfus affair, and for his part in the first World War.

Tim Harington Looks Back, by General Sir Charles Harington. (London: John Murray, 1941. Pp. 283. \$3.50.) The memoirs of the chief of staff of Lord Plumer's 2d British Army during the first World War.

Pilsudski, by Alexandra Pilsudski. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1941. Pp. 352. \$3.00.) A biography of the late Polish dictator and soldier by his wife.

He Might Have Saved France, by Marguerite Joseph-Maginot. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1941. Pp. 310. \$3.00.) A biography of Andre Maginot by his sister, translated from the French by Allen Updegraff. It deals primarily with Maginot's military career during the first World War. Those seeking the intellectual and military background of his actions as War Minister leading to the famous Maginot line will be disappointed. Enough is shown, however, to demonstrate that he did not look upon a fortified line as sufficient defense for France.

World War II

War Letters from Britain, edited by Diana Forbes-Robertson and Roger W. Straus, Jr. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941. Pp. 240. \$2.00.) A carefully selected collection showing the home front under air bombardment.

Suicide of a Democracy, by Heinz Pol. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940. Pp. 296. \$2.50.) One of the better books on the background of the French tragedy, with information on the French concentration camps for alien enemies.

Invasion in the Snows: A Study of Mechanized War, by John Langdon-Davies. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941. Pp. 202. \$2.50.) An account of the war in Finland by a left-wing sympathizer who fought in Spain. Langdon-Davies asserts categorically that the accounts of the Russian divisions destroyed in forest warfare are correct. He holds that three Russian divisions were entirely destroyed and that four suffered losses of from 33 to 50 per cent of their effectives. The subtitle is a misnomer.

The Battle for Asia, by Edgar Snow. (New York: Random House, 1941. Pp. 409. \$3.75.) A summary of the elements of the struggle for supremacy in Asia.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

"Teaching Political Science in a World at War," by Francis O. Wilcox, in *The American Political Science Review*, April 1941 (XXXV, 325-33). Report of a round table on teaching problems at the December 1940 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

"Our New Army," compiled by Leslie W. Dunlap, in *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, April 1941 (XLV, 363-69). A review of the new books and articles on the modern United States Army.

"Manuscript Maps in the William L. Clements Library," by Lloyd A. Brown, in *The American Neptune*, April 1941 (I, 141-48). Description of the more important maps and plans used by the civil and military authorities in British North America, 1755-1800.

"Journals and Orderly Books Kept by Massachusetts Soldiers During the French and Indian Wars," compiled by David S. Clark, in *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, April 1941 (XCV, 118-22).

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

"Reflections sur la Guerre et la Paix," by A. Dami, in *Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*, October-December 1940 (XVIII, 234-43).

"Grotius: Law of War and Peace," by George Grafton Wilson, in *The American Journal of International Law*, April 1941 (XXXV, 205-26). Extract from a translation of Grotius' *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*, with a brief introduction by the author.

"International Law and Totalitarian War," by Philip C. Jessup, in *The American Journal of International Law*, April 1941 (XXXV, 329-31). A brief examination of the effect of total war on international law.

"'Acts of War,'" by Clyde Eagleton, in *The American Journal of International Law*, April 1941 (XXXV, 321-26). An examination of the usage of the term "acts of war."

"Demosthenes Redivivus," by Frederick H. Cramer, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1941 (XIX, 530-50). Isolationism as a cause for the collapse of Athens before the Macedonian assault.

"The Fundamental Cause of the Civil War: Egocentric Sectionalism," by Frank L. Owsley, in *The Journal of Southern History*, February 1941 (VII, 3-18).

"Peace by Way of the Sword," by E. Merrick Dodd, in *The American Scholar*, Spring 1941 (X, 133-44). A reexamination of pacifism in the light of the present world struggle.

"Labor's Part in War and Reconstruction," by Marshall E. Dimock, in *The American Political Science Review*, April 1941 (XXXV, 217-31). The decisive rôle of labor leadership in war-time and after, with special reference to British experience.

"The Church in Wartime," by the Bishop of Norwich, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1941 (CXXXIX, 330-36). The attitude of the Church of England toward the war.

"Sociological Implications of Selective Service," by Victor A. Rapport, in *American Sociological Review*, April 1941 (VI, 225-29).

TOTAL WARFARE

"The Threat to American Security," by Edward M. Earle, in *The Yale Review*, March 1941 (XXX, 454-80). The totalitarian threat.

"The Myth of the Continents," by Eugehe Staley, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1941 (XIX, 481-94). An analysis of the defects of Western Hemisphere defense in contrast to all-out defense.

"What Shall America Defend," by Harold M. Vinacke, in *The Yale Review*, March 1941 (XXX, 499-520). All-out or hemispheric defense?

"The Island Sites," by W. M. Cousins, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1941 (CXXXIX, 337-49). An analysis of the strategic importance of the naval and air bases leased to the United States by Britain.

"The United States and the Defense of the Western Hemisphere, 1815-1940," by W. Stull Holt, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, March 1941 (X, 29-38). A summary of the attempts to organize the western hemisphere for defense.

"The Significance of Hispanic American Defense of the Continent," by Octavio Mendez Pereira, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, March 1941 (X, 39-45). A general statement of the attitude of Latin America toward hemispheric defense.

"How America Can Take the Offensive," by Edmond Taylor, in *Fortune*, May 1941 (XXIII, 64-65 ff.). The only defense against total war is total defense, with emphasis where Hitler puts it, on political and psychological factors.

"War by Radio," by John B. Whitton, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1941 (XIX, 584-96). The use of radio propaganda as a weapon in wartime.

"Propaganda by Short Wave: London Calling America," by Harold N. Graves, Jr., in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, March 1941 (V, 38-51). A summary of British broadcasts to America since the beginning of the war.

"British Propaganda," by C. F. Melville, in *Fortnightly*, March 1941 (pp. 233-40). An examination of the weaknesses of British propaganda techniques in the present war.

"The Rule of Law in Total War," by W. I. Jennings, in *Yale Law Review*, January 1941 (L, 365-86).

"Sabotage and National Defense," by L. Pressman, D. W. Leider, and H. I. Cammer, in *Harvard Law Review*, February 1941 (LIV, 632-46).

"Defense Economy of the United States Industrial Capacity," by J. C. deWilde and George Monson, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 15, 1941 (XVI, 282-300).

"Food as a Political Instrument in Europe," by Karl Brandt, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1941 (XIX, 516-29). The rôle of food in the Nazi *Wehrwirtschaft*.

"The Effect of War on the Relative Importance of Producing Centers," by E. T. Denhardt, in *International Labour Review*, February 1941 (XLII, 301-46).

"De la Guerre du Fer à celle du Pétrole," by Serrigny, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 15, 1940 (LVII, 211-22).

"Soldier and Civilian in Total War," by H. A. De Weerd, in *Infantry Journal*, April 1941 (pp. 23-27).

LAND WARFARE

"The Elizabethan Medical Service," in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1941 (XLI, 300-20). An account of medical services in the English Army in the sixteenth century.

"War and Disease," by George W. Gray, in *Harpers Magazine*, May 1941 (CLXXXII, 614-24). A review of wartime medical problems.

"Rise and Fall of the American '75,'" by Major General William J. Snow, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, April 1941 (XXXI, 218-23).

"Molotov Cocktail," by Captain John C. Hooker, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, April 1941 (XXXI, 216-17). An illustrated note on the construction and the use of gasoline bombs.

Combat

"The Development of German Strategy," by Brigadier General James Edmonds, in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1941 (XLI, 213-22). A survey from the time of Frederick II to 1918.

"Intelligence Lessons from the Battle of Waterloo," in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, December 1940 (pp. 5-16). Adapted from an article in the *Revue Militaire Française*.

"Two Generals—One Doctrine," by Major E. W. Sheppard, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1940 (XLI, 105-18). A comparison of the careers and theories of Generals von Seeckt and de Gaulle.

"Traditionalism and Military Defeat," by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Phillips, in *Infantry Journal*, March 1941 (pp. 18-27). A much discussed appraisal of the American officer's ability to think, study, and exercise foresight.

"Streamlining the Offensive," by Colonel Frederick M. Barrows, in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, March 1941 (pp. 9-19 ff.). The evolution of the panzer division, with a critical bibliography.

"Assault of a Fortified Position," by Captain William Whipple, Jr., in *The Military Engineer*, March-April 1941 (XXXIII, 85-94).

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

AMERICAN MILITARY DRESS IN THE WAR OF 1812

IV. Regular Riflemen


When war was declared in June 1812 the prescribed winter uniform of the Regular Army's single Regiment of Riflemen was of green cloth faced with black, and its summer garb comprised a fringed linen rifle frock and overalls. These uniforms had been prescribed shortly after the organization of the Regiment in 1808, although the winter dress had undergone several changes since then, notably those of February 1810. The color of these uniforms was particularly suited for troops whose duties called for operation in woods and generally required concealment. This fact, coupled with the relatively small number of men which had to be provided for, permitted the retention of the green uniform until the spring of 1814, or even later.

The winter uniform worn early in 1812 can be reconstructed in the main.¹ The headdress consisted either of "light leather caps, with green feathers, tipped with black" or of regular infantry caps of felt with yellow bands, tassels, loops, and plates. The actual form of the leather cap has not yet been determined. Field officers probably wore the chapeau bras.

The coat was of green cloth, cut straight at the breast, with black collar (probably of velvet for officers), flat wings, cuffs, and lapels. There was one row of yellow buttons on each lapel with green cord in imitation of button-holes, the cord being placed between the buttons and the edge. The coat was fastened with hooks and eyes. The cord and fringe on the wings and collars were green, as were the turnbacks and lining, but black cord finished the back seams and sham pockets. Vests were of buff kerseymere or other suitable cloth with nine small buttons. The overalls were made of green cloth with black edging on the seams and welts on the fall.

The uniform of the musicians was the same in cut, but the color varied. The coats and overalls were of buff cloth with green facings and trimmings;

¹ Order of the Secretary of War, May 21, 1808 (Quartermaster General's Office, Uniform File [National Archives], hereafter cited as Q. M. G. Unif.); correspondence between the Secretary of War and the Purveyor of Public Supplies, January and February 1810 (Secretary of War, Military Book, IV [National Archives], hereafter cited as S. W. M. B.; Secretary of War, Document File, 1810 [National Archives], hereafter cited as S. W. Docs.); and orders of the Purveyor of Public Supplies, March 5, 1810, and April 3, 1811 (Purveyor of Public Supplies, Order Book [National Archives], hereafter cited as P. P. S. O. B.).



UNITED STATES RIFLEMEN, 1812

the vests buff as above. Apparently there was no distinguishing mark for the musicians when the troops were in summer dress. Later during the war, as the problem of supplying a greatly enlarged army became more and more difficult, it was decided to issue the musicians of the Rifle Regiment "Light Buff Coats" of the band of the 104th Regiment of the British Line. These coats, as well as the rest of the clothing of this Regiment, had been captured on the way to Quebec by an American privateer and later acquired by the Commissary General of Purchases. The regular red coats were issued with some slight alteration to the musicians of other branches of the service.²

In February 1812 a change in uniform was ordered for the Riflemen as well as for the other branches of the service, but, with the exception of those officers who might have bought new uniforms during the spring or summer of 1812, this new dress would not have been introduced to the troops until the winter of 1812-13. No printed order was ever issued for this uniform, but the following description was sent to the Purveyor of Public Supplies:

Dress of the Head: Field officers will wear the chapeaux bras bound with black; the buttons, tassel loops & eagle yellow. The plume green. The company officers will wear black caps like those of the infantry, the band, tassels, & eagles yellow, the plume green.

Uniforms: The skirts of the coats of the officers will be long; those of Company officers short, the colour of the coat bottle green. The collar trimmed with gold lace all round, two lace holes on each side; plain Breast herring bone buttonholes of twist; four buttons and as many blind button holes of Twist on each cuff; the buttons yellow stamped with eagles and the letter R on the shield. The vest white; the pantaloons bottle green, in summer white.

The uniform of non commissioned officers and soldiers will resemble that of the company officers. The collar and cuffs to be black, the pocket flaps across the skirt indented below, with four buttons and twist holes, the buttons or cuffs across. The undress coat shall have the cape and cuffs of the same colour with the coat. Field officers cloaks to be of bottle green with a standing collar of the same lined with black. Black stocks.³

Apparently the breast of the coat was now without facings, and, as the details given correspond with those of the infantry except for color, it is probable that the other details of the uniform were similar to those mentioned for the infantry in the description of December 30, 1812.⁴ The lace for the officers' collar being of gold, it would follow that the twist of the officers' uniform and the binding on those for the enlisted men would be yellow. Probably the officers retained their velvet collars.

No special style of pantaloons was prescribed for officers beyond the requirement that they be "bottle green, in summer white." It may be supposed

² Commissary General of Purchases to George Ingels, Military Store Keeper, April 6, 1813, and to George Wadsworth, Assistant Commissary, March 16, 1814 (Commissary General of Purchases, Letter Book [National Archives], hereafter cited as C. G. P. L. B.).

³ Memorandum, February 1812 (Q. M. G. Unif.); Purveyor of Public Supplies, Orders Received Book, April 1812 (National Archives).

⁴ Quoted above in the chapter on "Regular Infantry," *Journal of the American Military Institute*, IV (Fall 1940), 186.

that any of the fashionable leg coverings might have been seen. Company officers could have worn sherryvallies, buttoned from the calf down and without leather; ordinary tight pantaloons with half-boots or Hessians; or even real trousers. Field officers would have worn the same, possibly with leather reinforcements to the sherryvallies. The overalls of the enlisted men were made gaiter fashion, buttoning, apparently, with only three buttons at the ankle.⁵

The side-arms of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and musicians of the Regiment of Riflemen were not prescribed by regulation. It seems probable, however, that the officers wore brass-mounted sabers and that the others carried swords of the same pattern as the infantry, only of brass.⁶ The men were armed with the regulation rifle models 1803 and 1814.⁷

The summer dress in 1812 consisted of a rifle frock and pantaloons of green linen, edged with buff or "wood coloured" fringe.⁸ With this was worn the winter cap. The frock was apparently similar to the ordinary fatigue garment then in general use throughout the Army—really an overshirt or smock—to which fringe was added. Its wide, shapeless form made a waistbelt necessary.⁹ The belt adopted was of black leather, three inches wide, on which hung a pocket or pouch of linen painted green.¹⁰ As this belt was the only such piece of equipment issued to Riflemen who carried swords, it is probable that both sergeants and musicians wore them also with their woolen uniforms, together with a sliding sword frog such as then held their knives.¹¹ It is likely that by 1813 the belt was worn by all ranks with the woolen uniforms. A list of uniforms and equipment issued to Captain Morgan's Company of the Rifle Regiment contains scalping knives and scabbards, "tommyhawks," and "tommyhawk belts," and it is not reasonable to suppose that tommyhawks and knives were worn only in the summer.

This summer uniform was worn during 1812; in 1813 the fringed green pantaloons were in part replaced by white linen infantry overalls and black

⁵ Orders of the Purveyor of Public Supplies, March 5, 1810, and April 3, 1811 (P. P. S. O. B.).

⁶ Orders of the Commissary General of Purchases to Jno. Taylor, April-October 1814 (Commissary General of Purchases, Order Book [National Archives], hereafter cited as C. G. P. O. B.); James E. Hicks, *Nathan Starr* (Mt. Vernon, New York, 1940), p. 56 ff.; James E. Hicks, *Notes on United States Ordnance* (Mt. Vernon, New York, 1940), II, 142 ff.


⁷ Hicks, *Notes on United States Ordnance*, I, 25-26, 46-47, and plate 7.

⁸ Purveyor of Public Supplies to George Ingels, June 15, 1808 (P. P. S. O. B.).

⁹ "Memorandum of sizes of linen garments sent to Inspector of Clothing," December 28, 1810 (Q. M. G. Unif.); Purveyor of Public Supplies to the Secretary of War, May 1808 (S. W. Docs., 1808).

¹⁰ Secretary of War to the Purveyor of Public Supplies, May 17, 1808 (S. W. Docs., 1808); Purveyor of Public Supplies to James Kerr, June 24, 1808, and to George Ingels, June 18, 1808 (P. P. S. O. B.).

¹¹ Commissary General of Purchases to Mifflin, June 20, 1812 (C. G. P. L. B.).



A, the summer dress of 1812. B, the uniform worn during the summer of 1814. C, the grey uniform issued in October 1814.

cloth gaiters.¹² During the winter of 1813-14, however, enough fringed frocks and trousers were manufactured to supply the existing Regiment, as well as many of the recruits for the new regiments organized the following year, with the green linen summer dress.¹³

By an Act of Congress of February 10, 1814, three additional regiments of Riflemen were organized as the 2d, 3d, and 4th, the old Regiment thereby becoming the 1st. Difficulties in procuring the necessary green cloth for this many men soon led to the adoption of a new uniform, and on March 17 the following General Orders were issued:

The uniform of the non Commd. officers, privates & musicians of the Rifle Regiments, will hereafter be as follows. Vizt. A short coat of grey cloth, single breasted; flat yellow buttons, which shall exhibit a Bugle surrounded by stars, with the No. of the Regiment within the curve of the bugle; one row of ten Buttons in front; three on each sleeve & three on each skirt, lengthwise, with blind buttonholes of Black twist or braid in herring bone form. A waistcoat of Grey Cloth with sleeves of the same. Pantaloons of Grey Cloth. The Jefferson shoe, rising two inches above the ankle joint, and not higher. Leather Caps with a plate and Design similar to that of the buttons; and a short green pompon in front.¹⁴

For field or active service, the officers will wear uniforms like those of privates, excepting as to quality. On other occasions they are permitted to wear the uniforms of the Artillery excepting as to Buttons; the position of them &c., which shall be the same with the field Coat. Epaulets of Gold. Yellow mounted Sabres for Officers and non Commd. Officers.¹⁵

This uniform, plain and serviceable almost to dullness, does not seem to have been issued, except to sergeants and musicians, until October 1814. It does not appear to have been adopted at once by the 1st Regiment, however, which probably continued to wear the green clothing.¹⁶

The uniform actually worn by the new regiments during the summer of 1814 can be reconstructed from the lists of supplies as follows: a leather cap with yellow band, tassel, and plate, a cockade and eagle, and a green pompon about five inches long worn in front of the cap; a waistcoat of grey cloth with sleeves and yellow buttons with the number of the regiment on them; two pairs of long, white, linen infantry overalls; a green, fringed, linen frock and a white linen vest; two pairs of Jefferson shoes, two pairs of socks, and one pair of black cloth gaiters; a stock, a blanket, a linen knapsack, and a haversack.¹⁷ It is probable that the grey waistcoat was the parade uniform and that the

¹² Commissary General of Purchases to George Ingels, February 20, 1813 (C. G. P. L. B.).

¹³ Commissary General of Purchases to The Adjutant General, March 21, 1814 (C. G. P. L. B.).

¹⁴ The leather cap mentioned here was of the same pattern as that adopted for the artillery and infantry; it had yellow bands, tassels, and plates (Commissary General of Purchases to Samuel Russell, April 1, 1814 [C. G. P. O. B.]).

¹⁵ Q. M. G. Unif.

¹⁶ Orders of the Commissary General of Purchases, April 18 and 23, May 12, and October 6, 1814 (C. G. P. O. B.).

¹⁷ Orders of the Commissary General of Purchases, April-July 1814 (C. G. P. O. B.).

green, linen, fringed frock was used for fatigue duty. For the sergeants grey coats were provided; the musicians had grey coats with black collars and cuffs. Both had grey jackets as well. The sergeants wore yellow epaulets, and both sergeants and musicians had yellow-mounted sword belts.

In October 1814, seven months after the grey winter uniform had been adopted, it was issued generally to the troops. Even then some of the new riflemen received white instead of grey woolen overalls.¹⁸ Mention should be made here of the 26th U. S. Infantry, commanded by Colonel Isaac Clark and raised in the spring of 1814, which was also supplied with the new rifle uniforms and equipment. The reason for this distinction is not clear, but all descriptions of the grey rifle uniform appear to apply to the uniform of this Regiment. The only difference seems to have been that the buttons and cap plates were plain yellow without numbers or other designation.

HUGH CHARLES McBARRON, JR.

¹⁸ Orders of the Commissary General of Purchases, October-November 1814 and February 1815 (C. G. P. O. B.).

PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE

BY LOWELL M. PUMPHREY

THE fact that modern warfare is highly economic in character has been universally recognized. In both the democratic and the totalitarian world, it is well understood that in present day conflicts between national states or combinations of states victory can normally be achieved only by a protracted economic and military effort overmatching that of the enemy. In the economic sphere, therefore, the basic problem of a nation is to achieve an organization that maximizes simultaneously the current diversion of economic effort to military purposes and the capacity of the state to withstand the strain of such diversion over the prolonged period that must elapse before complete victory is won. All the economic measures taken in such an effort together constitute *total economic warfare*.

Despite an understanding of the broad nature of the problems involved, months of almost uninterrupted disaster to one after another of the unprepared democratic states have still failed to drive home to the remnant of the democratic world either the tremendous organizational adjustments required to achieve a shift from a peacetime to an effective war economy or the full potentialities of *total economic warfare*.¹ In Great Britain, the Churchill Government has followed in the footsteps of the Chamberlain Government by continuing to pursue a policy of decentralized planning and administration of economic activity and, incidentally, of meeting public clamor against its failure to achieve sufficient war production by periodic reshufflings of Cabinet posts.² Even more ironic has been the experience of the United States. After a vivid recognition of the significance and the possibilities of economic warfare in the latter stages of the World War and the immediate post-war era, a long period of peace has dulled the American sense of the myriad ramifications of economic warfare. A lack of sufficient enlightened public interest has allowed the economic warfare work of the United States Army, which made an excellent start in the early post-war era,³ to drift into a state of innocuous desuetude. Thus, we have seen in the recent United States preparedness effort the passing over of the carefully

¹ Among the major tragedies of this war has been the failure of the leaders of the great democratic powers (with the exception of M. Paul Reynaud, who arrived in control too late) to bring to the vital economic issues the same sagacity and understanding that they have brought to the political and general strategic issues.

² Thus the vital Ministry of Supply has been headed *seriatim* by Leslie Burgin, Herbert Morrison, Sir Andrew Duncan, and Lord Beaverbrook. The Board of Trade has been presided over by Oliver Stanley, Sir Andrew Duncan, Captain Oliver Lyttelton, and (again) Sir Andrew Duncan. The lamentable deficiencies of the Churchill Government in the economic sphere, after a twelve months' conspiracy of silence, finally came to light in July 1941.

³ The Army Industrial College, for example, was established in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War in 1924.

prepared Army plans of industrial mobilization⁴ and the adoption instead of hybrid organizations similar to those utilized in the early days of the first World War. This repetition in the United States of many of the organizational blunders of the first war has caused much heartburning both in military and economic circles. Unfortunately, the momentum of the program has been such that the real possibilities of economic warfare are still only very partially exploited in this country and show every sign of being left in that state for a considerable time to come.

Only in Germany has there been a steady evolution both in the understanding of the relationships of economics to modern warfare and in the transformation of this understanding into the realm of practical operation. In the immediate post-war period, both the German and the American Armies recognized that it was the unexpectedly prompt harnessing of the American economic potential for war and the exhaustion of a limited German potential that was ultimately responsible for the military collapse of Germany. As so often before in the history of the world, the defeated army took the lesson to heart and profited. The *Reichswehr* recognized that the economic character of modern warfare made it imperative that a section of the German officers—both in the Army higher and middle command and in the General Staff—have a professional understanding of economics. As a result, a nucleus of German officer-economists, trained to deal with the various problems of economic mobilization that impinge on the military, was built up in the days of the Weimar Republic.⁵

Measures of economic warfare (using the term in its broad sense as defined above and not in the limited sense of measures specifically directed towards frustrating the efforts of the enemy in the economic sphere) fall into two basic categories: (1) economic-strategic; and (2) economic-tactical. By economic-strategic is meant those measures in the economic sphere comparable to the measures covered in military terminology by the same expression. By economic-tactical, similarly, is meant the economic measures taken to implement the strategic measures. Three major types of decisions may be called for in economic warfare:

1. *Basic policy decisions* involving consideration of the economic situation in relation to all other aspects of the total situation and a determination of economic purposes in relation to all other ramifications of general purpose.
2. *Administrative economic decisions* involving the determination of arrangements and measures most effective for carrying out a basic economic purpose decided with reference to the total war effort.
3. *Technological decisions* involving the determination of the most effective physical arrangements and measures for accomplishing the physical results requisite for the fulfilling of economic purposes.

⁴ The various *Industrial Mobilization Plans* (1931-1939) of the United States Army-Navy Munitions Board, although deemed worthy of the closest study by the Government of the Third Reich in formulating its own industrial mobilization plans, were ignored by our Government in 1939.

⁵ This was true not only for the economic but also for the other professional disciplines,

The German War Economic Organization

The key economic planning organization of Germany—the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* (the War Economy Staff of the High Command)—was established in 1935. Its personnel, headed by Colonel of Infantry Thomas, was recruited from the staff of officer-economists which was the legacy of the *Reichswehr*.⁶ From the beginning the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* planned the organization of the entire German economy with reference to basic military needs. In this rôle it acquired responsibility for allocating all labor and *matériel*, developing and locating productive capacity and transport facilities, and coordinating the entire economy. In addition, it has functioned as the economic intelligence branch of the General Staff (although it is nominally independent). Thus, the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* combines the functions of the planning divisions of the United States Army-Navy Munitions Board and of the planning sections⁷ of the Office of Production Management and the other civilian agencies as well as some of the activities of the Intelligence and Supply Sections of the General Staff. Unlike the corresponding American organizations, however, it has had from the beginning the necessary powers to put its plans into effect. Since 1935 the Army economic departments have dominated the entire German economic effort; it is this centralization of planning and the power to carry out the economic plans that so distinguishes the German from the American effort. One of the most obvious and frequently criticized weaknesses of the present American preparedness program is the complete failure either to provide for a centralization of responsibility for planning of the program or to grant any of the myriad military and civilian planning agencies (between which no satisfactory liaison has yet been established, with the result that endless duplication of effort continues) the power to implement their plans.

The supreme advisory organization for German war policy is the *Wehrmachtsamt*—the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces under General Wilhelm Keitel—which is composed of high staff officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and selected civilian specialists in economics and other disciplines.⁸ The *Wehrmachtsamt* serves as the private staff of the *Führer* in his capacity of Supreme War Lord and advises on the supreme war policy of the *Reich* in the

such as political science, sociology, and psychology, which are of a direct significance for a total military effort.

⁶ Authoritative published information on the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* was lacking until 1940 as a result of the German Government's policy of secrecy regarding its operations. Towards the end of 1940 this ban was deliberately lifted, and an "official" article on the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* by Hans Baumgarten, "Die Neue Waffe," appeared in *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, October 18, 1940.

⁷ Despite the fact that these civilian agencies, technically, are concerned only with the facilitation of procurement of items of the type and in the quantities decided upon by the armed services, they have from the beginning been involved in activities (e.g., plant location, etc.) that are true planning operations.

⁸ Hanson W. Baldwin, *United We Stand!* (New York, 1941) p. 138, and *New York Times*, Magazine Section, April 13, 1941.

light of all the information at the disposal of this selected group of experts in all the key disciplines that go into the waging of total war. Thus, the broadest type of economic considerations are brought to the attention of this supreme advisory group. (This, of course, is true not only for economics but for all the other disciplines.) The estimate of the situation that can be made by such a body embodies the most advanced and comprehensive consideration of all the varied elements that are relevant in modern war.

In Germany, most of the actual administration of the *Wehrwirtschaft* was from the beginning placed in the hands of civilian departments, for it was recognized that the planning and the management of such an economy called for a judicious division of responsibility between military and civil groups.¹⁰ Upon the outbreak of war, Field Marshal Göring, in his rôle of economic czar, established a General Council consisting of the heads of the Four-Year Plan Bureaus; the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* of the High Command; the departmental chiefs of the Ministries of Agriculture, Economic Affairs, Labor, Transport, Armament and Munitions, and Interior; the Price Commissar; and one representative of the Nazi Party.¹¹ This body serves as a true economic General Staff for the coordination of the administrative agencies of the German economy during a capital war and provides a system of liaison of unrivaled effectiveness between these key economic agencies.

Thus we see that the war economic organization of Germany in the sphere of grand strategy falls into three parts:

1. *Supreme policy decisions*, which are made by Adolf Hitler upon the advice of an advisory military body especially qualified to make an estimate of the situation in the light of all the information available.

2. *General planning*, undertaken by a military body, with the administration of plans carried out by both military and civilian departments.

3. *Coordination of administrative agencies* through a General Council of mixed military-civilian membership.

The development of a trained staff of officer-economists had the further advantage of making possible the extension of the economic warfare activities of the *Wehrmacht* into the tactical sphere. The extension of economic warfare into the actual theater of military operations constitutes perhaps the most original achievement of the *Wehrmacht* in this field. Even in the last war some use was made of special squads of great mobility for technical operations, such as construction. The *Wehrwirtschaftstab* improved upon World War practice and created special *Wehrwirtschaftstruppe*. These economic troops consist of specialist units, commanded by officers from the *Wehrwirtschaftstab*, which are used for the repair and operation of mines, electrical works, chemical works, and

¹⁰ Thomas Reveille, *The Spoil of Europe* (New York, 1941). This book contains the first comprehensive treatment in English of the *Wehrwirtschaft* and the German system of exploiting the occupied areas of the Continent.

¹¹ "German War Organization," *The Economist*, May 17, 1941, contains a brief but enlightening discussion of the structural pattern of Nazi economy.

the like. They were effectively used in the French campaign of 1940, in which their function was to prevent by their presence and intervention the regular army forces from handling inappropriately the economic *materiel* of conquered territories. Liaison officers from the *Wehrwirtschaftstab* were attached to the staffs of the advancing armies and served as special staff officers to advise them how to conduct their operations so as to minimize unnecessary destruction to key economic objectives in the overrun territories. The successful utilization of these specialist troops represented a major achievement in liaison with the regular army units and obviously called for an intimate understanding of the economic organization of the invaded areas.

This examination of the German system of organization suggests that economic warfare operations should be differentiated not only according to whether they are tactical or strategic in character but also as to whether their successful performance requires the use of professional soldier-economists or can be fulfilled adequately by civilian specialists working in conjunction with the military. In certain important areas of strategic planning the best results can often be achieved by the utilization of mixed staffs of specialists from both military and civilian pursuits. This is especially likely to be true in the highest spheres of policy advice. Here the extremely broad provinces of knowledge that have to be covered will normally recommend the resort to a number of specialists, all of whom, however, have the one common denominator of an understanding of the broad principles of military strategy.

In the sphere of general strategic planning either policy may be successfully followed. The decision as to which is preferable is dependent in practice on the existence or non-existence of a group of military men who are sufficiently trained to develop sound general economic plans. In the case of Germany such a body was available and was used. The advantage of utilizing a military body for formulating the war economic plans of a country lies in the superior coordination of military and economic considerations made possible thereby. On the other hand, if there is not a sufficient number of officer-economists qualified to devise and administer the general economic planning activities, it may be far better to resort to a division of effort between the available officers who have such a training and the most expert civilians available. To secure adequate economic planning for a war economy, however, it is essential that the members of the mixed group to which this responsibility is entrusted should be able to understand one another and work together effectively.¹¹ Very often, indeed, the ablest academic economists lack either a proper administrative sense or a grasp of the fundamental differences between a wartime and a peacetime economy. Similarly, some of the most competent army officers find it impossible to grasp the intricacies of modern economic interrelationships that must be

¹¹ Many of the shortcomings of the current American effort have arisen from the failure of the civilian and military groups engaged in planning and procurement to reach a satisfactory understanding of each other's special problems.

understood if an integrated war economic organization is to be devised.

In the case of tactical operations, trained army officers are essential for both command and staff functions. Herein lies a further advantage of having a considerable number of trained officer-economists in the armed services of a country.

Can the United States Establish an Effective Wartime Economic Organization?

The post-war history of the United States affords a basis of reasonable optimism that this country can establish an effective war economic organization. During the 1920's the United States Army made great strides in its economic mobilization plans. The relatively static state of American efforts as compared with German efforts in the 1930's should be attributed primarily to an absence of an appropriate psychological *milieu* in this country. Thus, the establishment of the National Defense Advisory Commission in 1940, rather than a War Resources Administration as recommended in the War Department mobilization plans, was probably due largely to the Administration's fear that American public opinion was not then prepared for such a drastic step as the establishment of a really powerful central administrative body. The time, however, has come when the United States must resume where it left off in the '20's.

The first essential of an enhanced and vigorous preparedness effort in this country is the establishment of a supreme advisory group corresponding to the *Wehrmachtsamt*.¹² First things must come first. Without a more unequivocal military foreign policy our defense effort will continue to be handicapped. It is often overlooked, but the fact remains that a war effort may fail from *misdirected* production arising from a failure to integrate production with the vital strategic needs of a nation as well as from inadequate production arising from a failure to organize the productive resources of the country. In this country our attention has been focused on the failures in the productive sphere arising from diffuse and uncoordinated planning and administration, to the exclusion of our more serious failure to arrive at a clearly defined military foreign policy that would, among other things, prescribe the appropriate weapons. Although our present diffuse planning and administrative system may suffice to create a large *volume* of war instruments because of our inherent capabilities in production, it offers small hope that we will be successful in the more vital sphere of providing for the effective utilization of those instruments.

The urgent necessity of the establishment of an economic organization to supervise and coordinate the myriad of existing agencies that are now attempting to deal with planning and procurement has fortunately received widespread recognition. Never have the needs been summarized more succinctly than in an editorial in the *New York Times* on July 3, 1940:

¹² George Fielding Eliot, "Planning for Victory," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941, and Hanson W. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-51. The current literature contains a number of such attempts by able military critics and publicists to drive home to the American people the basic requirements of an effective preparedness program.

There must be a master planning board at the top, able to make the over-all strategic and industrial decisions. This board should contain the best strategical brains of the Army, Navy and air forces, as well as civilian industrial and economic experts and first-rate non-special minds. Until such an advisory War Planning Board is functioning effectively, we may expect continuance of a lopsided and archaic defense program, with many needless gaps and bottlenecks.

As compared with the urgent necessity of arriving at a clear-cut military foreign policy and achieving an integrated war economy, the training of the United States Army so that it can undertake an extension of economic warfare to the tactical sphere may seem of relatively minor importance. Nevertheless, the successful utilization of the German *Wehrwirtschaftstruppe* indicates that this country cannot afford to lag behind in this sphere either.¹³ The United States has an almost unlimited body of trained mechanics to make up the enlisted personnel of such specialist troops. It would be confronted with an extremely difficult task, however, in recruiting an officer personnel. It lacks at present either a group of economists trained in military matters or a large group of army officers with a professional understanding of economics. It is clear that the officer force for specialist economic units must be trained from the ground up. The United States Army must either select a group of regular or reserve officers and give them a rigorous training in technological economics or else transform a body of economists into trained officer-economists by giving them a rigorous training in military science. It is obvious that the training of an officer staff for specialist economic troops will involve long and intensive training, but the risks inherent in our defensive military policy are such that a vigorous effort is clearly called for.

¹³ Indeed, in the absence of general public agreement on the necessity of a military policy of the offensive, it may perhaps be argued that there is a vital need for the United States Army becoming prepared to carry out such operations. In the event of an invasion, it is a matter of profound national importance that the Army have formulated plans and created specialist troop units that are able to carry out quickly the dismantling of essential industrial plants on the East Coast, both to keep the plants out of enemy hands and to preserve the national economic stock.

OUR NATIONAL GUARD

AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY¹

BY FREDERICK P. TODD

The Civil War, 1861-1865

THE first real test of the Volunteer force came at the outbreak of the Civil War. How far the potentialities of this force were realized by the State and Federal governments, how prepared it was to meet the emergency, and how extensive was its contribution are a confusing story. Because of this, most writers have minimized the effort made and the results obtained. Fred A. Shannon has written that, in addition to the sixteen thousand men in the Regular Army, "the decadent militia regiments were the sole remaining organized resources. A few of these still retained a fair share of their original numbers and vigor."²

Table I shows the condition of the Volunteer force as it existed on January 1, 1861, in the nineteen States which furnished troops in response to the President's call of April 15, 1861.³ During the first months of the year, as the prospect of war grew more certain, many of these companies and regiments tendered their services to the Federal government. Most of them volunteered without limitations of time or place; a few suggested that they might be used as garrison troops until they had had time to complete their organization and training and to secure needed equipment. But the government found it politically inadvisable to accept these tenders; indeed, one searches hard to find even an acknowledgment.⁴

¹ The first half of this article was published in the previous issue, V (Summer 1941), 73-86.

² *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (Cleveland, 1928), I, 28.

³ Table I is based principally on *Returns of the Militia . . . for the year 1860*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., House Executive Documents, no. 53 (ser. 1100); *The Union Army* (Madison, 1908), vols. I-IV; *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1881-1901; hereafter cited as *Official Records*), ser. I, vol. LI, pt. 1, pp. 321 ff.; *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 65 ff.; Frederick H Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Des Moines 1908), *passim*; Adjutant General's Office, *Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force . . .* (Washington, 1865); and reports of the States Adjutants General concerned. These are necessarily only approximate figures. For convenience the militia of the District of Columbia and of the States which later entered the Confederacy have been omitted. The infantry company has been taken as the unit of measure. At that time the Volunteer infantry company averaged about 50 men; in peace it rarely exceeded 75. It was supposed to be recruited to 77 men and officers in an emergency, and these additional recruits, often veterans of the unit, could be absorbed without serious loss of efficiency. By War Department General Order of May 4, 1861, this figure was raised to 83 minimum and 107 maximum. Ten such companies composed a regiment.

⁴ *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 38 ff.

TABLE I
THE VOLUNTEER FORCE, JANUARY 1, 1861

	Available Manpower (18-45 yrs.)	Effective Volunteer Strength	Effective Volunteer Companies
Maine	122,000	1,200	35
New Hampshire	64,000	... ⁵	...
Vermont	61,000	650	15
Massachusetts	258,000	5,600	80
Rhode Island	36,000	750	13
Connecticut	94,000	710	13
New York	797,000	19,000	300
Pennsylvania	555,000	6,000	150
New Jersey	132,000	600	15
Delaware	18,000
Missouri	233,000
Illinois	375,000	1,750	35
Indiana	265,000
Ohio	460,000	1,200	30
Michigan	164,000	1,240	28
Wisconsin	159,000	1,990	52
Iowa	139,000
Minnesota	41,000	500	15
Kansas	28,000
Total	4,001,000	41,190	781

At last, reluctantly, a few steps were taken to protect the national capital, and on April 9 part of the recently organized Volunteer militia of the District of Columbia was called out. Much has been made of the refusal of some of these troops to serve, but the recognized presence of Southern sympathizers in that body explains such refusal more adequately than do other causes. It can of itself in no way reflect on the military efficiency of the District Volunteers, any more than the same sort of refusal reflects on the Volunteers of a Southern State or, for that matter, on a large portion of the Regular officer corps.⁵

It soon became apparent that more effective steps had to be taken, and on April 15 the President issued his call for seventy-five thousand militia from those States which had not by then openly seceded. The figure has no military significance; it was purely a political compromise.⁶ The administration could have had no idea how many it would get in reply to its call. The militia returns of 1860, showing over three million "troops," had been made in a purely Pickwickian sense. How many of these were organized, equipped, or armed was unknown. Nor did the government have any plans for the use of those men

⁵ Charles P. Stone, "Washington on the Eve of the War," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York, 1887-88), I, 7-25; "Washington in March and April, 1861," *Magazine of American History*, XIV (July 1885), 1-24; *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. LI, pt. I, pp. 321 ff.

⁶ A. Howard Meneely, *The War Department, 1861* (New York, 1928), pp. 100-101.

it might get. It did recognize, however, the limitations of their service: legally they could be called out for three months only, and even the Governors could not increase this period. Many must have wondered what could be done within this short time, but there was nothing else for them to do save wait and hope for the best.

The service of the Volunteers who responded must be gaged within the frame of their legal establishments, the mission they were given, and the general competence of American military forces at the time. Their function in this emergency, if it could have been defined, would have read like that of our present National Guard—the immediate formation of a line of defense behind which the other forces of the land could be formed. The capital was in grave danger; time was of supreme importance. Thus speed of mobilization and movement to the front should be the real basis of judgment, and in this the Volunteers should be compared with the Regular Army on the one side and the absolutely green State units on the other.

Another basis of judgment would be the state of their training, armament, equipment, and discipline, but it is practically impossible to obtain any accurate idea of the extent to which the different units possessed these qualities. Undoubtedly they were weak all around, but not so weak as some writers would have us believe. If an arbitrary standard of measurement in these qualities can be taken, calling it the state of "readiness for combat," the relative speed with which the different groups reached this state can then be shown.

Table 2, based on such a standard, is the record of the National Guard in its first great emergency.⁷ It furnished 40 per cent of the men on this first call, at which time 48 per cent of its companies responded. At the end of the first week 100 per cent of those who were ready were Volunteers, at the end of the second week 88 per cent, and at the end of the third week 69 per cent. In other words, those States which had encouraged the Volunteer organizations were able to produce in this emergency a far more efficient force than those which had not, and in only a fraction of the time.

This, however, is only a small part of the Civil War record of the Guard. There were two subsequent calls of considerable size which were responded to with alacrity. Hundreds of State units volunteered *en masse* for full war service. New York, for example, sent its 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 20th, 25th,

⁷ Table 2 includes the same States and is based on the same sources as Table 1 (see note 3 above). In compiling this table a unit has been considered "ready" if it was organized as prescribed by law and Army regulations; if it contained its full quota of officers and at least 90 per cent of its authorized enlisted strength; if it had been properly mustered into either State or Federal service; if each individual was adequately armed, clothed, and accoutered with suspension equipment; and if at least 75 per cent of its personnel had drilled together under competent instructors for a minimum of one week. This is a low state of efficiency, but many an American regiment has gone into serious action in far worse condition. Most of the Volunteer organizations were much better prepared. Volunteer units organized after the call of April 15 are shown in italics.

TABLE 2
SPEED IN ATTAINING A STATE OF READINESS AFTER THE CALL OF
APRIL 15, 1861

	Companies	April 15-21 Men and Officers	Companies	April 22-28 Men and Officers	Companies	April 29-May 5 Men and Officers	Companies	After May 6 Men and Officers
Maine	{	8	624
New Hampshire	{	2	156	10	780
Vermont	{	10	780
Massachusetts	{	52	3,736
Rhode Island	{	11	1,220
Connecticut	{	10	780	3	240
New York	{	40	3,500	60	4,400	10	550
Pennsylvania	{	42	3,380	47	3,660	9	700	1
.....	{	15	1,170	24	1,870	113
New Jersey	{	1	50	10	774
Delaware	10	775
Missouri	49	4,731
Illinois	{	10	900	13	910	10	780
.....	{	10	780	20	1,560
Indiana	60	4,686
Ohio	{	17	1,360	6	480
.....	{	5	400	32	2,560	70
Michigan	10	780
Wisconsin	10	810	1
Iowa	10	968
Minnesota	10	930
Kansas	10	650
Previously Organized	173	14,146	154	11,664	49	3,584	4	320
Newly Organized	42	3,286	126	10,466	399	32,390
Total	173	14,146	196	14,950	175	14,050	403	32,730

28th, 69th, and 71st Infantry Regiments in answer to the call of April 15. In addition to this, its 2d, 9th, 14th, 64th, and 79th Infantry Regiments were reorganized and offered to the Federal government for service of three years or the duration of the war; its 10th, 19th, 55th, and 74th Infantry Regiments were reorganized and offered for periods of from nine months to two years. Furthermore, when the 6th, 13th, 20th, 69th, and 71st Regiments returned from the 1861 call, they were also reorganized and served again for from two years to the duration of the war, the 69th actually making up two full regiments. In the meanwhile the remaining New York State units were put in a state of

readiness for local service so that the State was able to furnish eleven emergency regiments in 1862, twenty-one in 1863, and seventeen in 1864. All these, of course, were regular State troops, not the purely volunteer regiments organized for the War only. Where units could not go as a whole they often supplied the cadre and *esprit de corps* to organizations being newly raised. The 7th New York alone provided the Union Army with over six hundred officers.* Units like the 2d, 9th, 69th, and 71st saw hard combat service. Several are listed among the "300 fighting regiments," and as a result many a Guard unit bears on its colors today such names as "Peninsular," "Gettysburg," and "Wilderness." The Guard need never be ashamed of its Civil War record.

The State Regiments, 1865-1903

Whereas the independent company of fifty to a hundred men, in spirit if not always in fact, was the typical Volunteer unit of the early nineteenth century, larger organizations were by no means rare, particularly in the larger Eastern cities. In 1786 the New York City Regiment of Artillery was formed from existing separate companies; by 1808 that city possessed three regiments of foot artillery and one of light infantry, to say nothing of a squadron of cavalry, two companies of horse or "flying" artillery, and several unattached rifle corps.

The tendency of companies to unite for mutual benefit was natural, and it continued in all of the Eastern States. Many of these combines were short lived, but when regiments so formed did survive they took on traditions of their own and commenced to demand allegiances previously reserved for the company. The regiment of some thousand men is the ideal social group in any army; it is large enough to survive serious losses and to be of military significance, yet small enough to be commanded by a single man and to permit a generality of acquaintance among its personnel. For the most part the State governments encouraged this evolution, capricious as it was, but the damage done the common militia did not go unnoticed.

Most authorities agree that by 1840 the militia "system" was virtually defunct. In that year, for example, Massachusetts practically disbanded the old organization and went on a Volunteer basis. Next year it authorized battalion encampments, and it is noteworthy that in 1855 the Adjutant General of that State reported that "The Volunteer Militia at the present time is better organized, and in a higher state of drill and discipline, than ever before" and "stands in better repute at Washington, than the Militia of any other State."¹ Other states followed suit with varying success, for the paper soldiers died hard. The old militia rolls provided many a glittering title of rank with little cost or bother. The Volunteers, moreover, were more contemptuous of State politics

* Emmons Clark, *History of the Seventh Regiment of New York* (New York, 1890), II, 479-87.

¹ Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for . . . 1855 (Boston, 1856), p. 22. See also these same Reports for 1846, 1857, and 1860.



CIVIL WAR COLORS OF THE 8TH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY
Photograph from the Signal Corps.

and jealous of their privileges, and thus harder to handle. But withal they offered the only practical solution of the militia problem. New legislation demanding standardized training and organization marked the '40's and '50's as a period of real if erratic Volunteer reform. Early summer encampments had been by small units, but, as the advantages to be gained by training larger groups became apparent, this also grew into a general practice. In 1859 the entire Volunteer force of Massachusetts encamped together for the first time.

The Civil War saw virtually the end of the independent companies. The thousands raised on both sides of the Potomac made regimental organization essential. The war also introduced the names "Organized Militia" and "National Guard" into general use, thus ending the confusion in terms between the old "State Volunteers" and the new "Federal Volunteers," first raised by the central government in the Mexican War.

The regimentation of the Volunteers had one less fortunate effect: it brought them into the realm of State politics, with all that that term implies. After a brief lag the organizations grew in size and importance throughout the '70's, and there came a race to top them off with the same sort of political generals and staff officers which had poisoned the old militia. This reached a maximum just before 1877, when the Guard found itself faced with the serious railway strikes of that year. It did not accomplish what had been expected of it and had the mortification of seeing a handful of Regulars succeed where an entire State force had failed. Reorganizations occurred in all the States, but the incubus of politics was too heavy to be shaken off entirely.¹⁰

Broadly speaking, the Guard developed thereafter along two general lines which for convenience may be called the Pennsylvania and the New York "plans."¹¹ In the Pennsylvania plan the ideal was the veteran volunteer of the Civil War, and stress was laid on rough field duty, practical mobilization, and plenty of hard work on the range. By 1878 the entire force in Pennsylvania had been tightened into a single compact division, carefully organized along Army lines. The troops had no dress uniforms but wore the same undress kit as the Regular. Camp attendance was high, but the tough work did not always attract the best class of recruits.

The New York plan, on the other hand, stressed the older "club tradition" of the independent company. Great attention was given to formal open and close order drill, and practically every unit had its distinctive full dress uniform as well as its undress for field work. Armories were built, sometimes by the units themselves, of a size and magnificence to be found nowhere else in the world. With such assets the New York regiments could afford to be selective in

¹⁰ Elwell S. Otis, "The Army in Connection with the Labor Riots of 1877," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, V (September 1884), 292-323; John R. Commons et al., *History of Labor in the United States* (New York, 1926), II, 185-91.

¹¹ Francis V. Greene, "The New National Guard," *The Century Magazine*, XLIII (February 1892), 483-98.

membership, and money and prominence played a considerable part, although these factors can easily be exaggerated. As a result the State organization was irregular and weak, and summer camps were functions of considerable color and social significance but offered little practical training for field service.

By this time the Guard had become a thing of considerable interest to the War Department. For many years most of the Regulars had looked with disdainful, if not hostile, eyes upon the Volunteer. Yet to others in Washington the prospect of a national militia had always had a distinct appeal. General Winfield Scott had urged the idea in 1861, suggesting that the 7th New York could be regarded as a "somewhat national" regiment.¹² But the Federal government was too feeble and the States too robust to attempt anything then, and throughout the Civil War each State handled its own military force in its own way.

A decade later found the prospect considerably altered. The War Department looked longingly at the growing force of ninety thousand men, largely officered by veterans and quite respectably, if inconsistently, equipped. In 1878 General McClellan made the following significant suggestion to the Burnside Committee, then studying the national military establishment:

All of our experience has shown that in the event of war we cannot rely upon the militia as such, but upon such individual members of that vast body as offer to serve and form corps of volunteers, and upon regiments of national guards. The great nursery of these volunteers be the corps of "National Guards." I would earnestly commend to the careful thought of the committee the propriety of encouraging the formation of such corps in the various States, and of assisting them as much as possible.¹³


With infinite diplomacy Regular officers had by 1880 commenced to inspect State summer encampments, always "at the request of the State authorities." In that year their reports were published for the first time, and with the assignment of more officers to this work the reports grew detailed and voluminous. The one for 1897 is over an inch thick, but it is no more adventurous than the one for 1880.¹⁴ It should be remembered that this was the period which Ganoe, the Army's historian, has called its "dark ages."¹⁵ It had taken Sherman's advice to shun politics, and in so doing it had come to shun all things civilian. This reticence was returned—in 1877 Congress even failed to pass a military appropriation—and our civil-military relations were often conducted on a plane of reluctant urbanity.

¹² *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 41. See also the interesting proposal for the reorganization of the militia submitted in 1861 by Brevet Lt. Col. B. S. Roberts in 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Executive Documents, no. 28 (ser. 1031).

¹³ 45th Cong., 3d Session, Senate Reports, no. 555 (ser. 1837), p. 458.

¹⁴ In the *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1880, I (46th Cong., 3d Sess., House Executive Documents, no. 1, pt. 2 [ser. 1952]), 245-85. About 1893 the publication of these reports was taken over by the newly created Military Information Division and appear in the series entitled *The Organized Militia of the United States* which continued until the formation of the Militia Bureau.

¹⁵ William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York, 1924), pp. 298 ff.



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7TH NEW YORK INFANTRY, ABOUT 1885



7TH NEW YORK INFANTRY, ABOUT 1901

Yet public interest in the Guard was increasing, and several national encampments and drill competitions were held in the 1880's. For the one in Washington in 1887 the citizens of that city alone subscribed fifty thousand dollars.¹⁶ The Army was forced to recognize this interest and play a more active part, and with that the Guard was launched into the powerful stream of Federal-States controversy. The questions, suggested earlier, concerning the purpose and allegiance of the Guard assumed new and added meaning.

The different arguments fall roughly into three groups.¹⁷ There were those who felt that the force should be retained entirely under State control for home defense and as State police, being thus incidentally available for defense. They pointed to the lack of any other effective machinery for these purposes, to the increasing unrest of labor, and to the dangers of a large "militaristic" Federal force. These were the survivors of the states' rights school, then fast diminishing.

The opposite side urged the breaking of all State ties and amalgamation with the Regular Army. This group stressed the lack of unity and standardization between the various State forces, the inability of each to put its military house in order, and the general folly of relying on green troops and non-professional officers in an emergency. The corner-stone of their argument was that these faults could never be overcome under the Constitution, and hence the Guard could never be made into an effective force for national defense. Extremists of this school soon found it easy to urge even the abolition of the Guard as a State force, recommending instead a compact, professional constabulary. This was, in general, the orthodox Army doctrine, which was to find its posthumous leader in Emory Upton.

Somewhere between ranged the groups which admitted many of the Guard's weaknesses but defended it on the grounds of political reality and as an agency for building civilian morale. The Civil War had given them an interesting argument. While the State regiments had not always been able to serve except for short periods or under new guises, they had furnished thousands of relatively well trained men to instruct or lead other outfits. The feat of the 7th New York, mentioned above of providing six hundred officers, pointed to a new function for the Guard.¹⁸ To be sure, this group argued, Federal assistance and supervision were highly desirable, but *complete* Army control would kill the volunteer spirit and community traditions which had given the only practical civilian reserve the country had ever known.

¹⁶ *Washington Star*, May 1-31, 1887.

¹⁷ John McA. Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen* (New York, 1930), pp. 263-99. Numerous articles reflecting these opinions appeared in the contemporary service journals, many of them frank and highly critical of Guard or Regular Army, climaxing in the series of prize essays in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, vol. XXVI (1900).

¹⁸ Subsequent wars make this figure even more impressive; in 1917-18 some 1,600 "graduates" of the 7th received commissions.

In 1879 the National Guard Association was formed to present a united front in defense of this last point of view. Its influence later, under the less elegant name "Militia Lobby," became a strong factor in Guard legislation. All of this controversy had the value of focusing attention on the patent defects of the Guard: no uniformity of instruction, organization, or equipment; the lamentable lack of funds; the absence of trained leadership; and, finally, the antiquity of the legislation then in force. An immense mass of literature came into being directed at reorganization in one form or another, and the tragic futilities of the Spanish-American War served as a fitting climax. The final bars of this vast chorus of criticism brings us to the regime of Elihu Root as Secretary of War (1899-1904) and the era of wide-spread army reform. With characteristic energy, Root, backed by President Theodore Roosevelt, attacked the antiquated militia legislation. Through a bill introduced by Congressman George F. Dick and passed with almost no opposition—so patent were the defects of the existing law—the National Guard was recognized as an agency distinct from the militia, and many of the absurd inconsistencies in organization between the States, and between them and the central government, were corrected.

The Process of Federalization, 1903-1933

The Dick Bill was approved on January 21, 1903, and is the foundation stone of the National Guard. It was generally conceded to be imperfect in places, and five years later, on May 27, 1908, it had to be strengthened. It is well to look briefly at these two laws together.¹⁹

In the first place they standardized to the extent then thought feasible the Guard's organization, equipment, arms, and discipline with that of the Regular Army. They provided for the issue of arms, ammunition, and other matériel to the Guard by the Federal government. They required a definite amount of training of a prescribed character every year, part of this training to be conducted in conjunction with the Regular Army or under Regular officers. More important still, they required periodic inspections by the Federal government, a step which, with the greatly increased appropriations (\$2,000,000 in 1903, for example, as compared with the \$400,000 of the year before), clearly indicates the increasing Federal control.

The Acts of 1903 and 1908 mark a new emphasis on the Guard as a factor in national defense. Under their terms the President could, through the Governors, call it into Federal service for such a term as he might specify (but not longer than existing individual enlistments) and, if necessary, outside the territory of the United States. But this provision for the emergency use of the Guard other than as individual volunteers was greatly weakened when it

¹⁹ *Statutes at Large of the United States* (Boston and Washington, 1853-), XXXII, 779; *ibid.*, XXXV, 403; John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York, 1922), pp. 15-22, 48-49; Frederick B. Wiener, "The Militia Clause of the Constitution," *Harvard Law Review*, LIV (December 1940), 193-99.

was declared unconstitutional by Attorney General Wickersham in 1912. Furthermore, the Acts lacked teeth, and they did not in any degree lessen the problem of dual allegiance. Indeed, this aspect was carefully avoided. Whereas in 1903 many thought they had the problem conquered, by 1912 there had developed a widespread doubt that the Guard could ever be made into an effective force.²⁰

In 1904 the War Department published Emory Upton's *Military Policy of the United States*. Save perhaps Baron Steuben's *Regulations* of 1779, no other book has had such a profound effect upon American military thought. It was a scathing denunciation of the militia, its conclusion being that no reliance for national defense could be placed upon any agency save the Regular forces. Unfortunately, Upton made little or no attempt in his history to differentiate between the types of "militia," and, worse yet, he used Washington as his chief source without having read or digested documents which would have proved that Washington had appreciated this differentiation and had recommended a "well-regulated" militia as the backbone of American defense.

Upton became a Bible to a group in the Army, and the idea of disbanding the Guard, or at least of stopping the millions of dollars of government money going into its training, and supplanting it with a completely Federal force gained new momentum. Yet under the Dick Act and through the medium of the Division of Militia Affairs, created in 1908, a definite improvement had taken place within the Guard and new plans for cooperation with the Army were set on foot. From some 119,000 officers and men in 1909 the State forces increased to nearly 127,500 in 1914.²¹ But the Uptonian doctrine was at work, and the narrow jealousies of certain State officials and Guard officers added to the problem, so that friction was not slow in developing. By 1913 it had come into the open, and the period from then until our entry into the World War saw probably the most brilliant invective of any in National Guard history.²²

The year 1915 was marked by a determined drive for preparedness. As the campaign progressed, it became obvious that what this country needed was not Army reform but an entirely new military system—a clean-cut break with the past. Out of the myriad schemes first considered two general ideas or plans gradually began to gel. In September the War College had submitted to

²⁰ Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-56; Palmer, *loc. cit.*; Walter M. Pratt, *Tin Soldiers . . .* (Boston, 1912), *passim*; "National Guard under Fire," *The Literary Digest*, LII (April 22, 1916), 1132-33.

²¹ *War Department, Annual Reports, 1914* (Washington, 1914), p. 128.

²² For example, see Sigmund Henschen, "The Collapse of Our Militia," *Forum*, LVI (September 1916), 294-303; Rupert Hughes, "The Case of Our National Guard," *Collier's*, LVII (May 20, 1916), 7 ff.; John F. O'Ryan, "Role of the National Guard," *North American Review*, CCII (September 1915), 264-72; Ralph C. Tobin, "The National Guard—Its Origin, Growth, and Peculiarities," *The Seventh Regiment Gazette*, XLIV (Spring 1934), 4-5.

Secretary of War Garrison a "Statement of Military Policy" which represented in a large measure the Army's point of view.²³ It was a powerful and brilliant document based on two premises (1) that the minimum length of time of actual training necessary for combat service was twelve months; and (2) that such training, under existing Constitutional limitations, could not be secured in the Guard. Hence, the reasoning continued, the Guard could not be considered as an effective reserve force and should be continued only by and for the States. Its place, as planned under the Dick Act, should be taken by a strictly Federal militia. This Statement became the basis of the so-called Continental Army plan and was strongly sponsored by Garrison and many others. As recommended by him to the President, it proposed to continue Federal support of the Guard but to look to it only for volunteers in times of war.²⁴

In the opposite camp were those who urged continued federalization of the Guard and blamed its existing difficulties on faulty legislation. They saw no need of a parallel body of civilian soldiery without traditions and under command of unsympathetic professionals. This group denied that the War Department had no check on the peacetime Guard organization, and generally approved the idea of universal military training, suggesting the Guard as a ready vehicle. But they did insist on the rights of the States to retain a large part of the peacetime control, and here, of course, hinged the principal dispute.

The Continental Army plan at length lost Presidential support, and Secretary Garrison resigned on February 12, 1916. After considerable discussion, something of a compromise was effected and became law as the National Defense Act of June 3.²⁵ As a piece of legislation it is easily as important as that of 1903. The Guard was given Federal pay but only upon fulfilment of definite conditions, a whip which gave the Federal government much larger powers over actual organization (it could, for example, change a unit's branch or combine it with another). It became possible to establish higher tactical units; to prescribe standards of professional, moral, and physical fitness for officers and of enlistment for men; to provide a uniform term of enlistment of three years in service and three in the reserve; and to take more effective steps to guard

²³ *War Department, Annual Reports, 1915* (Washington, 1916), I, 109-35. This report had been prepared as a "succinctly expressed statement" of a proper military policy for the United States at the request of Secretary of War Stimson in 1912. It was to have been developed from a report issued by Stimson in that year entitled "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States," but in the meanwhile a palace revolution had occurred within the General Staff and the "Statement" actually reversed the findings of the 1912 report. See the account of Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, the real author of the earlier document, in his *America in Arms* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 135 ff.

²⁴ For discussions of this period see the published hearings on the Army reorganization bills before the Committees on Military Affairs of Senate and House, 1916; Dickinson, *loc. cit.*; E. Brooke Lee, Jr., *The Politics of Our Military National Defense* (76th Cong., 3d Sess., Senate Documents, no. 274), pp. 27-63.

²⁵ *Statutes at Large*, XXXIX, 166, 197-213.

public property and to insure regular attendance at drills. Finally, the Act prescribed that all officers and men should take an oath to the United States as well as to their State, and so enabled the President to transfer complete militia units to the Federal service and to implement the vastly important section which permitted him for the first time to draft Guardsmen into Federal service under the "Army Clause" of the Constitution rather than the "Militia Clause."²⁸

The Act of 1916 was unquestionably studded with legal uncertainties and loopholes, but before these could be tested in the courts the Guard had put it on trial in another fashion. Conditions along the Mexican border were such as to offer reasons for a mobilization, and on June 18, 1916, the President called into Federal service a large part of the Guard. The call was made in terms of units, and their selection was left to the Governors. This State force of 156,414 men remained on the border for over nine months. There was no fighting, but their time was well filled with the toughest and dirtiest kind of field soldiering.

To many in the Army this border adventure appeared to prove everything Upton had contended. At least 20 per cent of the force was found to be physically unfit and had to be dropped. A large number did not respond to the call, and in only seven States did the units muster higher than 70 per cent of their full strength. Mobilization was slow and, in many cases, grossly inefficient. The Chief of the Militia Bureau reported:

Having entered the Federal service with a keen desire for active service, [they] found themselves scattered along the Mexican border and forced to undergo a much more serious and extended course of training than any of them had ever undergone before. As a consequence, many were disappointed; complaints of "We came down here to fight; not to sit around in camp" became heard; criticism became rife; and appeals to go home were voiced.

The Guard was not happy on the Border and some of its members went so far as to prophesy its disbandment as a result.²⁹

The experience did the regiments a world of good, however. Misfits were eliminated, good men dressed into shape, and the Guard began to realize that soldiering was not all beer and skittles. The part played by the Regular officers in this episode appears both efficient and strictly fair, although generally without imagination or apparent ability to handle any civilian troops save conscripts. The part played by the War Department was as planless as ever, and here lies the real core of the dissatisfaction. In the same Militia Bureau report quoted above is the statement that "The training . . . was . . . sadly handicapped

²⁸ Dickinson, *loc. cit.*; Wiener, *op. cit.*, pp. 199 ff.

²⁹ Militia Bureau, *Report on Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard, 1916* (Washington, 1916); War Department, *Annual Reports, 1917* (Washington, 1918), I, 845-926; George Marvin, "Marking Time with Mexico . . .," *World's Work*, XXXII, (September 1916), 526-33; Charles Nurz, "Truth Of It . . .," *Everybody's*, XXXV (October 1916), 434-41; and numerous other articles of this period.

because of the absence of any definite idea as to the duration of the entire period of service.²⁶

On April 1, 1917, the Guard numbered 181,620 men and officers; a day later President Wilson appeared before Congress and recommended war against Germany; a few days thereafter the administration offered its Selective Service Bill. The latter was a powerful, farsighted measure, and it was boldly defended. As described by Senator Chamberlain, it

left room for the operation of so much of the volunteer system as in our judgment is worthy of adoption. While it provides for the raising of additional forces in large number by selective draft . . . it also provides, through means of recruiting to war strength the existing establishments of the Regular Army and the National Guard, for absorbing a force of more than 600,000 volunteers.²⁷

The Act, signed on May 18, authorized the President to draft the Guard into service as prescribed by the Act of 1916 and to expand it to a war strength of over 470,000 men and officers.²⁸ This he did on July 3 to become effective about a month later. Again the War Department had no plan ready, but it commenced at once to reorganize the force and extend Federal recognition. The Guard began to recruit at once, and by August 5 it had grown to a force of 379,323 men and officers. Subsequent enlistments brought almost 100,000 more.²⁹ By September the Guard had been organized into the now familiar seventeen divisions, numbered 26 through 42, and all of its units had been redesignated according to the General Staff plan. Due to lack of wooden cantonments these divisions were generally housed under canvas in the Southern States during the winter of 1917-18. All of these Guard divisions reached France, elements of the 26th landing there as early as September 1917. Eleven of the units were designated combat divisions and saw hard front line service, participating variously in all of the A. E. F. operations.³⁰

As might have been imagined, however, the old State organizations and the new Army tables did not dovetail readily, and alterations within units were frequently radical and discouraging. The regiments had encouraged recruiting by advertising, "Enlist and go with your friends," but often as not a man would join under this promise only to be hauled out after a few days and transferred to a strange command. It was hard enough for cavalry to be metamorphosized into machine gunners, or infantry into trench mortar batteries, but for a long established unit to lose 90 per cent of its original trained strength, all of its best officers, and then its opportunity, apparently, of getting overseas was too much of a blow to take quietly. There were many and bitter complaints.³¹

²⁶ 65th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Reports, no. 22 (ser. 7249), p. 1.

²⁷ *Statutes at Large*, XL, 76.

²⁸ *War Department, Annual Reports, 1918* (Washington, 1918), I, 1107; *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General* (Washington, 1919), p. 227.

²⁹ Historical Section, Army War College, *Order of Battle . . . Divisions* (Washington, 1931), *passim*.

³⁰ *War Department, Annual Reports, 1918*, I, 1102-06; Robert S. Sutliffe, *Seventy-first*

The problem of these depleted surplus regiments was never really solved. When refilled with conscripts their combat efficiency fell far below standard. The best that could be done was make them army or corps troops, and one favorite device was the creation of "pioneer infantry." The word "pioneer" had a good American flavor, and the regiments were issued full combat equipment, including trench knives, but they spent most of their time filling in shell holes and loading trucks.

Since the official records of the A. E. F. are not available, no sound opinion can be formed of the combat value of the Guard divisions. In the Congressional hearings which followed the war the comments on their service were universally favorable. General Pershing said they had "performed very excellent service" and had "shown themselves in battle to be worthy of our best efforts." And he did not hesitate to add that in the past the Guard "had never received . . . the whole-hearted support of the Regular Army. There was always more or less prejudice against them, and many of our regular officers failed to perform their full duty as competent instructors, and often criticized where they should have instructed."²³

The 66th Congress met in June 1919 faced with the necessity of determining the future military establishment of the United States. So intricate was the problem, so radical were the many solutions, and so great was the number of persons qualified by war experience to give advice that both Houses instituted a series of hearings which continued for more than three months. The record of these hearings forms an extremely valuable military document and deserves the study of every officer.²⁴ The now familiar points of view of the Army and of the Guard were expressed in the greatest detail by virtually every important officer on either side, but two men stand out above the rest, Major General John F. O'Ryan of the 27th Division and Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer of the General Staff. These two men took neither side of the dispute but steered a vigorous and enlightened course of their own, supported and counseled by General Pershing. Their suggestions called for the use of the Guard organization as "charter members" of a national citizen army, to be perpetuated by means of universal compulsory training. The *esprit* of the old regiments would be maintained, local associations would be capitalized upon to the greatest extent, and the force would be very distinct from the Regular Army although no longer under State control.

New York in the World War (n. p., 1922), pp. 21-39; Clarence S. Martin, *Three Quarters of a Century with the Tenth Infantry, New York National Guard* (Albany, n. d.) pp. 109-20.

²³ *Reorganization of the Army* (Joint Hearing before the Committees on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. [Washington, 1919]), p. 1645.

²⁴ *General Army Legislation and Army Efficiency . . .* (Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs [Washington, 1920]); *Reorganization of the Army* (Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs [Washington, 1919]); Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-62; Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-110.

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The 174th Infantry on maneuvers, 1941. Photograph from the Press Association, Inc.



In the end both Houses drafted their own bills, and the important provisions for universal compulsory training were rejected, as many had prophesied they would be, in the bitter fight that followed. Indeed, when one reads the volumes of thoughtful and far-sighted suggestions which accompanied the earlier phases of this discussion, the bill which resulted appears to contain little that is novel and to have solved none of the real Guard issues at stake. In its final form it was approved by the President on June 4, 1920.²⁵ Its chief contributions were the establishment of a Militia Bureau in the War Department, staffed and commanded by Guard officers; the amendment of the draft clause to permit units to retain their State status after being drafted, and so prevent the legal death of the Guard which had followed the World War; the authority for Guard officers to hold Reserve commissions, and so be eligible for the same duty when drafted; and the provision for organizational problems to be considered by General Staff committees composed of an equal number of Regular and Guard officers.

The National Guard had become a true military force, organized into infantry and cavalry divisions and equipped with most of the necessary auxiliaries. But it was still not part of the Army, for this body by law included the Guard only "while in the service of the United States." The Guardsman was still a State soldier except in a national emergency.

Into the Army, 1933

On June 15, 1933, the final step was taken by the approval of an Act which created the National Guard of the United States, a full-fledged reserve component of the Army.²⁶ It is a far-reaching piece of legislation. At last the attempt to administer the Guard under the "Militia Clause" of the Constitution was completely abandoned; today it operates under the "Army Clause." No longer is the Guardsman drafted into Federal service, for he is already in; his unit need only be ordered to duty after Congress has declared a national emergency as it did in the summer of 1940.

Few people, not even all legislators, understand what this "federalization" really means or know the thought and effort which has gone into its development. Some, indeed, feel the Guard has been forced into a doubtful position. But to place all honor and credit where it is due, it must be recorded that it was Guardsmen who perfected and supported this legislation and who have entered into its first application with resolution and pride. If today there is dissatisfaction over retention in service or other matters, it is not difficult to put one's finger on the real root of the trouble. It is the old story—the lack of a well thought out plan.

²⁵ *Statutes at Large*, XLI, 759; Wiener, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Statutes at Large*, XLVIII, 153; Wiener, *op. cit.*

THE FETISH OF MILITARY RANK

BY ALEXANDER SEVERUS

ARMIES are museums—and soldiers perhaps the most devoted of all curators, save priests. There is hardly any aspect of military life which does not display an amazing collection of carefully preserved antiquities. And if their original usefulness be forgotten, a profound veneration for the glories of the past manages to find plausible reasons for keeping them until their accumulated weight ultimately leads to collapse in war fought under altogether different conditions. Even then only the barest minimum of these precious heirlooms is jettisoned. Only recently, in an age which is fast catching up with Buck Rogers, have we succumbed to the daring idea of giving up the drill regulations of the Old Dessauer, dating from a period when the bayonet and the deadly quick-firing flintlock, shooting effectively as far as two hundred yards, had made infantry, for a time, truly "queen of battles." Only two hundred years afterward, mind you, we have recklessly ceased to preserve as an honored if useless relic the battle tactics of this earlier time (as modified by Upton). Truly ours is a headlong age! Compared to the organization of our military hierarchy, however, the flintlock drill regulations were a relatively recent innovation, for the origin of the military profession's system of grades dates back beyond the beginning of modern times.

There have always been soldiers, amateur or professional, but in the sense of a social institution there has not always been a military profession. Such a profession can be said to exist only when certain conditions are satisfied. First, there must be a considerable body of men who devote themselves to bearing arms as a regular and principal means of gaining a livelihood. Second, this body of men must not be identical with the whole military manpower of a particular people but must form a specially recruited element in a larger social order. Third, there must be some sort of contractual arrangements between this soldiery and an employer whereby it yields obedience in exchange for regular remuneration. Finally, it must be possessed in commonality of ideas and practices which have to be specially learned and which are recognized as providing special standards of military conduct.

The high Middle Ages did not know a general military profession, although there were some professional experts in specialized fields such as military engineering. The fighting nobility cannot be considered to have constituted a military profession for the two reasons (1) that its contractual obligation was for contingent and not regular service and (2) that realization of its income required devotion to the management of its estates as well as to bearing arms. The armed retainers which the greater nobles habitually maintained in their strongholds and the mercenaries which were occasionally engaged to fight in important campaigns did not form elements very distinct, or conscious of being

very distinct, from the rest of the feudal forces. Before a military profession could arise the fiscal resources of princes had to become equal to maintaining mercenary armies in the field over long periods of time, and there had to come long, hard wars requiring just that.

These conditions were fulfilled in the Hundred Years' War, which was also, for the English, an overseas struggle in which the feudal levy could not be very effectively employed. This war came to be fought mainly by mercenaries. Irregularity of employment led these to form "free companies" similar in many ways to the contemporary craft guilds and in some ways to the modern labor union. When not employed the free companies lived off the French countryside under officers chosen by themselves.

In general, the perpetuation of these free companies resulted in their developing definite professional institutions which crystallized after 1500, as mercenary armies became typical, into a professional military system. In particular, however, their perpetuation resulted in the rise of a class of professional officers under whom mercenaries were especially ready to take service and by whom, accordingly, mercenary troops could be most effectively raised. Captains and colonels soon became the lesser *entrepreneurs*, or petty capitalists, in a thriving industry, and the common higher grades developed by analogy between the field army as a whole, as formed for more or less transient strategical purposes, and the single company or "regiment" of companies, as constituting a particular military business-enterprise—the same set of titles being used with the addition of the word "general."

In other words, our system of rank and command was worked out originally to suit the needs of a time in which fighting was a business very much like any other. More than that, it was worked out to meet the need for business organization more than the need for tactical organization. As long as armies were so small and serried that battles and marches took place directly under the eye of the commander-in-chief, no very complicated tactical organization was necessary. The system was therefore peculiarly tied up in its origin with contracts, profits, and property rights, and the vestiges of this connection long remained abundant. One may recall that it was not until as late as 1871 that private sale of commissions as so much property was abolished in the British army.

When the tactical revolution of the eighteenth century brought the need of better tactical organization, the existing system of rank and command was adapted to the new requirements, but there was no inherent reason why these could not have been met in other ways. It is interesting to note that the French Revolution, with its ideas of war as a "socialistic" enterprise, tried to get rid of the old system and did succeed in modifying it somewhat, mostly verbally but also in emphasizing the idea of *emploi* as distinct from grade. Soviet Russia, in its time, has reacted similarly but much more drastically. Other countries, however, have kept the system pretty much intact and without ques-

tioning it. One is tempted to suspect, therefore, that this system spawned in military capitalism has retained a peculiar appeal for peoples impregnated with the psychology of capitalism. But the important question to raise is whether a system worked out two centuries before the Frederickian drill regulations, and modified only in moderate degree since, remains the best suited under conditions of war, and conditions of preparation for war, so radically changed as to belong almost to another world.

Even today a military grade retains earmarks of a property right. It cannot be taken away except by what amounts to "due process of law." It carries with it assurance of a certain income, as of right, and this income could be capitalized and discounted for sale, if sale were still allowed. It carries with it, also, a very important element of prestige, like a title of nobility, and this, too, could be capitalized for sale, just as European titles of nobility have been capitalized for sale to American heiresses through marriage. Again, it entitles one to certain prerogatives of power over others, and in this connection it may be pointed out that one of the principal motives for amassing wealth has always sprung from the fact that money is very, very effective in giving one this power over others. If one reflects that income, prestige, and power, and security in the possession of these, are the principal mundane ends of man's individual existence—that they have been the supreme ends for which modern "economic man" has struggled ceaselessly and often lustfully and ruthlessly with his fellows—one may legitimately wonder whether the present system of grades does not have so much of an appeal to individual selfishness as to conflict very seriously with the best interests of the nation.

In a time when national governments were still too poor to maintain large establishments of professional soldiers in time of peace as well as in time of war, the hiring of military labor in an open market according to momentary need was in their interest and inevitable. But since that time war has been reorganized on principles of collectivism. The production of organized bodies of fighting men has become a state monopoly and as such one to be administered for the highest good of the entire nation regardless of individual interests. In European nations the state regularly exercises a sort of "right of eminent domain" over the lives of its citizens in time of peace in order that they may be equipped with something like the same skills as a professional soldiery. In all nations the state maintains a *cadre* of officers trained by itself and committed to life-long service of the state. It has been thought best to secure good officers and their best services by a certain amount of bargaining, but this is in a sense gratuitous, for when a state trains its own officers there is no ultimate reason why it should not recruit its material by conscription as it has done in the case of common soldiers. The modern state is not condemned to bargaining, and in its sovereignty it has every right to eliminate the element of bargaining as much as it sees fit. If bargaining involves a distinct sacrifice of its interests in favor of a "racket" being worked by a particular profession, that bargaining is

therefore—as no longer necessary—not in its interest and ought to be eliminated. Hence, if the present system of grades is not in the interest of the state, if it is rather in the interest of the military profession to the serious detriment of the nation's interest, something ought to be done about it, for in war at least the good of the nation should be paramount without qualification.

That the system is truly in the best interest of the state is exceedingly difficult to believe. Certainly it is of vital interest that in war the state should be able to utilize its ablest officers in the positions for which they are best fitted regardless of rank. We admit as much when we almost invariably resort to promotion by merit in time of war. But under modern conditions proper preparation for war is of even greater importance, since the initial decision in the field—a decision which may be final—depends pre-eminently upon the nature of that preparation in both its material and intellectual aspects. The interest of the state therefore demands that here, too, the best brains and skills should be utilized in the most effective manner quite regardless of rank. But it is notorious that this is not normally the case, although some effort is made at selection within the straitening limits of the system of grades.

Four methods of determining to whom higher grades shall be given have found wide usage. These are election, selection by "merit," competitive examination, and seniority. The first three have been found doubly unsatisfactory. From the social point of view they are not reliably effective in sifting out ability. Upon this point I need not and cannot elaborate, for the defects of these methods have been telled time and time again, and it would take a long excursion to survey them. I wish rather to drive home the point that these methods have been found highly objectionable by the officers of armies because they put in jeopardy the capitalistic interests of those officers.

In time of peace army officers, being human, are rather sensitive about the manner in which the "spoils of peace" are distributed—about their chances of coming into the larger "property rights" conferred by investment with higher grades. And since patent absurdities and abuses inevitably arise in connection with all of the first three methods of determining advancement, and since imagination magnifies these evils, a cry of "Injustice!" is pretty certain to be raised. Such a plea is of course quite irrelevant, and its making is merely another indication of the concern of officers over their equities in the military system. The only proper criterion for judging a method of advancement is whether it is on the whole—regardless of slips and abuses—effecting its national purpose of sifting out ability to better effect than any other that may be proposed.

In countries where the spirit of institutions is extremely solicitous of private rights, even to the detriment of public duties, the cry of "Injustice!" is likely to get a very sympathetic hearing, particularly if there is any political capital to be made of it. It is likely to be granted that this "injustice" should be reduced to a minimum. And its elimination seems to require recourse to advance-

ment by the fourth method, that of seniority. Some compromise is therefore usually arrived at from which the mass of officers carries off the major share of advantage in securing at least the predominance of advancement by seniority.

To the extent that it is applied, the rule of seniority involves the abandonment of any effort to sift for ability at all. Of course there is some slight correlation between length of service and ability, but it has become no less patent that this is mainly in technical skills of an habitual nature and that otherwise there is usually a serious falling off in flexibility and fertility of mind with advancing years. One is therefore justified in saying that advancement by seniority has zero value for obtaining best ability at the top, that it is neuter, as neuter as would be advancement by lot.

One may conclude that our system of grades generates forces which tend remorselessly to stifle any effort at general selection for ability in time of peace. Yet it becomes clearer and clearer that the most rigorous sifting for ability in time of peace is now desperately necessary. War and preparation for war have reached a stage of complexity which, in comparison to earlier stages, is like integral calculus compared to arithmetic or plane geometry, and it becomes a greater and greater folly to neglect larger possibilities in selection in order to give aid and comfort to the selfish interests of a particular class in our society. From which it would follow that the logical thing to do would be to root out in its entirety this system of grades that rides armies as the Old Man of the Sea rode Sinbad the Sailor—with a scissors hold around the throat cutting off blood from the brain.

It is probably not necessary or, for other reasons, wholly desirable to go quite so far. It might be suggested, however, that the present array of grades be reduced to three: (1) captain, (2) colonel, and (3) general. Within each of these grades the accordance of rank according to seniority ought to be entirely abandoned, so that any officer could be assigned to any command or special duty appropriate to his grade quite regardless of his seniority. During the tenure of any command or the performance of any special duty, he should have an appropriate functional title, such as Division Commander, Company Commander, Divisional Chief of Staff, and Battalion Adjutant, and wear corresponding insignia in order that his assigned *function* may be immediately apparent. But such titles and insignia should not be allowed to attach to officers apart from the actual performance of a particular duty. Civilian life offers innumerable examples of such titles attaching to a position rather than to an individuality, for example: foreman, manager, superintendent, president, chairman, secretary, mayor, etc. Moreover, a practically complete vocabulary of such functional designations has already developed in the military service, as is indicated by the commonplaceness of the functional designations previously suggested by way of example. The scheme would therefore be in complete accord with what is already a natural and customary way of thinking. All that is necessary is to eliminate the confusing and rigid element introduced into this

thinking by the existence of a multiplicity of permanent grades that are, in their essence, indicative only of anachronistic property rights.

Such a scheme has been outlined in order to make clear that a system of numerous permanent grades is not inherently necessary to the military profession and that such a system is therefore definitely an anachronism perpetuated by a capitalistic psychology in that profession. This psychology is in turn largely perpetuated by perpetuation of the system of permanent grades, so that a vicious circle is left intact. This situation is inimical to the best interests of the nation, because it not only constitutes a hopeless impediment to the efficient exploitation of military brain-power but is the primary cause of a chronic mental constipation in the military profession which has been constantly remarked and which has had to be so frequently referred to that "military stupidity" has become an established term in the English language.

The orthodox member of the military profession will of course object that schemes for eliminating the traditional system of grades have been tried before in history and found egregiously wanting. It is true that such schemes have been tried, *viz.*, by revolutionary governments attempting to crack the incorrigible Bourbonism of the military—its insistence on learning nothing and forgetting nothing. But the capitalistic and even feudal instincts of the profession have always remained overwhelmingly hostile to the reform in the same way as the instincts of business men are hostile to taxation of excess profits. The military profession, being necessarily involved in making the reform work, has therefore always managed to see to it that it did not work.

Such a reform cannot be made to work if a military profession united in hostility to it is allowed free scope for its natural determination to sabotage the reform at all costs. It is necessary that at least a minority element in the profession should come to think about this matter clearly in terms of national interest rather than professional interest, and that a determined civil government should utilize this element to secure loyal and devoted application of the principles of the reform—if necessary by summarily eliminating on a wholesale scale those officers whose mental attitude toward the change is such as will lead them to vitiate the application of those principles by every subtle means in their power. European countries have had long experience of a conflict which is summed up in the phrase "*The Army vs. the Nation.*" Now that this country has entered upon a stage in its history where the national interests involved in the effective preparation and conduct of war are too vital to be left entirely to any one self-centered element, the nation must be prepared to deal with any selfish intransigence on the part of the professional soldiery and to pierce with pitiless insight the smoke screen of specious rationalizations with which such intransigence may be obscured. This nation can no longer afford the luxury of supporting a military system designed for the benefit of the military profession and, as so designed, yielding as its principal end-product a plentiful supply of "military stupidity."

FORT BRIDGER

A WESTERN COMMUNITY

BY JEROME THOMASES

FORT Bridger, in the opinion of Hiram Chittenden, stands as a landmark of the beginning of the era of emigration into the Far West; it was the first post built for the emigrant trade. Writing to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., on December 10, 1843, "Jim" Bridger, veteran frontiersman and trapper, stated:

I have established a small fort, with a blacksmith shop and a supply of iron in the road of the emigrants on Black Fork of Green River, which promises fairly. In coming out here they are generally well supplied with money, but by the time they get here they are in need of all kinds of supplies, horses, provisions, smith-work, etc. They bring ready cash from the states, and should I receive the goods ordered, will have considerable business in that way with them, and establish trade with the Indians in the neighborhood, who have a good number of beaver among them.¹

From the evidence available it appears likely that Bridger built his establishment in 1843. It was constructed of poles and daubed with mud, "a shabby concern," encompassing some twenty-five lodges of Indians,

or rather white trappers' lodges occupied by their Indian wives. They have a good supply of robes, dressed deer, elk and antelope skins, coats, pants, moccasins, and other Indian fixens, which they trade low for flour, pork, powder, lead, blankets, butcher-knives, spirits, hats, ready made clothes, coffee, sugar, &c . . . At this place the bottoms are wide, and covered with good grass. Cotton wood timber in plenty. The stream abounds with trout.

According to Orson Pratt, Fort Bridger consisted in 1847 of "two adjourning log houses, dirt roofs, and a small picket yard of logs set in the ground, and about eight feet high." In setting up his post Bridger had not calculated amiss: it was on the Oregon trail, and the westward emigrants followed the route from Green River to Fort Hall, by way of the Fort.²

¹ Hiram M. Chittenden, *The American Fur Trade of the Far West* (New York, 1935), I, ix; Bridger to Chouteau, in Grenville M. Dodge, *Biographical Sketch of James Bridger, Mountaineer, Trapper, and Guide* (Kansas City, n.d.).

² The letter of Bridger, cited above, indicates that the post was established in 1843; but Joseph Williams, *Narrative of a Tour from the State of Indiana to the Oregon Territory in the Years 1841-2* (New York, 1921), pp. 77-78, states that he reached Bridger's Fort in July 1842; C. G. Coutant, *The History of Wyoming, from the Earliest Known Discoveries* (Laramie, 1899), I, 350, also gives the date as the spring of 1842; A. J. Archambault testified in April 1878 that he was present in the spring of 1843 when Bridger located his post (52d Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Documents, no. 624 [ser. 2913]). See also Joel Palmer, *Journal of Travels Over the Rocky Mountains, 1845-1846* (in Reuben G. Thwaites, *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* . . . [Cleveland, 1904-07], XXX), pp. 74-75; J. Cecil Alter, *James Bridger, Trapper, Frontiersman, Scout and Guide: A Historical Narrative* (Salt Lake City, 1925), p. 195; and E. Douglas Branch, *Westward, the Romance of the American Frontier* (New York, 1936), p. 383. Captain Howard

But the success of Jim Bridger and his partner, Louis Vasquez, was halted by the ambitions of the recently-arrived Mormon emigrants. In 1853 the latter sent out a posse after Bridger, claiming that he sold powder and lead to the Indians. Bridger managed to disappear before the posse arrived, and the Mormons asserted that they then bought the Fort from Vasquez. In any event, by 1855 Lewis Robinson, a Mormon, held Fort Bridger. Robinson rebuilt the post, using boulder stone to construct a wall fourteen feet high, with pickets on top of the walls, and bastions on diagonal corners.³


In 1857 the Mormon authorities refused to accept the territorial officials appointed by the Federal government, and Brigham Young declined to surrender the governorship of Utah Territory. The War Department anticipated future difficulties, and dispatched Captain Stewart Van Vliet to Salt Lake City to interview Young and other Mormon leaders. On September 16, 1857, Van Vliet suggested to the Adjutant of the Army of Utah, at Fort Leavenworth, that Fort Bridger was the only suitable location for wintering troops and animals if an expedition should prove necessary.⁴ The Mormons refused to yield, and troops were sent out to enforce the authority of the United States—the so-called "Mormon War."

The Army of Utah, Colonel Albert Sydney Johnston in command, started from Fort Leavenworth for the Mormon territory in September 1857. Once through South Pass, the intense cold and the heavy snows became the chief obstacle to the force's advance, endangering its lines of communication and supply. On November 5 Colonel Johnston reported his intention of marching upon Fort Bridger the following day, to seize it and spend the winter there while awaiting the arrival of Colonel Philip St. George Cooke with the 2d U. S. Dragoons. Since the Mormons "have with premeditation placed themselves in rebellion against the Union," wrote Johnston, ". . . I have ordered that wherever they are met in arms that they be treated as enemies." Because of the snowstorms fifteen days were consumed in marching the thirty-five miles from

Stansbury of the Topographical Engineers and his party halted for five days at Fort Bridger in August 1849, making use of Bridger's blacksmith shop to repair their wagons (*Howard Stansbury, Exploration and Survey of the Great Salt Lake of Utah, including a Reconnaissance of a new Route through the Rocky Mountains* [Washington, 1853], p. 74). On November 16, 1844, *The Subterranean and The Working Man's Advocate* of New York reported that "Mr. Gilpin passed the trading fort of Bridger and Vasquez on the 19th of August The American trappers scattered among the mountains, had there collected to meet the emigrants, of last spring, an advance party of thirty of whom, with their wagons and cattle, passed on the 17th Two larger companies behind passed subsequently, and all in good time to reach the settlements before the setting of the winter." This party was en route to Oregon.

³ Alter, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-63; Coutant, *op. cit.*, p. 353. For an account of the early history of Fort Bridger and of its occupation by the Mormons, see Robert S. Ellison, *Fort Bridger, Wyoming: A Brief History* (Casper, 1931).

⁴ Van Vliet to Pleasonton, September 16, 1857, Adjutant General's Office, Document File, 153-A-1857, enclosure (in The National Archives, hereafter cited as A. G. O. Doc. File).



PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT OF BUILDINGS AT FORT BRIDGER, 1859

This "original plan of the post," including buildings planned as well as those already constructed, was enclosed in a letter from Major E. R. S. Canby, commanding at Fort Bridger, to Lt. Col. G. H. Crosman, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Department of Utah, June 17, 1850 from the files of the Office of the Quartermaster General in The National Archives.

the junction of Ham's and Black's forks of Green River to Fort Bridger. Its route from South Pass was marked by the frozen carcasses of hundreds of battery horses, mules, and oxen. Colonel Cooke, on his way to join Johnston, lost nearly half of his horses. Reaching Fort Bridger, Colonel Johnston found that the Mormons had burnt the buildings, as well as all available crops, leaving only the high stone wall standing, upon which he proceeded to construct two lunettes to make possible the defense of the Fort by a small force. The main body of the Army spent the winter at Camp Scott, two miles distant, while supplies were stored at the Fort. By April 1858 rations at the post were short, and meat was supplied from the few work oxen which had survived the severe winter.⁵

With the coming of spring the troops moved on Salt Lake City through the three canyons whose approach was commanded by Fort Bridger, but peace was arranged without further hostilities. The Fort was maintained as a supply dépôt, one of its chief functions thereafter. By Special Orders No. 41, Department of Utah, June 7, 1858, Bridger was established as an Army post, with Companies E and H, 6th U. S. Infantry, and Company K, 1st U. S. Cavalry, assigned as its garrison. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William Hoffman assumed command on June 10 and began work on the erection of new buildings, which were completed by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. S. Canby who relieved him on August 10. Adobe covered with plank and earth, later limestone and sand-stone obtainable in slate in the vicinity, were used as building materials.⁶

In December 1861 Captain Clarke, then commanding the post, was ordered to the East, leaving only an Ordnance Sergeant and a few privates to carry on. To meet this new situation, Judge William A. Carter, the post sutler, organized a volunteer company of mountaineers for the protection of the persons and property at the Fort from the hostile Shoshone Indians and from any possible attacks from the Mormons, who still claimed ownership of the land at Fort Bridger. About a year later the post was fully garrisoned and remained occupied until May 23, 1878, when the post was discontinued. But on June 28, 1880, the 4th U. S. Infantry, under Captain William H. Bisbee, was stationed at the post, apparently because of the removal of the Utes from Colorado to the Uintah Reservation in Utah. The post was garrisoned until its final abandon-

⁵ Johnston [to McDowell?], October 18, 1857, and November 7, 1857, A. G. O. Doc. File, 189-J-1857, encl. 15; Johnston to McDowell, November 30, 1857, and Cooke to Johnston, November 21, 1857, A. G. O. Doc. File, 204-J-1857; T. B. H. Stenhouse, *The Rocky Mountain Saints: A full and Complete History of the Mormons . . .* (New York, 1873), p. 370; *The Utah Expedition 1857-1858: Letters of Capt. Jesse A. Gove, 10th Inf., U. S. A., of Concord, N. H., to Mrs. Gove, and Special Correspondence of the New York Herald* (New Hampshire Historical Society Collections, XII), p. 220.

⁶ Fort Bridger Post Return, June 1858 (in The National Archives); Department of Utah Books, no. 7, pp. 156-57 (in The National Archives); Medical History of Posts, no. 21, pp. 3, 26 (in The National Archives); Johnston to McDowell, October 12, 1858 (35th Cong. 2d Sess., Senate Executive Documents, no. 1, pt. 2 [ser. 975]).

FORT BRIDGER ABOUT 1880.

The buildings in center are the older log barracks; those across the parade ground and to left behind the flag pole are the newer stone buildings; branch of Black's Fork in foreground. Photograph from the Signal Corps.



ment on September 20, 1890. As early as 1884 Lieutenant Colonel Edwin C. Mason had suggested that it was no longer of military value, was a burden due to the long and severe winters, and ought to be abandoned.⁷

Fort Bridger was fairly typical of the frontier post of no very great military consequence in itself, whose garrison led a rather humdrum, uneventful life, seeing but little action, yet constituting a link in the frontier chain of forts. Here was a station of America's military forces, playing its rôle in the great process of the western advance, protecting the emigrant, building roads, guarding the railroad, wet-nursing newborn towns. This was one aspect of frontier life. But here, too, was a western community with its own problems of social living which reflected its special character.

Fort Bridger was located on Black's Fork of Green River in a pleasant valley surrounded on every side by table lands; about fifty miles to the south lay the snowcapped Uintah Range of the Rockies. The post itself was cut in two by a branch of Black's Fork, which ran directly through the parade ground and at times menaced the post with inundation. While the stream afforded bathing facilities and an excellent water supply, it was believed by the post surgeon that the moist subsoil was related to the prevalence of malarial, neuralgic, and rheumatic diseases. Winters were of long duration, very severe, and brought numerous cases of frost-bite and frozen feet. Heavy snow drifts frequently isolated the post from all outside communication. "With almost no mails, no arrivals or dispatches—No cases of special interest in the Garrison," wrote the post surgeon in 1872, after one such period of isolation, "the month has passed in a most uneventful and monotonous manner." The extreme cold caused barracks to be constructed with an eye to the exclusion of fresh air, resulting in inadequate ventilation, encouragement to the transmission of disease, and "crowd poisoning." The late frosts ruined several attempts at cultivation of a post garden, and whatever fresh vegetables were obtained had to be brought from California. In view of the diet of the garrison, whose regular fare appears to have consisted chiefly of meat, potatoes, bread and coffee, it is surprising that scurvy existed only to an inconsiderable extent. Venereal diseases were not unusually prevalent.⁸

Indian troubles caused no very great excitement in the many years of the life of Fort Bridger—at least, they were never a major problem. The principal

⁷ Medical History of Posts, no. 21, p. 4; Fort Bridger General Orders, 1877-81, Fort Bridger Post Books, no. 40A (in The National Archives, hereafter cited as Post Books); Letters Sent, Post Books, no. 19, pp. 108, 109; Letters Sent, to The Adjutant General, September 20, 1890, Post Books, no. 24; inspection report of Masen, A. A. Inspector General, Department of the Platte, November 5 and 6, 1884, A. G. O. Doc. File, 1383-1880.

⁸ Medical History of Posts, no. 21, pp. 1, 6-8, 12, 209-10, 222, 220; no. 26, p. 75. Report of Surgeon Borden, enclosed in Annual Report of C. O., Fort Bridger, September 1, 1885, Fort Bridger Document File, 1882-85 (in The National Archives). Report of Assistant Surgeon Charles Smart, April 30, 1874, and Smart to Post Adjutant, December 26, 1873, Fort Bridger Document File, 1873-81; endorsement, December 15, 1874, Post Books, no. 30, p. 397.

tribes of the region were the Utes, Shoshones, and Bannocks. Howard Stansbury wrote in 1852:

From its position with regard to several powerful Indian tribes which inhabit this region, Fort Bridger offers many advantages for the establishment in its vicinity of a military post. It occupies the neutral ground between the Shoshonees and the Crows on the north; the Ogallalahs and Sioux on the east; the Cheyennes on the south-east; and the warlike tribe of the Utahs on the south. A competent force established at this point would have great influence in preventing the bloody collisions which frequently occur between these hostile tribes, and would afford protection and aid to the great tide of emigration which, for years to come, must continue to flow in one ceaseless current to Oregon and California.

Soon after the Fort's establishment as an Army post some small Indian disturbances involving the Utes occurred, but these were of a petty nature. On July 26, 1858, four horses were stolen by Ute Indians, who were pursued, but not halted, as the pursuers were outnumbered. On the previous day a military party cutting timber on Black's Fork was visited by a group of Utes "who behaved very impudently and helped themselves to the men's rations." Colonel Hoffman, then in command, desired to avoid any conflict with the Utes which might endanger the emigrant trains on their way west. He was evidently successful in his tactics for he reported that two Ute deputations had visited him, expressed a desire to maintain friendly relations, and promised to recover the stolen animals. In May 1859 the Bannock Indians raided the settlements on Green River, making off with some property. A force of one hundred cavalry troops was dispatched from Fort Hall, and the commanding officer of Fort Bridger was ordered to keep his troops in the vicinity of the post in order to control the local tribes. Emigrants and traders moving along the road to California and Oregon at times had their property stolen, and lives were lost in Indian attacks. An undated letter in the post files, probably written in 1860, mentions Indian thefts of property from traders, the writer adding, "I have communicated your advice to the traders here [to come to the post?] yet I fear they will disregard it as the[y] respect the dollar more than their personal security."

There is evidence of Indian raids on a minor scale in the ensuing years, but at no time does it appear that there were serious disturbances directly involving Fort Bridger. Nevertheless, in 1873, the post surgeon wrote, "The utility of the post at present consists in the healthful influence which it doubtless exercises over a tribe of Ute Indians who are regarded as treacherous and dishonest." Part of this "utility" included guarding the mail and stage lines against marauding Indians. The Shoshone Indians remained on friendly terms with the military and usually visited the post in the spring of each year, while the Utes, until 1868, bartered their deer and antelope skins with the post trader in exchange for beads and articles of subsistence.*

* Medical History of Posts, no. 21, pp. 53, 117; no. 24, p. 23. Hoffman to A. A. G., Department of Utah, July 29, 1858, A. G. O. Doc. File, 91-U-1858, encl. 1. Letters Sent,

Fort Bridger was an important station for the western mail lines and the much-traveled western roads. The Oregon trail reached the post through South Pass before cutting up along the Snake into Idaho. The Great Overland Stage road, coming through Bridgers Pass, led on to Salt Lake City from the Fort. In the spring of 1860 a station of the Central Overland California and Pike's Peak Express (the Pony Express line) was set up at the Fort, and the same company's daily Overland Stage line maintained a dépôt there after March 1861. In the fall of the same year the Fort Bridger telegraph office was opened. When Wells, Fargo, and Company took over the western transportation business in 1866, they established their sectional headquarters at the post, which remained there until the railroad took over in turn in May 1869. A large part of the military duties of the garrison was concerned with protection of the roads, the telegraph line, and the westward-crawling track of the Union Pacific and with the repair and building of roads.¹⁰

The advancing railroad brought a new era and its problems to Fort Bridger—intervention in strikes, preservation of peace between settlers and road gangs, and maintenance of order in the railroad camps. In 1868 the Union Pacific track was in the vicinity, and the troops were frequently called upon by the railroad authorities for aid. Detachments were sent out to remove whiskey shops from the camps and to keep the lawless elements there in subjection by means of moral support to the railroad superintendent, one L. Carmichael.¹¹

The neighboring townspeople and the railroad men did not always get on well together. On one occasion the good citizens of Bear River City, who suspected three members of the road gang of garroting and robbing citizens, formed a vigilance committee and took the three into custody. Upon hearing of this a mob of some three hundred gathered from the road camps at Chesebrought and McGee and descended upon Bear River City. In response to a call from the latter place, troops of the 36th U. S. Infantry, in command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry R. Mizner, left Fort Bridger. Mizner was urged by the townspeople to declare martial law and take possession of the town, but he refused to infringe upon the duties of the civil authorities. As he saw it, his "duty was to act in conjunction with and aid of the Civil organization; that if attacked and unable to protect themselves, I would open fire upon the assailants, but under no other circumstances, and that I could not be justified

to Canby, June 1, 1850, Department of Utah Books, no. 2. Letters Sent, to A. A. G., Department of Utah, August 15, 1858, Post Books, no. 7. Memorandum, May 13, 1867, Fort Bridger Document File, 1860-68. Letters Sent, to Lieut. Stewart, June 22, 1865, Post Books, no. 7A.

¹⁰ Letters Sent, to Assistant Inspector General, Department of the Platte, April 15, 1867, Post Books, no. 8; Alter, *op. cit.*, p. 327; Letters Sent, to Canby, September 15, 1858, Department of Utah Books, no. 1; Medical History of Posts, no. 21, p. 6; S. M. Mills to C. O., Fort Bridger, March 21, 1885, Fort Bridger Document Files, 1860-68.

¹¹ Capt. Knight to C. O., Fort Bridger, September 6, 1868, Fort Bridger Document File, 1860-68.

in taking the initiative or offensive upon the mere approach of a mob." But when the railroad mob attacked and burned the office of the unpopular *Frontier Index*, released several of its fellows from jail, and opened fire upon and killed nine citizens, Mizner intervened. The leaders of the mob were arrested and sent to Fort Bridger, while troops remained at the town until order was restored and the track had advanced four miles.¹²

In July 1868 a part of the railroad gang at Green River went out on strike, and a company of the 36th U. S. Infantry was sent out "for the Preservation of the peace at that point among the road employees." Captain John H. Knight, in command of Company A, was ordered "to prevent destruction of property by the strikers on the Rail Road. Men who are willing to work for the Company are to be permitted to [do] so without molestation or hindrance from those who are not" The strike appears to have ended without disturbance, and the military was withdrawn. The attitude displayed toward the civil authority, as explained by Brevet Colonel Henry A. Morrow, commanding Fort Bridger, is significant:

In accordance with what I understood to be the instructions of General Augur I have refused to give any orders for the interference of the Military force at Green River in the civil affairs of the town. Colonel Knight has orders to protect the property of the Rail Road and to prevent all interference on the part of strikers with the workmen on the track. Beyond this under my instructions I have not felt at liberty to go. As soon as it is understood that the Military will be used to enforce order in the town the Military Officer there will be called upon to use his command on all occasions and for almost all purposes. The sooner the citizens understand that they must organize a Municipal Government the better it will be for themselves as individuals and for their community.¹³

In this embryo stage of the region's development the military yielded first place to the civil authority in the normal run of affairs and encouraged responsible civil government.

Drunkenness and desertion were two major problems at Fort Bridger. The post surgeon remarked philosophically in his entry for April 1870, "As is the case every spring several desertions have taken place during the month, the men having no difficulty in obtaining employment in the mines & on the R. R." In March 1871 a reduction in the clothing allowance led to the desertion of ten or twelve men, although three of the deserters returned within twenty-four hours with cases of frost-bite. A rough estimate indicates that thirty-eight desertions occurred at Fort Bridger between February 9, 1872, and September 30, 1874.¹⁴

¹² Bvt. Lieut. Col. Henry R. Mizner to Post Adjutant, December 5, 1868, Fort Bridger Document File, 1860-68.

¹³ Letters Sent, to Capt. A. McArthur, July 7, 1868, to Capt. John H. Knight, July 14, 1868, to Major E. B. Russell, July 19, 1868, and to Bvt. Brig. Gen. George D. Ruggles, July 22, 1868, all in Post Books, no. 10.

¹⁴ For a discussion of the problem of desertion in the Army, see Col. Richard I. Dodge, "The Desertion Question," *The Journal of the Military Service Institution*, XI (January 1890), no. 1; *Medical History of Posts*, no. 21, pp. 165, 210; *Post Books*, no. 17.

There is no indication in the post records concerning the relation of the punishment meted out by courts-martial to the frequency of desertion, but punishment was often severe. For failing to proceed for duty with a timber party one private was sentenced

to be confined in charge of the guard for one week; to walk before the sentinel on number one, daily from Guard mounting until recall, and from fatigue call until recall in the afternoon, carrying a bag of sand, weighing twenty pounds—to be allowed to rest 2-minutes after each two hours walking—and to forfeit ten dollars (\$10.00) of his monthly pay, for one month.

A typical sentence for attempted desertion was handed down in 1859, the prisoner being ordered

To forfeit all pay, and allowances that are, or may, become due him, except the just dues of the laundress and sutler; to receive thirty (30) lashes on his bare back well laid on with a raw hide, to have the letter "D," one and one half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) inches long, indelibly marked on his right hip and be drummed out of the service.

For drunkenness while on duty a corporal was reduced to the rank of private, confined in the guard house for thirty days, made to stand on a barrel during guard mount and until the guard was relieved, and forced to carry a log weighing twenty-five pounds during fatigue.¹⁵

Drunkenness was quite common at the post, a direct relation existing between this phenomenon and the arrival of the paymaster. Our philosophical surgeon commented in September 1870, "Maj Alvord, Paymaster arrived this evening and on the 12th paid off the command—The usual amount of drunkenness and consequent increased number on Sick report resulted." When no disorder or drunkenness occurred after one pay day in 1872, the surgeon ascribed the situation to the deep snow's interference with the transportation of liquor. Drinking became so much of a problem that stringent regulations were issued to govern the sale of liquor at the post trader's saloon, which had previously been closed by orders. No more than three drinks were to be sold to an enlisted man in any one day and only one during each of three periods of the day.¹⁶

Merrill, a town built on the reservation, added to the drink problem. When the Bridger reservation was reduced in size in 1868, Merrill was erected in the vicinity of the post. But in 1870, after the former boundaries had been restored, the post commander attempted to have the town removed since it had been only a nuisance, and a prolific source of annoyance, consisting, as it did, of drinking saloons, gambling dens and houses of ill fame, the resort of desperadoes, thieves and prostitutes, whose principal business was to rob the soldiers and instigate them to theft desertions were frequent, the guard house was constantly filled with drunken soldiers; arms, ammunition, clothing and rations were continually being stolen either by these citizens or by soldiers for them, and occasionally mules and horses belonging to the government, were run off, and the officers of the Post openly and insolently defied.

¹⁵ Special Orders No. 147, December 4, 1858, Post Books, no. 7; Department of Utah Books, no. 8, p. 93; General Orders No. 46, September 20, 1870, Post Books, no. 39.

¹⁶ Medical History of Posts, no. 21, pp. 186, 253; Letters Sent, to Carter, November 27, 1873, Post Books, no. 17.

The town was removed from the reservation, and this was followed by improved discipline among the men and a decrease in drunkenness. The whiskey men were persistent, however, and two of them who continued to carry on the illicit traffic were seized while encamped below the post. Besides eight kegs of whiskey, it was found that they had in their possession a government mule, an Army wagon, and other Army property; they had even threatened officers who tried to break up their trade, and one officer was fired upon.¹⁷

William A. Carter was appointed post sutler in June 1858 and continued in that capacity until his death, after which his widow carried on in his stead. He impressed Colonel James F. Rusling as "a shrewd, intelligent man, with a fine library and the best eastern newspapers . . . [who] had seen a vast deal of life in many phases on both sides of the continent, and his hospitality was open-handed and generous even for a Virginian." Carter, it appears, arrived at Fort Bridger without too much in the way of worldly goods. By 1866 he was reported to be worth over \$200,000 and owned two stores in the vicinity. In these he transacted some \$150,000 of business in 1865 at about a 50 per cent profit. He built himself a large frame building within the post as a residence and a sizable billiard room and saloon "convenient to the garrison." A shrewd businessman, he succeeded in obtaining a lease from the Secretary of War which gave him exclusive control of all grass and tillable lands on the reservation, the sole governing condition in the provision being that all the hay and grain raised was to be available for purchase by the government. No limitation was fixed on prices, and Carter was reported to be charging the government current prices at Salt Lake City plus the cost of transportation from there to Fort Bridger. Colonel Rusling, inspecting for the Quartermaster's Department, stated his belief that Judge Carter's influence was at work in a project to rebuild the post, since he would be in an excellent position as far as bids were concerned. Besides his position as sutler, Carter served as Probate Judge, Postmaster, and Special Agent of the Post Office Department. He was obviously a man of no mean influence, and his position suggests the potentialities within the compass of the post trader.¹⁸

¹⁷ A. G. O. Doc. File, 1871-1471; Letters Sent, to A. A. G., Department of the Platte, May 8, 1871, Post Books, no. 15.

¹⁸ General Orders No. 4, June 22, 1868, Fort Bridger; Report of Inspection of the Depot at Fort Bridger, U. T., by Bvt. Brig. Gen. James F. Rusling, October 1866, in "Reports of Inspections by Brevet Brig. General James F. Rusling Inspector Q. M. D. Across the Plains to the Pacific Coast and in the Military Division of the Pacific 1866-7" (among records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, in The National Archives), I, 18-21, 28, 35-36; Medical History of Posts, no. 21, p. 17. It should be noted that the 1870 census returns for Fort Bridger list Carter as possessing but \$30,000 in personal estate, with no entry for property in real estate (Population Schedules of the Ninth Census, Washington and Wyoming, p. 533, in the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce). The population of Fort Bridger in 1870 consisted of 44 families, 194 white males, 37 white females, 3 colored males, 2 colored females, and 3 Indians. Sixty-six of these men and 14 of the women were foreign born. (*Ibid.*, pp. 531-34.)

A description of life at Fort Bridger should not fail to mention the post's school activities. It is not known over how long a period a school was maintained, but around 1885 classes for enlisted men and for children were conducted from early fall until the middle of June. The average attendance of enlisted men was about ten, but those who attended reportedly made considerable progress. The subjects taught were reading, spelling, writing, history, "grammer," and arithmetic. Enlisted men served as teachers under the superintendence of an officer. On occasion, unfortunately, the regularity of school work was interrupted by teacher's absence due to that worthy's over-imbibition. Schools for commissioned and non-commissioned officers were also conducted. "The non-commissioned officers are instructed in tactics, guard duty, etc. by their company commanders; they are also required to study and recite in Blunt's Small Arms Firing Regulations." The post boasted a library of four hundred and fifty volumes, four daily newspapers, six weeklies, and two monthlies. Among the periodicals and papers received regularly in the 1880's were the *Army and Navy Register*, *Harper's Illustrated*, *Puck*, the *New York Herald*, the *Salt Lake Tribune*, and the *San Francisco Examiner*.¹⁹

On the nature of religious and social activities there is no clear picture to be drawn from the post records. In July 1871 there was a "Service by the Rev Seymour, Meth. Preacher, stationed at Evanston Nearly all of the officers and Ladies were present, tho' but few enlisted men attended." At times, apparently, services were held with considerable regularity. Of the various forms of recreation at the Fort, baseball was popular, vying closely with trout fishing. On July 4, 1872, the post surgeon duly wrote, in Pepysian mood, "All labor suspended.—Company amused themselves with a match game of base ball. Considerable drunkenness in latter part of day."²⁰

¹⁹ Report of Chaplain Simpson to Post Adjutant, August 17, 1886 (?), enclosed in report of C. O., Fort Bridger, to A. G., Department of the Platte, September 1885, Fort Bridger Document File, 1882-85; Letters Sent, to Assistant Surgeon Crampton, January 2, 1886, Post Books, no. 23; Adjutant General's Office, Reservation File, pt. 1, p. 21 (in The National Archives); A. G. O. Doc. File, 1880-3/3864; Deputy Quartermaster General to C. O., Fort Bridger, July 7, 1887, Fort Bridger Document File, 1886-87.

²⁰ Medical History of Posts, no. 21, p. 273.



HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

Because of the inability of the INSTITUTE to renew on satisfactory terms its lease at 3112 Que Street, the headquarters has been moved to 3145 P Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., pending the establishment of permanent quarters. The Secretary and Managing Editor will appreciate it if correspondents will direct their mail to the new address.

The National Archives has recently transferred from the War Department the main bodies of records of the Office of The Quartermaster General through 1914 and of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance through 1935. From the Navy Department it has received the correspondence files of the Bureau of Navigation through 1924 and of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts through 1939.

The National Park Service has instituted a new series of attractive little pamphlets known as the *Popular Study Series*. Number 1, *Winter Encampments of the Revolution*, includes "Winter Encampments of the American Revolution," by Elbert Cox, and "A Soldier's Christmas at Morristown in 1779," by Russell Baker. Number 2, *Weapons and Equipment of Early American Soldiers*, includes "Equipment of the Soldier During the American Revolution," by Alfred F. Hopkins, and two anonymous articles, "Some American Military Swords" and "Sticks and Swords." Number 7 consists of "Hot Shot Furnaces," by Herbert E. Kahler, and number 8 is "Perry at Put in Bay: Echoes of the War of 1812," by Charles W. Porter. These pamphlets, which are reprinted from *The Regional Review*, can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents apiece.

The New-York Historical Society exhibited during July watercolor drawings of American and British uniforms of the American Revolution and the War of 1812 by Charles M. Lefferts, Harry A. Ogden, and Alexander R. Cattley.

Bibliography

The INSTITUTE has long realized the need for a critical guide to the study of warfare. MILITARY AFFAIRS has attempted to list the more important current publications in "The Military Library," and there are numerous other bibliographies on different phases of the field. There is, however, no single, comprehensive guide to the material as a whole. As announced in the Winter issue (IV, 240-41), the INSTITUTE has undertaken both a comprehensive bibli-

ography of warfare and, to meet a more immediate and constantly increasing need, a selective, annotated guide to military literature and its relative elements. It is now hoped that the latter can be published in the near future.

The list will be selective, but attention will be given to all elements of warfare. As a general rule only the titles of works in English and reasonably accessible through the larger American libraries will be cited. The field will be divided into sections in accordance with the classification now used by the INSTITUTE. Since this is the same arrangement used for books and articles listed in "The Military Library," the following explanation of the various sections may be of interest to readers. Where the section titles used by MILITARY AFFAIRS differ from those in the regular classification scheme, the adapted titles have been indicated in parentheses.

A. Military Historiography (Historiography)

This class embraces the history of the study of war, the institutions and individuals which have participated therein, its tools and techniques, and its significance to the soldier, the civilian, and the nation. This class will include all general bibliographies, indexes, and dictionaries. Broken down subjectively.

B. Institutional and Cultural Background of War (Institutions and Culture)

This class covers war as viewed through the eyes of existing academic fields of study—the effect of war upon institutions and culture and their effect, in turn, upon war. It ranges from the biological roots of conflict and its fundamental social and economic aspects to international arbitration and regulation of war and professional pacifism and militarism. There is no emphasis here upon the techniques or philosophy of winning wars; rather, it is upon the innate nature of war. Broken down subjectively according to recognized academic disciplines.

C. National Warfare (Total Warfare)

This class covers the methodology of warfare on the national level. The emphasis is upon techniques in general rather than upon the national defense of a particular country (for which class G is used). The works in this class are by no means exclusively military, but only those are listed which have a direct bearing on warfare. Broken down subjectively.

D. Land Warfare

This class embraces the history, philosophy, techniques, and technology of organized combat on land, or principally on land. It includes all phases of military art and science that apply to land forces, the emphasis being on techniques which might be common to all armies rather than the systems peculiar to a particular army. Broken down into four sub-classes:

a. Combat

Strategy and tactics; leadership, discipline, and military morale; staff func-

tions and intelligence; techniques of various arms and field services; logistics; *etc.*

b. Weapons

All forms of ordnance used by land forces, including ammunition; ballistical and chemical background; body armor; *etc.*

c. Technology

All of the more non-military phases of combat—military engineering, cartography, chemical warfare, communications, cryptography, the use of ground vehicles, railways, *etc.*

d. Economy

All phases of military regulation and housekeeping such as military and martial law, medicine and sanitation, supply and subsistence, organization, administration and accounts, garrison service and ceremonies, prison management, *etc.*

E. Sea Warfare

This class is devoted to the history, philosophy, techniques, and technology of organized combat at sea, or principally at sea, by naval forces. Arranged generally the same as class D except that vessels are included in subclass "b."

F. Air Warfare

This class is devoted to the history, philosophy, techniques, and technology of organized combat by means of military aviation, including anti-aircraft defense, bombing, transport of troops, *etc.* Arranged generally the same as class D except that aircraft are included in subclass "b."

G. National Forces (Establishments)

This class embraces the actual and potential martial, political, and economic forces of a state for the conduct of war, both tangible and intangible. Included are works on the history and present condition of military, naval, and air units, components, and posts; of agencies of command and administration; and of war establishments as a whole. The mental, moral, and physical background of the agencies is covered, as well as those personalities which have controlled or influenced them and the policies which have affected their operation. The emphasis is entirely upon the national defense and forces of a particular state rather than upon techniques of forces in general or the events and military operations of the wars in which the state was engaged. Broken down by national or political groups.

H. Military and Naval Operations (Operations and Biography)

This class comprises works treating in a generally chronological manner upon the execution of operations in the field, on the high seas, or in the air. The emphasis is on the battle, campaign, or war rather than on organizations or individuals. The operation of administrative planning, industrial, or similar "home front" agencies is included in class G. The operations in this class

are those conducted by combatants in the face of an enemy. Broken down chronologically by specific wars, campaigns, etc.

I. Customs and Antiquities

This class includes work on the by-products of warfare and military service. Above all it embraces military and naval artifacts not covered elsewhere such as costume, insignia, and heraldry. Here also are included works on customs of the service, army slang, battle paintings, humor and caricature, etc.

Correction

In Dr. Vagts' article in the Summer issue, "Battle-Scenes and Picture-Politics," the size of the panorama described at the bottom of page 92 should have been "nearly one hundred and fifty meters horizontally by fifteen meters vertically."

Contributors to This Issue

Dr. Lowell M. Pumphrey, who did his graduate work in economics at Princeton University, has more recently been with the Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office of Production Management. During the past winter he has been a member of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine's Seminar-Conference on the Total Science of War.

The reign of Alexander Severus, Roman Emperor from 222 to 235 A.D., was noted for its many reforms, including improvements in the military system. The army expressed its appreciation by assassinating him.

Mr. Jerome Thomases is Junior Archivist in the Division of War Department Archives, The National Archives, and is also a member of Dr. Irvine's Seminar-Conference.

Mr. M. Hamlin Cannon, a graduate student in history at American University, is preparing a volume on the Mormon War.

Lieutenant Allen Pennell Wescott of Chicago deals in military books and has specialized in arms and antiquities. He is the author of "Arms of the Russo-Turkish War," which appeared in *The Gun Report*, November and December 1939.

Miss Marie Charlotte Stark, Junior Archivist in the Division of War Department Archives, The National Archives, has been working with the records of the War Industries Board and the Council of National Defense almost exclusively for several months.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The United States and Japan's New Order, by William C. Johnstone. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. 393. \$3.00.)

Professor Johnstone gives us two things in his latest book. The first is a concise review of American rights and interests in China as affected by the war. The second is a readable narrative of American diplomacy towards Japan since the outbreak of hostilities in 1937. A concluding chapter gives the author's own proposals for "a Far Eastern policy for the United States in a world at war."

Few Americans have any clear grasp of the legal basis of the State Department's long series of protests to Japan. It is useful, therefore, to have described here in non-technical language the pattern of treaty rights built up over a century, all of them now seriously impaired by Japanese actions but still legally in effect. Successive chapters are devoted, first, to the special privileges of extra-territoriality, residence and trade, foreign settlements, protection of citizens and property, inland shipping, etc., extracted after 1844 from an unwilling but helpless China; and, second, to the rights derived from the obligations of the seven other states which agreed in the Nine-Power Treaty to respect China's independence and the principle of the Open Door.

However important may be the legal background and argument for purposes of diplomacy, one wonders how much it has to do with the real driving forces of American opposition to Japan. Certainly few Americans care much about preserving the anachronistic network of special privileges in China, which seems doomed whoever wins the war. Nor is China being included under the lend-lease program primarily because of the injury Japan is doing to existing business and missionary interests in the occupied areas. As Professor Johnstone shows, such matters bulk large in the record of diplomatic protest from 1937 to 1939 and are worthy of careful examination. The stiffening American attitude today, however, is a compound of traditional moral convictions and sympathies now reinforced by a growing alarm over the ultimate strategic, political, and economic threat of Japan's New Order in Greater East Asia as one facet of the world-wide Axis challenge.

The author traces the cautious evolution of American policy since 1937, finding in it a reflection of the lack of concerted public opinion. Failure to define the national interest of the United States he believes to be the explanation for the "amazing paradox of American Far Eastern policy"—the refusal to stop shipments of war materials to a country whose policy we were at the same time

condemning in clear and unequivocal terms. It took the necessities of the national defense program in 1940 to bring drastic export restriction, now at last beginning to show its effects in trade statistics.

In his concluding chapter Professor Johnstone voices his own proposals on Far Eastern policy in the immediate situation. Japan should be asked to agree to a settlement involving the gradual withdrawal of her troops south of the Great Wall, the reaffirmation of her pledge under the Nine-Power and Four-Power treaties, and cooperation with China in peaceful economic reconstruction. The United States in return should signify her willingness to cooperate in abolishing all foreign privileges in China, in reconstructing and rehabilitating both China and Japan, and in supporting trade expansion on a non-discriminatory basis throughout the Pacific area. If agreement should be reached on this basis, the United States should further make plain her intention to enforce observance with all the forces at her command.

If Japan should refuse to accept such terms of settlement, the United States should proceed with full economic measures against her. She should also move forthwith to tighten the lines of cooperation with China, the Pacific dominions of Britain, and India. The author is not prepared to guarantee that such measures alone would carry the day, nor that force should be used if they fail. He believes, however, that we face a choice of risks and that the Far Eastern situation is still sufficiently fluid so that a bold program in support of traditional American objectives might succeed. He does not dwell upon the military and naval aspects of the situation except to urge that the United States should maintain her present armed forces in China.

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD

American Committee for International Studies

Sea Power in the Machine Age, by Bernard Brodie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1941. Pp. 451. \$3.75.)

With sea power playing such a dominant rôle in the present conflict, Dr. Brodie could not have chosen a better time for the appearance of his scholarly volume. The author, a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, shows how technological revolutions in naval *materiel* have altered the tactics and strategy of sea warfare and discusses the consequent repercussions on world politics. What Baxter has done for one phase of the industrial revolution in sea power, the introduction of iron armor, Brodie does for the whole field, though, naturally, not on the same scale. The result is a sound, well documented, and stimulating book based on a vast amount of printed material and illustrative of the theme that sea warfare is an unending contest between the menace and the antidote.

The century after 1815 witnessed more far-reaching changes in the *materiel* of sea power than all the previous centuries combined. The first revolutionary

invention, the steam-driven warship, made the traditional British strategy of close blockade more difficult. In spite of this, the British benefitted by the innovation because steam power practically abolished the tactical influence of wind and thereby enhanced the superiority of a stronger fleet by making its movements less dependent on chance and by rendering contact between fleets more probable. The introduction of the iron-hulled warship, armor, and heavy ordnance also worked to the advantage of England, as she was rich in the new raw materials of naval power. The duel between offense and defense—guns and armor—had profoundly important consequences. For one thing, it made ships of war quickly obsolescent and so enabled infant naval powers like the United States and Germany to compete successfully. The development in armor protection led to the fourth great innovation, the introduction of various forms of underwater attack.

The last chapters—on the rôle of the submarine and aircraft since 1914—are among the most interesting and suggestive in the book. On the controversial air-power-vs.-sea-power problem Brodie soundly concludes that air power, as demonstrated so far in World War II, is a vital adjunct to, but not a replacement of, the surface navy. In general, the great naval inventions, excepting the submarine, have strengthened the ability of the superior fleet to dominate the naval theater of war. "With enhanced reconnaissance and mobility, it was able to bring superior force to bear at any threatened point with far greater dispatch than before. The fleet unwilling or unable to meet the enemy in battle was deterred from attempting to range the seas by the knowledge that it ran a much greater risk of being brought to action."

It seems to me that Dr. Brodie has underestimated the revolutionary political effects of the dreadnought. "Much of the course of diplomacy in the immediate pre-World War period is written in terms of the *Dreadnought*, which is supposed to have rendered pre-dreadnought types of little or no use—as though those types suffered a sudden extinction of firing power and mobility." True, the pre-dreadnoughts did not lose their whole value and did play an honorable part in World War I; but the dreadnought type certainly altered the equation of maritime power after 1905, for it was dreadnought strength which determined naval rivalries in the pre-1914 decade.

Nor does it seem to me that Dr. Brodie is fair to Jellicoe in presenting a one-sided account of the Admiral's tactics at Jutland, though such a presentation is fashionable nowadays. A useful corrective would have been Admiral Bacon's *Jellicoe*. All too often it is forgotten that in 1914-16 Jellicoe did not possess the knowledge that his successors had—for instance, that the torpedo menace had been exaggerated. The destruction of the three British battle cruisers at Jutland was not due to their thin armor. The ships were lost, according to the best evidence, by the charges in the gun-house becoming ignited through a bursting shell and the penetration of the flash to the magazine. It was the method of packing the charges which was at fault.

Finally, any discussion of the early development of the submarine which fails to mention the contributions of such pioneers as Admirals Bacon and Fisher runs the risk of being likened, say, to a history of the American Civil War which omits all reference to General Grant. However, these criticisms do not detract from the great value of the book. It will, I am certain, take its place as a standard work by the side of such classic studies of the steam and ironclad era as the writings of Baxter and the Sprouts.

ARTHUR J. MARDER

Bureau of International Research

Approach to Battle, by Major Leonard H. Nason. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 113. \$1.50.)

The Battle Shield of the Republic, by Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 212. \$1.50.)

Major Nason discusses the defense of the United States, dividing his subject into five general headings: "The Peril"; "The Problem"; "The Plan—If Any"; "The Return of Armor"; and "The Approach to Battle." The peril, seen by the author is an attack upon American soil and American ideas by Russia and Japan in the Pacific and by Germany and Italy in the Atlantic. Here the author is quite right in assuming the most unfortunate conditions that we might be called upon to meet; furthermore, the peril is immediate in that it might appear within the next five years.

At the time of attack our fleet will still be in the Pacific protecting our interests there and those of Great Britain. England, it is assumed, has not yet fallen. Our Atlantic front will have to be protected by land forces. He allows us an air force of ten thousand airplanes, but many of these will be near the Panama Canal, Alaska, and the Pacific islands. The historic lines of invasion by way of the mouth of the Mississippi and from Canada he eliminates and concludes that an invasion by Germany will be along our eastern seaboard from New York to Virginia, seven hundred sea miles. The transports and war vessels of the invader will make a series of feints to divide our forces and then land, two hundred and fifty thousand strong, forming a bridgehead. These troops will later be reinforced and their policy will be, not to occupy large sections of our country, but to ruthlessly destroy and force a peace. To defend against this invasion we will have only two National Guard divisions and one draft division not completely equipped, with possibly a small mobile regular division and the coast defense troops in batteries. Major Nason believes that we will be "brought to our knees." The book says that to properly protect our eastern front we should have one hundred divisions, and to protect all coasts we should have a hundred and fifty.

The hypothesis of the author may well be correct in assuming the absence of our fleet from the Atlantic and also in allowing us not more than ten thousand

airplanes, but in view of our increasing land troops under the draft, raised since the book was written, we should allow a larger land force to meet the invader. It is true that by 1942 our field forces will not yet have received their full allowance of equipment, particularly heavy artillery. However, the invader must overcome many obstacles. He must secure sufficient shipping, with protecting war vessels, to transport the invading army; he must arrive with an immense air superiority; and he must force his entrance into a harbor or harbors, as modern equipment of a large army cannot be landed upon a sandy beach.

In his discussion of our system of army maneuvers the author objects to holding them near a fixed base of supply as the troops have no training in supplying themselves at a distance from their base. It is very true that experience in supplying a force rapidly moving through the country, creating new bases as it progresses, would be excellent training; but could we maneuver in this manner, requiring as it would regular issues supplemented by living on the country? Could we do this in our own country?

The subjects of motorization and mechanization, motor trucks and tanks, are fully discussed. The reappearance of armor is seen in the appearance of combat cars and of light and heavy tanks. The battle-ship on wheels accompanies armies on land!

In discussing the education of officers the author finds fault with what he calls a system of teaching all officers staff duties. It is true that most officers go to Leavenworth, but this is not only a staff school but also a school for command. These same officers are sent also to the various schools of their particular arms where they learn the technique of their arms, very necessary to commanders. It is also true that a commander of troops must have some knowledge of staff functions, and it is very difficult to draw a rigid line between staff and command duties.

Major Wheeler-Nicholson, in *The Battle Shield of the Republic*, discusses a wide variety of military problems. Many of them are as old as armies, and different countries have solved them in various ways, sometimes changing their solutions from time to time. Some of the subjects presented are "The War Department," "Promotion by Competition," "Our Army in 1917-1918," "Efficiency Records," and "Combat Troops."

He lays the greatest stress upon what he describes as our lack of a system of promotion by merit, and he would abolish promotion by seniority. All promotion should be, he believes, based upon "battle efficiency." The reviewer agrees that, if we could devise a workable system by which we could ascertain the battle efficiency of all officers in time of peace, such a system should be immediately adopted. How can we compare the battle efficiency of officers in Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Panama with those who are in the United States serving with troops and probably attending maneuvers, or either of these with other officers, especially those at colleges and other duties away

from troops, given duties not directly applicable to battle? We have at this writing a system based upon both selection and seniority.

The volume, unfortunately, is marred by a great deal of incorrect criticism of our Army in France in 1917-1918. The author gives as a fact that our staff "adopted without question the methods and dogmas of the Allied leaders, accepting hook, line and sinker" the tactics found in France. General Pershing brings out with much emphasis in his book how he found Allied tactics degenerated into a defensive trench system and how he took immediate steps to assign our own instructors and to emphasize the war of maneuver which he knew was sure to come. The author also depreciates all of our operations in France, the American effort, and goes so far as to bemoan the fact that we did not put American brigades and divisions under Allied command with trained Allied staffs to coordinate their effort. He is critical of the War Department because division camps were not of tents, though it is a well known fact that this was fully investigated at the time and that sufficient tentage could not have been made within the necessary period to shelter even the National Guard divisions; it has also been shown that lumber construction was much cheaper.

Major Nason's *Approach to Battle*, which discusses many of our military problems and gives the author's solutions, can be read with profit. Major Wheeler-Nicholson's book is interestingly written but contains much that has not been thought through. A critical attitude in writing is necessary in discussing important subjects, but the writer should beware of destroying his better judgment.

JOHN W. WRIGHT
Army War College

The Army of the Future, by General Charles de Gaulle. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1941. Pp. 179. \$2.00.)

Alas, this translation of De Gaulle's admirable *Vers l'Armée de Métier* is slipshod. Literate and lively, it suggests a good translator unwisely hurried by the publisher, but as it stands it is full of errors. For instance, a "moteur cuirassé" is emphatically not an "armored car" (p. 100), for the latter is a fighting vehicle moving on wheels without caterpillar treads, whereas the context shows that the author is concerned with the tactical mobility of tanks fitted with caterpillars. On page 112, "Constantinople" has been meaninglessly substituted for the North African town "Constantine." On page 142, "caterpillar wheels" is not good English; it should be "caterpillar treads" or simply "caterpillars." Napoleon's "groggnards" were not "old sweats" (p. 164); they were "grumblers," Brittanisé "grousers," in American vernacular "kickers" or "crabbers." A "maillot" is not merely a "bathing costume" (p. 178); it is a particular kind of woman's bathing suit, to wit a skin-tight one-piece garment without a vestige of skirt, a suit of the sort known to the reviewer's youth as

an "Annette Kellerman." On page 100 the translator has ". . . the stabilization of fronts by picked troops, which warped the last war . . . , will be avoided"—as if the picked troops had produced the '14-'18 stabilization—while the French text ("on évitera aux troupes d'élite la stabilisation des fronts") means the exact opposite. It says that, thanks to mechanization, future picked troops will be spared the stupid and murderous stabilization of the low grade masses of '14-'18.

Nevertheless, the book's many merits transcend these errors. Even without the tragic interest of the fall of France and of its author's name, both its admirable form and its forceful matter would give it high rank. Beginning with a brief but masterly survey of the French military problem of 1934, it goes on to argue in favor of supplementing the French conscript army with six highly mechanized divisions powerfully supported from the air. The initial survey emphasizes the peculiar geographical weakness of the northeastern French frontier between Switzerland and the North Sea, an area less defended by nature than that covering the vital areas of any other great power, and notes how near to that perpetually menaced frontier are the political and economic centers of the country.

In retrospect the note of tragedy is deepened when we find that the author, today the incarnation of French independence, cordially agrees both with Marshal Petain and with practically all clear sighted Frenchmen in despising the whole political system of the parliamentary Third Republic. As befits a soldier on the active list, he restrains his epithets somewhat, but still he goes pretty far. He calls the miserable regime which has misgoverned France since 1870 "absurd" (p. 36), "unreal" (p. 42), "full of dissensions" and a "paralysis" (p. 178). These are strong words. On pages 114-15 he writes, ". . . Except in moments of madness when they are paving the way for their own downfall, nations, as a matter of principle, cultivate the military spirit, as they do that of the family, of labor, and of thrift." One recalls the unhappy Petain's modest but solid motto: "Labor, family, country." However divided today from the aged Marshal, De Gaulle at least agrees with him in subordinating the resounding assertion of rights to the still small voice of duties.

The arguments from French geographical and political weakness are reenforced by a wealth of political and technical reasoning. In the year '34, already so distant, Paris was still seeking alternately to tow and be towed by the empty egg-shell of the League of Nations at Geneva. The author shows that professional troops who need no motive other than discipline and military honor to make them fight would be the only possible components of an international or League of Nations army. On the other hand, even if internationalism should disappear, regulars would still be the only soldiers appropriate for the policing and defense of a far flung overseas empire like the French. Further, universal military service was already becoming more and more unpopular in France. Nor is this surprising; today no country can show the exaltation and crusading spirit

of twenty-odd years ago. The lowering of military enthusiasm is notable even in such a combative people as our own.

The climax of the book is the necessary connection between powerful, complex modern weapons and high training of the men who are to handle them. The point is indisputable. Even a people as rich and as mechanically minded as our own could neither afford hundreds of thousands of planes and tanks nor fail to see the absurdity of putting such expensive machines in half-trained hands. European nations, poorer than ourselves, less accustomed to machinery, and exposed to sudden attack, are even harder pressed by necessity. Today the lurid light of subsequent events makes argument superfluous; the reader will note for himself the justice of De Gaulle's foresight. Despite the defects of the translation, the book deserves a wide audience. Rereading it has made the writer rejoice to think that its author's career is not over.

HOFFMAN NICKERSON

Oyster Bay, New York

West Point in the Confederacy, by Ellsworth Eliot, Jr. (New York: G. A. Baker & Co., Inc. 1941. Pp. 491. \$3.50.)

Here is a book that ought to have been two books, each the product of more of the patient labor of research which produces good works in any fertile field. Its title is a bit misleading; the bulk of the piece is devoted to an examination of Jefferson Davis' relations with certain of his generals, rather than the record of West Pointers in the Confederacy. Obviously these are two provocative subjects; they are worthy of the best effort of historians. Honest reviewing compels the recognition that they have not had it in this book. Numerous factual errors, inadequate documentation, exploration which fails to go far enough, and careless proof-reading, all combine with a somewhat difficult style to make the reader feel that the author owed him and the book more painstaking application to the job. It is especially regrettable in light of the importance of the two broad subjects treated.

These comments are patently fitting to the portion of the work which presents the service records of the West Point graduates who served in the Confederate Forces. They are extremely sketchy—much more so than necessary. They are inaccurate, and vague. Where dates of promotion might be presented, we find statements that in certain battles certain ranks were held—and some of these incorrect. Even battles are interconfused. In one instance, the sole entry is the following: "The only note of his war record states that he was a Brigadier General in Kershaw's Division and surrendered at Appomattox." Only note where? Were the 128 volumes of the *Official Records* and numerous other sources thoroughly searched? The answer is, No; this officer evidently is confused with another of the same surname who, by the way, never reached Appomattox. A prominent officer is stated to have been killed in the Battle of Spot-

sylvania Court House on May 10, 1864, when it is known that he was the first general officer killed in the Battle of the Wilderness on May 5, 1864. Such errors, in subjects familiar to the reviewer, inevitably lead to suspicion with regard to the others generally. Post-war careers are not searched out with diligence. Altogether too much is left to be done. The records of the more prominent figures are omitted, thus leaving the reader to consult the *Dictionary of American Biography*. The world of scholarship could profit by a neat job of outlining the records of West Point men who wore the Confederate grey. Also, such a handbook should include not only the graduates, but the undergraduates who resigned to go with the Confederacy. Without Pelham and his *confreres* it won't do.

A reviewer has a thankless task when he cannot say more pleasant things than these. Nevertheless, military historical scholarship owes it to itself to set high standards and to recognize frankly the failure to achieve them. Until the same professional technique is applied as is practiced in the more academic aspects of historiography, this important field of learning had better remain neglected, and mankind still so much the loser. Lest it seem squeamish to quibble so, consider the effect of historians who write a century hence, accepting inaccurate treatments published now—error begets error, and truth is defeated by its own servants. Be it repeated, readers are entitled definitely to certain things, among them being citation of authority for an author's statements and convincing evidence that the author has devoted to his subject a plenteous portion of that love for drudgery of research which is the *sine qua non* of sound and profitable historical writing. Now may there be two books suggested by *West Point in the Confederacy*. They are needed.

BRANCH SPALDING

*Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania
National Military Park*

Yellow Wolf: His Own Story, by Lucullus Virgil McWhorter. (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 324. \$3.50.)

A few writers, before Chief Joseph fell dead on a September day of 1904, gained from that famed leader partial glimpses of the Nez Perce War of 1877. Four years later, L. V. McWhorter formed a friendship with Joseph's cousin and warrior, Heinmot Hihhih, this war name meaning "White Thunder" or "White Lightning"; popularly, Hemene Moxmox, "Yellow Wolf." Between 1908 and 1935, when he died in his eightieth year, Yellow Wolf unfolded the story which McWhorter has painstakingly documented and presented in unshorn virility.

Yellow Wolf never achieved the greatness that was Joseph's, either in war or in peace. Yet the lesser-known cousin, undaunted warrior that he was, realized acutely the need of giving to the world the richest Indian version of

the campaign. For Yellow Wolf was the last great Nez Perce fighter-scout. Stark truth is unrestrained. And smashing blows are dealt long-standing assumptions.

Astutely, McWhorter gives elaborative stress to the first part, "The War and the Warrior." Summarily, in introducing each chapter, the author guides the reader over breaks of the narration; appendices at chapter endings bolster the narrative. Some of the abundant footnotes seem superfluous, yet citation of Congressional Documents might be more specific. The second part, "The Fugitive" is anticlimax, relating vividly Yellow Wolf's flight to Canada and his voluntary return to the Nez Perce Indian Agency. Sincere as Yellow Wolf may be in baring his grievances, however, it is hard for the reader to reconcile calamity meted some white persons with the narrator's statement (p. 274) that the start of the trouble could be blamed on "only General Howard and the Indian Agent." Some misspellings are "Bandire" for Bendire (p. 181), "Hayt" for Hoyt (pp. 289, 313), "C. W." for W. C. Brown (p. 315).

Diaries and other papers coming to light make for revision of accounts of the Nez Perce War. It is fortunate for Americana that McWhorter, long a friend and counselor of the Nez Perces, gave ear to Yellow Wolf. Like Frank Bird Linderman, biographer for Plenty Coups of the Crows, McWhorter speaks forthrightly for a warrior whose experiences are no longer familiar to red men who follow a new order.

Appendices, bibliography, glossary, index, forty-seven photographs, and campaign maps round out a work produced in highly tasteful format.

GEORGE F. BRIMLOW

Chattanooga, Tennessee

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

War and Society, edited by Rufus B. von Kleinsmid, Charles E. Martin, and others. (Los Angeles: Institute of World Affairs, 1941.) Proceedings of the eighteenth session of the Institute of World Affairs.

Government in Wartime Europe, edited by Harold Zink and Taylor Cole. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941. \$2.00.) A study of the changes in the principle European governments from September 1939 to May 1941.

TOTAL WARFARE

Smash Hitler's International, by Edmond Taylor, Edgar Snow, and Eliot Janeway. (New York: The Greystone Press, 1941. Pp. 96. \$1.00.) A discussion of total attack.

Arsenal of Democracy: How Industry Builds Our Defense, by Burnham Finney. (New York: Whittlesey House, 1941. Pp. 284. \$2.50.) Analysis of the problems involved in a defense program.

Defense Planning and Labor Policy. (Washington: National Planning Association, 1941. Pp. 24. 25c.)

Military Psychology, edited by Carroll C. Pratt. (Evanston: The American Psychological Association, 1941. \$1.00.) Critical articles and selected bibliographies prepared for the Emergency Committee in Psychology of the National Research Council.

German Psychological Warfare, edited by Ladislas Farago and Lewis Frederick Gettler. (New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941. Pp. 144. \$3.50.) A critical, an-

notated, comprehensive survey and bibliography of German literature on this subject, 1846-1941.

AIR WARFARE

So You're Going to Fly! by James L. H. Peck. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1941. \$1.50.) An account of aviation training and of developments in other aspects of modern aerial warfare.

ESTABLISHMENTS

The Armed Forces of the Pacific: The Military and Naval Power of the United States and Japan, by Captain W. D. Puleston. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 273. \$2.75.)

British Empire

The R. A. F. in Action. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1941. \$2.00.) A photographic record of its activities during the first year of the war.

First Blood for the R. A. F., by Charles Gardner. (Philadelphia: David McKay Company. 1941. \$2.50.)

Canada Fights, edited by J. W. Dafoe. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1941. Pp. 280. \$2.00.)

United States

America's Economic Strength, by C. J. Hitch. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. \$1.00.) A non-technical account of the development and organization of the American economy with reference to its bearing on the war.

Industry Goes to War, edited by Cecil E. Fraser and Stanley F. Teele. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1941. \$1.50.) Readings on American industrial re-armament.

America Rears: The Citizen's Guide to National Defense, by William T. Stone. (New York: Foreign Policy Association. 1941. Pp. 64. 25c.) An excellent study of our defense agencies and policies.

United We Stand! Defense of the Western Hemisphere, by Hanson W. Baldwin. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1941. Pp. 364. \$3.00.)

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties, by Samuel White Patterson. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 466. \$4.25.)

The Admirable Trumpeter: A Biography of General James Wilkinson, by Thomas Robson Hay and M. R. Werner. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 383. \$3.00.)

A Pathfinder in the Southwest: The Itinerary of Lieutenant A. W. Whipple, edited by Grant Foreman. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1941. \$3.00.) A Topographical Engineer officer's journal of his explorations for a railway route from Fort Smith to the Pacific, 1853-1854.

Captain Paul, by Commander Edward Ellsberg. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1941. Pp. 609. \$2.75.) A novelized biography of John Paul Jones.

David Glasgow Farragut: Admiral in the Making, by Charles Lee Lewis. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. 1941. Pp. 372. \$3.75.)

Zapata the Unconquerable, by Edgcumb Pinchon. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1941. Pp. 332. \$3.00.) The biography of a Mexican revolutionary hero.

World War I

We Dive at Dawn, by Kenneth Edwards. (Chicago: Reilly & Lee. 1941. \$3.00.) An account of the exploits of British submarines during and after the first World War.

World War II

Battle for the World, by Max Warner. (New York: Modern Age Books. 1941. \$3.00.) The strategy and diplomacy of the second World War.

My First War, by Sir Basil Bartlett. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1941. \$1.25.) An army officer's journal from May 1940 to the retreat of Dunkerque.

The Nine Days Wonder, by John Masefield. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. Pp. 76. \$1.25.) An account of the evacuation of Dunkerque.

War in the Desert: The Battle for Africa, by Raoul Aglion. (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1941. \$2.75.) The African campaign in the present war, with a background of the military history of this region.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

Military and Naval Recognition Book, by J. W. Bunkley. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1941. \$2.50.) A handbook on the insignia of the world's armed forces and the etiquette and customs of the American services.

Insignia of the Services, by Paul Brown. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. \$1.50.)

Ranks & Medal Ribbons of the Fighting Forces. (London: Daily Mirror, 1941. Pp. 31. 25¢.)

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

"Pacifism and Democracy," by Julien Benda, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 693-701). Contends that pacifism is dangerous to democracy.

"After Four Years," by Owen Lattimore, in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1941 (XIV, 141-53). An analysis of the nature of the conflict that has beset the world since the opening of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

"Psychological Causes of War," by Ross Stagner, in *Psychological Bulletin*, June 1941 (XXXVIII, 484-88).

"German Military Psychology," by H. L. Ansbacher, in *Psychological Bulletin*, June 1941 (XXXVIII, 370-92). With an extensive bibliography.

"War and the Family," by James H. S. Bossard, in *American Sociological Review*, June 1941 (VI, 330-44).

TOTAL WARFARE

"Planning for Victory," by George Fielding Eliot, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 702-14). The need of planning for wartime efficiency.

"Military Lessons of the War," by Hanson Baldwin, in *The Yale Review*, Summer 1941 (XXX, 649-68). Analysis of the new methods of modern warfare.

"Legislature and Executive in Wartime," by Lindsay Rogers, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 715-26).

"A Multiplier Analysis of Armament Expenditure," by Robert V. Rosa, in *The American Economic Review*, June 1941 (XXXI, 249-65). Analysis of the adaptation of financial policy to the progressive stages of employment under the present program of increasing armament expenditures.

"Wartime Problems of English Agriculture," by I. D. Blair, in *Agricultural History*, January 1941 (XV, 12-19). How the British government is meeting the wartime problem.

"The Wartime Use of Shipping," by William Diebold, Jr., in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 751-63).

"Oil and the War," by Louis E. Frechling, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 1, 1941 (XVII, 70-80).

"Replacements: Life-blood of a Fighting Army," by Major General Fox Conner, in *Infantry Journal*, May 1941 (pp. 2-9). Modern aspects of an important but rarely treated theme.

"The Man-Power Problem," by G. D. H. Cole, in *The Political Quarterly*, April-June 1941 (XII, 154-66). A statement of the problem in wartime Britain and its solution.

"Control of the Conquered," by Erich Hula, in *Social Research*, May 1941 (VIII, 136-55). An analysis of the economic and sociologic aspects of German control in the occupied states.

"Control of the Baltimore Press during the Civil War," by Sidney T. Matthews, in *The Maryland History Magazine*, June 1941 (XXXVI, 150-70).

LAND WARFARE

"Climate and Warfare," in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 133-38). Analysis of the problem of preparing troops to fight in foreign climates.

"The Classification of Military Personnel," by Thomas W. Harrell, in *Psychological Bulletin*, June 1941 (XXXVIII, 331-53). A comparison of German and American methods.

"Invasion of England—A Preview," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, July 1941 (XXXI, 442-50). A discussion of an article by Tomas de Martin Barbadillo which appeared in the April issue of the Spanish publication *Ejercito*.

"House Organ of War," by Tom Mahoney, in *Esquire*, August 1941 (pp. 19 ff.). A brief account of the history and significance of *Militär-Wochenblatt*.

"The Mechanized AGO," by Lieutenant Henry C. Wendler, in *Coast Artillery Journal*, May-June 1941 (LXXXIV, 216-19). A brief account of the record system of the modern army.

"Present Day Camouflage," by Lieutenant Colonel Homer Saint-Gaudens, in *The Reserve Officer*, May 1941 (pp. 10-13).

"Barrier Tactics," by Major L. E. Seeman, in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1941 (XXXIII, 182-88).

"Modern Military Obstacle Technique," by Major W. E. Potter, in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1941 (XXXIII, 189-93).

Combat

"Organized Intelligence: The Problem of the French General Staff," by Stefan Th. Possony, in *Social Research*, May 1941 (VIII, 213-37). A careful analysis of the French military collapse in terms of intelligence and planning.

"Moltke and Conrad: The Problems of Military Leadership," in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 95-98). Analysis of the recent work by Dr. K. Leppa entitled *Moltke und Conrad*.

"Selection and Education of an Officer," by Lieutenant Colonel Graham Seton Hutchison, in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 66-74).

"What a German Soldier Thinks About," by Lars Moen, in *Infantry Journal*, May 1941 (pp. 36-44). A sidelight on German military morale.

"Morale: First Line of Defense," by Edward L. Bernays, in *Infantry Journal*, May 1941 (pp. 32-35).

"Counterbreakthrough: Parts I and II," by Major H. W. Ehrgott, in *Infantry Journal*, July and August 1941 (pp. 4-13, 26-33). A discussion of German tactical developments and the means of countering them.

"Stopping the Armored Onslaught," by Major A. C. Wedemeyer, in *Infantry Journal*, May 1941 (pp. 22-31). An able study of the techniques of anti-tank work.

"A Panzer Division Crosses the Meuse (The Little Picture)," by Captain Paul W. Thompson, in *Infantry Journal*, May 1941 (pp. 45-47).

"An Historical Example: A Successful Defense Against an Air-Borne Invasion," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, July 1941 (XXXI, 451-57). An account of action near Valkenburg, Holland, based on the accounts of two Dutch officers which appeared in recent issues of *Militaire Spectator*.

"Twentieth-Century Irregulars," by Lieutenant A. Stuart Daley, in *Infantry Journal*, June 1941 (pp. 37-42). A review of modern guerrilla organizations.

Weapons

"War Rockets of the Past," by Willy Ley, in *Coast Artillery Journal*, May-June 1941 (LXXXIV, 226-33).

"Weapons of German and British Infantry Battalions," by Captain Carl T. Schmidt, in *Infantry Journal*, July 1941 (pp. 30-33).

"Wartime Production: The British 75 Millimeter Gun," by Major General William J. Snow, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, June 1941 (XXXI, 379-87).

"Gun Procurement: The French 75 Millimeter Gun (The 'Soixante Quinze')," by Major General William J. Snow, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, May 1941 (XXXI, 299-304).

SEA WARFARE

"Two Elements in Sea War," by H. C. Ferraby, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1941 (CXXX, 32-35). Emphasizes the important tactical rôle of the air arm.
 "The Fighting Ship: A Portfolio," by E. J. Matthews, in *Fortune*, June 1941 (XXIII, 76-81).

AIR WARFARE

"Lessons from Crete," by F. A. de V. Robertson, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1941 (CXXX, 36-41). Contends that a superior air force alone is not sufficient.
 "Air Raids and Protective Construction," by Sherwood B. Smith, in *The Military Engineer*, July-August 1941 (XXXIII, 287-93).
 "Blackouts," by Major Charles W. Stewart, Jr., in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1941 (XXXIII, 177-81). Techniques and possibilities.

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British Empire

"The R. A. F. in the First Half of the Second Year of War," by Air-Commodore P. F. M. Fellowes, in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 57-65).
 "The Ministry of Supply," by Donald Tyerman, in *The Political Quarterly*, April-June 1941 (XII, 167-78). Analysis of the wartime function of this British agency.
 "The B. B. C. in Wartime," by Albert John, in *The Political Quarterly*, April-June 1941 (XII, 190-201). Effects of the war on the British broadcasting system.

China

"China's National Front: Problems and Policies," by T. A. Bisson, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 15, 1941 (XVII, 105-24).
 "Three and a Half Years of Progress in War-time Administration," by Dr. H. H. Kung, in *China Quarterly*, Supplementary Winter Number, 1940 (V, 765-72). An account of civil administration in wartime China by the Chinese Minister of Finance.
 "Eighth Route Regions in North China," by Anna Louis Strong, in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1941 (XIV, 154-65). An account of the effort of the Eighth Route Army to resist the Japanese advance in North China.
 "Chinese Women and the War," by Eva Dyke Spicer, in *China Quarterly*, Supplementary Winter Number, 1940 (V, 799-823).

Germany

"Money, Production, and Time: The Three Vital Elements," by Dr. Fritz Sternberg, in *Infantry Journal*, May and June 1941 (pp. 10-16, 30-36). An outline of Germany's activities in wartime industry.
 "The German War Economy in the Light of Economic Periodicals," by H. W. Singer, in *The Economic Journal*, April 1941 (LI, 19-35). An account based on research in German economic periodicals.
 "The Food Problem in the German War Economy," by Frederick Strauss, in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 1941 (LV, 364-412). Contends that German domestic production, imports, and reserves do not meet the wartime food requirements in a protracted war.
 "Hitler's Scientists," by Frederic Sondern, Jr., in *Current History & Forum*, June 1941 (LIII, 10-12). An outline of the function and activities of the Geopolitical Institute at Munich under Major General Dr. Karl Haushoffer.
 "The Secret German Weapon," by Captain T. L. Crystal, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, June 1941 (XXXI, 399-402). Remarks by a German officer on his army's organization, training, and method of thinking.

Japan

"The Military and the Government in Japan," by Chitoshi Yanaga, in *The American Political-Science Review*, June 1941 (XXXV, 528-39). Analysis of the development of the military influence in governmental policy-making.
 "Japan's New Order in the Pacific," by William Magistretti, in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1941 (XIV, 198-206). An analysis of Japanese strategy.

"America's Strategy against Japan," by Rear-Admiral Gumpel Sekine, translated by A. J. Grajdanzev, in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1941 (XIV, 215-221). An account by a Japanese naval officer which appeared in the Japanese magazine *Totairiki* for March 1941.

United States

"Where Are We Now?" by Frank C. Hanighen, in *Harpers Magazine*, August 1941 (CLXXXII, 283-93). Analysis of the American defense program after a year.

"Total War for the U. S.," in *Fortune*, August 1941 (XXIV, 42 ff.). The entire issue devoted to the transformation of the United States to a wartime basis, with emphasis on the civilian aspects.

"Army and Super-Army," in *Infantry Journal*, August 1941 (pp. 2-15). An answer to the demands for super-mechanization.

"U. S. Naval Strategy," by Fletcher Pratt, in *Fortune*, June 1941 (XXIII, 72-74 ff.).

"Policies and Problems of the U. S. Navy," by David H. Popper, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 1, 1941 (XVII, 38-48).

"Defense Economy of the United States Transportation and Power," by John C. de Wilde, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 1, 1941 (XVII, 94-104).

"Washington and the Whiskey Insurrection," by Bennett M. Rich, in *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, July 1941 (LXV, 334-52). A critical discussion of one of the earliest cases of the use of troops in quelling a civil disorder in the United States.

"A Soldier-Archivist and His Records: Major General Fred C. Ainsworth," by Siert F. Riepma, in *The American Archivist*, July 1941 (IV, 178-87).

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"The Southwest Territory to the Aid of the Northwest Territory, 1791," by Samuel C. Williams, in *Indiana Magazine of History*, June 1941 (XXXVII, 152-57). An account of the contribution of the militia of the Southwest Territory to the defense of the Northwest Territory.

"New Orleans under General Butler," in *The Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, April 1941 (XXIV, 434-536).

"Colonel James B. Many, Commandant at Fort Gibson, Fort Towson and Fort Smith," by Carolyn Thomas Foreman, in *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*, June 1941 (XIX, 119-28). A biographical sketch of a frontier military officer.

World War I

"General Wetzel's Plan for 1914," in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 75-80). An outline of a plan of attack on the eastern front as devised by General Ludendorff's strategist.

"The Warsaw Campaign, October, 1914," by Brigadier General J. E. Edmonds, in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 17-26). Contends that this campaign does not deserve the praise that military men have given it.

World War II

"Economic Aspects of the Sino-Japanese War," by D. K. Lieu, in *China Quarterly*, Supplementary Winter Number, 1940 (V, 791-98). A comparison of the economic positions of the two belligerents.

"Warfare in the Atlantic," by Admiral William V. Pratt, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 729-36).

"The War at Sea: December, 1940-February, 1941," in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1941 (XLII, 38-50).

"The Defeat of the French Air Force," by Pierre Cot, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941 (XIX, 790-805). Argues that the defeat of France was due more to the German armored divisions than to her aerial divisions.

"The Fall of Belgium: Parts I and II," by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, June and July 1941 (XXXI, 346-57, 472-84).

"Profile of Mediterranean Strategy," by Lawrence Fernsworth, in *The Virginia Quarterly*, Summer 1941 (XVII, 389-404).

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE UTAH EXPEDITION

The decision to send Federal forces against the Mormons in 1857 is another example of the lack of confidence and cooperation existing between Winfield Scott as Commanding General of the Army, John B. Floyd as Secretary of War, and James Buchanan as President. In his *Memoirs* Scott stated that he had advised against the Utah expedition:

The expedition set on foot by Mr. Secretary Floyd, in 1857, against the Mormons and Indians about Salt Lake was, beyond a doubt, to give occasion for large contracts and expenditures, that is, to open a wide field for frauds and peculation. This purpose was not comprehended nor scarcely suspected in, perhaps, a year; but, observing the desperate characters who frequented the Secretary, some of whom had desks near him, suspicion was at length excited. Scott protested against the expedition on the general ground of inexpediency, and specially because the season was too late for the troops to reach their destination in comfort or even in safety. . . .¹

Buchanan's denial of any knowledge of such a protest has led historians to assume that Scott was as responsible as Floyd and Buchanan for sending a poorly equipped force to the Rocky Mountains to endure great privation and semi-starvation:

. . . Mr. Buchanan was no little surprised to discover that General Scott, in his autobiography, . . . asserts that he had protested against the Utah expedition. . . . The President had, as a matter of course, left the military details of the movement to the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army. . . . Most certainly Mr. Buchanan, until he read the autobiography, never learned that General Scott had protested against the expedition.²

Actually, both Scott and Buchanan may very well have been correct in their statements. Certainly Scott made the protest, for the original document, in his own handwriting, is still on file among the records of the War Department; but there is no endorsement or other indication that it was ever submitted to the President. Did Floyd deliberately withhold Scott's memorandum from the

¹ *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D., Written by Himself* (New York, 1864), II, 604.

² *Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion* (New York, 1866), pp. 238-39.

³ Secretary of War, Document File, 1857-C-180^{1/2} (National Archives). There is also a copy of the letter in Headquarters of the Army, Letters Sent, vol. 7, pp. 67-70 (National Archives).

Chief Executive? If so, both Scott and Buchanan should be exonerated of blame for the ill-fated expedition. In any case, Scott's written protest, published below, vindicates him.

M. HAMLIN CANNON

Garrison for Salt Lake City.

It is proposed to send a military force to that city sufficient to enforce obedience to the civil magistracy of the Territory or to the laws of the United States.

The population of Utah valley is entirely Mormon, or fanatics—that is, religiously hostile to the morals, the authority & laws of the United States.

As these have been steadily resisted, so, it is thought, will be resisted any inadequate military force that may be sent to coerce obedience.

The population to be coerced may be assumed to be about 40,000 souls.

This estimate would give quite 8,000 males (between 16 & 65) capable of bearing arms. We will, however, take the number at the low figure of 7,000, without including Indian allies.⁵

The military organization & discipline of the Mormons may be set down as indifferent;⁶ but we must remember that *religious* fanaticism has often proved itself to be an over-match for military discipline.

No division of interest or sentiment is known to exist among the Mormons in respect to obedience to their church or to the laws of the U. States. They are understood to be, *to a man*, on the side of the former, & the two are utterly repugnant & antagonistic.

The only hope of schism rests on the women. They may create a party, among the American men, in favor of Christianity, law & order.⁷

But for this hope it would not be safe to propose a garrison for the Mormon Capital, of less than 4,000 troops—; but the President may, it is thought, risk a regiment of horse, two regiments of Infantry, and a company of Artillery, with a field battery—making rather less than 2,500 effective men.⁸

This force it would be necessary to keep well *massed* both in approaching and after arriving at the Capital—the occupation of which alone would necessarily control the entire Territory.

No detachments from that mass should be risked, except when indispensable for gathering in necessities of life, and with a smaller garrison no detachment could be made strong enough to operate at a distance of only a few miles; for the garrison might possibly be obliged to consider itself as besieged for six or twelve months after its arrival.

It is certain that if the occupation be attempted with an inadequate force, & consequently, be cut off or destroyed, the U. States, after suffering the deep mortification, would be obliged to employ double the force that would, originally, have been necessary. This disgrace ought not to be risked by too great a parsimony in the means first employed."

⁵ It was actively believed in the States that the Mormons had alliances with the chief Indian tribes of the country. So far as is known, the people in Utah were friendly to, but not allied with, but one tribe, the Piutes of the southern part of the Territory.

⁶ The Mormons had over five hundred men who had formed the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican War. In addition, the Constitution of Desert, adopted in 1850, made every male a member of the militia, though not a member of an army in the military sense. The Nauvoo Legion, the Territorial force, was reasonably well organized.

⁷ Much later the Federal Government built a huge sanctuary for plural wives, but only two made application for admittance.

⁸ This was the number eventually sent out.

⁹ A year and a half later Floyd acknowledged the validity of Scott's judgment by writing: "When a small force was first sent to Utah, the Mormons attacked and destroyed their trains, and made ready for a general attack upon the columns. When a sufficient power was put on foot to put success beyond all doubt, their bluster and

But can we get together the minimum force (estimated above) & march it to Utah this season?

Remember also, that the little army must arrive out in time to establish itself in an entrenched camp (of huts or tents) before the setting in of the heavy frosts and snows of that region.¹⁰

Wood for huts, & even for fuel, is distant from Salt Lake City and the sun is too feeble to bake adobes (sun-dried bricks) after the month of October.

As grazing cannot be relied upon after an early day in November, that fact alone fixes the time for arriving out, & as the distance (say) from Fort Leavenworth cannot be less than 1150 miles, we must allow some 90 days for the march. This shows that the movement, from Leavenworth, ought not to be delayed beyond the middle of July.

Can we bring the required force to that point of departure in time this season? It is feared not.

Six companies of the 2^d Dragoons (Cen' Harney's regiment) are now in reserve at Fort Leavenworth (under Lieutenant Colonel Cooke) awaiting the call of Governor Walker.¹¹ The other 4 companies of this regiment are divided between Forts Randall & Kearney with less than half their complement in men & horses. These 4 companies cannot be brought into line with the six, on the route to Utah, & the whole regiment filled up with effective recruits and horses before, probably, the middle of September.

The first Cavalry (Colonel Sumner's regiment) is out of position—being (six companies under the Colonel) in march against the Cheyennes, & their allies, & the other four, with Lt Col. Johnson, moving along the southern boundary of Kansas. This regiment, therefore, cannot be disposable for any new service the present season.

The 10th Infantry, now on the Upper Mississippi & the Minnesota, may be replaced in part (at Fort Ridgely) by 4 companies of the 2^d Infantry, & the 10th be brought, after the delay of waiting to be relieved, to Leavenworth, by the middle of July; but cannot march alone, nor, with only Capt. Phelps' company of Artillery (already at that fort) upon the Salt Lake Valley.

There are, however, nine companies of the 2^d Artillery stationed—two at Boston, two at N. York, two on the Upper Lakes, one at Baltimore & three at Fort Monroe—besides about seven companies of the other three artillery regiments not immediately employed against Indians; but all these companies, if full, would not be sufficient with the 10th Infantry, & Capt. Phelps' company to make up the Salt Lake expedition—besides the extreme injury to the administration & discipline of troops to intermix the companies of different regiments.

It may further be observed that, until the late Indian marauders upon the Minnesota border settlements shall be punished, to give up the pursuit of them would, probably,

bravado sank into whispers of terror and submission" (*Report of the Secretary of War, December 6, 1858, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Executive Documents, no 1, pt. 2 [ser. 975]*, p. 6).

¹⁰"The commander, Brevet Brigadier General A. S. Johnson, . . . infused into his command a spirit of serenity and contentment which amounted to cheerfulness, amidst uncommon hardships and privations which were unabated throughout the tedious and inclement season of the winter. The destruction of our trains by the Mormons, the disasters which necessarily flowed from it, drove General Johnston to the necessity of sending a detachment of men to New Mexico for supplies essential to preserve the whole command from the greatest extremity, and to enable him to prosecute his march with all practicable despatch" (*ibid.*, p. 7).

¹¹In a letter to Robert J. Walker on July 12, 1857, Buchanan wrote: "General Harney has been selected to command the expedition to Utah, but we must continue to leave him with you, at least until you are out of the woods. Kansas is vastly more important at the present moment than Utah" (*The Cowode Investigation, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., House Reports, no. 648 [ser. 1071]*, p. 123). If affairs in Utah were not of such great importance, why were troops sent there when the season was so far advanced?

cause an early repetition of the same outrages. Hence, General Shields, a most excellent judge in such cases, urges that a squadron of horse should be placed in pursuit, in addition to the present Infantry companies employed in that direction.

For the foregoing reasons—the insufficiency of available troops and the want of time—the conclusion seems to be forced upon us that we cannot make an orderly or safe movement upon the Utah valley, before the beginning of the summer of 1858.

All which is respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.

Winfield Scott.

Head Quarters of the Army,
May 26, 1857.

"FOR MILITARY MERIT"

In an Exeter, New Hampshire, museum hangs a worn and faded uniform of dark blue homespun, the property of the Society of the Cincinnati. Who the soldier was who wore this uniform during the Revolution is unknown, but we know that he possessed such virtues as valor, fidelity, and fortitude because on the left breast, over the heart, is a badge of purple sprigged silk, faded to steel gray, edged in tarnished silver. It is the only known specimen of a decoration designed by George Washington and designated by him as the Badge of Military Merit—America's first military decoration, the second oldest in the world (the Cross of St. George of Russia was established in 1769) and unique in that it was obtainable only by non-commissioned officers and privates.

On August 7, 1782, at Newburgh, General Washington caused the following general order to be issued:

The General ever desirous to cherish virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as to foster and encourage every species of Military merit, directs that whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings over the left breast, the figure of a heart in purple cloth, or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. Not only instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary fidelity and essential service in any way shall meet with a due reward. Before this favour can be conferred on any man, the particular fact, or facts, upon which it is to be grounded must be set forth to the Commander in chief accompanied with certificates from the Commanding officers of the regiment and brigade to which the Candidate for reward belonged, or other uncontested proofs, and upon granting it, the name and regiment of the person with the action so certified are to be enrolled in the book of merit which will be kept at the orderly office. Men who have merited this last distinction to be suffered to pass all guards and sentinels which officers are permitted to do.

The road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus open to all. This order is also to have retrospect to the earliest stages of the war, and to be considered as a permanent one.¹

Evidence that the Badge of Military Merit carried with it certain privileges is signified by an order issued at Verplanks Point, August 31, 1782, to the effect that "No Noncommissioned Officer or soldier except those having the

¹John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799* (Washington, 1931-38), XXIV, 488.



THE PURPLE HEART

*Left, the original Badge of Military Merit, courtesy of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.
Right, the present Purple Heart.*

badge of Military merit is to go off the Island or peninsula on which we now are encamped without a pass in writing from the Commanding officer of the regiment to which he belongs. If any should be found off it contrary to this order they are to be deemed Deserters and tried accordingly . . . ”²

The book of merit unfortunately having been lost, few records of Revolutionary soldiers so decorated survive, but in a general order dated April 27, 1783, we find this entry:

The Board appointed to take into consideration the claims of the Candidates for the Badge of merit. Report. That Serjeant Churchill of the 2d regt. of Light Dragoons and Serjeant Brown of the late 5th Connecticut regt. are in their opinion severally entitled to the badge of Military merit and do therefore recommend them to His Excellency the Commander in chief as suitable characters for that honorary distinction.

The Commander in cheif is pleased to order the before named Serjt. Elijah Churchill of the 2d. regt. of Light Dragoons and Serjt. Brown of the late 5th Connecticut regiment to be each of them invested with the badge of merit. They will call at Head Quarters on the third of May, when the necessary Certificates and Badges will be ready for them.³

Sergeant William Brown⁴ was awarded the Badge of Military Merit because “in the assault of the enemy’s left redoubt at Yorktown, in Virginia, on the evening of October 14, 1781 [he] conducted a forlorn hope with great bravery,

²*Ibid.*, XXV, 97.

³*Ibid.*, XXVI, 363-64.

⁴This may have been Daniel Brown.

propriety and deliberate firmness and that his general character appears unexceptionable."⁵

The citation of Sergeant Churchill of the 2d Continental Dragoons, also a Connecticut regiment, describes his service as follows:

That Serjeant Elijah Churchill of the 2d Regiment of Light Dragoons, in the several Enterprizes against Fort St. George and Fort Slongo on Long Island, in their opinion acted a very conspicuous and singularly meritorious part; that at the Head of each Body of Attack, he not only acquitted himself with great gallantry, firmness and address; but that the Surprise in one instance, and the success of the attack in the other, proceeded in a considerable degree from his Conduct and management. . . .⁶

Sergeant Daniel Bissel of the 2d Connecticut Regiment of the Continental Line also received this honor badge. He enlisted from Windsor, Connecticut, but "deserted" in August 1781. Nearly two years later the Badge of Military Merit was conferred upon this "deserter" who, it seems, had been entrusted by Washington to spy upon the enemy within their own lines. Bissel had proceeded to New York and enlisted in a British regiment. More successful than Captain Hale, Bissel escaped from the British and returned to Washington's army after an absence of thirteen months with a wealth of valuable information gathered while on his hazardous mission. He was cited in general orders of June 8, 1783:

Serjeant Bissel of the 2d Connecticut regt. having performed some important services, within the immediate knowledge of the Commander in chief, in which the fidelity, perseverance, and good sense of the said serjeant Bissel were conspicuously manifested; it is therefore ordered that he be honored with the badge of merit; he will call at Head Quarters on Tuesday next for the insignia and certificate to which he is hereby entitled.⁷

After the Revolution the Order of Military Merit, or of the Purple Heart as it came to be called, fell into disuse and eventually vanished from public sight. For years it had been practically unknown except to a few historians until in recent years interest in the decoration was aroused by the publication of articles calling attention to its existence.⁸ For some time a number of individuals sought to have the order revived and perpetuated, among these being Carleton S. Gifford of Boston, Stephen H. P. Pell of New York, and Lynde Sullivan of the Society of the Cincinnati. The bicentennial anniversary of the birth of George Washington was selected as the most appropriate time for the reinstitution of the order, and on February 22, 1932, the Purple Heart was officially revived out of respect to his memory and military achievements.⁹

⁶ John C. Fitzpatrick, *The Spirit of the Revolution: New Light from Some of the Original Sources of American History* (Boston, 1924), p. 202. This volume, pp. 190-204, also describes the exploits which won the order for Churchill and Bissel.

⁷ *Writing of George Washington*, XXVI, 373.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XXVI, 481.

⁹ For instance, *The Badge of Military Merit of the Continental Army*, published by the Society of the Cincinnati of the State of New Hampshire in 1925.

⁹ General Orders No. 3, War Department, February 22, 1932.

The Purple Heart is awarded for acts or services performed prior to February 22, 1932, by persons who, as members of the Army, had received a Meritorious Service Citation Certificate from General Pershing or who were wounded in an action against an armed enemy of the United States. The present decoration is a heart-shaped medal of bronze, with a center of purple upon which is superimposed a bust of Washington and above which appears the Washington family coat-of-arms. Upon the reverse appear the words "For Military Merit." The medal is suspended from a purple ribbon edged in white.

ALLEN PENNELL WESCOTT

INDUSTRIAL SERVICE BADGES

The question of providing badges for industrial employees engaged in work necessary for the prosecution of the first World War was brought to the attention of war agencies by various industrial concerns who wished to increase morale by some form of recognition for vital service in the war effort. According to the records of the War Industries Board, now in The National Archives, first official recognition of these requests from industry was made by the Navy Department.

The Bureau of Construction and Repair, in referring the suggestions to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, cited a letter of the Provost Marshal General dated August 20, 1917, in which it was stated that steps had been taken to provide a bronze button to be delivered to all registrants under the Registration and Draft Act, but recommended that the matter could most properly be handled by the Council of National Defense since such a badge would have to be uniform for the Navy and War Departments and the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This recommendation was in turn addressed to Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, the Navy Department representative on the War Industries Board, by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt on November 8, 1917.

The proposal evidently began to gain momentum, for eventually there were created both a United States War Industries Badge Board headed by Hugh Frayne, Chief of the Labor Division of the War Industries Board, and an Industrial Insignia Service in the Department of Labor.

In the meantime, however, industry began to issue its own insignia for war workers. An article in the New York *Evening World* of May 23, 1918, states that the idea originated with Lieutenant Cohle, stationed at Hartford, Connecticut. The design, executed by the Gorham Company, incorporated the American eagle in combination with a workman, tools of his trade in hand, and carried the name of the concern issuing the medal. Certain firms had individual designs prepared. These badges and buttons became popular and were adopted in the plants, among others, of the Marlin-Rockwell Corporation and the Winchester Repeating Arms Company of New Haven, Connecticut; the Colt



BADGES ISSUED BY MANUFACTURERS
From the New York Evening World, May 23, 1918.

Patent Firearms Company, Meriden, Connecticut; the William J. Oliver Company, Knoxville, Tennessee; and the Pennsylvania Trojan Powder Company, Allentown, Pennsylvania.

While the matter languished in the hands of the War Industries Board, the Department of Labor's Industrial Insignia Service adopted regulations covering the issuance of War Industries Badges, the fourth and presumably last draft of which was dated August 24, 1918. The plan attempted to avoid the mistakes which contributed to the failure of the British War Service Badge. In the British plan, the employer distributed the badge and the purchase of badges was permitted. The War Industries Badge was to be dispensed by the Government upon evidence submitted by a committee of workers' representatives and was to be irreplaceable.

The plan for distribution was as follows. The employer was to apply for badges, not for his employees but for his plant. Such application would signify that the employer was conforming to the National War Labor Program, that the plant was engaged in essential work, and that workers therein might earn the War Industries Badge. A committee of delegates, one from each shop or department in the plant and one representing the employer, was to administer

the distribution of badges. Each badge was to be numbered and the title to it retained by the Government until the war's end, when it was to be awarded to the wearer together with an honor certificate resembling a military discharge and reciting special services. Upon leaving employment the badge had to be surrendered to the committee, but if new essential employment was taken up within a reasonable interval the committee in the new plant was to obtain the badge from the former committee. Should the badge be lost, the Government was not to have replaced it, the wearer's only course being to earn another badge.

The *Official Bulletin* of August 13, 1918, published a statement authorized by the Department of Labor to the effect that the first batch of medals was to be in readiness by September 1. The medal, designed by Jo Davidson, was to have been disk-shaped, slightly larger than a quarter, and attached to a red, white, and blue enamel bar $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches long. Four consecutive months of service in war production was to entitle the worker to a bronze badge; a silver one was to have been earned by eight months of continuous service.

The scheme was never put into effect, however. The Minutes of the War Industries Board for October 22, 1918, indicate that the President disapproved of badges for war workers. On October 31, when Mr. Frayne again called the attention of the Board to the numerous requests for the badge, Chairman Baruch replied that if Frayne would take the matter up with the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chairman of the Shipping Board, and the Fuel Administration, he would bring this to the attention of the President at a meeting to be held at the White House on November 6. There is no record of further action on the measure.

MARIE CHARLOTTE STARK

FRONTIERS OF DEFENSE¹

By HAROLD SPROUT

NATIONAL security is not exclusively a military concept. A country's frontiers of defense are economic and psychological as well as military. Today the enemy may be encountered anywhere along the industrial front, far behind the military lines of defense. Armament alone cannot safeguard a people against sabotage and other disruptive penetration by a hostile fifth column. These psychological and industrial frontiers are vital sectors in any grand strategy of total defense.

But much depends, nevertheless, on a country's military frontiers—and I use that term in its broad sense, which includes sea and air as well as land. For the United States, the safety of our people, the protection of our industrial economy, possibly even our survival as an independent nation, may depend on where we establish our military frontiers, on where we choose to make a stand in this world of tottering institutions and crumbling power relations. Our military frontiers are not fixed and immutable. They can be moved; they have been moved repeatedly in the past, in response to changing conditions and pressures both at home and abroad.

At one period in the early years of our republic, the prevailing view of national defense included little more than primitive coastal fortifications, a small force of untrained militia, and a few improvised gunboats to stop an enemy at the water's edge. Eventually that impractical scheme of passive defense gave way to the broader concept of commanding the American seas to a considerable distance from the coast line. In 1917 our military frontiers were temporarily extended deep into Europe and into eastern Asia, but we subsequently withdrew from those far advanced positions. American opinion recoiled from the responsibilities of world power. American statecraft reverted to earlier patterns of national defense. But recent events overseas have driven us, however reluctantly, and with much confusion of thought, to reexamine our whole strategy of national security.

Any realistic appraisal of this problem, as it confronts us today, must begin with the unalterable facts of political geography. First and foremost is the fact of our incomparable geographical position. The United States occupies the heart of a vast continental island. This country, alone of all the countries in our Western Hemisphere, possesses the essential elements upon which to build a great military power. As a result, we have never had, and do not have today, any dangerous military rivals anywhere in the two Americas.

¹This article was presented in substantially the same form before the Faculty-Alumni Forum, held by Princeton and Vanderbilt Universities at Nashville, Tennessee, October 23, 1941.

Wide oceans separate us from Europe and Asia. These bodies of water are not in themselves insuperable barriers that will automatically protect us from oversea enemies equipped with modern engines of war. Science and technology have made huge strides toward the conquest of time and space. But it is still axiomatic that sea frontiers can be, and are, defended more securely, with less outlay and effort, than land frontiers. A country thus removed from other centers of military power and ambition enjoys a measure of security and a freedom of action and choice denied to less favored countries with powerful and dangerous neighbors and vulnerable land frontiers.

It has been one of the historic principles of American statecraft to exploit this advantage of continental insularity. More than a hundred years ago a somewhat similar crisis, though far less serious than the one we face today, called forth the famous declaration of policy which we know as the Monroe Doctrine. The essence of that declaration was that any extension of European military power or political influence in the Americas would be viewed as inimical to the security of the United States. The oceans, it was reasoned, constituted protective barriers only so long as potential oversea enemies lacked military bases, or "bridgeheads," in this hemisphere from which to launch an assault on the United States.

The concept of hemisphere defense, implicit in the Monroe Doctrine from the outset, went considerably beyond our immediate defensive needs in that remote era of "horse and buggy" warfare. It also happened that Great Britain, as well as the United States, had an interest in preventing the Latin American countries from passing under the sway of other European powers. In consequence the overwhelming sea power of the British Empire generally stood between continental Europe and the Western Hemisphere. And in turn, the usually latent but periodically active danger of a hostile European coalition against Great Britain likewise played a part in thwarting the ambitions of British statesmen to extend their own power and influence in this hemisphere.

For these reasons, it is not surprising that our own statesmen, during a large part of the nineteenth century, should have inclined toward a somewhat restricted geographical interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Time and again they acquiesced in European intrigues and maneuvers within the more distant South American countries, meddling which could not, and would not, be tolerated today. This is so because twentieth century developments in war technology, in conjunction with fundamental changes in international power relations overseas, have given to the Monroe Doctrine a vitality and a bearing on our defense problem which were sensed but dimly, if at all, during the nineteenth century.

These recent developments have compelled us to reassert the principle of hemisphere defense and to push outward in all directions the boundaries of that geographical area from which, for the safety of the continental United States and the Panama Canal, we must exclude all potential enemies what-

soever. It is just as necessary as ever for our fleets to command the American seas, but command of these waters is no longer sufficient. We must prevent any and all rivals from gaining footholds anywhere within striking, or even within threatening, distance by air as well as by sea.

Specifically this means that we have today a vital military interest in every square mile of land and water throughout that huge wedge-shaped area which extends roughly from Iceland and the Aleutian Islands in the north to the Argentine in the south, including that sector of the African coast line which juts westward into the Atlantic opposite the shoulder of Brazil. This is an enormous defense area. It comprises nearly thirty per cent of the earth's surface and, with the surrounding seas, almost one-half of the globe. But it may be, and is, regarded today as the irreducible minimum in this era of violence and rapidly developing war technology.

This geographical area does not, however, represent the totality of our military defense problem as that problem exists and is envisaged today. The grand strategy of American statecraft has long transcended the purely hemispheric conception of security embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. Since 1898 we have held outlying insular possessions. Those in the western Pacific lie several thousand miles from our primary base of operations in North America. And our military power as well as our civilian economy still rests to a greater extent than is sometimes realized upon distant markets and upon raw materials transported across long and exposed stretches of ocean.

To say this is not to minimize the immense internal strength of the United States. Our national life could go on even if we were cut off from most of our trans-oceanic sources of supply. Assertions to the contrary ignore the plain facts of economic geography. We possess within the boundaries of the continental United States a wealth of accessible raw materials unmatched in any other country whatsoever. If to all this is added the almost equally accessible minerals and other resources of Canada, Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and northern South America, we reach a grand total of industrial and military potentialities far greater in variety and in abundance than is to be found within any comparable area upon this planet.

But there are still serious and well-known deficiencies. We import vast quantities of rubber, tin, and certain other critically important raw materials. An inventory of these deficiencies shows that we are especially dependent upon the distant lands of southeastern Asia and the islands of the southwestern Pacific. Stock-piling, industrial chemistry, and the development of alternative sources nearer home may eventually free us from this dependence upon trans-oceanic supplies. Steps toward that end have already been taken. Other steps are in prospect. But this emancipation will not be completed in a day, or in a year.

Furthermore, a self-contained or narrowly regional economy, achieved at considerable economic sacrifice, is utterly repugnant to the trend of American

statecraft today. There is abundant evidence that our people still look forward to the eventual restoration of a world order in which persons, goods, and ideas can move with reasonable security and comparative freedom back and forth across national frontiers. It is constantly asserted that that is the only kind of international regime in which the ideal of democracy, the "American way of life" as we know and value it, will have any chance of survival.

This larger view of national security carries inescapable political and military implications. It automatically extends our frontiers of defense into distant lands and seas, far removed from the industrial heart of our national life and power. What all this may mean in terms of outlying naval and air bases, garrisons to defend them, ships, planes, and other war material, diversion of industrial effort from civilian to military purposes, centralization of governmental power, etc., it is impossible as yet to foresee. Much depends on the outcome of the present struggles in Europe and in the Far East.

But this at least can be said. If we had to envisage a prostrate England stripped of sea and air power, the European continent and the European seas dominated by a hostile Germany bent on further conquests, and a Far East under the heel of Japanese militarism, we should have to look forward to unprecedented and continuing outlays of our national wealth and income in order to achieve these larger aims and ideals—if indeed we could achieve them at all without effective allies beyond the seas. This conclusion follows inexorably from the facts of political and military geography. We have a primary base of great inherent strength in North America, but we hold no military bridgeheads on the continents of Europe and Asia. We have no naval or air bases so situated as to command the main trunk lines of sea-borne commerce radiating from the Old World.

This state of affairs caused little concern so long as the Eurasian Hemisphere remained politically disunited, and so long, further, as dominant sea power in European waters and in the Indian Ocean and the southwestern Pacific was held securely in the grasp of the British Commonwealth of Nations whose fundamental interests and world policies ran parallel in the main with our own. But the inherent limitations of our own geographical position as a base from which to exert political influence in Europe and Asia become of grave concern when we contemplate the catastrophic march of events on those war torn continents.

The impact of these events is forging a new network of Anglo-American power relationships and a new strategy of American statecraft. This new strategy, profoundly at variance with our historic traditions of foreign policy, is nothing less than a closely integrated coalition of British and American sea power, fortified by air power, to repel the totalitarian menace and to re-establish in our own and in British hands an ironclad and invincible control of all the main arteries of sea-borne traffic radiating from Europe and Asia.

To this undertaking, which is being hammered into shape before our eyes, each of the principal partners brings indispensable elements of strength which tend to compensate for elements of weakness in the other. The United States has a central position, midway between, yet safely removed from the sources of aggression in Europe and the Far East. This is an ideal location for the vast industrial arsenal necessary to support a system of global power under present day conditions.

Historically the British Isles have provided just such a secure primary base. But modern technology has furnished the weapons which have enabled the totalitarian powers not only to overrun the Continent but also to threaten the industrial heart of the British Empire. As long as continental Europe possesses submarines, bombing planes, the industrial plants to make them, and the will to use them, the British Isles alone can scarcely provide a secure industrial and military base for the support of a far-flung sea power.

But these islands still constitute a military position of great importance. They interpose a huge land barrier between northern Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. The sea-borne commerce of half a continent still has to pass under the guns of British squadrons and under the bombs of British war planes patrolling the narrow seas surrounding the British Isles. British fleets, reinforced by land and air forces, still hold, albeit under terrific pressure, the bottlenecks of sea-borne commerce at each end of the Mediterranean. Great Britain, the British oversea Dominions, and the United States together control every sea lane in the Atlantic and every navigable exit from the Pacific Ocean.

Here, it may be submitted, are the elements of a new order of sea power. Properly organized, supported, and coordinated, these elements may become in time the foundation stones of a new world order, possibly in somewhat the same manner as British sea power alone provided a sanction and balance-wheel for the quasi-world order which lasted nearly a century after the Napoleonic Wars. One may venture to predict that we shall not regain our traditional sense of military security, that we shall not recover our historic freedom of choice and action, unless and until the long lines of sea communications, and the airways above them, are once again held with an unshakable grip in the hands of the English-speaking peoples. Then, and then only, will we again have unassailable frontiers of defense behind which to pursue the larger avowed aims and ideals of our national destiny.

RATIONAL PLANNING FOR WAR

By STEFAN T. POSSONY

MILITARY science attempts to make use of the knowledge of the present for the purpose of "preconstructing" the future. The correctness of its theories cannot, therefore, be proved from the available data but will have to be determined in and by the times to come. Naturally, this does not mean that the past is of no consequence for military science. On the contrary, a whole series of very important factors of warfare remains more or less constant; in all probability the most important regulating principles of war will continue to be valid. Nevertheless, these constants are forever being combined with new variables so that their specific importance continually changes. The planning for the future war must, therefore, if it is to be rational, (1) induce the constants out of historical material, (2) deduce the characteristics of the new factors, and (3) out of constants and variables make conclusions by analogy concerning the new war. This third act of thinking, the most important one in preparation for war, being a conclusion based on analogy, cannot be carried out entirely scientifically but must be drawn in part from forces of the human mind other than reason, above all from intuition. Thus, complete validity of such a conclusion is not possible either; errors will creep into it.

These are the logical facts that must be taken into consideration in a discussion of the problem of how, from the organizational point of view, rational planning for war is to be achieved. The problem as such is not very old historically; it dates only from Napoleon's time. Before Napoleon it did not arise, either because the arming of the two opponents was approximately equal, or because the technically inferior party was also so inferior in matters of culture and civilization that it did not recognize the existence of the question. Wars were won by political alliances, by greater strength and better organization, and by superior strategy. Victories were the result of higher arts and skills, but everyone could acquire these. With the rise of the industrial war and the "nation in arms," however, war in large part leaves the sphere of art and enters the field of science. At present better art and intuition are unable to accomplish anything if armament does not correspond to modern needs and if the organization of the army and of the people is not in accord with the required armament. Armament and its corresponding organization—the obtaining of arms, the economic preparations, and the organization of the people—are problems which cannot be solved by means of art alone but must be approached by scientific methods, since the planning for war must be undertaken a very long time before the actual outbreak of war.

Since scientifically gifted people are not necessarily at the same time determined and courageous, there was a proposal to maintain "two kinds of

officers under Napoleon's regime: one for fighting, the other, scientifically educated engineers, only for the purpose of construction—as is the case in the navy." This proposal was adopted only in very small part, Napoleon's own comment being: "I cannot endure an officer who owes his promotion to clerical service. I know, to be sure, that officers who have never smelled powder are necessary, too; but these people are distasteful to me."¹ This distaste was transmitted to Napoleon's successors, so that out of this reform movement there remained merely the new institution of the *intendance*.

The division of labor between the military mind and the "will" was attempted in a certain respect through the establishment of the general staff, but it was nowhere fully attained. In the first place, the tasks of the general staff were much too limited. The staff is after all nothing but a supporting organ of the will of the commanding general.² Not only is the position of the staff in the military hierarchy inadequate (except perhaps in Germany), but its personnel is not suited to form an intellectual organ, in the narrower sense of the word. The staff officers have an education whose main goal is not the training of military scientists, but rather the training of men who can be used in war. They lack the *qualités civiles* which the leader of modern war unquestionably needs in order to be a good general or which, to express it more adequately, must be placed at the disposal of the general in the organization of his army.

The lack of an intellectual organ became obvious in all the warring countries in the wars from 1864 to 1871, when new weapons began to play a more important rôle than they had played previously. Characteristically enough these new weapons, which were to have such a decisive strategic value, were by no means secret weapons. As Major Victor Lefebure has pointed out:

One of the significant differences between the Nineteenth Century and the Twentieth Century in the preparation for, and the conduct of, war, is the rigorous secrecy imposed upon the development of new weapons in our time Not merely was there a complete absence of concealment during the Nineteenth Century but the private armament firms were privileged, and even encouraged, to peddle their latest wares on an international market or to distribute to factories abroad on a royalty basis the process of fabrication and the right to manufacture new and possibly revolutionary weapons.³

Nevertheless, the potentialities of the new weapons were seldom recognized by the general staffs. The most striking example of this is the case of the Prussian needle-gun which defeated the Austrians at Sadowa. This gun had been adopted by the Prussians as early as 1851 and had been used successfully by them when they had been allied with the Austrians against the Danes in 1864.

¹ Gaspard Gourgaud, *Sainte-Hélène: journal inédit de 1815-1818* (Paris, 1899), entry for December 8, 1816.

² Bronsart von Schellendorf, *The Duties of a General Staff* (London, 1893).

³ Bernard Brodie, "Defense and Technology," *The Technology Review*, XLIII (January 1941), 107-10, 123.

The Austrians had had every opportunity to observe its advantages and to adopt it, but they failed to do so.⁴

It is easily understandable that, if the staffs failed with such comparatively easy problems in the last century, they would also fail in this century when greater secrecy was maintained. To meet this fundamentally new problem of the technical surprise, it would have been necessary to develop appropriate intellectual organs within the staff, but this was nowhere done. It is true that the general staffs were usually increased by one office which had the responsibility of working on technical progress, but these bureaus were not equal to their task. During the World War the civilian element everywhere made its weight felt by the strength of intellectual superiority and brought about technical and other military progress often in opposition to the army directorate. This usually happened in an unconventional fashion or indirectly by way of the parliamentary ministers. In at least two cases, however, the army itself organized intellectual organs—in England, in order to organize the gas defense, and in France, where Pétain engaged scientific co-workers so that he might master the mutiny of the dark year 1917. But in other respects as well the influence of the civilian element was of great consequence. The armament industry was everywhere in the hands of private individuals, and we owe it to them that a number of the most important errors of the staffs were quickly corrected. The rôle of the free entrepreneur in this respect has not been sufficiently appreciated.

The creation of an army organ for the sole purpose of thinking and planning has been advocated by several military writers.⁵ The most specific proposal comes from Captain B. H. Liddell Hart who thinks that an organ for "thinking ahead" should be formed for the rational planning of war:

The more one examines the course of past wars the more one is impressed by the frequency with which military policy and preparations have taken the wrong turning. And this abnormal percentage of error can be traced to the habit of basing policy and preparations on an assumption, without adequate verification. The way that decisions are reached on questions of strategy, tactics, organizations, etc., is lamentably unscientific The War Office has organs for research into weapons, etc., but not into the probable conditions of future warfare. Any military, as distinct from mechanical

⁴ See Brodie, *op. cit.*, and the books cited therein; Robert Mackenzie, *The Nineteenth Century: A History* (London, 1893), p. 332; J. F. C. Fuller, *War and Western Civilization* (London, 1932), pp. 40, 103, 107.

⁵ See Edward Mead Earle, "National Defense and Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, LV (December 1940), 481-95; George Fielding Eliot, *The Ramparts We Watch: A Study of the Problems of American National Defense* (New York, 1938), ch. XV, especially pp. 332 ff.; George Fielding Eliot, "Planning for Victory," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (July, 1941), 702-14; Lindsay Rogers, "National Defense: Plan or Patchwork?" *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (October, 1940), 1-11; B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Defence of Britain* (New York, 1939). The last, which is partly a reproduction of memoranda submitted by the author to the British War Office, is the most important discussion of the problem.

or chemical, research is no more than an incidental diversion on the part of officers who are busily occupied with day to day affairs. There are no means for the comprehensive analysis of past experience, and thus no synthesis of adequately established data to serve as a guide in framing policy . . . At present the investigation of problems is pushed on to officers who are occupied with current military affairs. The task ought to be given to a body of officers who can devote their whole time to exploring the data on record, collecting it from outside, and working out the conclusions in a free atmosphere. Such a body should be composed of the best intellects in the army with a good blend of practical experience . . . It is also very desirable that they should be supplemented by a permanent nucleus consisting of some first-rate University men who have been trained in the processes of scientific training . . . It is worth mention that the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence was originally intended to fulfil such a purpose, in part at least; but it has been diverted to the compilation of the official histories of the war.

Such a body, most certainly, would be extremely useful. It must, however, be pointed out that, as it stands, the creation of a bureaucratic organization cannot be sufficient for so difficult a task and that its creation is not as simple as might be assumed.

There are some unexpressed implications in this solution of rational war-planning which must be brought to light if we wish to find a method which will yield substantial results. The first is that the scientific bureau charged with war-planning will, as a result of its being composed of scientists, be free from the more or less irrational and unscientific working methods of traditional general staffs. This is, however, an entirely inadmissible assumption, and we shall show, without wishing here to assert the opposite, that so-called science and the scientists in nowise necessarily proceed according to exclusively rational standards.

It might be unfair to call to mind that at the end of the Middle Ages and at the beginning of modern times the development of science was very strongly curtailed, not only by theologians, but by the scientists themselves. Characteristic examples are to be found in the fields of astronomy and anatomy. Semmelweis, the discoverer of the cause of puerperal fever, was a widely-known authority in the field of obstetrics, but his easily investigable theory was mockingly rejected by the greatest authorities in Austria, Hungary, France, and England.⁶ Pasteur's discoveries of the rôle of the bacillus were likewise rejected by the "authorities," especially by the French *Académie de Médecine* whose most influential member, Pouchet, wrote a long book to prove that Pasteur was wrong and that spontaneous generation was possible.⁷

In the field of biology examples abound. The laws of heredity discovered by Mendel were silenced for decades—to be exact from 1866 to 1900 when De Vries acknowledged Mendel's importance. When, on the other hand, the Darwinian theory was generally accepted by science, in spite of the very insufficient proofs offered by Darwin, his opponents were not even permitted

⁶See Schürer von Waldheim, *Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis: Sein Leben und Wirken* (Vienna, 1905).

⁷Felix Pouchet, *Hétérogénie ou traité de la génération spontanée* (Paris, 1859).

to present irrefutable counter-proofs. The German scientist Wigand sent a three volume refutation directly to Darwin who had declared himself willing to submit to counterproofs, but Wigand was completely silenced until thirty years later when he and his arguments were honored.⁸

Even in the most scientific science, mathematics, striking examples can be found. Bolzano's work on *The Paradoxes of the Infinite* was forgotten for decades. Georg Cantor had to struggle for a very long time until his new views, which were to place mathematical science on entirely new bases, were acknowledged. Poincaré, though he was considered one of the leading authorities in the mathematical field, did not dare to publish an article on the foundations of mathematics for some years. On the other hand, Poincaré himself also proved to be a false prophet when he wrote, "Later generations will regard the *Mengenlehre* as a disease from which one has recovered."⁹ In spite of this caustic prognosis, the *Mengenlehre* was to become one of the most important branches of mathematics. Even Gauss, who undoubtedly was the greatest mathematician of his time, refrained from publishing important contributions because he was afraid of the clamor of the "Boetians."

It is obviously unnecessary to give examples from the social sciences or from the arts, although these would be even more striking and numerous, for in these fields one must count on a much slighter degree of investigability. The general rule propounded by Arthur Schopenhauer for the reception of new ideas—that new ideas, even if they are completely correct, are at first not noticed at all, then go through a phase in which they are greatly overestimated, and finally arrive at their right place—is also true for natural science and consequently for every kind of science. Some ideas, on the other hand, begin their career in the midst of an enormous overestimation of their significance, only to be forgotten a few years later—scientific psychology, behaviorism, technocracy.

A second assumption, that the proposed "thinking-ahead" body would be organized rationally and efficiently, may also be questioned. If we recall the history of the various academies of science whose members are in general the high priests of theories already belonging to history and whose researches usually have nothing to do with the present-day problems of science, then this assumption proves a somewhat bold one, even if in days gone by academies have exercised a positive function. In the second decade of this century, for example, the *Collège de France*, one of the most illustrious scientific bodies in the world, was radically opposed to Einstein's physics; the worthy members of the *Collège* reluctantly changed their minds only after more than ten years of opposition. Incidentally, the *Académie Française*, which claims the forty most famous *hommes de lettres* of France, never accepted Molière; the leader of the opposition against him, Gossuet, was of the opinion that a writer of

⁸ Albert Wigand, *Der Darwinismus und die Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers* (Braunschweig, 1874-77).

⁹ E. T. Bell, *The Development of Mathematics* (New York, 1940), p. 156.

comedies was not worthy of membership. Some decades earlier one of the foremost French intellectuals of all times, the Abbé de St. Pierre, was even driven out of the *Académie*. Similar tendencies still prevail, and many of the most important French writers are not, and probably never will be, *de l'Académie Française*.

Let us consider also the enormous difficulties which always stand in the way of the institutionalization of a new science and which often greatly delay the creation of new professorial chairs. Classical examples are the separation of chemistry from physics, of physiology from anatomy, of psychoanalysis from psychiatry, of sociology from history, and even of political economy and political science from jurisprudence. It is especially difficult to institutionalize new branches within the framework of an already existing science, as was shown in the last generation in mathematics, physics, anthropology, and in most of the "border fields" such as physical chemistry. The cause for this lies not only in the usually irrational "doctrinism" of the scientists who have "arrived," but also in the absence of sufficient funds—both causes are apt to be of great influence upon the scientific organ of the general staff.

The third implication is that, in case of good results from such a bureau, the relevant scientific discoveries will find actual practical application and that criticism will fall upon fruitful soil so that they will receive not only an ideal but also a practical reception. Experiences with civil administrations prove, however, that this is far from certain, although the difficulties in the case of the civil administration are technically much less grave and are constantly being criticized in a much sharper fashion than is possible in the case of an army. How long did it take before the civil administration learned to make use of the telephone, the typewriter, the radio, or the automobile? Even today French law requires that all notarized documents must be entirely handwritten; French administration is still unfamiliar with modern data-files, let alone with more modern cataloging methods; it still holds to the old, badly arranged, and never discoverable *dossiers*. In fact, nothing takes as long as the reform of an administrative procedure, even if the reform obviously has become urgently necessary or if the conditions upon which a certain procedure was based have long since completely changed.

What, however, is the relation of administration to the technical progress of civilian life? Civil administration may perhaps hinder civil progress more than military administration can obstruct military progress. It is quite comprehensible that states inimical to industry have hindered the flourishing of industry. It is, however, incomprehensible that the official economic policy of industrial states should usually work against its own goals. Almost nowhere has the administration of the state, even though it wished to, furthered the development of trade and industry—a fact which is true even in great measure for the defense industries. What prejudices, for example, had to be overcome before railroads could be built in Europe! The position of the states with re-

spect to foreign trade demands special attention. Above all, it is remarkable that almost all states believe in the necessity of an "active" balance of trade, an intellectual accomplishment which is equal at least to that of a general who orders a cavalry charge against heavy tanks.¹⁰

Typical of every kind of bureaucratic organization, even of a nongovernmental organization, is its incapacity to adjust itself to reality, even when the measures to be taken are no longer a matter for discussion. Private industrial organizations have often hindered really pressing reforms; and trade union politics are characterized by an even greater lack of insight.¹¹ Almost never is the difference between nominal and actual wages clear to the leadership of a trade union; and, although statistics show that increased wages beyond a certain limit lead automatically to unemployment, trade union thinking and planning is always directed toward increased wages—an offensive à outrance so to speak.

Incidentally, the engineering officers of the navies from whom, in Napoleon's time, the solution of the problem of rational planning was expected did not always prove efficient themselves, despite the fact that the navy on the whole was probably more successful in planning for war than was the army. The British and French admiralties refused for a very long time to build steam vessels. About the year 1840, twenty-six years after the first steam vessel for war purposes was built by Robert Fulton and some forty years after the invention of the steam vessel generally, and at a time when the British mercantile marine already included nearly seven hundred steamers, "it still was not generally believed . . . that steam would ever replace sail, or even become auxiliary to it, on larger ships, especially on line-of-battle ships." Nor did the British Admiralty recognize the efficiency of screw propulsion. "When John Ericsson demonstrated his screw on the Thames in 1836 by towing . . . a barge at the then phenomenal speed of ten knots, the Admiralty's official report declared that the device was obviously unsteerable."¹² More recently the true significance of the U-boat and of the impact of air power on sea power has been appreciated only tardily.

It would, of course, be unjust to assume that the experts who failed so utterly in understanding technical progress did not have good, even very good, reasons for their attitude. It must be admitted that the steam warship in its early development really was not practicable for war service because of its small range and because of the weight and the vulnerability of its mechanism. The potentialities of the screw were not realized because of the inept design of the early types. If Tirpitz at first opposed the adoption of the submarine,

¹⁰ See Gottfried von Haberler, *Theory of International Trade* (London, 1937).

¹¹ See Élie Halévy, *Histoire du peuple anglais au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1912-26), vol. II; Jacques Maritain, *A travers le désastre* (New York, 1941).

¹² For all naval examples see Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, 1941).

he did so because it was not then technically perfected and could, in 1905, be considered only for defensive purposes.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that such errors, whatever their reasons may have been, could have been avoided. There is, after all, a difference between temporary and permanent technical deficiencies of a new weapon. A military construction bureau must be able to distinguish between a technical idea which will be useless for all times and a new weapon with great possibilities. It must be able to disregard temporary imperfections, to foresee technical progress and improvements, and to visualize the final shape of the arm.¹³ But it is evident that a bureaucratic organization in the traditional style is incapable of dealing efficiently with such creative problems, even if a new office should be formed for this special purpose. To be creative one must definitely avoid the traditional bureaucratic framework, because every bureau, particularly every military bureau, is likely in the long run to place its own service-interests above all other interests.¹⁴ But the rejection of technical and other progress is characteristic not only of bureaucracy; traditionalist behavior is generally typical of men even when such behavior is clearly against their own interests.¹⁵

Can, therefore, the problem of rational planning for war be solved through a bureaucratic body? Such an organization never exists in a vacuum but has very strong sociological connections which always play as important a rôle as rational reflection. Since the "thought organism" of a general staff must at least partly be recruited by and from the general staff itself, and since, therefore, a number of personalities are excluded (very frequently, to be sure, for objective reasons), a community of interests which must grow stronger in the course of time is quickly formed between the two bodies. Once the thought-bureau has been formed and its personnel subsequently increased through the selective affinity of its earlier members, it cannot be assumed that many dissenters will be included even if we leave out of consideration the fact that fruitful scientific work is only possible in a bureau when a certain minimum of unity and unanimity has been achieved.¹⁶

The following objection, however, is much more basic: experience in all realms of life teaches that progress is to a great degree dependent on the activity of outsiders. Such an outsider is necessarily a man who does not know the problem at all, or only as a dilettante, but who is not laboring under the suffocating weight of detail and can approach the problem without prejudice. That is the reason why civilians, especially in our time, have often possessed a

¹³ An interesting illustration of this point is contained in the note on the proposed use of the automobile in the United States Army in 1900, which appears below on pp. 267-70 of this issue. (Editor)

¹⁴ Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1937).

¹⁵ See the notion of "traditionales Handeln" in Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922), vol. I.

¹⁶ Stefan T. Possony, "Organized Intelligence: The Problem of the French General Staff," *Social Research*, VIII (May, 1941), 213-37.

better insight into problems of war than military men. This is not dependent upon the peculiar characteristics of military men and civilians but upon the fact that outsiders can see certain things which are likely to escape the attention of those who are accustomed to a fixed routine and whose thinking revolves about definite difficulties of detail. It is important in the preparation for war, therefore, to draw in outsiders as a matter of principle, not only so that they may point out new ways but that they may act as *advocati diaboli*, a rôle for which members of the military hierarchy are especially unsuited. The institutionalizing, the "taking in," of outsiders is organizationally a completely new type of problem, but one which should be capable of solution if there is willingness to depart from the bureaucratic formula.

One of the underlying ideas of all proposals tending to increase the intellectual efficiency of the general staff is that military errors can be attributed to a basic lack of intellectual insight. This is not true, however. It is, rather, a very different problem, namely, that in spite of a correct, or almost correct, insight, mistakes are committed because "doctrine" makes them inevitable. Examples in point are the French errors of 1914 as laid down in Plan XVII, the disregard of a German advance through Belgium west of the Meuse, the rejection of heavy artillery, and the neglect and underestimation of reservist troops. In general, these errors are explained by the lack of sufficient information, more specifically by the fact that the French general staff did not know—would not believe—that Germany would march through Belgium.¹⁷

The Germans similarly committed a strange error in connection with their fortifications. Germany had on the western front a large number of strong fortifications although the German plan of war envisaged the offensive in the west. The western fortifications were, therefore, completely useless, while fortifications were necessary in the east for the better support of the defensive foreseen there. Although the eastern German, especially the East Prussian, terrain is very favorable for the erection of fortifications, Germany had built practically nothing there to implement her strategy of defense. This error in planning was an important contributory factor in the German defeat.

The fundamental problem lies in the fact that scientific methods of work cannot be used in the final military decisions since, from a certain point on,

¹⁷ See *Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre* (Paris 1922), vol. I, pt. I, chs. I-II, especially p. 66; General Lanrezac, *Le plan de campagne française, et le premier mois de la guerre* (Paris, 1929); Marshal Joffre, *Mémoires du Maréchal Joffre* (Paris, 1932), vol. I; Jean de Pierrefeu, *Plutarque à mentir* (Paris, 1923). It is interesting to note that the French did not adopt Plan XVII for exclusively military reasons; they were partly influenced by political considerations, by a "servitude politique" to use an expressive term of Admiral Castex. The British suggested a plan to remove any suspicion that France would violate Belgian neutrality and, at the same time, put the guilt on Germany. Such servitudes play a part in nearly all war plans and necessarily reduce their military rationality. A very recent example of this is to be seen in the Balkan campaign of 1941, when the Jugoslavs refused staff conversations with the British and the Greeks.

only conclusions by analogy can be drawn. That is to say, the conclusions of forecasting military science are not based totally upon known and scientifically tested facts; they are based in part upon mere assumptions. It is true that, if handled with critical caution, the analogical method is not absolutely forbidden by logic, but it is equally true that such caution is generally lacking and that very often military analogies are, by necessity, very daring and hazardous. Even if this were not the case, so-called "rationality" does not protect against doctrines; on the contrary, even science is always split into doctrinaire camps. The arrangement of a scientific staff-organ is in itself no guarantee against doctrines, and the fact that military science can never work without certain premises simply forces the formation of doctrines. Preparation for war is *ipso facto* indoctrination, since, speaking in Hegelian terms, it represents the negation and exclusion of other, likewise possible, preparations for war. Even within the doctrine definite unchangeable factors such as geographical position, climate, number of inhabitants, and character of the people limit the application of science.

Let us assume, however, that the scientific staff-organ has convincingly proposed a change of doctrine. This does not mean that the change is possible in actuality. A medical practitioner can change his methods from one day to the next, but an army cannot do this. A change in doctrine means that the previous training of the army and its reserves has become in part worthless. The earlier training of the staff would also for the time become useless. A long period of time would pass before the new organization could be created and the new equipment of the army completed, a task which today is equivalent to a reorganization of the economic structure of society. It is clear also that such a reorganization has its financial limits. Should the proposed change of doctrine coincide with a grave crisis in foreign affairs, it is quite comprehensible that the necessary reform should be postponed, for the existing traditional army would be more effective than an army caught in the process of reorganization.

The problem of reception of new discoveries is considerably more difficult to solve in the army than in any other field of human life. An important reason for this is that discoveries in other fields of activity can be developed independently of the state administrations; after the innovations have proven themselves, the governments can adopt them. Thus the stream of discovery in civilian life goes on continually, but in the army large-scale testing of discoveries takes place only occasionally, in war, and the development of military inventions is consequently sporadic. Moreover, civilian discoveries do not bring about immediate basic reorganizations; usually they lead long, though frequently a very productive, existence at the periphery of existing social organization and at a fairly great distance from the government.

Finally, the thought-organism is incapable of producing even the slightest result if it does not receive the material necessary for thinking. This material cannot be put together exclusively through technical experiments but must be

developed through tactical experiments. Facilities for such experiments are at present scarcely available in any army, for the so-called maneuvers serve an entirely different purpose—the training of troops and the staffs. Moreover, in maneuvers the same tactics and the same doctrine are frequently employed by both sides so that an experimental control of the different assumptions does not seem possible, even if the fact that maneuvers are usually unrealistic is disregarded. It is probably impossible to arrange for great army maneuvers several times a year, but even this would not serve as a satisfactory tactical laboratory. It would be much more to the point to train a small unit of intelligent soldiers and let them test systematically all vital tactical problems again and again under ever-varied conditions and while applying different tactics on both sides. If the thought-bureau does not have such a tactical laboratory at its disposal, its activities must remain purely scholastic. If, however, it possesses such a laboratory, it may be assumed that usable results might be obtained.¹⁸

Such is the frame within which the solution of the problem of rational planning for war may be sought insofar as it can be solved at all. First, the personnel of the thought-bureau must be so recruited as to eliminate too much disharmony on the one hand and too much conformity on the other. Secondly, it is of decisive importance that every bureaucratic method of procedure and all dangers of traditional bureaucracy and of *esprit de corps* be avoided. Finally, provision must be made that all problems come up for discussion and that none be slighted—that every question be examined thoroughly and tested experimentally. There are other aspects of the problem which need elaboration, especially questions concerning the organization of such a bureau and its methods of functioning, both of which the author hopes to discuss in the near future.

¹⁸ Laboratories of this kind have existed, for instance, the Prussian *Lehrinfanterie* which was, however, devoted only to minor tactics. This experimental troop was too small to achieve greatly important results, but its value has never been disputed. It is an astonishing fact that it fell completely into disregard. The present German army apparently possesses similar experimental troops as was revealed by the fact that French and Belgian fortifications were copied in Poland for the training of troops. It is clear that such training is, at the same time, a testing of the best methods of attack.

DEMOCRACY AND THE FRENCH ARMY

By ÉTIENNE DENNERY

THE idea of conscription has often been opposed in Great Britain and in America as a danger to free institutions. "An armed disciplined body is in its essence dangerous to Liberty," said Burke. Conscription had not yet been thought of in America when Madison said, "A standing army is one of the greatest mischiefs that can possibly happen," but he would have been even more opposed to conscription than to the maintenance of a professional standing army. In France, on the other hand, the idea of conscription has generally been connected with the idea of democracy. At the end of 1938 and during the first half of 1939 French public opinion found it difficult to understand why conscription in Great Britain was opposed mainly by liberals and laborites and why its adoption, in a time of at least nominal peace, meant such a break with British democratic tradition.¹ The same questions could have been asked about the United States, where conscription was opposed mainly by representatives of progressive tendencies.

General conscription was adopted for the first time in French history during the Revolution, in August 1793, while the French Convention was struggling against a coalition of European monarchs. It had been advocated by prominent revolutionary leaders since the beginning of the Revolution, when Dubois-Crancé, for instance, said in a well-known formula, "Every citizen is a soldier, every soldier a citizen." Even Rousseau, in the *Contrat Social*, had clearly outlined the idea of a pact of citizens united to serve the state equally.

Theoretically, the conscription of 1793 was the most complete which can be imagined. It was the nation in arms. The decree of the French Committee of Public Safety says, in the somewhat pompous style of the period:

The young men will go to battle, the married men will forego arms and transport food; the women will make the tents, garments, and help in the hospitals; the children will cut old rags into strips; the old men will place themselves in the public squares to inflame the courage of the warriors, incite hatred against the kings, and recommend the unity of the Republic.

"That vast levy," said a member of the Convention, Barère, "took place amongst hymns to Liberty." The history of the years between 1789 and 1795, with due emphasis upon the patriotic enthusiasm of the mass fighting for Liberty, was very much insisted upon in the text books of elementary schools under the Third French Republic, and most Frenchmen consequently know that in their country democracy and conscription developed hand in hand.

Three-quarters of a century later, following the war against Prussia in 1870-71, a strict enactment of conscription was advocated largely on the demo-

¹ See G. G. Coulton, *Democracy and Military Service* (London, 1916), and F. Maurice, *Governments and War* (London, 1926).

cratic ground of abolition of the special privileges of social groups. During most of the intervening years conscription had theoretically been in existence, but it had only intermittently and partially been enforced.² Napoleon I had partially utilized conscription but had admitted selection by lot and replacements, given exemptions to some, and prolonged the service of others to the point of making them virtually professional soldiers. Under the Restoration and Napoleon III the *bourgeoisie*, practically all-powerful, were instrumental in having general conscription discontinued. When conscription was adopted again in 1872 other than democratic reasons were undoubtedly put forward—mainly the success of the German army which, since the time of Stein, had been a conscripted one. But it was also to a great extent the attempt of the mass of the people to destroy the privileges of the upper middle class, which had been allowed to provide substitutes for personal military service, and an effort to get rid of, or at least to restrict, the influence of a professional army whose growth might have endangered the free institutions of the country. Thiers, a leader representative of the upper middle class whose ministerial experience went back to the reign of Louis Philippe, was opposed to universal conscription and favored long-term service and the maintenance of substitutions. He was suspicious of the practice of universal service which, in his opinion, would only "inflame all heads and put a rifle on the shoulder of every socialist."

The Assembly did not agree, however, and conscription was reintroduced in 1872. Although military service was equal in theory, under the influence of Thiers and the conservative elements inequalities still existed on a rather large scale. There was still "selective" service, some serving five years, others only eighteen months. Selection was determined partly by lot, partly by social and economic status. Those who had passed the baccalaureate and could provide their own equipment were able to contract for only one year of service. There were also special exemptions in time of peace for certain groups of young men, officials of public education, future priests, undergraduates, or those supporting their families.

The gradual shifting of the parliamentary majority toward the left had the effect of limiting exemptions and making military service more universal. In 1889 military service became equal for all, and there remained only exemptions due to family situation or to some professional distinction. In 1905 most of the remaining exemptions were also abolished. Priests and undergraduates were liable to service like everybody else; those supporting families were no longer exempt, although a measure of relief was afforded to indigent parents of conscripts. Left wing politicians continued to insist on universal service, but they began to an increasing extent to advocate a shorter term with the colors. By the beginning of the World War the most representative of the Socialist leaders, Jaurès, advocated the end of any professional army and the intro-

² J. Monteilhet, *Les institutions militaires de la France, 1814-1932* (Paris, 1932).

duction of a French system of militia comparable to the Swiss, in which the obligation of universal service was well established.³

Thus, although a distinction must be drawn between the conscripts and the professional soldiers who made up the regular army,⁴ it can be asserted that by the beginning of the twentieth century the composition of the French army had become most democratic. Every physically able man was conscripted. The only special privileges, before the war of 1939, were for students of universities and *grandes écoles*. Provided they would agree to undergo military training two mornings a week during two years of their university training and to seek commissions as reserve officers at the end of this training, their period of service was reduced from eighteen months or two years to one year. Students were allowed to postpone the period of their military service for five years. In addition, special leaves were provided at harvest time for conscripted farmers.

The recruiting of reserve officers was not less democratic in principle.⁵ It was always based upon examinations, more especially upon competitive examinations, and candidates were drawn from two sources. They were recruited from the students of universities and *grandes écoles* who had had military training while there and had successfully passed two competitive examinations—one while still in the university to qualify for admission to a reserve officer school, and the other at the conclusion of the training in this school.⁶ The other source was from among conscripts and non-commissioned reserve officers who had been selected, after six months or a year of service in their regiment, to compete for admission to a reserve officer school.

All of these examinations could be considered fair. The juries were composed of officers. Most of the tests were technical, although some presupposed general instruction on such subjects as military history and rudimentary geography, and sometimes even a general essay was required.⁷ Physical training

³ Jean Jaurès, *L'Organisation socialiste de la France: l'armée nouvelle* (Paris, 1915). Regarding the somewhat similar question of the comparative value of the active and reserve army see: Joseph J. C. Joffre, *Mémoires du Maréchal Joffre* (Paris, 1932), II, 8-9; Marie Eugene Debeney, *La guerre et les hommes: réflexions d'après-guerre* (Paris, 1937), and *Sur la sécurité militaire de la France* (Paris, 1930); Charles de Gaulle, *The Army of the Future* (New York, 1940).

⁴ See Charles Rabany, *Le recrutement de l'armée* (Paris, 1923); the chapter on "Le recrutement des cadres" in Debeney, *La guerre et les hommes*, pp. 235-43; Carl Bermer, *Rapport relatif au recrutement de l'armée* (Chambre des Députés, Session de 1927, No. 4653); Shelby C. Davis, *The French War Machine* (London, 1938).

⁵ Leon Vignal, *L'Officier de réserve: ses droits, ses prérogatives, ses devoirs, ses obligations* (Paris, 1927).

⁶ It has often been complained that officers recruited in this way, having never served as soldiers in the barracks, lacked real contact with the troops. See Debeney, *La guerre et les hommes*, p. 240.

⁷ Some have thought that the examinations were based too much on actual knowledge. General Debeney wrote, "The true elite in a country are distinguished by character and judgment more than by education" (*Ibid.*, p. 261).

counted somewhat in the final ratings. The officer who had supervised the military training of the student, or the commander of the regiment if the candidate had come from the ranks, gave an opinion upon his general aptitude to become an officer, but this was not the decisive factor. Except in very rare cases of direct extremist political activity while serving with the colors, the political opinions of the candidate played practically no part. Class or race prejudices were, so far as is known, practically non-existent in the selection of officers. Political or military recommendations might have had some effect behind the scenes in some cases, but probably only in a very personal way and to a very limited extent.

Nevertheless, in spite of the democratic system of recruitment, only those possessed of a relatively higher education could really hope to become officers. The inequality between reserve officers and conscript soldiers was based on inequalities of opportunity for education under the French system of public instruction, which was, however, a very democratic one.* Both secondary and university education were for the most part state supported. Although secondary education had only very recently become entirely gratuitous, the number of fellowships had always been numerous. Moreover, the fees of the universities were extremely low, especially when compared to those of the best American or English institutions, and fellowships and exemptions from fees were also very numerous. Still, the majority of students in the French universities came from the middle class, and reserve officers consequently came very largely from that class and doubtless shared its prejudices and points of view.

But, although middle class trends of thought predominated, it may safely be said that all shades of political opinion could be found among reserve officers. Perhaps such diversity may be explained by diversity in origin. Cavalry officers, considered to be the most conservative, generally belonged to the aristocracy or upper middle class—perhaps because of the survival of a feeling connected with the old feudal relationships between possession of a horse and nobility. Riding had always maintained a certain prestige in French society, and, while horses were slowly disappearing from the cavalry, the name, still given to the mechanized units, retained some of its old prestige. The composition of artillery, engineer, and pioneer officers was more complex. Many of the candidates of this category had passed through advanced engineering schools, desired to enter or already were in industry, and belonged to employers' family circles; others, however, were students in schools of practical mechanics, had had less academic and more technical training, belonged to poorer families, and were generally more democratic both in their origin and in their ideas. Finally, in the infantry, the reserve officers belonged to widely different groups. Many of them, for instance, were elementary school teachers with socialist or even communistic tendencies.

* C. Richard, *L'Enseignement en France* (Paris, 1905).

The reserve officers' societies have shown themselves to be, if not typically conservative or reactionary, at least adherents to the kind of nationalism which was characteristic of conservative circles in the years following the World War. They were strongly represented in the Chamber of Deputies, which was called "*la Chambre Bleu Horizon*." In fact, those who belonged to the societies were mostly those who were especially proud of their title and wanted sometimes to use it as a privilege. Their president, André Lefèvre, exerted a reactionary influence on French public opinion in matters of foreign policy. The society of the *Croix de Feu*, which was definitely anti-parliamentarian although not exactly Fascist, was also composed to a great extent of reserve officers. These societies, however, were something outside the army itself.

The composition of the rank and file of the conscript army was as nearly democratic as it could be. Social groups were completely mixed, and people of different classes became acquainted with each other in everyday life.⁹ The son of the employer or landlord lived with the son of the worker or tenant and had an opportunity to learn the other's feelings, aims, and outlook on life. The service also mixed people of different regional origins. In many of the French regiments a large proportion of the men belonged in time of peace to neighboring districts, but there were always men who came from more remote parts of the territory, especially in the regiments located near the frontiers. The peasant who had never been away from his small village in Touraine or Brittany came in contact with the more experienced and more sophisticated worker from the Paris suburbs; the small, dark, vineyard farmer, fresh from his easy-going life under the sun of Provence, became acquainted with the tall, sturdy miner of the Pas de Calais; the rough mountaineer of the Massif Central or the Alps rubbed shoulders with the son of the *bourgeois* of the town.

But in addition to the opportunity to know and perhaps influence each other, this year of service, which nearly all Frenchmen have spent during their youth in nearly identical conditions, means for every man in the whole country common memories of nearly common adventures. Each could say with Courteiline, "Bad memories! . . . Welcome to you however: you are my far-away youth." Memories of a closed world, with limited perspectives, but in which small incidents, nearly always the same, aroused the same feelings among millions of men; a life having its pains—the punishment, the *corvées*, the *salle de police*—but also its hopes, like the hope of the next leave, with its hours of freedom and its possibilities, seldom realized, of unlimited adventure. A kind of folklore of innumerable popular jokes, songs, plays, and novels has developed out of this life in the garrison, a folklore with rarely varied types—the colonel, good, rough, and slightly soft-brained; the young lieutenant, terror of the mothers and husbands of the town; the adjutant, always grumbling and always mistaken; and the two types of recruits, the conscientious but unclesver, always

⁹ Debéney, *La guerre et les hommes*, p. 108

surrounded by difficulties, and the astute, always passing through obstacles. The movie has given a new youth to themes already old; the military vaudeville was known to be the only kind of film in France always assured, whatever the trends of the time, of a large and sympathetic audience.

Universal military service is also of some value in the education of the masses, so much required in a democracy. "Discipline," reads the first sentence of the French military regulations, "is the main strength of the army." Great stress was put on discipline, respect, and solidarity, and military team-work might develop national solidarity. Poincaré wrote, "The effort which is demanded of him [the soldier], the regularity of life imposed, the machinery to which he is bound, all remind him that he is a part of a whole, a unit in the national collectivity, a living cell of that great organism, the Mother Country."¹⁰ Such an educational possibility might, of course, be dangerous if imposed upon conscripts for some narrow political purpose, but it cannot be said that it was used in France, during the Third Republic, for spreading political or social doctrine. Regulations pressed the officers to give the men a knowledge of hygiene, and every year there were lectures on protection against venereal diseases and still more against alcoholism. Attempts were sometimes made in the regiment, with rather small success, to educate the limited number of conscripts who had escaped childhood education, but elementary instruction is far more difficult and requires longer for a young man than for a child. Occasionally general adult education courses were given, more often for the non-commissioned officers than for the soldiers themselves.

The part which the officer can play in the general education of conscripts has frequently been discussed in France. Marshal Lyautey, in an article written about fifty years ago when he was still a young officer, tried to show what the social rôle of the officer could be.¹¹ The twenty thousand professional officers who then formed the framework of the French army could, he thought, be the ever-ready body able to direct French youth. He pointed out that the possibilities of moral influence on the men were numerous. The officer shares the work and the trials of the men without deriving, as does an employer, any profit from this common effort; his interests are the same as those of the men. His authority is undisputed, and, since he is altogether independent and disinterested, he is in a position to know his men, their state of mind, their character, their moral individuality. Discreetly and kindly he must guide them and advise them about their problems. Such an attitude will benefit the army, for it will give the officer greater moral influence and more grip on the men when war comes and personal authority is imperative. But it will also

¹⁰ Henri Poincaré, *How France is Governed* (New York, 1919), p. 364. See also Carlton J. H. Hayes, *France: A Nation of Patriots* (New York, 1930), pp. 75-78.

¹¹ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, CXL (March 15, 1891), 443-59. See Carl Vincent Confer, "The Social Influence of the Officer in the Third Republic," *Journal of the American Military Institute*, III (Fall, 1939), 157-66.

contribute to the bettering of social relations between Frenchmen, to the appeasement of minds and the ending of any class warfare.

This article, which was much noticed and discussed, illustrates the pre-occupations prevailing in the minds of some of the best officers at that time. But the line between moral and political influence, like that between personal influence and military pressure, is sometimes difficult to draw. That consideration explains why the different governments of the Third Republic never emphasized in the army regulations the ideas expressed by Lyautey. They left each officer free to work out for himself his personal relations with the men and so avoided the accusation of using conscription to spread political propaganda. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the value of military service, in terms of the general education of the masses, depended to a great extent upon the professional officers who have been the permanent frame of the French conscript army.

Together with a huge conscript army, the Third Republic always maintained a limited but strong regular army. Though its extension and even its maintenance was always opposed by the left-wing parties as anti-democratic, all French governments have thought it necessary to keep a permanent nucleus of professional soldiers. Modern warfare in particular, with its high degree of mechanization, demands officers and men more highly trained than the average conscript or reserve officer.¹² Between the two wars the average class of conscripts numbered about 240,000. The term of service being one or two years, the average active conscript army thus numbered between 240,000 and 500,000 men. During the same period the average regular army comprised about 150,000 men. Nearly all enlisted men of the regular army were stationed in the colonies, while most of the regular officers and non-commissioned officers served in France with the conscript army.

The system of recruiting regular officers and non-commissioned officers was also very democratic. Young men desirous of becoming regular officers could enter by competitive examination one of the main schools for preparing officers, such as Saint Cyr for the infantry or the Polytechnique for the artillery or engineers. Officers were also chosen from among non-commissioned officers by competition or, though more rarely and generally only for those remaining in the lower grades, by promotion. The examinations, like those for reserve officers, were fair, and there were no other restrictions of any importance. But the fact that social or racial prejudices were practically excluded does not

¹² Long and sometimes passionate discussions have taken place in French military circles about the comparative efficiency of the reserve and active army, and the problem is similar to that of the relative value of the conscript and professional armies. See Adolphe Messimy, *Mes Souvenirs* (Paris, 1937), p. 76; Alexandre Percin, 1914: *les erreurs du haut commandement* (Paris, 1929), pp. 91-112; the evidence of Generals Michel, Percin, Messimy and of Marshal Joffre in *Commission d'enquête de la métallurgie, Compte rendu des débats du Chambre des députés* (Paris, 1929); Debeney, *La guerre et les hommes*, p. 107; De Gaulle, *op. cit.*

mean that every social group was equally represented among the professional officers. Those who were promoted out of the ranks were usually men of humble origins, but most of the regular officers, like most of the reserve officers, belonged to the middle class, and the percentage of regular officers of aristocratic origin was much higher than among the reserve officers.

This high percentage of aristocrats in the regular officers' corps was due to many factors, mainly historical. The tradition of the army has been kept alive in more than one family of the aristocracy. Before the French Revolution officers were invariably noble. Most of them were eliminated from the national army and fought in the armies of Condé during the Revolution. Large numbers of them returned, however, some as early as Napoleon's time and many more during the Restoration. In these families the tradition of a military career was handed down from father to son. Furthermore, in the early years of the Third Republic at least, nobles did not want their children to enter the civil administration where they would be directly in touch with the abhorred government of the republic and obliged to serve politicians whom they despised more than anything. The negative duty of not participating in politics in the army seemed to them easier and less disreputable than the positive duty of serving directly some political faction which they detested. Thus the French conscript army, most democratic in its composition, possessed a frame of professional officers who, though also recruited in a very democratic way, included, as some trace of an old regime long ago abolished, a relatively high percentage of aristocrats.

When one speaks of the danger of a standing army for a democracy he may mean that such an army can be used in a dangerous way by a leader who legally controls it or, and this fact is of a totally different nature, he may mean that the army can initiate of its own accord a revolt against the democratic institutions of the country. Only in the second sense can it really be said that the army as such is a danger for a democracy. The relations of the army to the civil power in France during the Third Republic were generally, as desired by the founders of the regime, the relations of an instrumental body to an organ of command. Since the Revolution the French army can fairly be considered as having been the servant of civil power. With perhaps only one exception, "it has shown no force of its own, no will of its own, no policy of its own." Never did the army originate a *coup d'état*; the tradition of *pronunciamientos* is not a French one.

"THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS"

A SOURCE FOR MILITARY HISTORY¹

By ROBERT G. BALLENTINE

THE *Territorial Papers of the United States*, of which the first nine volumes have now been published by the Department of State under the able editorship of Dr. Clarence E. Carter, has established a new landmark in the publication of sources for western history. Selected with care and edited with the thorough scholarship characteristic of the editorial undertakings of Dr. Carter, literally thousands of documents from the federal archives have been made readily accessible for the first time to all students of the field. Unable to reproduce *in extenso* documents of every category—since that would have been impossible—priority has been given to those relevant to the civil administration of the territories. Thus, the series is of primary interest as a documentary record of the administrative development of the West. Since, however, the problem of defense and the part played by the Army in the West figured largely in territorial administration, the object of this article is to examine briefly the value of the series to the western military historian. Materials of particular interest to him are to be found in documents of two types: first, in those papers on military and Indian affairs which have a relevancy to civil administration; and, second, in papers which, although primarily of administrative concern, incidentally include information on technical military matters and on the defense problem.

While the framework of the publication revolves about the correspondence of the Department of State, the chief supervisory agency of the territorial governments prior to 1873, this correspondence is supplemented by other federal archival materials which delineate the administration of the territories. As such, it has been the editorial policy to exclude a great majority of the documents on military affairs and the related field of Indian affairs. This was done, in the first place, because papers found on these phases were too numerous for inclusion without extending the number of volumes beyond a judicious limit, or beyond which the authorization of funds already made or contemplated permits. Furthermore, both military and Indian affairs transcended

¹This article is a review, from the point of view of the student of western military history, of the first nine volumes of *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, compiled and edited by Clarence Edwin Carter (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1934-). The volumes included are: I, General (Preliminary printing, 1934. Pp. 37. 15c.); II-III, *The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 1787-1803* (1934. Pp. 694, 588. \$2.00 each.); IV, *The Territory South of the River Ohio, 1790-1796* (1936. Pp. 527. \$1.75.); V-VI, *The Territory of Mississippi, 1798-1817* (1937, 1938. PP. 815, 893. \$1.50 each.); VII-VIII, *The Territory of Indiana, 1800-1810* (1939. Pp. 784, 496. \$2.00, \$1.50.); IX, *The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812* (1940. Pp. 1092. \$2.50.).

the boundaries of the territories and frequently could not be said to be a part of the affairs of any individual territory.

This situation was not universally true, however, since events connected with one branch of territorial administration frequently impinged upon those pertaining to another branch. When documents pertaining to questions of jurisdiction and the relation of the civil and military aspects of administration are concerned, it has been the practice of the editor to include them. Thus, for example, the volumes are interspersed with documents relative to the exercise of the militia power by the territorial governors in connection with the protection of the territories from Indian attacks, as well as documents illustrative of the conflict between the civil and military authorities over the use of that power. Furthermore, since the territorial governors were invariably authorized to superintend the Indians within the boundaries of their civil jurisdictions, their two-fold functions were too closely united to make feasible an arbitrary exclusion of all papers on the military and Indian problems.

While the Regular Army in the territories was not, strictly speaking, an agency of territorial administration, it so often displayed such a close relationship to problems confronted by the territorial administrators on matters of defense and Indian affairs that documents relating to its jurisdiction and activities could not be excluded. In the field of Indian relations—to select one instance—the Army had been charged by law with the duty of enforcing certain provisions of the acts governing the conduct of Indian affairs, and as such, questions were frequently raised as to the jurisdiction between the Army and the territorial governors in their capacities as superintendents of Indian affairs. An interesting indication of this conflict and an attempt to define the respective jurisdictions are revealed in instructions to the commander of the western troops, Colonel J. F. Hamtramck, in 1799:

You are aware that the Governors of the North Western Territory and of the Mississippi Territory are severally *ex officio* Superintendents of Indian Affairs. The management of those affairs under the direction of the Secretary of War appertains to them. The military in this respect are only to be auxiliary to their plans and measures. In saying this, it must not be understood that they are to direct military dispositions and operations; But are to be the organs of all negotiations and communications between the Indians and the Government; They are to determine when and where supplies are to be furnished to those people and what other accommodations they are to have. The military in regard to all such matters are only to aid as far as their Cooperation may be required by the superintendents; avoiding interference without previous concert with them This . . . will promote a regular and uniform system of Conduct toward the Indians, which Cannot exist if every Commandant of a Post is to intermeddle separately and independently in the management of the concerns which relate to them.²

Obviously in a sparsely settled region as large as the area of the territories within the scope of this review, inhabited by Indians and lawless characters and flanked on three sides by hostile or potentially hostile powers, military affairs

² III, 24-25.

assumed some considerable importance. To the Army, in conjunction with the territorial militia, fell the main burden of policing and defending this region. This constituted a tremendous task for a force which rarely exceeded five hundred men in the Northwest Territory prior to 1800 and no more than two thousand in the entire West before 1818. And, although the size of the Army was small, its duties were manifold. The papers published in these volumes provide ample indication of the variety of its activities: the disposition and movement of troops; problems involved in establishing, supplying, and fortifying military posts; the protection of civilian surveyors; the clearing of the public lands of squatters; and the construction of military roads and the marking of post roads. Worthy of particular note are documents descriptive of the methods of warfare employed on the frontier. Governor William Henry Harrison, for example, in writing to the Secretary of War in August 1812, describes

Two species of Warfare [that] have been used by the United States in their Contests with the Tribes upon the North Western frontier—Viz rapid and desultory expeditions by mounted men having for their object the surprise and destruction of Particular Villages, Or the more tardy but more effectual operations of an Army Composed principally of Infantry penetrating the Country of the Enemy and securing the possession by a chain of Posts.³

Coupled with the general situation which imposed on the Army as well as the local militia the necessity of policing this area and defending it against both external and internal enemies, the Secretary of War assumed the burden of the management of Indian affairs and trade. While the administration of Indian relations centered largely in the governors of the different territories in their capacities as superintendents of Indian affairs and in the Superintendent of Indian Trade, the Army was important in Indian administration. Army officers figured largely in the conduct of Indian negotiations and diplomacy, the running of Indian boundary lines, the prevention of settlement on Indian lands, and the enforcement of Indian trade regulations. In addition, the Indian trade, which was confined largely to military posts, was always under the scrutiny of the local military commandants. The machinery of organization for the management of the Indians was, thus, for many practical purposes an adjunct of the military.

The military and Indian problem, as well as problems in territorial administration, varied to some extent by territory. Considering the westward movement in chronological sequence, the occupation of the Tennessee region—as well as Kentucky—preceded the settlement of the Northwest Territory. Thus, different problems were confronted in the Southwest Territory as it was comparatively well settled at the time of its territorial organization. The result was that, while serious problems of Indian defense arose from the depredations of the Creeks and Cherokees on the Cumberland settlements, there were

³ VIII, 190.

not present there the extensive Indian hostilities, campaigns, and negotiations that were provoked by the advance of settlement in the Northwest Territory during its early history. Secondly, problems of civil administration in the Southwest Territory were relegated to the background, due partially to the fact that the basis of local government had already been established under North Carolina jurisdiction, and partially to the lack of a public land problem for the United States in this region since the lands had long since been absorbed by military grants and speculators. Consequently, the papers of this territory relate to a considerable degree to defense and Indian policies as these were the prime considerations of both territorial and federal governments.

With Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers in 1794 and the evacuation of the British posts in 1796, the Indian problem in the Northwest was materially decreased. A major portion of the papers of the later history of the Northwest Territory and of Indiana Territory, with the exception of the War of 1812, relate to routine problems of territorial administration, politics, post offices, and public lands, scant consideration being given to military activities.

In the Mississippi and Orleans territories, on the other hand, circumstances created difficult and uncertain problems for those charged with the defense of this region. The tardiness in the withdrawal of Spanish troops, the presence of Spanish forces on the Florida and Texas frontiers, the threat of invasion by American settlers on West Florida, and the unsettled state of American foreign relations during this period made for a condition of constant uncertainty on the southern and southwestern frontiers.

Although such diversity in military administration and defense is reflected in the papers of the different territories, the series as a whole emphasizes the common elements confronted on each frontier. Through the office of the Secretary of War passed a continuous stream of correspondence with the territorial governors, Indian agents and factors, and military commandants at widely scattered posts relative to the part played by the Army in the defense and administration of the West. These documents pertain to such diverse matters as Indian politics in its various aspects—commercial and political; the establishment of military posts and protection against encroachments on the public domain; the enforcement of laws relating to the Indian trade; technical military problems; and disputes between the military and civil departments. *The Territorial Papers* thus constitutes an important introduction to the sources for the military administration on the frontier and the part played by the Army in the settlement of the West. Students of military history will join others in hoping for the uninterrupted continuation of this significant series.



HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

The annual joint session of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE and the American Historical Association will be held at ten o'clock on Tuesday morning, December 30, in the North Ball Room of the Stevens Hotel in Chicago. The meeting, which will be presided over by Dr. Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study, will be devoted to the general topic "Sea Power in the Twentieth Century." Dr. Theodore Ropp of Duke University will read a paper on "The *Jeune École* after Fashoda: French Theories of Naval War with England." Dr. Arthur J. Marder of Harvard University is to discuss "Admiral Sir John Fisher: A Reappraisal." Professor Allan Wescott of the United States Naval Academy will contribute a paper on "American Naval Policy Since Mahan."

The INSTITUTE has been fortunate in having had as one of its Patrons the Archivist of the United States. For over two years Dr. R. D. W. Connor, the first Archivist, lent the prestige of his name and title to the organization and always took a friendly interest in it and the journal. Dr. Connor retired on September 15 to accept a newly endowed Professorship in American History and Jurisprudence at the University of North Carolina. His successor, Dr. Solon J. Buck, already a member of the INSTITUTE, promptly consented to act as Patron and has already given evidence of his intention to serve in more than a nominal capacity. The new Archivist has for many years been very active in historical circles and has an established reputation as both an administrator and a scholar. He was Superintendent of the Minnesota Historical Society from 1914 to 1931, Director of the Western Pennsylvania Historical Survey from 1931 to 1935, and Director of Publications at The National Archives since 1935 and has served on the faculties of the Universities of Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, and Pittsburgh.

Major Frederick Bernays Wiener, whose election as Treasurer was announced in the Spring issue, was soon afterward called to active duty and found it necessary to resign. The INSTITUTE is fortunate in having been able to obtain as his successor to this important position Lieutenant Colonel Ralph C. Bishop, Secretary of the Civilian Military Education Fund and now on duty with the General Staff. Members who have not paid their dues are hereby warned that Colonel Bishop is taking his job seriously.

The terms of some of the members of the editorial staff of **MILITARY AFFAIRS** having expired this year, five familiar names will be missing from the mast-head hereafter: Major Joseph Mills Hanson, Dr. Dimitry Krassovsky, Dr. Philip T. McLean, Mr. Don Russell, and Mr. Frederick P. Todd. To all of these gentlemen the **INSTITUTE** is deeply indebted for their long and faithful service, but a special debt is owed to Mr. Todd. It was he who edited the first issue of the magazine, and he has been intimately connected with it ever since. It is not too much to say that there have been times when his faith and labor alone have kept it going. He now feels that he should devote all of his available time to the affairs of the **INSTITUTE** in his capacity as Secretary; in that office he will, of course, continue to be closely associated with **MILITARY AFFAIRS**.

The new group of Associate Editors is gradually being organized to meet present conditions and to attempt to put out an ever improving journal. Of the old board, Dr. Branch Spalding will continue to serve especially as our Civil War and general American advisor and Mr. Robert G. Ballentine will carry on his excellent coverage of periodical literature and the preparation of the annual index. Dr. Richard P. Stebbins, whose appointment was announced earlier this year, is the new book review editor. With this issue Lieutenant L. Eugene Hedberg joins the staff as business advisor, a task for which he is particularly fitted as a result of his experience as Assistant National Secretary of the Reserve Officers' Association of the United States and as Assistant Editor of *The Reserve Officer*. It is hoped that other names will be added to fill the gaps by the time the Spring issue goes to press.

A highly successful dinner meeting of the **INSTITUTE**'s Chicago membership was held at the Union League Club on November 3. Lieutenant Colonel Willard R. Matheny and Mr. Arthur L. H. Rubin shared in honors as hosts, and to them and to Mr. Don Russell goes the credit for the arrangements. Dr. Hugh M. Cole of the University of Chicago discussed Napoleon's campaign of 1812 in relation to the current Russo-German war. Among those who took part in the lively discussion which followed were Colonel Donald Armstrong and Professor Louis R. Gottschalk.

The first session of the **INSTITUTE**'s new Seminar-Conference on the Backgrounds of National Defense Science was held in Washington on November 6. The Secretary presided and outlined the objects and methods of the course. Among those who attended were Messrs. Lewis A. Dexter, Lewis Gittler, and L. Theodore Olom, all of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service; Miss Marie Berger of the Surplus Marketing Corporation; Mr. Edward Y. Hartshorne of the Office of the Coordinator of Information; Mr. Francis Russell of the Department of State; and Mr. Aaron Bell of the University of Chicago.

Professor William L. Willey, President of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New Hampshire, adds an interesting note to Lieutenant Allen Pennell Wescott's discussion of the Badge of Military Merit in the Fall issue (V, 211-14). He writes that the badge referred to and illustrated is not shown with the collections in Cincinnati Hall in Exeter as stated but is stored in a vault for safe keeping. The coat is a mere fragment, the skirts having entirely disappeared and the body being badly damaged. Fortunately, this unique specimen of the decoration is in reasonably good condition.

The title page and index for Volume V of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* will be distributed with the Spring issue.

Contributors to This Issue

Dr. Harold Sprout is Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University and Lecturer at the United States Military Academy. Co-author of *The Rise of American Naval Power* and of *Toward a New Order of Sea Power*, he is a member of Dr. Earle's Seminar on American Military Policy and Foreign Relations at the Institute for Advanced Study.

Dr. Stefan T. Possony, formerly of the University of Vienna and now a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, is the author of *Tomorrow's War: Its Planning, Management, and Cost*.

Dr. Étienne Dennery, the author of several works on economic factors in international relations, was Professor at the *École libre des Sciences Politiques* from 1935 to 1940 and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in 1940-41. He is now with the Free French Forces in Britain.

Mr. Edward C. Kuhn of North Tonawanda, New York, formerly a non-commissioned officer in the United States Army, specializes in American military antiquities.

Mr. Jerome Thomases needs no further introduction after his article on Fort Bridger in the last issue (V, 177-88).

Dr. Alfred F. Hopkins is Field Curator in the Museum Division of the National Park Service.



THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Battle for the World, by Max Werner. (New York: Modern Age Books. 1941. Pp. 403. \$3.00.)

The weakness of this book lies in the fact that the author attempts too much. His avowed purpose is "to give a summary of experience up to this point that may be useful in the next action phase of the war." He might have reached this aim if he had limited himself strictly to an analysis of the military lessons of the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. He tries, however, to go further: he stresses the dependence of the military actions on the diplomatic and political situation; he outlines the whole social background of the war; briefly, he attempts a comprehensive history of the Second World War. Consequently, much speculation enters into his reasoning. Moreover, since events which have occurred since he completed his book—namely, the Balkan campaign and the Russo-German War—have proved him wrong on many points, one begins to question his interpretations of the past as well as his predictions of the future.

It would be unfair, however, to stress only the negative aspects of this work. Mr. Werner is one of the very few writers who years ago directed attention to the great military strength of the Russian army. In this book also the sections dealing with Russia are extremely valuable. Unquestionably, he overestimates the offensive power of the Russian army and does some tight-rope walking in order to explain the Russo-Finnish campaign, but his description of the technical equipment and training of the Russian army, his analysis of the revolutionary nature of the Russian war doctrine, and his characterization of Stalin's foreign policy as exclusively guided by consideration of military security, are all very interesting and suggestive. The main source of Mr. Werner's statements seems to be Russian military periodicals. Likewise, on the basis of an analysis of French and English military periodicals, he has two excellent chapters on the French and English war doctrines; these chapters show very conclusively the connection between the antiquated war doctrines of these countries and the military catastrophe of last year. Mr. Werner seems to be more at home in analyzing the doctrines and the intellectual backgrounds of an army than in describing actual campaigns. At any rate, his picture of the German campaign in France remains somewhat confused; the Polish and Norwegian campaigns come out more clearly.

Perhaps the chief importance of the book lies not so much in the light which it sheds on single events as in the fact that a history of the present war has a

definitely pedagogical value. It is a saddening spectacle to review again the hesitations, the miscalculations, the missed opportunities of the first fifteen months of the war, but it is, at the same time, the strongest counterpoise imaginable against the dangers which result from indulging in self-complacent optimism, in inaction, and in feelings of false security while an enemy like Hitler is *ante portas*.

FELIX GILBERT

The Institute for Advanced Study

America in Arms, by Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 207. \$2.00.)

General Palmer's *America in Arms* is an epitome of his earlier *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen*. Much of the historical matter of the latter has been omitted, and the object lessons have been sharpened and related to our present Nazi-beclouded world. Both books have been unblushingly mistitled (a frequent and quite inexcusable device today), for both relate almost exclusively to American experience with, and thought upon, the problem of reserve components of the army.

The author hardly needs an introduction to readers of **MILITARY AFFAIRS**. A Regular officer with a long and most distinguished record, years of General Staff experience, scholarly ability, and the courage of his convictions, General Palmer is well qualified to write on this subject. Indeed, no one living today has fought harder and more ably for an army built upon American traditions and principles. Since 1912 he has been the unyielding antagonist of that blind super-professionalism which has from time to time threatened to engulf our national military policy.

America in Arms is, in a sense, the record of this fight. The first part of the volume presents the historical background of General Palmer's reasoning. It is based heavily upon the military philosophy of George Washington as the author reads it, a philosophy which he feels is as applicable today as in 1790. To demonstrate this timelessness, he supposes Washington's advice to have been taken and undertakes to rewrite certain scenes from our military history with this different set of circumstances. The results are thought-provoking but open to much question. After all, this is a dangerous historical device, for the opportunities for disagreement are enormous, especially when, as here, the treatment is not particularly comprehensive.

In the second part of the book the author personally enters upon the scene and its character alters considerably. Here is the story of the 1912 report on *The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States* of which he was the author, of his hard fought battle within the General Staff, of the "Continental Army Plan," and of the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920. All of this is well worth reading and is told nowhere else so clearly and

frankly. A short concluding chapter serves to relate the author's historical work and practical experience to our present military problems, particularly those which will arise "after the emergency."

General Palmer has not undertaken to present a rounded study of the development of American army organization. Yet even within the limited field selected and the limited approach used he has, in this reviewer's opinion, weakened his case by too great an emphasis upon a theoretical concept (no matter how good) and too little upon actual experience (no matter how bad). There is almost no mention of the State volunteer militias, which came closer to Washington's ideal than any other class of troops. And the various reserve components raised during our different emergencies are not balanced upon their actual battle value, save in the questionable comparison of Bladensburg with New Orleans. Why the author feels the State troops at the former engagement were "watered-stock" and those at the latter were "gilt-edged bonds" is hard to understand. The reasons for the success at New Orleans appear patently to be, first, the able leadership of Jackson as against that of an incompetent; second, the defense of a fortified position instead of maneuver in the open; third, the presence of regulars; and, last, the continued employment of rifle fire permitted by the above conditions.

In spite of such minor factors General Palmer's message is clear and eternally correct. In a country such as ours it is tragic folly to rely entirely upon either a purely amateur or a purely professional army. In 1790, through a message to Congress, Washington pointed out a practical mean. In *America in Arms* this message is reiterated in modern terms.

FREDERICK P. TODD

The National Archives

Lazare Carnot: Republican Patriot, by Huntley Dupre. (Oxford, Ohio: The Mississippi Valley Press. 1940. Pp. 343. \$4.50.)

The last ten years of military revolution unavoidably brought with them a rewriting of military history, or, at least, a revaluation of a good deal of the military past. Carnot, the "organizer of victory," was significant and important enough not to be overlooked in this process. An English writer, Compton Piers, has presented him as a "Maker of Armies" (London, 1937), and a young German historian has thoroughly investigated the eighteenth century roots of Carnot's ideas on warfare (*Warschauer, Studien zur Entwicklung der Gedanken Lazare Carnots über Kriegsführung, 1784-1793* [Berlin, 1937]). On the whole, this revaluation has been in favor of Carnot as against the somewhat negative judgment of the late R. W. Phipps in *The Armies of the First French Republic* (London, 1926-39).

The present American contribution to Carnot literature is essentially untouched by such currents of re-appreciation, happy and just or otherwise.

Worse, it is untouched by a knowledge of the very problems involved in any discussion of Carnot's activity: Was Carnot a soldier first and always, or a politician first? Was it as an officer with a sense of essential war needs that he conceived and proposed and carried through a sort of planned war economy for revolutionary and warring France? Was it as an officer that he proceeded from the *levée en masse* to war industrial production *en masse*, and thence to the *en masse* use of men and, to a lesser extent, of arms in battle? Was it above all others *he* who saw the logic of these steps?

Around these questions, and around other ideas that stand out in Carnot's thought—"natural boundaries," balance, honor, discipline—any work concerning him should be centered. These are obviously the high points in describing the life of such a man. Instead, he has been placed on the mud-flats of an ever-so-conscientious calendar of unequally relevant dates and names, and beneath the bulk of this material the man himself is often lost from sight—in places, to the extent of ten or fifteen pages. Innumerable facts about Carnot have been collected, a few from unprinted sources, but they have been subjected to such a silting up that the prolonged process of clarification, which is historiography in progress, is not in the least furthered by their presence.

ALFRED VAGTS

The Institute for Advanced Study

Juggernaut over Holland, by E. N. van Kleffens. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. 195. \$2.00.)

This thin little volume is less a personal document than an historical summary of the events which led up to and accompanied the Nazi rape of the Netherlands. Van Kleffens, who is a career diplomat of more than twenty years' service, took over the Dutch Foreign Office a few months before the outbreak of the present war and has continued to occupy that position in the refugee government in London. This circumstance has no doubt contributed in some degree to the style and coloring of the work.

Those who may take it up in the hope of discovering anything in the nature of an "inside story" or "revelations" will be disappointed. They will discover instead that its limited space is largely occupied with expressions of sentiment and with the passing of strictures which, while obviously justified, become somewhat tiresome through repetition. At certain points, as in connection with the Venloo incident, we are given a few scraps of information beyond what was already known, but the veil is not lifted very often.

The book furnishes us with a convenient *résumé* of Dutch policy previous to the war and in the days of precarious neutrality which followed its outbreak. If any lingering doubt may have remained in the minds of observers regarding the genuineness of this neutrality, Van Kleffens will certainly dispel it. Now that we can judge with the wisdom that comes after the event, the

enumeration of all the precautions adopted to avert the slightest appearance of partiality does in fact make painful reading. In this regard the leaders of the Netherlands government can survey their work with a clear conscience. In view of the fruits of their activity (or inactivity), we can only hope that the verdict of history will be gentle.

HAROLD C. DEUTSCH

University of Minnesota

Soldiers of the American Army, drawings by Fritz Kredel, with text by Frederick P. Todd. (New York: H. Bittner & Company. 1941. 25 hand-colored plates. Pp. 111. \$36.00.)

This book is the first important effort to relieve the deficiency of historical material, pictorial and literary, on American military dress and equipment. It will prove stimulating to those who read of campaigns and battles with something more than the abstract mental attitude that reduces troops to impersonal little blocks. Any work conducive to humanizing military history, bringing it down to earth, by enabling the reader to picture correctly the actors in a given scene, should be of great value and general interest. Certainly it needs no apology, as, unfortunately, the foreword seems to imply.

Many of the errors in the early plates of the Quartermaster General's publication of 1888 are corrected at last. Though adequate coverage of 165 years of both Regular Army and Militia may be too much to expect of twenty-five plates, the generally excellent selection of subject matter has made this difficulty unnoticeable. The drawings are well done, with a certain casual realism usually absent from the conventional military print, and for the most part actual battle dress has been stressed rather than parade uniform. The unfamiliar appearance and combinations of some of this battle dress will surprise many.

It is hardly to be expected, however, that all the conclusions reached and exhibited will have universal acceptance among students of American military dress. Why, for instance, is Washington shown with his breeches pulled up above his knees? Why has the old misconception of the "eagle" of the cockades, as an actual cut-out eagle rather than an eagle-impressed metal disc, been given again the semi-official sanction of print? The musket slings are also unauthentic, or not American types. It is also regrettable that the 1851 Dragoon has been shown with his carbine cartridge box slipped on the back of his carbine sling, an impossible position for a box which the Ordnance manuals of 1841 and 1850 describe as of practically the same size as the Infantry cartridge box. The proper position for it was the back of the waist belt. This waist belt itself is incorrectly shown with the oblong eagle-and-wreath plate belonging to the new black buff leather equipment which was prescribed in 1851 but could not have been in the hands of troops the same

year. The plate described in the 1850 Ordnance manual is the oval brass, U. S.-stamped design which is familiar as the Infantry waist belt plate of the Civil War. More stress might have been laid on the wadded-chested, small-waisted, tight-sleeved smartness of the 1830's and 1840's than is apparent in that plate. In any event, the number of plates being so limited, it would have been more fitting to have both the uniforms selected of American background or influence.

These minor details do not, of course, detract from the importance of the book, and it is hoped that it will be the means of encouraging other works with a view to eventual complete coverage of American uniform history. The comments accompanying each plate are very much to the point and, though condensed, supply all necessary historical background and detail not given in the drawings. The hand coloring of the plates is excellent, and the general make-up of the book leaves little to be desired.

H. CHARLES McBARRON, JR.
Chicago, Illinois

Diary & Letters of Josiah Gregg: Southwestern Enterprises, 1840-1847.
edited by Maurice Garland Fulton, with an introduction by Paul Horgan.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1941. Pp. 414. \$3.50.)

Mr. Fulton's discovery of the diary and letters of the author of *The Commerce of the Prairies*, and their publication by the University of Oklahoma Press (which promises a second volume), are a notable event in the history of the western frontier. Previously we have known almost nothing of Gregg except what he revealed in his own volumes, published in 1844, which have been a primary source of information about the early Santa Fé trade. So far as the Santa Fé Trail was concerned, Gregg's contribution was practically exhausted by this book, and the present publication adds only a brief diary of his last trip over the trail in 1840. Other sections deal with a journey to Texas in 1841-42 (during which he was an unimpressed witness at the inauguration of Sam Houston), with his difficulties in publishing *The Commerce of the Prairies*, and with his attendance at lectures in a medical school in Louisville in order to increase his knowledge of an art he had long practised.

But the great value of these diaries and letters lies in the description of his experiences as a sort of volunteer staff officer under various commanders in the Mexican War. First of these was Colonel Archibald Yell, of Arkansas fame, who desired Gregg's services as guide because of his thorough knowledge of the country. His changing opinions of Colonel W. S. Harney, of Generals W. J. Wool, W. J. Worth, W. O. Butler, James Shields and Zachary Taylor—with all of whom he was from time to time associated, though with none to his complete satisfaction—bring some of these forgotten heroes to life. His

comments on the volunteers are particularly pungent. This volume takes the story to the eve of the Battle of Buena Vista.

The editing and presentation leave little to be desired, although some identifications are lacking and the indexing is not thorough, as was discovered in checking several names of Illinois interest.

DON RUSSELL
Chicago, Illinois

Messages of the Governors of the Territory of Washington to the Legislative Assembly, 1854-1889, edited by Charles M. Gates. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1940. Pp. 297. \$3.00.)

This twelfth volume of the University of Washington *Publications in the Social Sciences* will be of interest and value to students of western military history, for nothing could more adequately illustrate the importance of military affairs to a frontier community than these reports to the territorial legislatures. The large amount of space devoted to Indian hostilities, the protection of emigrants, the construction of military roads, and the organization of the territorial militia indicates clearly the significance contemporaneously attached to these matters. For instance, consider this paragraph from the annual message of 1860:

Among the [Federal] appropriations of greatest importance to the Territory, are those for the construction of military roads. In addition to the facilities afforded for travel and communication, these roads present great inducements for settlement, and soon every acre throughout their entire length is brought into cultivation. Their importance in a military point of view, is known and appreciated by the War Department.

The editor quite rightly remarks that the messages "afford the reader a single panoramic view of the territorial period"; in so doing, they bring into sharp focus the part played by the military in the building of a State.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS
The National Archives

Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies, with a Survey of Military Aeronautics Prior to 1861, by F. Stansbury Haydon. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941. Pp. 420. \$4.00.)

Some years ago this reviewer, basing his research on the diaries of Professor T. S. C. Lowe, wrote an article on aeronautics in the Civil War which evoked considerable interest among the readers of the periodical in which it appeared. It is now obvious that this article represented but a fleeting glimpse into the aeronautical activities of those belligerent times. For a comprehensive grasp of the early air observations and flights made for the Union army, of the internal bitterness and conflicts between rival balloonists, of the chauvinistic opposition of army brass-hats, of the snorting condemnation of this new mili-

tary arm by politicians and high-ranking officers, and of the overwhelming struggles against wind, darkness, and untrained personnel, little indication can be found outside the covers of the present volume.

If the nation and the armed services have neglected Lowe and La Mountain in their roster of heroes, it is because Dr. Haydon did not publish his findings long ago. Of the thousands of books relating to the War Between the States, not one has hitherto attempted to recount properly the history of America's initial adaptation of aeronautics to warfare. That vacant niche has now been filled by a detailed, studious, complete account of the aerial excursions of both Federals and Confederates. The reader will find no sensationalism, little raw adventure, but these pages lay bare the entire policy and operation of the Aeronautics Corps, a brave pioneering institution.

This volume is a "must" for anyone interested in aeronautical or Civil War history.

HORACE S. MAZET
Long Beach, California

Lone Star Preacher: Being a Chronicle of the Acts of Praxiteles Swan, M. E. Church South, S sometime Chaplain, Fifth Texas Regiment, Confederate States Provisional Army, by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Thomason. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1941. Pp. 296. \$2.75.)

Colonel Thomason again carries his talent to fiction. The result is a literary form similar to the historical novel, which is purely of the American tradition and is a notable contribution to American letters. Praxiteles Swan, the preacher from Texas turned fighting man in the Confederate States Army, is a person one is pleased to meet. He is of the essence of the fighting portion of the Southern Confederacy: he epitomizes a mighty band of men who immortalized themselves, even in the hearts of those they fought for four years. Here is a master stroke of literary characterization. Praxiteles is the book. And he is delightful in all the elements of delight that the best Confederate soldier presented: the shrewdness, the comic homeliness, the largesse of spirit, and sheer courage unconscious of its own heroism. He is projected before a background that could be created only by a thorough student who had comprehended all of that War, as has Colonel Thomason. The reader who loves a good tale with a chuckle in it, and a wealth of high spirit, will be grateful to the Colonel. Now may this soldier-author *par excellence* go on with his venture into the field of the historical novel. His fiction is truth. Perhaps he is the one who will bring forth the great military historical novel that American literature is wanting.

BRANCH SPALDING
Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania
National Military Park

OTHER RECENT BOOKS**INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE**

Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disarmament Conference and Public Opinion, by C. Leonard Hoag, with an introduction by Admiral H. E. Yarnell. (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs. 1941. Pp. 205. Cloth \$3.00; paper \$2.50.)

War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy, by T. A. Taracouzio. (New York: Macmillan. 1940. Pp. 354. \$4.00.) A treatment of Soviet concepts of war and peace by an authority on Soviet diplomacy.

International Labor, Diplomacy, and Peace, 1914-1919, by Austin Van der Slice. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1941. Pp. 408. \$4.00.) The international labor movement during the first World War.

Conquest and Modern International Law, by Matthew M. McMahon. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press. 1940. Pp. 233. \$2.00.) A treatment of the legal limitations of the acquisition of territory by conquest.

The Political Economy of War, by A. C. Pigou. (New York: Macmillan. 1941. Pp. 169. \$1.50.) The revised edition of a well-known work first published in 1921.

Modern Publicity in War (Modern Publicity 1941), edited by F. A. Mercer and Grace Lovat Fraser, with an introduction by Sir Cecil M. Weir. (New York: The Studio Publications. 1941. Pp. 128. \$4.50.) A profusely illustrated study of British governmental and commercial propaganda under war conditions.

TOTAL WARFARE

Intelligence: An Indictment of a Colossal Failure, by S. Theodore Felstead. (London: Hutchinson. 1941. Pp. 341. 10s. 6d.) A revelation of the repeated failures of Allied military intelligence in the present war.

Ways and Means of War, by Geoffrey Crowther. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1940. Pp. 184. \$1.25.) The economic problems of war analyzed by the editor of the London *Economist*.

Economic Warfare, 1939-1940, by Paul Einzig. (New York: Macmillan. 1941. Pp. 160. \$1.75.)

The German Fifth Column in Poland. (London: Hutchinson. 1941. Pp. 157. 2s. 6d.) An important collection of documents published for the Polish Ministry of Information.

Strategy of the Americas, by Fleming MacLeish and Cushman Reynolds. (New York: Duell. 1941. Pp. 247. \$2.50.) A discussion of the problems of hemisphere defense.

South America and Hemisphere Defense, by J. Fred Rippy. (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press. 1941. Pp. 112. \$1.50.)

LAND WARFARE

Chemical Warfare, by Curt Wachtel. (Brooklyn: Chemical Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 312. \$4.00.)

Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus, by Eugen von Frauenholz. (Munich: C. H. Beck. 1940. Pp. 482. Rm. 20.) Volume IV of the *Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens*.

The Evolution of the Tank: A Record of Royal Naval Air Service Caterpillar Experiments, by Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter. (London: Hutchinson. 1941. Pp. 209. 15s.) A revised edition.

The Minds and Nerves of Soldiers, by Edward L. Hanes. (Pasadena: Login Press. 1941. \$3.00.) Problems of neuropsychiatry in the first World War.

Home Guard Warfare, by John Langdon-Davies. (London: Routledge. 1941. Pp. 214. 2s. 6d.)

SEA WARFARE

The Roman Imperial Navy, 31 B.C.—A.D. 324, by Chester G. Starr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1941. Pp. 228. \$2.50.) Volume XXVI of the *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*.

Sea Power, by Captain Russell Grenfell. (New York: Doubleday, 1941. Pp. 244. \$2.00.) An interpretation of the doctrine of sea power by a foremost British authority.
Submarines, Admirals and Navies, by Colin Mayers. (Los Angeles: Associated Publications, 1940. Pp. 280. \$3.00.) The rôle of the submarine in modern naval warfare.
Der U-Bootskrieg, 1914-1918, by Vice Admiral A. D. Michelsen. (Leipzig: Hase & Koehler, 1940. Pp. 207. Rm. 2.85.) An account of German submarine warfare in the First World War by a distinguished German admiral.

AIR WARFARE

Douhet and Aerial Warfare, by Louis A. Sigaard. (New York: Putnam, 1941. Pp. 134. \$1.75.)
War in the Air, September 1939-May 1941, by David Garnett. (New York: Doubleday, 1941. Pp. 292. \$3.50.) A critical survey and analysis.
How the Air Force Defends Us, by Charles Cyril Turner. (New York: Norton, 1941. Pp. 136. \$1.50.) The system of air defense in Great Britain.
Bombs and Bombing, by Willy Ley. (New York: Modern Age Books, 1941. Pp. 124. \$1.25.)

ESTABLISHMENTS

Finland

Field-Marshal Mannerheim, by Tancred Borenius. (London: Hutchinson, 1940. Pp. 303. 18s.)

Germany

The Potsdam Fuehrer: Frederick William I, Father of Prussian Militarism, by Robert Ergang. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 290. \$3.00.)
Der Kriegsminister, 1814-1914: Ein Beitrag zur militärischen Verfassungsgeschichte, by Otto H. Meisner. (Berlin: Hermann Reinshagen, 1940. Pp. 119. Rm. 2.75.)

Great Britain

British Strategy: Military and Economic, by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. (New York: Macmillan, 1941. Pp. 157. \$1.25.) An historical and analytical review.
The Invasion of Britain: An Account of Plans, Attempts and Counter-Measures, from 1586 to 1918, by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. (London: Methuen, 1941. Pp. 86. 2s. 6d.)

The R.I.F.'s First Twelve Months of the War, by Air Commodore L. E. O. Charlton. (London: Hutchinson, 1941. Pp. 398. 12s. 6d.)

The Women of England, by Margaret Biddle. (Boston: Houghton, 1941. Pp. 108. \$1.75.) A description of women's auxiliary war services in Britain.

Italy

La Marina italiana nella grande guerra. Volume VIII: Verso la vittoria contro il sommersibile. (Florence: Vallecchi, 1940. Pp. 809. L. 30.)

Switzerland

Honneur et fidélité: Histoire des Suisses au service étranger, by Paul de Vallière. (Lausanne: Editions d'Art Suisse Ancien, 1940. Pp. 775. Fr. 58.)

United States

The Administration of the American Commissariat during the Revolutionary War, by Victor LeRoy Johnson. (Allentown: Published by the author, Muhlenberg College, 1941.)

Against This Torrent, by Edward Mead Earle. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. 73. \$1.00.) A study of security as the controlling factor in American foreign and military policies.

The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms, by Pendleton Herring. (New York: Farrar, 1941. Pp. 306. \$2.50.) The place of military institutions in American political life.

The Economics of American Defense, by Seymour E. Harris. (New York: Norton. 1941. Pp. 350. \$3.50.)

Building an Army: Mobilization of Manpower in the Army of the United States, by Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Johnston. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. 159.) A study of mobilization planning and procedures.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine, by George Vernadsky. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1941. Pp. 150. \$2.50.) A scholarly biography of the seventeenth-century Cossack leader.

James Burd: Frontier Defender, 1726-1793, by Lily Lee Nixon. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1941. Pp. 198. \$2.00.) A volume in the "Pennsylvania Lives" series.

Anthony Wayne: Trouble Shooter of the American Revolution, by Harry Emerson Wildes. (New York: Harcourt. 1941. Pp. 514. \$3.75.)

Secret History of the American Revolution, by Carl Van Doren. (New York: Viking. 1941. Pp. 534. \$3.75.) New light on the Benedict Arnold conspiracy, from the secret papers of Sir Henry Clinton.

Moltke: Ein Vorbild, by Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt. (Leipzig: Hase & Koehler. 1940. Pp. 184. Rm. 3.)

Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars, by H. A. De Weerd. (New York: Norton. 1941. Pp. 378. \$3.50.)

World War I

Krieg in Irans Wüsten: Erlebnisse der deutschen Expedition nach Persien und Afghanistan, by Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer. (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. 1940. Pp. 89. Rm. 1.)

Die Kaukasusfront im Weltkrieg bis zum Frieden von Brest, by Felix Guse. (Leipzig: Koehler. 1940. Pp. 128. Rm. 4.) The author was Chief of Staff of the Turkish Third Army.

World War II

The War for World Power, by "Strategicus." (London: Faber. 1940. Pp. 304. 10s.6d.) A review of the first nine months of the war, by the military critic of the *Spectator*.

The Current War, by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. (London: Hutchinson. 1941. Pp. 401. 12s.6d.)

Norway Invaded, by James Tevnan and Terence Horsley. (London: Withy Grove Press. 1940. Pp. 143. 6d.) A popular account of the Norwegian campaign.

The Epic of Dunkirk, by E. Keble Chatterton. (London: Hurst. 1940. Pp. 250. 10s.6d.)

The Battle of Britain. (New York: Doubleday. 1941. Pp. 65. 25¢.)

Bomber Command. (New York: Doubleday. 1941. Pp. 128. \$1.00.) These two publications embody the official Air Ministry accounts of the repulse of the Luftwaffe over Great Britain in 1940, and the offensive operations of the Bomber Command through July 1941.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

History of the Uniforms of the British Army, from the Beginnings to 1760, by Cecil C. P. Lawson, with illustrations by the author. (Toronto: Saunders. 1941. 2 vols. \$4.00 each.)

The Ranks and Uniforms of the German Army, Navy & Air Force. (London: Seeley, Service & Co., Ltd. 1941.) This book, based on the German publication *Uniformen der Deutschen Wehrmacht* (1939), contains over 450 illustrations, many of them in color.

Marching Along: Recollections of Men, Women and Music, by John Philip Sousa. (Boston: Hale, Cushman & Flint. 1941. Pp. 384. \$1.49.) Memoirs of the famous band leader, in a popular reprint.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

"U. S. Military Writing Today," by Captain Hoffman Nickerson, in *Infantry Journal*, November 1941 (pp. 34-39). Comments chiefly upon the works of civilian writers.

"Our War Literature," by Akira Asano, in *Contemporary Japan*, June 1941 (X, 800-806). An account of the types of Japanese war literature.

"Subsidios Bibliograficos para uma Sociologia da Guerre," by Emilio Willems, in *Sociologia*, August 1941 (III, 227-33). Bibliography of works dealing with general technological, economic, psychological and biological aspects of warfare.

"The Archives of Military Posts," by G. Hubert Smith, in *Minnesota History*, September 1941 (XXII, 297-301). A discussion of the archival material relating to Fort Ridgely, limited almost entirely to the post records of which the Minnesota Historical Society has microfilm copies.

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

"Motivation and Causation in War," by Russell H. Barrett, in *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, June 1941 (XXII, 39-48). Analysis of war as the final stage in the process of competition and conflict between national states.

"A Time for War," by William Yandell Elliott, in *The Virginia Quarterly*, Autumn 1941 (XVII, 481-90). Urges the entrance of the United States into the war on certain moral considerations.

"German Geopolitics: A Workshop for Army Rule," by H. W. Weigert, in *Harpers Magazine*, November 1941 (CLXXXIII, 586-97). A digest of the views of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and other important German publications on geopolitics.

"Uma Analise Anthropologica de Guerre," by Bronislaw Malinowski, in *Sociologia*, August 1941 (III, 203-17). A broad treatment of the relationships between anthropology and war.

"Social and Political Changes in Wartime Britain," by James Frederick Green, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 15, 1941 (XVII, 138-48).

"The British Cabinet, the House of Commons and the War," by Herbert Finer, in *The Political Science Quarterly*, September 1941 (LVI, 321-60). An account of the effect of the war on the organization and attitude of the Cabinet and the House of Commons.

"War and the Common Law," by Sir W. A. Greene, in *American Bar Association Journal*, May 1941 (XXVII, 336-41). The effect of war on a legal institution.

"Neutrality and the European War, 1939-1940," by J. L. Kunz, in *Michigan Law Review*, March 1941 (XXXIX, 719-54). The legal aspects.

"The Army of a Democracy," by Charlotte Muret and Denis de Rougemont, in *Harpers Magazine*, September 1941 (CLXXXIII, 537-46). An important study of Swiss military psychology and its application to this country.

"The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," by Warren H. Goodman, in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1941 (XXVIII, 171-86). Concludes that historians have not yet satisfactorily explained the causes of the war.

"A Confederate Trade Center under Federal Occupation: Memphis, 1862 to 1865," by Joseph H. Parks, in *The Journal of Southern History*, August 1941 (VII, 289-314). Trading as affected by the military situation.

TOTAL WARFARE

"Priorities: The Synchronizing Force," by Bernard M. Baruch, in *Harvard Business Review*, Spring 1941 (XIX, 261-70). The importance of priorities as a focal point for industrial mobilization.

"The Paradox of Oil and War," in *Fortune*, September 1941 (XXIV, 69-72 ff.).

"Magic Geography," by Hans Speier, in *Social Research*, September 1941 (VIII, 310-30). An analysis of the use of maps in modern propaganda, especially the German techniques.

LAND WARFARE

"The Brunt of the Battle," by Colonel Martin C. Shallenberger, in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, October 1941 (pp. 17-18). Brief account of new uses of weapons and techniques whose value had not been previously recognized.
 "Selecting the Nazi Officer," by H. L. Ansacher and K. R. Nichols, in *Infantry Journal*, November 1941 (pp. 44-48).

Combat

"Assault of Fortified Positions," by Major A. G. Trudeau, in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, October 1941 (pp. 12-16).
 "British Antiaircraft Defense," by Drylaw, in *Coast Artillery Journal*, September-October 1941 (LXXXIV, 418-25).
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

U. S. ARMY COLORS AND STANDARDS OF 1808

The alarms of 1807 and 1808 led to an increase in the Regular Establishment of the army. In the latter year, by an act of April 12, Congress authorized the creation of five regiments of infantry and one each of light dragoons, light artillery, and riflemen. It was the function of the Secretary of War to see that these new organizations were equipped with all the necessary paraphernalia, including their flags and all that went with them. In that period it was customary for each regiment to carry a "standard," or national flag, and a "color," or regimental flag. The standard was not—as it is today—the Stars and Stripes; each branch of the services had a more or less distinctive standard bearing what purported to be the Great Seal or coat of arms of the United States.


It is doubtful if the Secretary of War knew much about flags, but even before the new force was authorized he began to secure its complement of colors. Remembering that a few years before there had been a similar alarm and a similar increase in the force, he wrote to the Purveyor of Public Supplies on March 16, 1808, "I will thank you to inform me whether there were Standards or Regimental Colors furnished by the public to the 12 Regiments raised in 1798 & 1799, and if there were, what has become of them."¹ A few days later, after getting in touch with his subordinates and predecessors, the Purveyor replied that he had been unable to find any record of a previous issue of emergency flags.² The Secretary was thus forced to take the matter into his own hands, and on May 9 he sent the following order to the Purveyor:

. . . Seven Regimental Standards and a equal number of Regimental Colors should also be procured.


The Standards should have a deep blue field with full spread Eagle in the Centre surrounded by 17 stars, handsomely wrought in needle work with yellow silk for the Artillery and white silk for the infantry on both sides. Under the Eagle should be the number of the Infantry Regiment, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7; those for the Artillery designated 1st Regt Lt. Artillery—the one for the Rifle Regiment 1st Rifle Regt.—U. S. should be on the breast of the Eagle, in white silk needle work.

¹ Secretary of War to Tench Coxe (Secretary of War, *Miscellaneous Letters Sent, III, 200* [in The National Archives]). For this document and the others cited below I am indebted to Mr. Detmar H. Finke.

² Tench Coxe to the Secretary of War, March 21, 1808 (Secretary of War, Document File for 1808 [in The National Archives]).



A



B

FLAGS OF THE 1ST U. S. LIGHT ARTILLERY
A, the standard, and B, the color, at the United States Military Academy.

The size of the Standards should be two yards on the Staff & $2\frac{1}{2}$ yards in length; the silk should be strong & pliant. The Eagle ought to be so large, that the extent from tip to tip of his Wings will be two and a half feet; his head should be white. If the whole of the Eagle could be handsomely wrought in the real Colors of the Eagle it would be preferred; but unless it can be well executed, it had better not be attempted.

The Standard for the light Dragoons should be of like kind, but much smaller.

The Regimental Colors, except for the Rifle Regiment, may be plain buff colored silk, with the letters U. S. & the designation of the Regiment. The Rifle Regiment colors should be green.

As the Horse will be dispersed, it may be well to have a small Company flag, or Colors, for each Company.

The size of the regimental Colors should be 5 feet on the Staff, and 6 feet in length.

The length of the Staff for the Regimental Standards should be 10 feet, including the Brass tip, and $1\frac{1}{4}$ inch in diameter from the lower end to the middle, and then tapered so as to terminate at $\frac{3}{4}$ of an inch at the top, made of strong white Ash, well painted of an Iron Color.

The staff of the Regimental Colors to be 9 feet in length, and of the size of the others, & painted in the same manner.

The ferrule for the lower end, & the tip for the upper end, should be of Brass, made neat & strong.³

Thus were issued what are probably the earliest regulations concerning United States military flags. It will be noted that the 1st and 2d Infantry Regiments were not specified. They were part of the "Old Establishment," having existed since 1784 and 1791, respectively. They already possessed their colors and standards, although the records show that new ones were later issued to them also.

The contract for the embroidery of these flags—or most of them at least—was given to the sisters Anna and Eliza Leslie of Philadelphia. Embroidery took a long while, however, and flags were needed by the new regiments for recruiting. To fill this need painted flags were ordered from William Berrett, also of Philadelphia. By 1809 both types were being issued as entries in the blotter of the United States Arsenal show:⁴

Receipt 32

November 8th [1809]

Rec'd of Tench Coxe Esqr. by E & A. Leslie

1 standard flag L[ight] A|rtilly] embroidered 75.00

Voucher 33

December 8th [1809]

Issued for transportation to Col. John P. Boyd, Ft. Independence

1 Blue Standard	{	4th Regt. Inf. Painted
1 Buff Regt. Colors		

2 Pr. Cords & Tassels
2 Flag Staves


Unfortunately, the records of the War Department contain no drawings of these colors and standards. To visualize their appearance it is necessary to

³ Secretary of War to Tench Coxe (Secretary of War, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, III, 249-50 [in The National Archives]).

⁴ Blotter for 1809-12 (among miscellaneous books of the Purveyor General of Public Supplies [in The National Archives]).



C



D

FLAGS OF THE 4TH U. S. INFANTRY
C, the standard, and D, the color, in the Chelsea Hospital, London.

examine the flags preserved today which are known to have been in service during the War of 1812. Examples of these are illustrated.

The standard and color of the then newly organized Regiment of Light Artillery (figs. A and B) now hang at West Point. Both are marked "First Regiment" as ordered, suggesting that further regiments were anticipated. The regimental color (fig. B) appears white today but could once have been buff. Both are embroidered. The Arsenal blotter entry, quoted above, indicates that the standard embroidered by the Leslie sisters was blue, and other supply records of the period show that a "yellow regimental color" had been made earlier in the year for the Light Artillery.

The standard and color of the 4th Infantry (figs. C and D) are considerably different than those of the Light Artillery, but, other than being painted, they also conform to the regulations of 1808. These particular flags hung for many decades (and perhaps still do) in Chelsea Hospital in London. They were captured by the British when General William Hull surrendered the 4th Infantry with the rest of his ill-fated army at Detroit on August 15, 1812. In this connection it is interesting to note, as seen above, that painted colors were issued to the regiment in 1809. Thus, in spite of the fact that certain ladies of Boston are supposed to have presented similar flags about this time, it appears probable that the colors carried by the 4th Infantry at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 and surrendered the following year had a much more prosaic origin.

EDWARD C. KUHN


MECHANIZED MOBILITY PROPOSED IN 1900

At the turn of the century the automobile was in an experimental stage. Its potentialities in peace and in war were yet to be appreciated. That John Brisben Walker (1847-1931) was one of those who foresaw the utilization of the auto as the means of endowing armies with a higher degree of mobility is made evident in the document printed below.¹ Walker, a journalist and publisher of wide experience, began to manufacture the steam "Mobile" in 1898 at the factory he built at Philipse-Manor-on-the-Hudson. He served as the first president of the Automobile Manufacturers' Association.²

His letter also reflects something of the War Department's attitude in this vital matter. After receiving it, the Secretary of War, in November 1900, appointed an informal board of five officers to observe the machine in operation with a view to determining its adaptability for military use. On October 9, 1901, the five officers, with Walker and his two sons, left Jersey City in a

¹ Adjutant General's Office, Document File, No. 350017 (in The National Archives).

² Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, 1928-36), XIX, 347-48.



A "MOBILE" RAPID TRANSIT WAGONETTE, 1901
Photograph from the National Museum.

"Mobile" *en route* to Washington. Upon reaching Wilmington the machine was disabled, the engine boilers having burned out. The board adjourned but withheld its report until Walker should have had another opportunity to submit his car to a further test. The second test began on October 24 when the board of officers and representatives of the "Mobile" Company left the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in two automobiles. One of them caught fire before reaching Philadelphia and had to be abandoned. The party continued in the second, which, after some difficulties, reached Washington on October 27.

The reports of the Army board were generally unfavorable to the "Mobile." The officers pointed out several technical defects and were rather skeptical of its utility for field operations. It was felt that Walker's "Mobile" was not yet developed to the standard demanded by military requirements, and it was not adopted by the War Department.

JEROME THOMASES

Irvington, Philipse-Manor-on-the-Hudson, N. Y.
October 25th, 1900.

Hon. Elihu Root,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Under date of June 5th, I had the honor to receive from you the following communication:

"Subject: Use of automobiles for Army transportation.
"File No. 2145.

"Sir:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 19th last, submitting a proposition to construct an automobile carriage, with a view to its adoption for Army transportation, in place of horses.

"Relying thereto I beg to say that it appears from a report of the Quartermaster General of the Army on the subject, that the use of automobiles for Army transportation in this country is not favorably considered at this time, and it is not thought that their adaptability to Army uses has been demonstrated in any way that would justify the Department in entering into an agreement to accept and pay fifteen hundred dollars for such a vehicle as your Company proposes to build, even if it fulfilled all the requisites mentioned in your communication.

"The question of covering long distances in quick time is practically solved by the railroad systems of this country, which render easily accessible nearly all the points it may be found necessary to visit in the course of military movements; and the necessity for sudden, hurried and frequent movements, under all kinds of weather conditions and over every description of country, with varying amount and weight of cargo, enjoins the Army from using any method of transportation which is in any degree experimental, or untried and unproven.

"Very respectfully,
(Signed) Elihu Root,
Secretary of War.

"Hon. John Brisben Walker."

I feel quite confident that this letter was prepared by some clerk connected with the Department and that in the hurry of the immense detail which is thrown upon the

shoulders of the Secretary of War its full bearing escaped recognition at your hands when attaching your signature.

The great interest taken by all European armies in the subject of automobiles during recent manoeuvres and the favorable reports which have been made by some of the most noted military men of the French and German armies, warrants me in again bringing the matter to your attention.

We are now building and will have ready for trial at the convenience of the War Department a "Mobile" for which we make the following claims:

- A "Mobile" for military operations, for which we promise that it will carry,
First, 1000 rounds of ammunition.
- Second, Four military rifles.
- Third, Four riflemen.
- Fourth, Four pairs of blankets.
- Fifth, Four soldiers' kits. (light)
- Sixth, Two rubber shelters arranged to let down from the sides of the carriage
so as to cover two men on either side.
- Seventh, Cooking utensils. (aluminum)
- Eighth, Two very light intrenching shovels.
- Ninth, Enough condensed food & salami sausage to last the four riflemen for
three (3) days.
- Tenth, Enough fuel to take the carriage and full outfit here described two hundred
miles.
- Eleventh, The machine is guaranteed to carry the entire party and their equipment
one hundred miles within twelve hours over the average country roads or over the average unbroken prairies of Nebraska and Colorado.
It can be easily lifted across ravines and dragged up heights.

If the War Department will appoint a Board of five officers to thoroughly test this machine at Washington City, we will agree to deliver it there under the charge of a competent expert. The Government will be put to no expense of any kind except for the officers detailed to study the experiment.

Anyone familiar with the art of war will recognize that if the claims made for this machine can be substantiated it will practically mean a revolution in military art. This military "unit of fours" combines within itself nearly all the functions of military organization. Even light artillery may be included by substituting two men and two rapid fire guns and 200 rounds of ammunition for the four riflemen and 1000 rounds of ammunition of the infantry.

The Commissary Department, Quartermaster's Department, including all necessary baggage and tents, the Ordnance supplies and a rapidity of travel which would render the Cavalry Bureau superfluous—all are represented in this single carriage with its four completely equipped riflemen who can cover in a day more than five times the distance ordinarily marched, and who are thus in a position to strike a superior force upon its flanks, destroy its communications and be at all times in a position to fight or disappear, as occasion might warrant. The military carriages which have been built in European countries have had to do with conveying staff officers or light guns. This carriage contemplates the conveyance of an entire army with a rapidity which places an opposing army organized under the conditions now prevailing at the utmost disadvantage.

Inasmuch as the subject is one of the greatest military importance, as the building of this carriage will cost the Government nothing, I feel justified in asking your serious consideration of the proposition here made.

Respectfully yours,

John Brisben Walker



Photograph from the Morristown National Historical Park.

VOLUNTEER CORPS HAT OF 1814

An interesting example of the round hat of civilian style worn by many American units of the early nineteenth century is shown in the accompanying illustration. This hat was a gift to the museum of the Morristown National Historical Park from the Washington Association of New Jersey. Made of beaver, it is $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches in height and has a 2 inch brim. Attached by a leather strap, buckled at the back, is a shaped tin plate which permits a rapid and inexpensive transformation from civilian to military headdress. The plate is painted blue with a red border; the name and insignia on the front are painted in gold.

Pasted inside the crown is the silk label of Samuel Eaton, a hat manufacturer of New York City. The label was printed from an engraved plate signed by Rollinson, an Englishman who came to America in 1789 and, aside from commercial orders, made plates of George Washington in 1791 and of Alexander Hamilton in 1804. Eaton's label consists of an American eagle on a solid foundation, a female figure of Justice sitting nearby and holding a balance, and a full-rigged ship riding on a body of water in the background.

The Morris Rangers was one of three uniformed volunteer corps in Morris County, New Jersey, at the outbreak of the second war with Great Britain. Together with the Riflemen of Bottle Hill and the Fusileers of Chatham, the Rangers formed part of the 3d Regiment of New Jersey Detailed Militia, which saw service at Paulus Hook in 1814.

ALFRED F. HOPKINS

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